

On Being and Cognition

Ordinatio 1.3

JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

*Edited and Translated by
John van den Bercken*



ON BEING AND COGNITION



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ABBREVIATIONS

References are “logical” only—that is, in terms of the internal structure of the relevant work (number of book, chapter, distinction, part, question, article: whatever applies), not “physical” (referring to editions or pages), except in the case of Aristotle’s works, where the Bekker pagination has become standard.

*References to Scotus’s writings:*¹ Cross-references to the *Lectura* and the *Ordinatio* are based on the Vatican edition; they consist of the number of the relevant book and distinction and the paragraph number in the edition. References to the *Questions on the De anima* and to the *Questions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics* are based on the Bonaventure edition. Before these critical editions were available one often used “Wadding numbers”—that is, the section numbers of the Wadding/Vivès edition. They are conveniently retained in the various critical editions but not in this translation. When appropriate we signaled in the text of Ord.1.3 parallels to the QDA and the QMet., which were not given in the Vatican edition.

Lectura (Vatican edition): Lect. 1.3 = book 1 distinction 3

Ordinatio (Vatican edition): Ord. 1.13 n. 45 = book 1, distinction 13, paragraph 45

Questions on the “De anima” (Bonaventure edition): QDA 19 n.5 = question 19, paragraph 5

Questions on Aristotle’s “Metaphysics” (Bonaventure edition; translation by Etzkorn and Wolter): QMet. 9.1 = book 9, question 1

Quodlibetal Questions (edition Alluntis; translation by Alluntis and Wolter): Quod. 13 = question 13

Reportatio 1A (Semi-critical edition and translation by Wolter and Bychkov): Rep. 1A. 3 n. 8 = book 1, distinction 3 n. 8.

*References to authors cited by Scotus:*² The more frequently cited authors are indicated by an abbreviation (e.g., GR = Giles of Rome); others are mentioned in full (e.g., “Boethius” or “Gregory the Great”).

Anselm De Anima (On the Soul): “431b21–23” = p. 431 right column,

lines 21–23 in the Bekker edition

~~ARistotle~~, *Nicomachean Ethics*

~~ARistotle~~, *On Interpretation*

~~ARistotle~~, *Metaphysics*

~~ARistotle~~, *Physics*

~~ARistotle~~, *Posterior Analytics*

~~ARistotle~~, *Prior Analytics*

~~ARistotle~~, *Topics*

Augustine, *City of God*: 8.16 = book 8, chapter 16

Augustine, *On Genesis*: 8.12(26) = book 8, chapter 12, number 26

Augustine, *On the Trinity*: 8.3(4) = book 8, chapter 3, number 4

Averroes (Long) *Commentary on Aristotle's "De anima"*: 3.5 = book 3, comment 5

Averroes, *Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics"*: 2.26 = book 2, comment 26

Averroes, *Commentary on Aristotle's "Metaphysics"*: 2.1 = book 2, comment 1

Avicenna, *Metaphysics*: 1.6 = book 1, chapter 6

Gérard of Fontaines, *Quodlibeta*: 1.7 = Quod. 1, question 7

Gregory of Rimini, *Quodlibeta*: 1.7 = Quod. 1, question 7

Henricus of Ghent, *Quodlibeta*: 1.7 = Quod. 1, question 7

Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones Ordinariae*: 24.8 = article 24, quaestio 8

Patrologia Latina (PL 64, 1311 = vol. 64, col. 1311)

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*: 1.85.2 = Prima pars, quaestio 85, article 2

Thomas of Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae*: 2 = quaestio 2

Thomas of Sutton, *Sententiae*: 1.3.2 = book 1, distinction 3, quaestio 2

PREFACE

While studying philosophy, a long time ago, I got an assignment for a paper on Scotus's *De primo principio*, which I did not complete, as I decided to switch to a study of psychology instead. I do not regret the switch at all, but throughout my career there were at times those intrusive thoughts about a project once pursued but never completed. So when I retired I decided to revisit Scotus and, as Anthony Kenny so nicely put it, to "enter more fully into the intellectual world of a bygone area," *non propter opus sed propter scire* at that. However, the First Principle was no longer the prime object of my concern. I was now more fascinated by the medieval "science of the soul," a penchant gently nurtured by Paul Bakker. I started to read Scotus's *Questions on the De anima* and *Ordinatio* 1.3, translating them to facilitate a more permanent understanding. As it happened, Fordham University Press became interested in the project. So here it is. It would not have been completed without the support and help from many people who generously spent a lot of time checking most of the translation or otherwise making useful suggestions. I am greatly indebted to Paul Bakker and Richard Cross for their invaluable support and indispensable help; to Gyula Klima for his confidence in the project; to Oleg Bychkov, Tim Noone, Giorgio Pini, Thomas Williams, Sander De Boer, and an anonymous reader of Fordham University Press for many constructive comments; and to the Center for the History of Philosophy and Science of the Radboud University for its hospitality and financial support. Needless to say, all remaining errors are mine. Finally, I thank Regina for her patience in bearing with me when I was once again lost in translation.

John van den Bercken

ON BEING AND COGNITION

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INTRODUCTION

SCOTUS ON BEING AND COGNITION: *ORDINATIO* 1, DISTINCTION 3

Scotus's *Ordinatio* is a commentary on the *Sentences* written in order to fulfill the requirements for becoming a master in theology. The four books of *Sentences* as composed by Peter Lombard are a compendium of theological learning accumulated over the centuries leading up to Lombard's time (the first half of the twelfth century), and it soon became the basic handbook for students of theology. Yet it also covered a number of topics that pertain to the domain of natural philosophy and metaphysics, the third distinction of the first book of Scotus's *Ordinatio* (henceforth Ord. 1.3) being a case in point.¹ It is at its roots motivated by a theological concern (can man in his earthly life know God?), but the general focus is cognition in all its aspects, both epistemological and psychological, and if it presents any theology at all it is mostly of the variety called natural theology, which relies on reason and (at least to some extent) on experience.

Slightly changing the order of the questions in Ord. 1.3, we can distinguish three more or less independent parts. The first part concerns the scope and limits of human knowledge (nn. 1–280). It opens with the question that signals the theological starting point of the whole distinction: is it possible for man in this life to have knowledge of God through the natural powers of his intellect? (nn. 1–68). It then addresses two more general questions: what is the first thing known by our intellect? (nn. 69–107), and what is in fact the first and adequate object of our intellect? (nn. 108–201). Finally, a fundamental epistemological question is raised: is it possible for man in his present life to have certain and infallible knowledge (nn. 202–80)? In all four questions, Scotus develops his thoughts primarily in discussion with Henry of Ghent.

The second part deals with the structure and function of the intellective soul (nn. 281–332). It starts with a question concerning memory as the part of the intellective soul that stores abstract concepts or “intelligible species” (nn. 333–400) before presenting a detailed analysis of the way the intellect and the object cooperate in generating actual knowledge in the case of abstractive cognition (nn. 401–568). Here Scotus's main interlocutors are not only Henry of Ghent but Godfrey of Fontaines and Giles of Rome.

The third part of Ord. 1.3 returns to the theological agenda as set by Lombard in the third distinction of the first book of his *Sentences*: is there a trace of the Trinity in every creature? (nn. 281–332), and, more specifically, does the human mind offer an image of the Trinity? (nn. 569–604). In the following I will summarize Scotus’s main theses and arguments concerning the various issues treated in Ord. 1.3. This should suffice by way of introduction. To do justice to the full range of Scotus’s intellectual achievements it would be necessary to pay more attention than is done here to the authors he discusses, notably Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines, and to a lesser extent Thomas Aquinas; this, however, I must leave to the secondary literature.²

UNIVOCITY OF BEING AND NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

The question of whether man in his present state is naturally able to have knowledge of God may come as a surprise, given the conclusions established in the second distinction of Ord. 1, where Scotus has demonstrated, by means of rational arguments, the existence of God as a unique first cause that is infinite and has intellect and will. This would seem to answer the present question sufficiently. It is, however, not as simple as that. What Scotus has in mind here is a simple quidditative concept, a concept that expresses what (*quid*) something is, its essence or nature—in particular a simple concept, acquired by natural means, in which God is conceived (n. 19). For example, can we say that our common or everyday concept of “wise” or even that of “being” applies to God and expresses his essence? Scotus answers this question positively, in contrast to Henry.³

Henry’s answer was that attributes like “good” and “wise” do not apply to God directly: God is not wise in the way we use this concept in everyday language, but he is wise in a completely different, preeminent way. Nevertheless, our concept of wisdom is related to the transcendental wisdom of God by way of analogy. According to Henry, the process of acquiring concepts that apply to God evolves in steps of decreasing generality or increasing specificity. It may be illustrated by means of the notion of “good,” a favorite example of Augustine’s, referred to by Scotus, too.⁴ When we consider several good things, like “this good” and “that good” (first step), we can abstract from “this” and “that,” thus arriving at a general or universal notion of “good” (second step). This general notion of “good” is divested from the particular subjects in which it exists (it is “privatively indeterminate”). But we cannot simply apply to God such a concept that is indeterminate because it misses something: the abstract notion of “good” is at most analogously common to creatures and God. A further (third) step is

needed: we must conceive an absolute notion of “good,” the good subsisting in itself that does not require any further determination (i.e., negatively indeterminate). This good is then attributed to God preeminently, in the highest degree of perfection (fourth step) and identified with God’s essence itself (fifth step), as with other absolute perfections like wisdom and justice, which are all identical with God’s being.

Now, for Henry what is proper to God and what is proper to creature are fundamentally different. Consequently, the notion of “good” as predicated of creatures and of God cannot have something in common. Still, the former is analogously related to the latter, and they appear to be so similar that we in fact can hardly distinguish between them and thus take them as being one concept. It is precisely this interpretation of the process that is contested by Scotus. In his presentation of Henry’s view on the matter (in nn. 20–21) Scotus focuses on the concept of “being,” which according to Henry is an analogous concept: it means something different for God and for creatures but is sufficiently similar in both cases to be taken as an analogously common concept. Scotus agrees with Henry in that we can abstract from creatures a concept of being that is free of any determination, but he denies that being as predicated of God is only analogously common to the being of creatures. It is inconsistent to hold that God’s being and the being of creatures are fundamentally different and at the same time that they are so similar as to admit a commonness that is not stronger than that of analogy (nn. 31–32). Scotus claims that we can (only) have quidditative knowledge of God by accepting a fully univocal notion of being, a notion that has exactly the same meaning in the case of God and of creatures. When a concept X has “exactly the same meaning,” it is impossible to maintain both that something is X and that it is not X. Moreover, such a concept is what ensures the validity of a syllogism; for example, A is X, X is B, therefore A is B (nn. 25–26). Now Scotus sets out to prove that the concepts of being and absolute perfection can be predicated of God and creatures in the same, univocal sense.

The first proof is the one generally held to be the strongest (nn. 27–30). You can be certain that God exists (his existence was proven in the second distinction of *Ordinatio* 1), but at the same time unsure whether he is finite or infinite. The notion of being as applied to God must be different from the notions of finite and infinite, since it is contradictory to have mutually exclusive attitudes (certainty and doubt) with respect to one and the same concept (n. 28). But—and this is crucial—the very notion of being is included in both “infinite” and “finite.” It must, therefore, be univocal because it applies indifferently to both finite and infinite being (n. 27).

The second argument targets one of Henry’s basic assumptions: namely,

that the being of creatures and the being of God are fundamentally different *to begin with*, but are *subsequently* thought to be sufficiently similar to support analogy. If Henry were right, it would be wholly impossible to obtain by natural means any concept of God that is fundamentally different to what we can attain by natural means. Our concepts have natural causes—created objects and their internal representation in sense images—and they are processed by the natural power of the agent intellect. Concepts of naturally knowable created objects, obtained by natural means, can only give knowledge of what is proper to created objects, not to what is not proper to such objects, and certainly not to what is proper to the uncreated alone. Created objects can only give rise to concepts of other objects if the latter are somehow contained in the former. But no created object can contain something that is right away fundamentally different from it; in particular, it cannot contain notions that are proper to God *alone*. The conclusion must be, therefore, that knowledge of God is only possible via the link of a truly common—that is, univocal—concept (n. 35).

The next two arguments appear to be an elaboration of the previous one. The third proof for (the possibility or necessity of) the univocity of the concept of being is enigmatic: it consists only of two premises, leaving the conclusion to the reader. The gist of it seems to be that since we do not have a concept of God from which we can derive everything that can be known of him (as already signaled in the previous argument), we must resort to a univocal concept of being (nn. 36–37).

The fourth proof rests on the notion of a pure or absolute perfection. It argues that we can only attribute pure perfections to God if we first have a notion of what a pure perfection is, independently of God's having it. This means that it is conceived on the basis of creatures; after removing every imperfection and limitation it is attributed to God. This is the common way of proceeding "in every metaphysical inquiry about God." The concept of a pure perfection must be univocal because if it were not (i.e., if it were only analogous), it would be imperfect (nn. 38–39).

Like the third, the fifth and final argument represents a later addition to the original text. And just like the third, or even more so, it is difficult to understand, both with respect to its premises and with respect to the intended conclusion. Perhaps this is the reason these arguments are seldom discussed in the secondary literature. In any case, reflecting on the various arguments (in n. 44) Scotus himself deems the first and the fourth the most relevant, and what he wants to show here is clear enough. It is not that there can be univocal notions or that such notions are necessary for intellectual discourse in general (which they evidently are). Scotus's claim is more specific: such notions are possible and necessary, especially for being and

absolute perfections, if we want to talk about God in a meaningful way. While Scotus does not reject Henry's psychological sketch of the way concepts of God are acquired, he does not accept its epistemological assumptions and their implications. What he disagrees with in particular is Henry's thesis that our concepts of God are merely analogous to concepts obtained from creatures. Essentially, he argues that it is inconsistent to claim an absolute difference between, on the one hand, concepts that are proper to creatures and, on the other, concepts that are proper to God, and at the same time to uphold that they are so close as to be nearly indistinguishable and sufficiently similar to be analogically applied to God. According to Scotus, the only solution is to assume that the relevant concepts are in fact univocal.⁵

Although the notion of being applies to God in the same sense as it applies to creatures, this does not mean that God's particularity, his essence as *this* essence, can be known by us in our present state. The notion of being is in fact too general and does not tell us anything about what is proper to God (n. 57). Still, it is possible for us to attain concepts that are not proper to creatures but proper to God alone. Such are the concepts of pure perfections taken in the highest degree, in particular the notion of infinite being. Scotus explains that when God is said to be infinite this does not entail any sort of composition, as for instance would obtain when a wall is said to be white. In the latter case "a white wall" is composed of two independent concepts or entities, "wall" and "whiteness," which together result in a unity that is merely accidental. Not so with "infinite being": "being" and "infinite" are not two independent things, but only one simple entity, just "infinite being." The qualification "infinite" does not add something to "being"; it signifies the very mode of being. By way of analogy Scotus presents the notion of "intense whiteness," where "intense" indicates an intrinsic degree of whiteness itself (nn. 58–59).

Scotus concludes his reply to the first question of Ord. 1.3 by summarizing his own version of the process by which we obtain knowledge of God. When we consider created things we can form abstract concepts (*species*) like "good," "highest" and "actual"; the intellect can combine such concepts, thereby arriving at the concept of "the highest and most actual good" that may be applied to God. This description of the process is not unlike that of Henry. Henry had argued (cf. n. 21) that God is known not through a species proper to him, but through a species alien to him, which is derived from creatures in a way that resembles the operation of our estimative power. For Henry, the process of abstraction results in concepts that are not proper to God and may not be directly applied to God, but that are merely similar to concepts that are proper to God and hence can be applied only analogically (cf. n. 21). According to Scotus, then, man can have natural knowledge of

things that pertain to God in a more direct way on account of the univocity of the relevant notions.

THE FIRST OBJECT OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT

The second question of Ord. 1.3 is a kind of bridge between the first and the third. It is linked with the first (on the possibility of natural knowledge of God) in that for Henry, who was Scotus's main opponent there, God is the first object that we can naturally know. Scotus does not agree, but he gives his definitive refutation of Henry's view in question 3, where he discusses the "adequate object" of our intellect.

Scotus starts with several basic distinctions. There are three ways of ordering intelligible things (n. 69): (1) in terms of the order in which they arise or are generated (*ordo originis vel secundum generationem*); (2) in terms of their degree of perfection (*ordo perfectionis*); and (3) in terms of the extent to which they match our cognitive powers (*ordo adaequationis sive causalitatis praecisae*). The present question discusses the first object in the order of generation and in the order of perfection; the first object in terms of adequacy is discussed in the next question (Ord. 1.3.1.3).

In the order of generation there is a difference between actual knowledge and habitual knowledge (n. 71; cf. n. 94). Actual cognition (*cognitio actualis*) occurs when the mind, engaged with external reality, apprehends an object. What our cognitive powers meet first is a most specific species—for example, a particular concrete instance of "blue." The relevant object is said to be cognized confusedly or indistinctly (*confuse/indistincte*) because, initially at least, there is no further analysis of the object with respect to its definition and its location in the hierarchy of things (Porphyry's tree). "Blue" is a most specific species because it is the ultimate specification of the category "color," which itself is a member of the fundamental category or genus of the accident "quality." Likewise, when we apprehend an instance of the category of substances, for example, "a man," we have an indistinct or vague cognition as long as we do not analyze the object further as to its place in the hierarchy of substances, which would mean that we consider the definition of man as a rational animal. In general, then, when actual cognition involves a most specific species, the object is cognized confusedly; this kind of cognition is nominal in that it involves only the name of a thing ("blue," "man"), not its definition (nn. 73, 76). But actual cognition can also be distinct, as happens when it apprehends an object as a being. In general, the first thing we can say of something is that it is a being (n. 80). "Being," importantly, is a distinct concept because it is irreducibly simple—that is, it cannot be analyzed in components (n. 71). Therefore, speaking of actual

distinct cognition, “being” is the first object.

Prima facie it may seem strange that the object of a confused cognition is something as distinct as a specific concrete item (a most specific species), whereas the cognition of something as general as a being is called distinct. Scotus seems to have this worry in mind when he points out (in n. 72) that “confused” and “distinct” can be used to qualify not only cognition (as adjectives) or the act of cognizing (as adverbs), but also the object of cognition or (the content of) what is cognized (*cognitum*). Both uses are logically independent, and the relevant claims here pertain not to what is cognized (something confused or distinct) but to how it is cognized (confusedly or distinctly): in actual cognition, the first thing known confusedly is a specific species, and what is known first in a distinct way is being (cf. QDA 16 n. 9).

The question of what is known first in the generation of knowledge can be considered with respect to habitual and virtual cognition. Habitual cognition involves what we may call a body of knowledge that is stored in intellective memory and can be used when needed; for example, knowledge of the hierarchy of substances. Virtual knowledge concerns intelligible items that are implied by or contained in other items but have to be made explicit by further intellective activity (n. 92). Scotus maintains that in this kind of cognition the first object is “what is most common”—namely, “being.” Any concept—for example, the concept of “man”—is generated by starting with being and then specifying it further by differentiating features such as material, living, animal, and rational. Scotus’s explanation of this generative process in habitual cognition is a bit indirect, relying on an analogy. A certain entity—for example, an animal—may be conceived either in terms of a series of nested forms or in terms of one single form encompassing successive perfections. Whichever case may apply, we could say that it is *first* a substance and *then* a body and *then* living, and so on; the full entity is, as it were, generated by proceeding from what is more general to what is less general. Note, however, that this process must not be understood in a strictly temporal sense (n. 94), as is the case in actual knowledge, but rather in terms of what Scotus often calls “signs of nature,”⁶ by which a logical order is imposed on the nature of things even when there is no temporal order. Scotus claims that the same goes for the process by which concepts bring the intellect to the perfection that consists in habitual and virtual knowledge: it starts with the less perfect—that is, more general—concepts.

The question of the “first object” can also be considered on a scale of less perfect to more perfect. In an absolute sense, “more perfect” knowledge has the most perfect object—namely, God, who is absolutely the most perfect thing we can know, even naturally (n. 97). But knowledge can also be

proportionally “more perfect” on a scale where knowable items range from less to more perfectly knowable. This is the case with sensible items: to the extent that sensibles affect the senses more strongly, they are “better known.” This means, presumably, that there is an optimal level of stimulation of the senses that makes the relevant object “first” (n. 98).

THE ADEQUATE OBJECT OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT

Finally, the question of the “first object” of the human intellect can be read as “what is the most adequate natural object of the intellect?” The most adequate object of a power is the object that matches the power perfectly—that is, its full extension falls under the scope of the power—and it can completely be handled by the power. An object can be adequate because of virtuality or because of commonness (*propter communitatem*) (cf. QDA 21 n.6). If an object is most adequate to the power of the intellect because of virtuality, then the object must contain in itself everything that is intelligible for the intellect; by knowing the relevant object, one can in fact derive and come to know everything implied by it. If an object is most adequate because of commonness, then it can be predicated essentially of everything that falls under the scope of the power. In the case of the intellect, the concept that can be predicated of every conceivable intelligible item is the most adequate one for the intellect. Scotus claims that being as such (*ens in quantum ens*) is the most adequate object of the human intellect because it has a primacy of commonness with respect to all quidditative concepts and a primacy of virtuality with respect to things that cannot themselves be conceived as quiddities (nn. 137, 150, 151). But first he rejects some contenders for the role of being the first object proposed by other authors: God and “the true” (Henry of Ghent) and the quiddity of material things (Thomas Aquinas).

According to Henry of Ghent, God is the first and most adequate object of the human intellect because he is the most perfect thing ever to be known and because he is the source of all there is (nn. 108–9). Scotus rejects this view, as God is not an object that naturally acts on our intellect, except perhaps under the general notion of being, but in that case that general notion itself would be the first object (n. 126). Moreover, God cannot be the most adequate object according to commonness because he is not predicated of everything our intellect can think of. True, God contains virtually in himself all things that are intelligible, but this does not make him the first adequate object, as all these things are directly moving our intellect by themselves (n. 127).

Scotus further represents Henry as arguing for the view that truth is the first object of the intellect (nn. 167–70). Again, Scotus disagrees, for reasons

quite similar to the ones for which he is opposed to God as the first adequate object: “true” does not express *what* things are (their quiddity), nor does it include everything that can be understood of things. In contrast, when “being” is said of things—for example, of a stone—it includes its being true or the notion that it is something true (n. 171). Moreover, when things are understood under the aspect of “true,” the relevant cognition is not about the essence of things; it involves an attribute of being only (n. 172).

Another candidate for the most adequate object of our intellect was put forward by Thomas Aquinas: the quiddity of material or sensible things. Thomas argues that there must be a proportional match between power and object. The human intellect, he goes on, happens to be a power that exists in matter but functions at an immaterial level. Therefore, its adequate object does come from material or sensible things but consists in the *abstract* quiddity or essence of these things (whereas the *singular* material quiddity as such can only be known by the senses) (nn. 110–12). According to Scotus, the intellect can also know immaterial substances, so Thomas’s view of what is the intellect’s most adequate object is too narrow. The first adequate object must be defined in relation to the very nature of a power as such, independent of an eventual later state of beatification. It is obvious that by our cognitive powers we can understand more than just the sensible: witness our science of metaphysics, which is concerned with being as such (nn. 113–18).

Scotus’s theory of being as the first adequate object of the intellect is complicated and controversial. What follows is a summary of the bare essentials.⁷ Being has a primacy of commonness with respect to all quidditative concepts—that is, with respect to all things we can call “beings”—and, technically: to all intelligible things of which “being” can be predicated *in quid*, as expressing (a part of) their essence. To understand what this means, consider, for example, the following expressions: “horse is an animal” and “rational animal.” In both expressions the intelligible content (*ratio*) of “animal” is univocally the same. Still, there is a difference between the two predications. Saying that a horse is an animal amounts to a predication *in quid* because the intelligible content of the predicate “animal” is part of the essence or quiddity of “horse.” Not so in the second case. The notion (*ratio*) of “animal” is not included in that of “rational”; it does not indicate a part of the essence of “rationality.” In the expression “rational animal” the adjective “rational” specifies one kind of animal—namely, animals that are characterized by rationality (i.e., humans)—in contradistinction to animals that are nonrational (i.e., beasts). In “rational animal” the adjective “rational” is a qualitative concept, indicating a quality of “animal”; technically: it is predicated *in quale* of the genus “animal.” So a

notion like “animal” expresses what a thing is: it is a quidditative concept and said to be “determinable” because it can be qualified by determining notions or differences such as “rational.” In general, “being” is the ultimate determinable element in every quiddity or essence.

Now, Scotus asserts that the concept of being cannot be predicated univocally *in quid* of *all* intelligible items; it can only be so predicated of quidditative notions that have a determinable and a determining element. “Being” cannot be predicated *in quid* of certain differences, notably the so-called ultimate differences, nor of the proper attributes of being itself. Consider the ultimate differences first. To explain their meaning, we can again refer to the familiar hierarchy of substances. A substance can be material or spiritual. “Material” and “spiritual” are differences specifying two kinds of substances. Likewise, there are sentient living things (i.e., animals) and nonsentient living things (plants), as well as rational animals (humans) and nonrational animals (beasts). Among these differences only “rational” is an ultimate difference because it cannot be decomposed further. In technical terms it is an absolutely simple concept (*conceptus simpliciter simplex*, sometimes also translated as “unqualifiedly simple concept”) while the other differences are not absolutely simple; for example, “sentient” applies to or contains both “rational and “nonrational.” The notion “rational” characterizes a so-called most specific species in the hierarchy, after which no further differentiation follows. Briefly, it is an ultimate difference (cf. nn. 131, 159–61).

Scotus holds that being cannot be predicated univocally *in quid* of ultimate differences, which means that they are not beings in the same sense as other things (quiddities) are. Why does Scotus thus restrict the extension of univocity? He has two arguments. The first can be illustrated as follows: When “rational” included being, it would have something in common with other beings, and it would have to be differentiated by other differences. The latter in turn would either include being again or not, and so on. In order to avoid an infinite regress, we have to accept a difference that does not include being quidditatively: an ultimate difference, like “rational,” which as a qualifying or determining concept is outright diverse (*primo diversa*) from the being that it determines (n. 132). Note, however, that this does not mean that “rationality” is not a being. All Scotus is saying is that being cannot be predicated univocally *in quid* of the relevant difference; being can still be predicated indirectly, or denominatively, as the technical term is. In the expression “rational animal” being is included quidditatively in “animal,” while in “rational” being is included indirectly because the adjective “rational” is a term derived (or denominated) from the noun “rationality,” which is a being (cf. n. 161).

Scotus has another reason, which is very similar to the first, for denying that being can be predicated univocally of ultimate differences. Any composite concept is a unity made up of a determinable element and a determining element. For example, in the concept of “man” the determinable element “animal” is combined with the determining element “rational.” As before, if there is to be any scientific knowledge at all, there can be no infinite regress in analyzing composite concepts; so there must be a point where we end up with two irreducibly simple concepts, one that is purely determinable and one that is purely determining (an ultimate difference). Furthermore, these notions must have nothing in common at all: as the purely determinable concept is that of being, the ultimate difference must be a concept not including being (n. 133).

Scotus excludes not only ultimate differences from univocal predication, but also the so-called proper attributes of being (*propriae passionis entis*), such as “one” and “true.” Proper attributes, as conceived by Aristotle, are essentially connected with their subject but are not part of their subject’s definition; in addition, they cannot be defined without reference to their subject. A classic example is the ability to laugh (“risibility”): it is an essential property of man, but although the essence of “man” can be understood without the notion of risibility, the latter cannot be understood without mentioning the subject to which it applies. According to Scotus, the same goes for the proper attributes of being. “Being” can be conceived apart from the notions “one” and “true,” but the latter cannot be conceived without that of “being.” Still, “being” is not part of their intelligible content; it is mentioned there just “by way of addition.” With respect to predication all this means that “being is one” (*ens est unum*) is a predication that cannot be inverted to “one is being” (*unum est ens*). The latter expression would suggest that “being” is part of the essence of “one,” but “being” is not a quidditative element of “one.” In the parlance of the medievals, “being is one” is an essential (*per se*) predication, but not “in the first mode,” as if the predicate “one” were an essential part of the subject “being.” Here “one” is predicated “in the second mode”: the notion of the subject (“being”) is not of the essence of the predicate “one” but is still unavoidable for its understanding (n. 134). There is a further reason that the notions “one” and “true” cannot include that of “being” in a quidditative sense. If they did include “being,” they would have to be accommodated somehow in the overall ontological scheme of beings or quiddities as particular elements of it, but this is impossible, since it would limit the scope of the transcendentals, which by their nature apply to all and everything (n. 135).

If there are intelligible things of which being cannot be predicated *in quid* (namely, the ultimate differences and the proper attributes of being), this

means that “being” is not a notion that is common to these things and, therefore, not common to all things. How then can it be the adequate object of our intellect? Here Scotus invokes another kind of primacy, that of virtuality. He maintains that the ultimate differences and the proper attributes are virtually contained in the notion of being. Being, then, is the first adequate object of our intellect because it has a double primacy. It has a primacy of commonness with respect to all quidditative concepts because it is univocally common to all intelligibles of which it can be predicated *in quid* (nn. 138–40). The relevant intelligibles, called “first intelligibles” by Scotus, are the uncreated being and all the created beings making up the ontological system of genera, species, individuals, and their essential parts. With respect to nonquidditative concepts—that is, the ultimate differences and the attributes of being, of which being cannot be predicated univocally *in quid* (nn. 147–49)—being has a primacy of virtuality because the concepts are virtually contained in the first intelligibles; this means that they become understood when the intellect scrutinizes the first intelligibles (nn. 137, 150, 151).

Scotus’s theory of the univocity of being and the adequate object of the intellect was not developed in one stroke. Elements of it are addressed in Scotus’s early writings, notably the *Questions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics*⁸ and the *Questions on Aristotle’s “De anima.”*⁹ Moreover, Scotus seems to have been at pains to neutralize any criticism of his theory because even in the most developed version of it many possible objections are anticipated and dispelled (nn. 152–66). Nevertheless, the theory of univocation remains complicated and controversial. Even early Scotists who generally accepted the univocity of being disputed the exclusion of the ultimate differences and the proper attributes of being.¹⁰ Modern authors, too, find it difficult to construe a satisfying interpretation of the various elements of Scotus’s doctrine in the question at hand.¹¹

CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE AND ILLUMINATION

The next question changes the subject from how men can have knowledge of God to how man can have certain knowledge, with or without God’s support, in the form of divine illumination. Once more, Scotus’s starting point is the opinion of Henry of Ghent,¹² who relies on the arguments of Augustine that are cited by way of introduction to the question (nn. 202–7). According to Henry it is impossible that cognitions concerning the material world are certain and infallible. Such cognitions rest on what Henry calls a “created exemplar”—that is, a mental representation of things perceived by the senses. The objects of sense cognition are inherently changeable and

cannot, therefore, be the foundation of infallible truth (n. 211). Moreover, the cognizer itself is also inherently changeable (n. 212). And, finally, the images of things cannot always be trusted: when we are unable to distinguish between them and what they represent, as in dreams, we cannot distinguish between truth and falsity (n. 213). Consequently, in order to have certain and infallible knowledge, man must resort to and rely on the representation or idea of a thing in God's mind: the uncreated exemplar. The latter is the reason (*ratio*) of created essences and of our knowledge of them (n. 214). Man does not have natural knowledge of the uncreated exemplar. It is put into his mind through divine illumination, thus ensuring genuine or perfect truth with respect to the cognition of the created exemplar (nn. 216–17).

Scotus objects that Henry's view leads to skepticism (nn. 219–22), which was definitely not Augustine's intention (nn. 223–28). He then sets out to disprove skepticism by presenting several classes of certain knowledge (nn. 229–45), the first being that of self-evident principles. The classic example here is the statement "the whole is greater than its parts." Understanding the meaning of the terms "whole" and "part" necessarily implies seeing the truth of the proposition "the whole is larger than the part." One cannot have knowledge of the individual terms without apprehending the truth of their combination. The fact that the knowledge of two terms is based on sense perception, which may be deceptive, does not affect the certainty of the proposition in which the terms are combined. For example, the proposition "green is not blue" is self-evident as soon as one has seen something blue and something green, even if it is possible to believe that something is green when it is in fact not (nn. 230–34).

The next category of certain knowledge is concerned with empirical events, and it presupposes a particular (Aristotelian) view on causality. When a certain effect occurs "most of the time" it is taken to be caused by a natural cause, which is not free as to which effect to produce. Its effect is determined by the nature or essence of the cause (for example, fire causes something to burn "in most cases"). A natural cause is a *per se* cause, in contrast to a chance or fortuitous cause, which may or may not produce a certain effect (an example, given by Thomas Aquinas, would be wind or heat as a cause of health).¹³ A natural cause may operate in a variety of accidental circumstances, but it produces the same effect "most of the time." According to Scotus this principle, based on as well as justifying empirical generalization, is an instance of infallible and certain knowledge (n. 235). Another way in which an empirical event gives rise to infallible knowledge is when it can be explained by evident principles. For example, an eclipse of the moon occurs because the earth, which is an opaque body, blocks the sunlight. That an opaque body prevents the propagation of light is a self-

evident principle, according to Scotus (n. 236). But sometimes an empirical conclusion itself can be accepted as a certain principle, even though it cannot be explained by deducing it from further principles—for example, the general observation that a particular type of herb is hot (n. 237).

The final category of infallible knowledge is concerned with our own acts: insofar as they are brute facts they are *per se* and immediately known by us—for example, “I am awake,” or “I hear,” or even “I think.” Even when a sensation is illusory, it still is a fact that I have a sensation (nn. 238–39). Scotus spends some time to discuss the reliability of sense cognitions (nn. 240–46) but then returns to the arguments that lead Henry of Ghent to conclude that natural knowledge is inherently fallible and that only divine illumination can give us certainty. Even if the objects of knowledge were continuously changing (which they are not) this would constitute a certainty in itself. More to the point is the fact that true knowledge is not based on the variability of things, but on their invariable nature (nn. 246, 249). As for the changeability “in the soul”—that is, of the human intellect itself—Scotus argues that with respect to self-evident propositions the soul is not changeable at all. Such self-evident propositions even make it possible to prevent or correct errors with respect to the relevant objects (n. 250). Henry’s final argument was the unreliability of mental images as in dreams. According to Scotus this argument is invalid because in dreams the relevant images are phantasms or sense images, in contrast to the images on which intellections are based—namely, intelligible species (see the subsequent section). Henry (who does not accept intelligible species in this sense) might insist that the intellect may err or become blocked due to an error in the imagination (where the sense image resides); however, in that case the intellect is not active itself and consequently not in error itself (n. 252).

So far Scotus has refuted one part of Henry’s thesis: that there can be no certain knowledge by natural means. He then addresses the second part: the need for a special illumination. It is impossible for certain and genuine truth to consist in the agreement between the uncreated exemplar in God and the created exemplar in our intellect (the object as known) because an agreement is a relation and a relation presupposes knowledge of the terms involved. But, according to Henry, the uncreated exemplar is unknown to us (n. 258). Moreover, the process of cognition can very well be explained without appealing to a special illumination by the eternal light in the way Henry does. For how would divine illumination operate? Suppose that it causes something that precedes the cognitive act. It cannot add something real to the cognized object, for the latter does not have real being; it has only intentional being in the intellect (as explained in the next section). Another possibility is that the eternal light has some effect in the intellect that brings

the latter to the cognition of a genuine truth. But in that case Henry's claim that truth is seen in the uncreated light is not different from the "common view," because the latter holds that truth is seen in the agent intellect, which is itself the effect of the uncreated light. So the latter is a remote cause only, and there is at most a general illumination making it possible to know genuine truths, not a special illumination for particular cognitions. Suppose, then, that the uncreated light does not cause something that precedes the act, but instead directly causes the act itself. It cannot do so alone because that would make the agent intellect superfluous, which is absurd; the agent intellect is the most noble part of the intellect, and it must somehow be involved in the most noble activity of the intellect (which consists in knowing genuine truths). What remains, then, is that the uncreated light causes genuine truth together with the object and the intellect, but this is the common opinion again (n. 260).

Augustine sits at the origin of the illumination theory, and in defending it Henry frequently invokes the authority of Augustine. Scotus, too, holds Augustine in high esteem, so he is very keen on (what he believes to be) the correct interpretation of Augustine (cf. nn. 223–28), and, having argued against illumination itself, he concludes by showing how Augustine's view that infallible truths can be seen in eternal rules is to be understood (nn. 261–80).

INTELLECTIVE MEMORY AND INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES

The first three questions of the third part of Ord. 1.3 are concerned exclusively with psychological issues, in particular the structure and function of the intellectual soul, but at the same time they are a preparation for the final (fourth) question, which is occasioned by Augustine's thought on the mind as an image of the Trinity. Yet for the first three questions the context is provided by Aristotle's treatise *On the Soul*, which sketches an account of perception and thought that was taken up and developed further by medieval masters, a project that gave rise to much dispute.¹⁴ Relatively uncontested were the following points. Cognition starts with sense perception of the material world: an object produces representations in the external senses (*species sensibilis*), which in turn produce a sense image (*phantasma*) in the inner sense of imagination (or sense memory). Cognition ends when the intellect actually thinks of a concept of the object (the actual thought is often called the *species expressa*, or *verbum*, the (mental) word). What happens in between is the subject of various theories and much controversy. A phantasm represents an object as something concrete, singular, and vested with all its material conditions. Concepts, on the other hand, are abstract, general, or

universal, and immaterial (since they reside in the intellect, which was assumed to be immaterial). Any theory explaining the process of cognition has to bridge the gap between these extremes or, as Scotus puts it, to pass from one order to the other. And as usual, when theories are worked out, it turns out that specific questions can be answered in different ways. One such question was: are phantasms and expressed species sufficient to account for the process of cognition, or must we assume additional entities, notably the so-called intelligible species? Scotus will argue for the latter position. Another fundamental question was, which factor effectively causes the act of intellection: the object (as represented in the phantasm and/or in the intelligible species) or the intellect? Scotus's answer is "both." Both issues are discussed in the context of two more or less competing theoretical frameworks, the Augustinian and the Aristotelian conceptions of the intellective soul and its functioning, which Scotus attempts to combine as far as possible.¹⁵

Scotus treats the two issues in separate questions, but they are in fact closely related because those who want to deny intelligible species will do so by proposing a theory of cognition where intelligible species are deemed to be superfluous. These authors, notably Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines, believe that the phantasm is somehow sufficient to cause cognition. Scotus does not agree. In his view phantasm and agent intellect are certainly relevant, but cognition cannot come about without intelligible species.

Having an occurrent cognition means that the intellect is in a different state than it was before. It changes from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality. Before any cognition at all, it is in a state of essential or remote potentiality: it has the ability to acquire knowledge. Having obtained some knowledge, it is in a state of accidental or proximal potentiality; it now has the ability to actually use the knowledge it has (its cognitive "habits") (cf. n. 374). Thus the intellect in fact actualizes its potential in two steps, called respectively first actuality (having knowledge) and second actuality (using knowledge) (cf. n. 376). Of primary relevance here is the change of the intellect into a state of having knowledge in store; accounting for the use of knowledge in actual intellection is the topic of the next question. In terms of Aristotelian physics this is an instance of a qualitative change. For a thing to change from one state into another means that it acquires a new quality or accidental form. Applied to the intellect and cognition, having knowledge means that the intellect has acquired a new quality, consisting in a form representing the cognized thing. This form is called the intelligible species (n. 339).

So far, Scotus merely invokes the commonly accepted assumption that a

qualitative change consists in the induction of a new form; what is disputed is the introduction of a separate entity over and above the phantasm and the agent intellect to account for the relevant change. Another commonly accepted Aristotelian assumption is that in abstractive cognition the intellect is concerned with *general* concepts, or universals (n. 348). All cognition starts with the senses, and the objects of the perceptual powers are singular. Yet, the object of intellective cognition is something universal; there was no doubt about that. There happened to be doubt about the possibility of intellective knowledge of singulars, but that is not relevant here.

As we will see, the substance of Scotus's arguments for positing species mainly rests on Aristotelian assumptions concerning cognition, but Scotus's motivation for bringing up the issue is also inspired by Augustine. Saving the details for later, let us just note that for Augustine actual knowledge is generated from memory, which is an image of the Son (or, in biblical terms, the Word) being generated from God the Father. When Scotus, in the final question of Ord. 1.3, explains how the mind can be an image of the Trinity, he assumes likewise that memory is a part (power) of the intellective soul and the main source of actual knowledge, which is precisely what he wants to establish in the first three questions: that the intellective soul has a memory where intelligible items are stored and that it is the primary cause in the generation of actual knowledge.

The arguments for intelligible species essentially consist of two claims: the required universality of objects of abstractive cognition cannot be ensured by the phantasm or by the agent intellect; and the object must be present (represented) in the mind before the latter can engage in actual acts of cognition and thinking about it. Abstractive cognition is only possible when the mind has at its disposal an entity in which the object is represented as universal (nn. 349–50). The first proof for these claims is fairly straightforward. Thinking about a general (universal) concept is not the same as thinking about a concrete singular object. Each of these two acts involves a mental representation of its own. The phantasm or sense image, then, is an entity that represents an object precisely as singular, so it can never at the same time represent the object as universal because the two relevant aspects are opposite to one another (nn. 352 and 357). The phantasm, therefore, cannot deliver universality.

The next argument is more complicated and directly relates to the way the process of cognition is detailed. It presupposes another commonly accepted Aristotelian doctrine: that there are two parts in the intellective soul, an active part, called the agent intellect, and a passive part, usually called the possible intellect. According to Aristotle, "all things" that are intelligible are "made" so by the agent intellect and then received by the possible intellect,

which, accordingly, is said to “become all things” (cf. nn. 359 and 371). Scotus now argues that whatever the agent intellect does, it cannot directly cause the intellection of the universal. It cannot be active with respect to or cause something in the phantasm because what receives the result of the agent intellect’s activity is the possible intellect, not the phantasm; and because causing something in the phantasm would mean causing something in the material domain of the phantasm itself, there would be no transfer to the immaterial domain of intelligibles. The agent intellect only causes the intelligible species that represents or contains the universal. Actual intellection obtains when the species is received in the possible intellect. The intelligible species is a real form, a real accident inhering in the intellective soul. But this real form is “accompanied by” something that has only intentional or diminished or represented being—namely, the universal (nn. 359–60). Here we have one of those passages that cry out for analysis and comments;¹⁶ just a few brief remarks will have to suffice here. The gist of the argument seems to be that the only function of the agent is to cause a mental entity that represents the universal. Scotus does not offer a substantive proof for this conclusion; it is in a way the result of eliminating or disproving other possible actions of the agent intellect, and it seems to beg the question, as it is motivated by the premise that the intellect must have a universal concept before it can actually use it. Finally, Scotus does not offer any explanation of how exactly the agent intellect causes the intelligible species and how it can represent or contain the universal. Anyway, the latter point brings up the much discussed topic of intentionality. To understand Scotus here, note first that “real being” is not restricted to material or extra-mental things, but also to what “really” exists in the mind (which, even though immaterial, is, of course, real), such as intelligible species and habits. There is a difference, however, between the being of the species and the being of what the species represents: the species itself is a real thing, but its semantic content (a universal) has only “intentional” or “diminished” being. The meaning of this notion may be clarified by an analogy. A portrait of a person is a real thing, but the person in the portrait is not the real thing. In the portrait the person does not have the full being he has in reality, only a diminished form of being consisting in being represented (cf. n. 386 and the interpolation at n. 382).¹⁷

Another argument for species is based on the way knowledge reflects the way things are hierarchically organized. To be concrete, following Porphyry’s tree of substances, we can have knowledge of the things making up a particular level of the hierarchy—for example, of animals, of material bodies, of spiritual substances, and, at the most general level, of beings as such. The relevant knowledge constitutes a habit, a body of knowledge, such as

“biology,” “physics,” and “metaphysics” (in the medieval sense, of course). Then, argues Scotus, when we are doing metaphysics, for example, or physics, we are considering the relevant objects at their proper level of universality; but this is only possible when the intellect has a representation of the relevant object at the relevant level of universality, which is not to be found in the phantasm. Thinking of this particular stone is not the same as thinking of a stone in general as something solid, subject to physical forces and involved in geological events. Likewise, metaphysics is not about this or that particular being but about “being as such.” This kind of knowledge requires the appropriate general concepts (universals), which are abstracted from and hence different from phantasms (nn. 364–65).

The final series of arguments rests on the fact that, according to Aristotle, the intellect is a distinct cognitive power that can exist and operate independently of lower powers, such as the external and inner senses. If the intellect could only operate on an object presented to it by a lower power such as the imagination, it would lose its own perfection and dignity (nn. 368–69). Therefore, it must have an object of its own, presenting to it the things it can understand. Indeed, it does have such an object of its own: the intelligible species, provided by the phantasm and the agent intellect, which are “natural causes,” meaning that they act necessarily upon their passive counterpart when they are “sufficiently near” to the latter (n. 366). And here we are talking about an object that is strictly owned by the intellect, not just what is present in the imagination, too: the intelligible content “shining out” in the intelligible species is something of the intellect alone (n. 367). Scotus summarizes by stating that the fact that the object of the intellect must be universal and naturally present before any act of the intellect forces us to assume intelligible species in the intellect. This is what gives the intellect its character of memory (n. 370).

In answering the question as to whether intelligible species must be assumed, Scotus could not, as we saw, avoid touching on the more fundamental question: what in fact causes intellection? One of his main arguments was based on the role of the agent intellect. Although the agent intellect does not directly cause intellection, it makes intellection possible by producing intelligible species, which are a necessary requirement for intellection. It is of interest to compare Scotus’s position in the *Ordinatio* (Ord. 1.3.3.1) with the one he held in question 17 of his early QDA, where he asks whether there are intelligible species in our intellect naturally prior to the act of understanding. In QDA 17, Scotus considers a number of arguments for and against species, some of which return in the *Ordinatio*, but he does not yet give a definite answer. QDA 17 is similar to the treatment in the *Ordinatio* in that in the former Scotus discusses two authors he will

discuss again in Ord. 1.3.3.1 and in Ord. 1.3.3.2: Godfrey of Fontaines and Giles of Rome. In QDA 17 they are treated very sketchily, while in the *Ordinatio* they get much more attention. So let us now turn to Scotus's account of the process of intellection.

THE CAUSES OF INTELECTION

The background of the second question of the third part of Ord. 1.3 is, once more, the discord between the Aristotelian and the Augustinian views on the nature of the act of understanding. Roughly, according to the former the intellect is a passive power, merely reacting to external stimuli, whereas according to the latter the intellect is actively involved in producing the occurrence of acts of intellection. "Roughly" because neither view was fully worked out by its protagonist, giving rise to several interpretations as well as attempts to combine them into one single framework.

The title of the present question clearly reflects its background: is the intellect the total cause of intellection? This formulation immediately sets the agenda. If so, then what about perceptions and phantasms? If not, then what about the "powers" of the intellect: the agent and the possible intellect? Like the preceding question, the present one also has a precursor in the QDA—specifically, question 12, asking whether the intellective and sensitive powers of the soul are only passive. Scotus's answer there is that the powers of the soul are truly active,¹⁸ but he does not yet have a full account of the way they act in cognition. In the *Ordinatio*, Scotus presents a more developed theory, according to which intellection is caused both by the object and a (for now) unidentified part of the intellect, the latter being the more important factor. In Quod. 15, finally, he considers the role of the intellect as to its two parts, the agent and the possible intellect.

Returning to Ord. 1.3, the first opinion rejected by Scotus is that of Peter of John Olivi, who maintains that the soul is the only and total active cause of all intellection (cf. QDA 17, n. 20). This claim reflects Augustine's view on the nobility of the mind, which does not admit to its being affected by "corporeal images" (nn. 407–8). Furthermore, it is based on the very nature of the soul as the only principle that can account for a vital action like cognition and as being maximally actual, which means that it can initiate its own activity (nn. 409–10). Scotus replies that this view misunderstands Augustine's words (nn. 413, 504–8) and then points out that his own theory, according to which the soul is a partial but still more important cause of cognition, also upholds the adduced features of the soul (nn. 509–10).

The opinion of Godfrey of Fontaines is "completely situated at the other extreme": it holds that the intellective soul is completely passive.¹⁹ The

intellect cannot cause its own act of cognition because, generally, one and the same thing cannot act upon itself, for that would mean that the thing is simultaneously in potentiality and in act—that the effective and material causes coincide and even that in the end everything will be able “to move itself,” all of which is impossible. It will not do to have the agent intellect cause and the possible intellect receive the cognitive act because they both reside in the same subject (i.e., the intellective soul), and an agent and a recipient must be distinct as to subject. Therefore, if an intellection occurs, it cannot be due to the intellect itself (n. 422). The agent intellect does not cause something in the possible intellect; it merely illuminates the phantasm, which thereby becomes actually intelligible for the possible intellect. So intellection is effectively caused by the phantasm that resides in the imagination (nn. 423–25). This does not violate the principle that nothing can move itself because here agent and recipient are distinct as to subject: the imagination is a part of the soul associated with a part of the body, whereas the intellective soul resides “in no part at all” (n. 426). Scotus spends much time in refuting this opinion, which is not to his liking at all because it “seriously vilifies the nature of the soul” (n. 429) and requires phantasms to perform tasks that only the intellect can perform, such as securing orderly thinking on the basis of a habit (nn. 433–34). Most of his criticism, however, is concerned with the metaphysical principle Godfrey relies on—namely, that “one and the same thing cannot act upon itself.”²⁰ Scotus points out that this principle holds only in the case of a so-called univocal agent, which produces an effect that is like itself (as, for example, in the generation of living things). It does not hold in the case of equivocal agents, which produce an effect that is specifically different from their own nature. Here the active and the passive elements are related in such a way that as long as the former is only virtually in act (meaning that it is capable of acting but does not yet do so), the latter is formally in potentiality, no contradiction being involved (n. 513). Scotus does not complete the argument. For it to work, we have to assume that an act of intellection, which is produced in the intellect, is an effect of a different nature than the very nature of the intellect by which it is produced; if so, the intellect can very well be virtually in act and formally in potentiality at the same time. The most obvious interpretation of this would be in terms of the agent and the possible intellect, but right now Scotus does not want to address “that difficult issue” (n. 512).²¹ Scotus further points out that an effective and a material cause may very well coincide in the same thing, as shown by the case of a subject and its essential accidents (n. 518). Finally, Scotus does not share Godfrey’s worry that by accepting the possibility that something can move itself, in fact everything could do so. On the contrary, “he is the great

champion of self-motion,” as Effler aptly remarks (1962, 159). As was noted earlier (in n. 414), given the right circumstances, a “total and perfect and natural” cause always produces its effect. When the effect does not always follow, even though the right conditions are present, the relevant cause cannot be the *total* cause of it. This goes for wood with respect to burning, but also for the intellect with respect to intellection. The intellect is a natural cause of intellection and it is always suitably disposed (cf. n. 415). So, *if* it were the total or only cause, it would have always been actively producing intellections. However, it is not the *total* cause; it needs the object to become active. In sum, nothing can move itself as a total cause, but it can do so when another cause joins in (n. 521).

Scotus next considers two versions of Henry of Ghent’s theory.²² It was generally assumed that the intellect performs three kinds of task (cf. n. 348): the understanding of universals, the composition of propositions, and syllogistic reasoning. In his first theory, Henry assumed that the soul is passive with respect to its first function, having and thinking of general concepts. The intellect simply receives confused knowledge of intelligible items as they are illuminated by the agent intellect. It only becomes truly active when it engages in analyzing the intelligible content and in discursive reasoning (n. 430). According to Scotus, Henry changed his mind in that he came to realize that a vital action like intellection can only be accounted for by a principle intrinsic to the soul itself. As such he proposed that the intellect, gently pushed by the phantasm, elicits an intellection as its own operation (n. 451). Scotus cannot accept these accounts. To the first account he responds: why deny the intellect an active role initially and allow it subsequently? (n. 452). To the second, he suggests that it underestimates the activity of the object (n. 453). Henry’s two accounts appear to have been harmonized and improved in one combined account by an unknown author, but according to Scotus, the result fares no better than the originals (nn. 529–36).

Finally, there are two closely related opinions (presented by Thomas of Sutton and Giles of Rome) in which a crucial role is reserved for the intelligible species. In one view it *causes* actual intellection, while in the other it *constitutes* actual intellection. In the former case the species is the formal principle of the act of understanding, the intellect being merely passive, analogous to prime matter with respect to various forms. By way of support the proponents of this opinion refer to Aristotle, who emphasizes the intellect’s passivity (nn. 457–58). In the other case the act of understanding is considered to be analogous to the act of seeing. Just as, following Aristotle again, seeing is constituted by the occurrence of a sensible species in the senses, intellection is caused by the occurrence of the intelligible species in

the intellect (nn. 460–62). Much of what was said against the preceding opinions applies here, too, according to Scotus. Nevertheless, he adds some further comments and goes to some length to explain how the relevant passages of Aristotle are to be interpreted.

There is a weak parallel between the discussion in QDA 12 and the discussion of the last two opinions in the *Ordinatio*. In both cases the opinions rejected by Scotus are, respectively, that the intelligible species is the formal principle of intellection and that the species is intellection. But in QDA 12 the editors of the critical edition associate Thomas Aquinas with the first opinion and Giles of Rome (and perhaps Thomas of Sutton, too) with the second,²³ whereas in Ord. 1.3 Thomas of Sutton and Giles of Rome are associated with both opinions. So it seems that Scotus never expressly deals with the position of Aquinas, perhaps because he considers Sutton's opinion sufficiently similar to that of Aquinas, which would be no wonder, since Sutton is known to have defended Aquinas's doctrines frequently.

Thus far, Scotus has established that with respect to intellection the object, either in itself or in its representations (phantasm and intelligible species), is not the total cause of intellection. Neither is the intellect itself the total cause (emphasized by means of several extra arguments: nn. 490–93). “If, therefore, neither the soul alone nor the object alone is the total cause of actual intellection—and these are the only factors that appear to be required for intellection—it follows that these two are one integral cause with respect to the genesis of cognitions” (n. 494). Scotus explains how this is to be understood by calling into use his famous theory of essentially ordered causes.²⁴ The idea is as follows: Intellect and object are *both* required to account for intellection, and they must be at work simultaneously—not, however, as two causes of equal standing. They are essentially ordered causes in that “one of them is simply more perfect than the other, but in such a manner that each of the two is perfect in its own causality and not dependent on the other.” In spite of the fact that each factor is a cause in its own right, it cannot just by itself cause the effect: both causes have to cooperate while using their own causal power, operating independently in the sense that the one does not receive its causality or causal power from the other (nn. 496–98). Note that so far Scotus has only established that intellect and object are causes of unequal perfection, jointly required to cause intellection.

The question, then, is how important is each cause (n. 554)? Scotus argues that the intellective soul is the main cause. This must already be the case for reasons of the soul's perfection. The soul has “more actuality” than other things, so it must be the main agent in any cooperation (n. 557). It is in its own being definitely more perfect than its objects, which in the intellect have

only being in a limited sense (n. 558; see above, as well as the interpolations at nn. 359 and 382). The relative importance of the intellective part of the soul more specifically rests on its unlimited capacity with respect to intellections. An object can only lead to an intellection of itself, whereas the intellect can have a virtually infinite number of intellections corresponding to an infinity of objects. Hence it is the more important power (n. 559). It also rests on the fact that the intellect is autonomous: it is free to engage in cognitive acts, with intelligible species merely being instrumental in their production (nn. 560, 562).

In this presentation of his theory of the co-causality of object and intellect, Scotus does not clarify the latter's role beyond the statement that "the intellective soul or something that is formally part of it" is involved. Is he referring here to agent intellect and/or possible intellect? Neither does he explain how these Aristotelian powers would fit into the Augustinian picture of the soul as consisting of memory, intelligence, and will. He is, nevertheless, well aware of these problems, as witnessed by several pertinent remarks inserted in the text (cf. nn. 554, 563). As noted earlier, the most complete treatment of Scotus's theory of the causes of intellection is found in his late *Quodlibet* 15, where he addresses, in addition, the two problems just mentioned. To wind up this part of the introduction it will be convenient to compare the result of the *Ordinatio* discussion and the relevant complementary conclusions of Quod. 15.

In the intellect two activities occur: the production of the intelligible species and the production of an act of intellection. In the first a potentially intelligible object as represented in the phantasm is made actually intelligible in the form of an intelligible species; the main cause here is the agent intellect. The second activity consists in the intellect's taking up of the intelligible species, which results in actual intellection of the species' intelligible content (n. 563). In Quod. 15, Scotus considers two models of the process of intellection, each involving the same two activities and differing only with respect to the role of the agent and possible intellect. In the first model the agent intellect first transforms a phantasm into an intelligible species, which it then delivers into the possible intellect, thereby effectively causing intellection. The possible intellect remains passive, both in receiving the species and in receiving the intellection. In the second model the task of the agent intellect is restricted to the production of intelligible species, whereas actual intellection is effectively caused by the possible intellect's actively taking up and expressing the species. While detailing these models, Scotus also attempts to map them onto the Augustinian view of the mind. In the first model, the agent intellect, as a cause of intellection, belongs to intellective memory; as receiving the species the possible intellect is called

memory; as receiving actual intellection it is called intelligence. In the second model the agent intellect does not belong to intellective memory (the species does): the possible intellect belongs to memory both as conserving intelligible species and as expressing actual knowledge.²⁵ Then Scotus concludes, “Briefly, if one would not accept that the powers [of the soul] are really distinct, either as absolute entities or as real relations, but rather that one and the same absolute entity, somehow unlimited, is the immediate principle of many acts, but with respect to different acts is called a different power, then the first approach seems to be likely (*probabilis*).”²⁶ Scotus himself denied a real distinction between the powers of the soul, at least at some point in his career (Rep. 2.16). If he did not change his mind, this would imply that he also favors the first model himself.

TRINITY IN MAN: TRACE AND IMAGE

The first question of Ord. 1.3 may have occasioned a variety of questions concerning the nature of human cognition as such; however, the overarching issue remains whether man by his natural powers can have knowledge of the God of Catholic faith, who is “one God in three persons.” Following Augustine’s lead in his *On the Trinity*, medieval theologians set out to clarify the dogma that the divine essence is really one and yet three really distinct persons by considering the human mind as an image of the Trinity. Augustine had pointed out that the human mind is one undivided substance and yet has several distinct powers: memory, intelligence, and will (*memoria, intellectus, voluntas*). This is already an instance of “three-in-one,” but Augustine also wanted to catch the “genesis” of the Trinity in the divine, the so-called “processions” of the persons. According to Catholic faith, God the Father generates the Son and the Father and the Son generate the Holy Spirit. Augustine finds an image of this mystery in the mind (*mens*), as it is the generating principle of (acts of) knowledge and (acts of) of love (*notitia, amor*). These two analogies became fundamental to virtually all medieval thinking about the Trinity; they also established an intimate link between the theology of the Trinity and psychological theory concerning the human mind, or, in medieval terms, the intellective soul.

Scotus gives his view on the matter in the second part of Ord. 1.3 and in the final question of the third part. In both cases his starting point is Augustine’s *On the Trinity*, the substance of which is concerned with the notion of an “image” of the Trinity, but Augustine also talks of a “trace” of the Trinity (n. 284). As Scotus points out, the two notions are very different: an image represents the whole of something, a trace only a part (nn. 286, 575). The question as to whether there is a trace of the Trinity “in every

creature” deserves a separate treatment in the single question of Ord. 1.3.2, and the question as to whether there is an image of the Trinity “in our mind” is addressed later. Scotus offers a very sophisticated analysis of the linguistic and metaphysical aspects of the trace relation in general and an elaborate exegesis of some pertinent Augustinian texts. The philosophical analyses are of interest in themselves more than as prerequisites for the essentially faith-based but dogmatically innocent conclusion—that is, that viewed as a trace any creature represents God (nn. 298, 331) and that various characteristics of the created world can be seen as representing an aspect proper to a divine person (n. 299).

The issue of an image of the Trinity in our mind is theologically more sensitive: the image has to preserve the real distinction between the divine persons, their “consubstantiality” in the unity of the divine essence, and their order of origin (n. 576). Crucially, the mind has three powers (or “first acts” or “perfections”)—namely, memory, intelligence, and will; these are indistinct or “really the same” (cf. Rep. 2.16), thus constituting “one single fertile principle” of two different “productions” (or operations or “second acts”): intellection (or the generation/reception of knowledge) and volition (the reception of an act of willing) (n. 580; cf. Note by Scotus in n. 584). This combination of first and second acts essentially constitutes an image of the Trinity. To support this conclusion, Scotus offers a fitting interpretation of the relevant texts of Augustine in which he tries to harmonize the latter’s two triads cited earlier.

In the present question Scotus appears to follow Augustine’s intention: to look at the mind, its powers, and operations in order to gain understanding of the mystery of the Trinity. The emphasis is on the mind to the extent that it *resembles* the Trinity. But in his theological treatment of the Trinity itself, Scotus goes further. There, the psychological process of forming a concept (or a “mental word”) is what constitutes and explains the procession of the Son from the Father (cf. Ord. 1.27). Friedman calls this the “strong” use of philosophical psychology, which is characteristic of late thirteenth-century Franciscan trinitarian theology.²⁷

PART 1

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

QUESTION 1

CAN GOD BE KNOWN NATURALLY BY THE INTELLECT OF THE WAYFARER?

INITIAL ARGUMENTS FOR BOTH QUESTIONS

1 As for the third distinction, I start with questions concerning the knowability of God. The first one is whether God can be known naturally by the intellect of the wayfarer.

[*Interpolation*] “For the Apostle says”: as regards the first part of this distinction, where the Master [i.e., Peter Lombard] treats God’s knowability, five questions are asked. The first is whether God can be known naturally by the intellect of the wayfarer [= Q. 1 below]; the second is whether God is the first thing known by us in our present state [= Q. 2 below]; the third is whether God is the first natural object—that is, the adequate object—for the intellect of the wayfarer [= Q. 3 below]; the fourth is whether some transcendental, different from being (*ens*) but equally common as being, can be posited as the first object of our intellect [= a section of Q. 3 below, starting at n. 167]; the fifth is whether a certain and genuine truth can be known naturally by our intellect without any special illumination of the uncreated light [= Q. 4 below]. As for the first:

I argue that this is not possible. In *On the Soul* III the Philosopher says, “Phantasms are related to the intellect as sensibles are to the senses.”¹ The senses, however, only perceive what is sensible. Therefore, the intellect understands only things of which a phantasm can be apprehended through the senses. But of God there is no phantasm, nor is he something of which there can be a phantasm. Therefore, etc.

2 Also, according to *Metaphysics* II, “Just as the eye of an owl stands to the light of the sun, so our intellect stands to the things of nature that are most evident.”^{2*} But in the former case there is impossibility [since an owl cannot look at or see the sun]. Hence there is also impossibility in the latter case.

* [*Interpolation*] According to the Commentator, such things are first principles or separate substances [cf. *Rep.* 1A.3 n. 2].

3 Also, according to *Physics* I, “The infinite as infinite is unknown.”³ And in *Metaphysics* II, it is said, “It is not the case that we know an infinite number of things.”⁴ So we cannot know the infinite either as our finite intellect seems to have the same disproportion vis-à-vis the infinite as vis-à-vis an infinite number of things. The infinite exceeds [our intellect] as much as or at least not less than an infinite number of things does.

4 Also, Gregory writes in his commentary on Ezekiel, “However much our mind (*mens*) will have progressed in contemplating God, it does not attain what he himself is, but only what is beneath him.”⁵

5 To the contrary, according to *Metaphysics* VI, “Metaphysics is theology about God and is primarily concerned with divine things.”⁶ Therefore, etc. And in *Ethics* X, Aristotle places human happiness in the exercise of metaphysics—that is, in the activity of considering separate substances.⁷

QUESTION 2

IS GOD THE FIRST THING THAT IS NATURALLY KNOWN BY US IN OUR PRESENT STATE?

6 In this context I ask whether God is the first thing naturally known by us in our present state.

For a positive answer: “Each thing is related to cognition just as it is related to being (*esse*), from *Metaphysics* II.”⁸ But God is the first being. Therefore, he is the first thing known.

7 Also, nothing is known in a perfect way unless God is known in a perfect way. Hence, nothing is known in an unqualified sense (*simpliciter*) unless God is known in an unqualified sense. The inference is clear because in things that are subsistent (*per se*) [the following holds]: “Just as the maximum relates to the maximum, so the unqualified relates to the unqualified” and vice versa—from *Topics* II.⁹

8 Also, the most perfect act of a power is directed toward the object that is first in an unqualified sense. According to *Ethics* X, the most perfect act is directed toward God.¹⁰ Therefore, God is the first knowable object in an unqualified sense.

9 To the contrary: all our knowledge originates from the senses, according to *Metaphysics* I¹¹ and *Posterior Analytics* II at the end [of book II of *Post. An.*].¹² Therefore, God, who is most distant from the senses, is not what is first known by our intellect.

CLARIFICATION OF THE FIRST QUESTION

10 In the first question there is no need to make the distinction as to whether God can be known by negation or by affirmation because a negation can only be understood on the basis of an affirmation, according to *On interpretation* II at the end¹³ and *Metaphysics* IV.¹⁴ It is also clear that we only know negations concerning God by means of affirmations because through affirmations we get rid of other features that are incompatible with them [cf. *Rep.* 1A.3 n. 9]. Also, what we love most are not negations. Similarly, a negation can either be conceived strictly [as in “not-stone”] or predicatively [as in “X is not a stone”]. If a negation is taken strictly, as in “not-stone,” it

applies equally well to nothing as it does to God, since a pure negation is said of both being and nonbeing. Therefore, in this way [by a pure negation] God is no more understood than nothing or a chimera. If the negation is understood predicatively, then I ask whether the underlying concept about which the negation is known to be true is affirmative or negative. If it is affirmative, we have our point. If it is negative, I ask as before whether the negation is conceived absolutely or predicatively. If in the first way, then it applies as much to nothing as it does to God. If it is conceived predicatively, we argue as before. No matter how far one proceeds in successive negations, either God will be no more understood than nothing or one will have to stop at some affirmative concept that is first.

11 Second, there is no need to distinguish between knowing “what something is” (*quid est*) and knowing “whether something is” [or “that something is” (*si est*)]. At present I am looking for a simple concept, whose existence (*esse*) [i.e., something actually satisfying it] is known by an act of the intellect composing or dividing [i.e., making affirmative or negative judgments]. For I never know of something “whether it is” unless I have some concept of the thing of which I know that it is. This concept is the object of our present inquiry.

12 Third, neither should a distinction be made with respect to the question “whether something is” (*si est*) as being either a question about the truth of a proposition or a question about God’s existence (*esse*). For if there can be a question about the truth of a proposition in which “existence” is predicated of a subject, then, in order to understand the truth of that question or proposition, one must first conceive the terms of that proposition. Our present inquiry concerns the simple concept of that subject—namely, whether such a concept [i.e., a natural concept of God] is possible.

13 Fourth, it is not useful to distinguish between natural and supernatural concepts, since our inquiry is about a natural concept.

14 Fifth, with respect to the natural, it is not useful to distinguish between speaking of nature in an absolute sense and speaking of nature as regards our present state because our inquiry is precisely about knowledge in this present state.

15 Sixth, it is not useful to distinguish between knowing God in creatures (*in creatura*) and knowing God in himself (*in se*). For if knowledge is to be had by means of a creature in such a way that discursive knowledge started from a creature, then I ask where this knowledge comes to an end. If it comes to an end in God in himself, I have my point because that concept of God in himself is what I am looking for. But if the discursive knowledge does not come to an end in God in himself but in a creature, then the end of the discursive process will be the same as the starting point, and thus no

knowledge of God will be obtained—at least no understanding occurs in the final stage of the discursive process if it comes to an end in an object that is the very starting point of the discursive process.

16 {With respect to knowledge of God “if he is” (*si est*) and “what he is” (*quid est*) Godfrey of Fontaines refutes, in question 11 of his *Quodlibet* VII, Henry of Ghent’s view of the distinction between “if he is” [and “what he is”] and his thesis that knowledge of “what he is” is possible.—Note: the “what” indicated by a name is the “what” of a thing, and it includes the “if it is,” for according to *Metaphysics* IV, “the concept (*ratio*) of which the name [or word] is a sign is the definition.”¹⁵ Yet, the “what it is” of a name is more common than the being (*esse*) and than the “what” of a thing because being signified by a name applies to more things than does being. But where they are joined together they are the same. The case is similar to the following: not every color is whiteness, but the color that is whiteness is the same as whiteness. Yet the example is not perfectly similar, since color is taken from a partial perfection. It is different in the present case: here the whole “what” is related to the name as to its sign, and the same whole is related to the thing as the quiddity is related to its subject (*suppositum*). But concerning one and the same “what,” I know the first relation [of “what” as related to the name] prior to the second one [“what” as related to the underlying subject]. The order of these cognitions does not only consist in the fact that with respect to the same simple concept one relation is known prior to the other. It also consists in the fact that the simple concept is somehow different in many things—namely, in [various] definitions because the first concept is confused (*confusus*) and the second distinct [cf. n. 72 below]. Either the first [confused] concept does not make explicit the parts of the concept, or if it does, it does not do so distinctly in terms of their compatibility or incompatibility. The second [distinct] concept does make the compatibility of its parts explicit, and in doing so it shows its conceptual content (*rationem*) to be true (*veram*), and hence it also shows the “what” that expresses the “what it is” of a possible thing.

17 Second, with respect to the subject of the first science, note that the “what” expressed by its name [i.e., its nominal definition], its “whether it is” and its “what it is” are simultaneously known in advance. No science asks “whether it is” or “what it is” with respect to its first subject. So these questions either cannot be asked at all or they can only be asked in another, preliminary science. But no science is prior to the first science. Therefore, it is utterly impossible to ask “whether it is” or “what it is” with respect to the first subject of the first science. Therefore, its subject is an absolutely simple concept (*conceptus simpliciter simplex*); therefore: being (*ens*).

Concerning the concept of “*per se* being” (*ens per se*) [which is not

absolutely simple], doubts can arise as to the compatibility of the parts of the concept [namely *per se* and *being*]. For that matter, “God,” too, is not [an absolutely simple concept] because we do not have an absolutely simple notion (*ratio simpliciter simplex*) of God by which to distinguish him from other things. So for any such concept [i.e., for any concept that is not absolutely simple, like the concept of *per se* being or of God], we can ask “whether it is” and have a demonstration that its conceptual content (*ratio*) is not incoherent. Hence, it is impossible for the wayfarer to have a concept of God according to which God could be the first subject of metaphysics.

Also, whatever we can prove about God is right away virtually (*primo virtualiter*) contained in the notion of being because, just as a simple and convertible property is right away included in a subject, a disjunctive property is included, too. Therefore, a subject includes right away that one member of a disjunctive property belongs to some being. So “being” (*ens*) includes right away virtually this argument: “Some being is first”; hence, also “whether it is” and “what it is.” On the basis of this reasoning we have: “first being” is included in being right away, therefore, also everything that can be concluded about first being, by reason of this whole [= first being] or by reason of the notion of being. Therefore, by its goal and by its principle, metaphysics is theology. For just as it is more fundamentally about substance than about accidents (according to *Metaphysics* VII),¹⁶ so, extending the analogy, it is more fundamentally about God. For what is prior in the order of perfection is always included in the notion of the first subject, particularly that member of a disjunctive property that is the more perfect one in an unqualified sense.

18 Objection: Knowledge that is more perfect in an unqualified sense is never virtually included in less perfect knowledge; rather, it is the other way around. Therefore, no knowledge of God that is naturally attainable by a wayfarer is ever more perfect than the concept of being. Therefore, happiness is to be found in studying that concept. [Reply to the objection:] if this argument were correct, the assumptions concerning non-simple concepts underlying the initial arguments in favor of the first part [i.e., for a negative answer to the first question; cf. nn. 1–4] would be correct, too. But this is what Henry denies. Rather, he argues for a proper and simple concept of God by means of the motion of effects. But then being is not common [univocal], but analogous. And thus the first science of being will be about the first being to which all other things are related (by an analogy of attribution).}

19 So the meaning of the question is this: can the intellect of the wayfarer naturally have a simple concept in which God is conceived?

20 A certain doctor [Henry of Ghent] gives the following reply: speaking about knowledge of something, one can distinguish, on the side of the object, between knowledge of a thing by the thing itself (*per se*) and knowledge of it by accident (*per accidens*), knowledge of a thing in particular (*in particulari*) and knowledge of it in general (*in universali*).¹⁷—God is not really known by accident. For whatever is known of him, is he himself. Yet by knowing some attribute of his we know what (*quid*) he is as if by accident. That is why Damascenus (in *On the Orthodox Faith*, book I, chapter 4) says about God’s attributes, “They do not express God’s nature but what surrounds his nature.” Furthermore, God is known in general (*in universali*), which is through a general attribute (*generali attributo*)—not, however, in the way a universal would be predicated of him because there is no universal in him, since his quiddity is singular of itself. But God is known in general through a general attribute that is only analogically common to him and creatures. Yet this attribute is conceived by us as if it were one (*quasi unum*) because the concepts involved are close to each other, even though they are different. God is not known in particular (*in particulari*) on the basis of creatures because a creature only bears a fleeting similarity to him so as to be only like him (*conformis*) with respect to some attributes that are not this [divine] nature in particular. Therefore, since a thing does not lead to the knowledge of something else other than under the aspect of being like it, it follows that, etc.

21 Moreover, there are three levels of general knowledge (*in universali*): general (*generaliter*), more general (*generalius*), and most general (*generalissime*). Now “most general” knowledge comes in three levels, for when we know a being as just “this being” (*ens ut hoc ens*) in the most undifferentiated way, then being is conceived as a part of a concept, as it were. And this is the first stage. Then, by removing “this” and by conceiving “being” we get the second stage; for then, insofar as being is a concept [in its own right] and not just a part [of a concept], it is already conceived as analogously common to God and creatures. In the third stage a concept of being that applies to God is obtained by conceiving negatively indeterminate being—in other words, being that cannot have any determination [cf. n. 105] and distinguishing it from the concept of being that applies analogously and is just privatively indeterminate being [i.e., being stripped of its determinations, as in stage two]. What is “indeterminate” in the first way [i.e., negatively indeterminate being] is as a form abstracted from all matter, as self-subsistent and participable [i.e., something in which something else can participate]. What is “indeterminate” in the second way [i.e., privatively indeterminate being] is a universal abstracted from the particulars that actually participate in it. After these three stages of conceiving in the most

general way, God can be conceived in a moderately general way [*generalius*: less general than the most general way but *more* general than just general!] by conceiving any of his attributes not in an unqualified sense as before but as existing in the highest degree of perfection. In a general way [which is again less general] God can because of his simplicity be conceived by conceiving any of his attributes as being identical with his primary attribute: “being” (*esse*). God is not known through a species proper to him (for nothing is more simple than he is) but through a species alien to him, derived from creatures in a way that resembles the operation of our estimative power.* And this applies to all three ways discussed earlier [cf. Rep. 1A.3 nn. 23–27].

* [Interpolation] Just as the estimative power in a brute animal knows intentions it did not sense (such as harm and profit) by digging them up from under the intentions that it *did* sense, our intellect, thanks to its keen sense of understanding, digs under the species of a creature (which [species] represents nothing but the creature) for the purpose of knowing what belongs to God and what is said of him [cf. Lect. 1.3 n. 12].

THE OPINION OF HENRY OF GHENT CONCERNING QUESTION 2

22 As for the second question, it is according to this view [i.e., Henry of Ghent’s] necessary to distinguish between two ways of conceiving: naturally and rationally.¹⁸ In the first way God is the first object that can be known by us from creatures, since natural knowledge proceeds from the indeterminate to the determinate. Now, what is negatively indeterminate is more indeterminate than what is privatively indeterminate. Hence the former is conceived before the latter. And what is privatively indeterminate is in turn prior in our knowledge to what is determinate because “being and thing are the first impressions that come into our intellect,” according to Avicenna (*Metaphysics* 1.5).¹⁹ So with respect to the way of cognizing naturally, the very first object for our intellect is what is negatively indeterminate. In the rational mode of cognizing, however, it [= what is negatively indeterminate] is known later, following upon the cognition of creatures in three stages: first in a most general way (*generalissime*), then in a more general way (*generalius*), and, finally, in a general way (*generaliter*). We first conceive “this good thing.” Then we conceive the universal “good” that is abstracted by a secondary abstraction and that is something privatively indeterminate. Then we conceive “good” as abstracted by a primary abstraction, which [good] is something negatively indeterminate. The sequence proceeds in this manner because the process of rational deduction requires that we know the item upon which abstraction operates before the

item that is to be abstracted.

23 How God is what is first cognized in a natural way is explained [by Henry] as follows. As being cognized first in this manner [i.e., “naturally”], God is not distinguished from other things because of his simplicity and because he is only first with respect to the first two stages of conceiving in the most general way, none of which attains a notion (*ratio*) that confines that attribute to God. As regards the question of how God can be known by the cognizing intellect without being distinguished from other things, the following example is given: just as the eye first sees light but does not discern anything [in it] due to its subtlety, and just as it discerns color through the light.

SCOTUS: A QUIDDITATIVE CONCEPT OF GOD IS POSSIBLE

24 My answer to the first question is different, and I will oppose the preceding view in several points (five, to be precise [cf. nn. 25, 26, 56, 58, 61]); the arguments for my position will show the opposite of the other [i.e., the preceding] position.

[*Note by Duns Scotus*] Perhaps the following procedure would be a good one: first, to put this first question [n. 1] and then because the solution of that question depends on the third question (given the fact that anything that incorporates the nature (*ratio*) of the first object of vision, is itself visible), immediately move on to the third one [n. 108]—namely, “Is God the first object of our intellect?” The arguments that are now at the head of the second question [nn. 7–9] are sufficiently appropriate for that one [= the third question].

Then, concerning the second question [n. 6], first the distinction of the triple primacy is to be made [nn. 69–70, 71–94, 95–98, 99], starting with the primacy of adequacy where we have to examine three opinions [in 108–28, 167–84]: first, that of Thomas, who has one extreme answer: “no” [nn. 110–12 (–124)]; second, that of Henry, who has the other extreme answer: “yes” [nn. 125–29] and two arguments for that view are relevant to the third question [nn. 108–9]; and third, the correct opinion, beginning at “In view of these ...” [nn. 167–70, 184].

Having dealt with these issues, then, in order to examine the first object according to commonality [nn. 129–51], the question should be asked whether some real concept is univocally common to all things that are intelligible *per se* [nn. 129–31]. Here one extreme opinion says, no, there is not, except in the case of things that belong to the same predicamental category [= Henry of Ghent]. In favor of this opinion are

some arguments [nn. 152–57] that are listed before “in view of these.” Against this view: the arguments that are formulated against Henry in the solution of the first question [= the five arguments in favor of univocation, in nn. 27–44] and are clarified in the third question are conclusive with respect to substance and accident [nn. 139–46]. Solution [of the question]: there is no real concept univocally common to the ultimate differences and the attributes because of the four reasons given in the third question [nn. 132–35], but there is a real concept univocally common to all quidditative concepts [nn. 137–46, 150–51].

When this question has been solved [the following possibilities are to be considered]: either there is no first object of the intellect or there is a first object in two ways—namely, the way of virtuality and the way of commonality to all things because a single [kind of] primacy is not found in everything. So there is in being a twofold primacy [nn. 129, 137]. A distinction concerning the first object: [it can be considered] from the side of the nature of the power and according to our present state [nn. 185–88]. And there the reply based on the deficiency of the [natural] light [of the intellect] is excluded.

Then the solution of this first question [can be given] [cf. n. 1; solution in nn. 25–26, 56–62]. Then what was left out concerning the twofold primacy [can be examined] [nn. 71–94, 95–98].

Alternatively, since the *per se* object is obvious from the acts of a power, whereas the first object is deduced from a number of *per se* objects (for the first object is an adequate object and so the first object virtually covers all *per se* objects), two extreme opinions will be treated here: first, the one of Thomas (“no”), to be discussed below, in the third question [nn. 110–12]; second, the one of Henry (“yes, in a proper concept”), [to be treated] here [i.e., in the first question]. This may be done forcefully because of the six arguments to the opposite [nn. 27, 35, 36, 38, 41, 44]. The third opinion [Scotus’s own view] must be intermediate, proposing that a proper concept is indeed possible, although not in the present state unless in a concept univocally common to God and creatures. And then [i.e., when this alternative procedure has been followed] the entire third question, both as regards the univocity of being and as regards the nature of the true etc. [i.e., concerning the transcendentals “being” and “true” as the first objects of our intellect] has been laid down.

25 I start with the following statement: not only can we naturally have a concept in which God is conceived as it were by accident—for example, in some attribute—but also a concept in which he is conceived *per se* and quidditatively. Here is the proof: when we conceive “wise” we conceive,

according to Henry, a property or a quasi-property that perfects a nature in a second act. Therefore, when we understand “wise” we must first understand a “what” of which we understand that it has this quasi-property. So, prior to the concepts of all attributes or quasi-attributes one must look for a quidditative concept of which they are understood to be attributes. And that other concept will be a quidditative concept of God because we cannot come to a halt in any other concept.

The concept of being is univocal to God and creatures

26 Second, I state that God is not only conceived in a concept that is analogous to a concept of a creature—that is, in a concept that is entirely different from one that is applied to a creature—but also in a concept that is univocal to him and to a creature. And to avoid disagreement over the word “univocation,” I call a concept univocal if it is one in such a way that its unity is sufficient for a contradiction to arise when it is affirmed and denied of the same thing. Its unity is also sufficient for its use as a middle term in a syllogism so that we may conclude without committing a fallacy of equivocation that when the extremes are united in the middle term having that unity, they are also united among themselves.

27 Now I give five arguments to prove univocity in this sense. The first argument runs as follows: every intellect that is in doubt over several concepts but certain of one concept has the concept of which it is certain as different from the ones over which it is in doubt—[this is true because] the subject [“every intellect that is certain”] includes the predicate [“has the concept”]. But the intellect of the wayfarer can be certain of the fact that God is a being, while it remains in doubt about whether he is a finite or an infinite being, a created or an uncreated being. Hence the concept of being as affirmed of God is different from the one and the other concept [i.e., from both members in each of the two pairs mentioned], and thus of itself it is neither the one nor the other but is included in both of them. Hence it is univocal [cf. Rep. 1A.3 n. 28].

28 Proof of the major premise: one and the same concept can never be certain and doubtful at the same time. So either it is another concept [different from the doubtful ones], which is our thesis, or it is not, but then there is no certainty for any concept.

29 Proof of the minor premise: every philosopher was certain of the fact that what he postulated as the first principle is a being. For example, one philosopher with respect to fire, another with respect to water, was certain that it was a being {Interpolation: with being (*ens*) conceived univocally}:²⁰ but he was not certain of whether it was a created or an uncreated being, the first being or not. He was not certain that it was the first being because then

he would have been certain of what is false, and what is false cannot be known. Nor was he certain that it was not the first being, for in that case he would not have proposed the opposite [namely, that it was the first being]. The argument may be corroborated as follows: a person who sees philosophers disagreeing could be certain of the fact that whatever was proposed as the first principle is a being, but, as a consequence of the contrary views of the philosophers, he could still doubt whether it was this being or that being [i.e., fire or water]. Now suppose that such a doubting person were given a demonstration proving or disproving some lower concept—for example, a demonstration that fire is not the first being but some being posterior to the first being. Then that person's original concept of being, of which he was sure, would not be disproved but would survive in that particular concept that was proved with respect to fire. And so the proposition that was assumed at the end of the argument is proved—namely, that this certain concept, which of itself is neither of the two doubtful concepts [finite or infinite, or created or uncreated], is preserved in both of them.

30 Perhaps you will dismiss the authority of this argument about the disagreement between philosophers [as Henry would do], saying that each of them has in fact two concepts in his mind that are close to each other and seemingly one concept on account of the closeness of analogy [cf. Rep. 1A.3 n. 29]. The following observation goes against this: such an escape seems to destroy every possible way of proving the univocal unity of a concept. For if you say that “human” (*homo*) is one concept, applicable to both Socrates and Plato, this will be denied, and it will be said that there are two concepts that seem to be one on account of their great similarity [cf. Rep. 1A.3 nn. 30–31].

31 {Moreover, these two concepts [“being” as applied to God and “being” as applied to creatures] are simple in an unqualified sense. Therefore, they are intelligible only in a distinct and complete way. Therefore, if they do not seem to be two right away, they will not seem to be two later on.

32 Also, either these concepts are conceived as totally disconnected (*disparati*), and then it is astonishing how they seem to be one or are conceived as connected according to an analogy or a likeness or a distinction, and then they are simultaneously or previously conceived as distinct. So they do not seem to be one concept [cf. Ord. 1.8 n. 59].

33 Also, by positing two concepts you posit two formal objects being cognized. But how could two formal objects be cognized without being cognized as distinct?

34 Moreover, if the intellect could understand (*intelligeret*) singulars according to their proper notions (*rationes*), then, even though the concepts

of two singulars of the same species would be most similar (they would certainly be much more similar than the two concepts we were talking about [finite and infinite being, or created and uncreated being] because the latter concepts differ according to species), the intellect would nevertheless very well distinguish between such concepts of two singulars. This objection [in n. 30] is also refuted in distinction 8, question 3, as well as another objection denying the major premise [in n. 27: “Every intellect that is certain”].}

35 The second main argument runs as follows: in the intellect of the wayfarer a real concept is caused naturally only by things that are naturally capable of moving our intellect. Such things are a phantasm (or the object shining out in the phantasm) and the agent intellect. Hence, no simple concept arises naturally in our intellect in its present state if not by virtue of these factors. But a concept that is not univocal to the object shining out in the phantasm, but entirely different and prior and related to it by analogy, cannot arise by virtue of the agent intellect and the phantasms. Therefore such a different concept, which is supposed to be analogous, will never occur naturally in the intellect of the wayfarer. And so it will be impossible to have some concept of God in a natural way, which is false.

[*Note by Duns Scotus*] This second argument can be corroborated, against Henry, by what is said in distinction 8, question 3; but the reply will be given there [nn. 53–54].

Proof of the assumption [“but a concept that is not univocal”]: any object (be it shining out in a phantasm or in an intelligible species) according to its utmost power and in cooperation with the agent or the possible intellect brings about as its adequate effect a proper concept of itself* and a concept of all things that are essentially or virtually included in it. But this different concept, which is supposed to be analogous, is neither essentially nor virtually included in it, nor is it [the same as] the latter. Therefore, this supposedly different concept is not brought about by any such moving object.

* [*Interpolation presenting an alternative to the last part of the paragraph*] [... brings about as its adequate effect a proper concept of itself and] a quidditative [concept]. For that is its [i.e., the object’s] adequate offspring in the realm of the knowable, just as in the realm of natural being its offspring would be adequate when it is similar in nature. Hence, of whatever our intellect will be able to get an understanding, the offspring [the quidditative concept] will be less perfect than its own nature. As a consequence, the latter is not *per se* attributed to the former because what is more perfect [= the nature] is not attributed to what is less perfect [=

the concept]. Therefore it is not possible in any way to have a natural knowledge of God [cf. below, nn. 48–49: “But let us take the major.”].

Corroboration of the argument (“any object, be it”): apart from the proper and adequate concept of the object itself and a concept included in it in one of the two aforementioned modes [i.e., either essentially or virtually] nothing can be learned from this object other than by way of discursive reasoning. But discursive reasoning presupposes the knowledge of that simple concept toward which the reasoning develops. So let us formulate the following argument: no object produces in the intellect a proper simple concept—that is, a proper simple concept of *another* object, unless it contains that other object essentially or virtually. But a created object does not essentially or virtually contain an uncreated object, which by its very nature is the term to which it [i.e., the created object] is attributed, in the way something essentially posterior is attributed to what is essentially prior. Indeed, it is contrary to the very notion of being “essentially posterior” to include virtually what is prior to it. And it is clear that a created object does not essentially contain the uncreated according to something that is entirely proper to it [= the uncreated] and not common. Therefore, a created object does not produce a simple concept proper to an uncreated being.

36 {The third argument runs like this: the proper concept of a subject is a sufficient ground for concluding about that subject everything conceivable that resides in it necessarily. But we do not have a concept of God through which we can sufficiently cognize all the things conceived by us that are in him necessarily. This is clear with respect to the Trinity and other necessary truths of faith. Therefore, etc.

37 Proof of the major premise: we know any immediate proposition insofar as we know its terms. Hence the major premise is clear with respect to anything conceivable that immediately resides in the concept of a subject. If it [= anything conceivable] resides there in a mediated way, the same claim will be made with respect to the medium in relation to the same subject. And wherever we come to a stop we will have our point concerning the immediate propositions, and by these the mediated ones are known subsequently.

38 Fourth argument: one can argue as follows: either a pure perfection (*perfectio simpliciter*) has a conceptual content (*ratio*) that is common to God and creatures and then we have our point, or it has a conceptual content that is only proper to creatures, but then its content does not formally apply to God, which is unacceptable. Or it has a conceptual content that is entirely [and exclusively] proper to God, but then it follows that nothing can be attributed to God on account of the fact that it is a pure perfection because

this amounts to saying that an attribute is posited in God only because its conceptual content as it applies to God means a pure perfection. But in this way, Anselm's doctrine will collapse. For in his *Monologion* [ch. 15] he makes the following claim: "Leaving relations aside, [we maintain] with respect to all other attributes [that] any attribute that is such that it is unqualifiedly better itself than what it is not, must be attributed to God, just as any attribute that is not such must be removed from him." So according to Anselm, we first know something to be such [i.e., a pure perfection], and second, we attribute it to God. Therefore such a pure perfection is not something that is exclusively in God. This can be corroborated as follows: because then [i.e., in case a pure perfection has a conceptual content that is entirely proper to God alone] there would be no such perfection in a creature. The inference is clear, for a concept of that sort of perfection does not apply to creatures unless it is an analogous concept (by hypothesis). A concept of that sort is imperfect in itself, since it is analogous. And in nothing is its conceptual content better than what it is not, for otherwise the perfection would be posited in God according to that analogous content.

39 This fourth argument can also be corroborated as follows}: every metaphysical inquiry about God proceeds in the following way: it considers the formal notion (*ratio*) of something, then it removes from that formal notion the imperfection that it has in creatures while retaining the formal notion [as such], to which it then attributes completely the highest perfection and in this way it attributes that notion to God. For example, take the formal notion of wisdom (or of intellect) or of the will. It is first considered in itself and according to itself. Then, given that this notion does not [in itself] formally imply any imperfection or limitation, the imperfections that are connected with it in creatures are removed from it. Then, once the notions of wisdom and will as such are preserved, these properties are attributed to God in the most perfect way.* Therefore, every inquiry about God assumes that the intellect has an identical, univocal concept that it receives from creatures.

* [Note by Duns Scotus] Some supporting testimonies mentioned in distinction 8, question 3, "Against the first opinion" are relevant here [n. 44].

40 But if you say that the formal notion of things that apply to God is different [from that of things as they are in creatures],²¹ the unacceptable consequence is that it is impossible to conclude something about God on the basis of a notion proper to these things as far as they are in creatures because [in that case] the formal notions of what applies to God and of what is in creatures are completely different, and from the notion of wisdom that we

grasp from creatures we will no more conclude that God is formally wise than that God is formally a stone. Indeed, it is possible to form a concept other than that of a created stone [namely, the concept that is an idea in God] and to that concept of a stone, as it is an idea in God, this [created] stone is related by attribution. And according to this analogous concept we could formally say “God is a stone,” just as we say “God is wise” according to the relevant analogous concept.

41 {The fifth argument runs as follows: a more perfect creature can move [the intellect] to a more perfect concept of God. Therefore, when some vision of God, for example, the lowest one, and a given abstractive intellection (*intellectione*) of God are not as different from one another as the highest creature differs from the lowest one, it seems to follow that, if the lowest creature can move [the intellect] to an abstractive intellection, then the highest creature or one that is just beneath it will be able to move [the intellect] to an intuitive intellection, which is impossible [cf. Rep. 1A.3 n. 34].

42 Perhaps you will object that in an abstractive intellection of God there are as many degrees (*gradus*) as there are created species (even though the extreme degrees of intellection are not as distant from one another as the extremes of the species²²—which is very well possible, since the distance between any given degree of intellection and the adjacent degree is smaller than the distance between the created species moving [the intellect] to that given degree of intellection and the species moving [the intellect] to the other one).—Against this: the difference between abstractive intellects is not merely numerical, since they are produced by causes of different species and by features (*rationes*) proper to these causes, not insofar as they include something common as the univocity approach claims. It follows that between the lowest abstractive intellection and the lowest intuitive intellection there are more intermediate intellects than (or as many as) there are [intermediate species] between the lowest and the highest species of being. Now, if this conclusion is unacceptable, then, consequently, the antecedent is so, too. Therefore, there are fewer species of abstractive intellection than of being. As a result, starting from the lowest [species of being] and then moving upward there will be some species of being that is superior to the one that causes the highest abstractive intellection. Hence that superior species of being will cause an intuitive intellection of God.

43 Also, why are there said to be so many species of intellection with respect to the same object if the latter moves [the intellect] to a proper concept?

44 Also, in support of the principal thesis [i.e., the univocity of being]: it seems that every plurality can be reduced to a unity. So this goes for

concepts too}.

[*Note by Duns Scotus*] Note concerning the second article [cf. n. 26] that there are ten arguments: the first is about certain and doubtful concepts [n. 27]; the second is about the impossibility to understand God in our present state [n. 35]; the third is that we do not know everything that necessarily inheres in God [n. 36]; the fourth is that some perfection in an unqualified sense is common [n. 38]; the fifth is about the order of intellections corresponding to the order of creatures that move [the intellect] to them [n. 41]; a sixth argument can be construed from the fact that there would be an infinite number of abstractive intellections if there were an infinite number of species. These are the proper arguments. Common arguments are: coming to a stop in one [ultimate concept] [n. 44]; number and otherness [cf. Ord. 1.8. n. 83]; comparison [cf. *ibid.*]; and in *Metaphysics* II [993b24–27] “the most true,” etc.

To the first argument: in distinction 8, question 3 [there are] three replies of Henry [nn. 57, 59, 66, 68]; the first two are refuted there [nn. 58, 60, 67], the second here, “such an escape ...” [n. 30].—To the second argument: Henry’s reply is refuted in distinction 8 [nn. 52, 53–55], and it is treated here, below, as a common problem for both sides but by explaining the opinion of the analogy of concepts in terms of the very concepts involved [n. 54].—To the third argument it is said [by Henry] that it is possible to have some proper concept of a subject, a confused concept, not a defining one, by which nothing of that subject is evident, not even what most immediately inheres in it (for example: through the confused concept of man one does not know that man is “capable of laughing”). But any concept we have, even if it is a proper one, is not perfect in the way a defining concept of a creature is. This is corroborated as follows: in book II, distinction 3, the article concedes that an angel in the realm of natural things can have a proper concept of God [Ord. 2.3 n. 219 and n. 236], and yet in the Prologue it is claimed that theology is naturally known to God alone [n. 152].—To the fourth argument: a “pure perfection” is said [by Henry] to be that which is capable of having concepts that have an analogy of the imperfect to the perfect, in such a way that the notion of a “pure perfection” is not attributed to something that is unqualifiedly one according to concept. Moreover, the reasoning (*deductio*) of the saints and the masters seems to confirm this [fourth argument, n. 39]. To the confirmation given there [n. 40], “God is a stone,” a reply is given in distinction 8, question 3, at the place marked by the letter “e,” outside the text [n. 74].—The fifth argument is solved here, outside the text [nn. 42–43], where the argument is found [n. 41]. But to

the objection against the reply [n. 42, “Against this ...”], I answer: one must maintain that specific difference between intellections [n. 42], and one must concede that there are as many species of abstractive intellections of God as there are species of objects that move [the intellect]. This point is against you [Henry], for there are as many species of words [or concepts] proper to creatures as there are creatures. (One could argue there: “If there are fewer species of words of creatures than there are species of the creatures that are rendered by these words, then some creature can cause an understanding that is more perfect than any word of a creature, and thus [it can cause] a vision of God.”) In the same way as is answered here one can answer the [argument about the] abstractive intellections of God through creatures because on both sides [i.e., according to both opinions] there are as many abstractive intellections as there are objects that move [the intellect].—The sixth argument likewise is against you [Henry], for one must admit an infinite number of words, each of which is inferior to a vision of God, assuming the hypothesis concerning the infinite, necessity and, eternity as they are modes precisely [cf. n. 55], for as such they are unqualifiedly simple concepts.

So you only have to care about the first and the fourth arguments [nn. 27, 38], both because they are not equally problematic for both sides and because they do not lead to conclusions too far beyond what is proposed [n. 26], for they do not prove that we cannot have a concept proper to God but instead that we can have some common concept. Nevertheless, the first of these two statements, the negation [“we cannot have a concept proper to God”], seems to be false. Are there perhaps many quidditative concepts derived from creatures, each creature moving [our intellect] in a different way? And are they of different species or of the same? And when several [creatures] are moving, are there several [concepts] simultaneously about a plurality of moving objects, or is there always only one [concept] about the plurality?—Also, you deny intelligible species.

45 But what the univocity of being is like, and to how many things and to what kind of things it applies, will be treated in the question about the first object of the intellect [nn. 130ff.].

46 {There are objections against these arguments.²³ An objection against the first argument [in n. 27] concerns the disjunctive totality. This objection is to be found in distinction 8 [n. 68]; its refutation [= of the objection] is weaker than that of the other objections [= the replies alluded to in the first line of the second paragraph of the annotation to n. 44].

47 With respect to the second argument as it is outlined above [in n 35:

“So let us formulate the following argument”) the major premise is denied, for, since cause and effect are connected, an effect can produce a concept of a cause, although this concept will not be as perfect as the one the cause can produce of itself. For [likewise] it is granted that a conclusion produces knowledge of a principle through a demonstration of the simple fact (*demonstratio quia*). However, that is not the most perfect knowledge of a principle, which consists in knowledge through which a principle is known on the basis of a perfect knowledge of the terms involved. Now, why would it not be the same with concepts: that an effect that is apprehended unqualifiedly will cause some unqualified habitual knowledge of the cause?

48 Concerning the proof of the major premise [of n. 35], I say the following: although an equivocal effect cannot lead [the intellect] to its existing equivocal cause, nor to something of the same nature (*ratio*) as the cause, it still can lead [the intellect] to some knowledge (*notitia*) of the cause. This knowledge is not only less perfect than [that of] the cause in itself but also less perfect than [that of] the cause in its equivocal effect—that is, [less perfect than] a perfect concept of that effect.—But let us take the major premise as follows: “No object can lead [the intellect] to a concept of something unless it contains that concept virtually or essentially.” This proposition seems evident by the very notion (*ratio*) of cause and equivocal effect. And even though some people attribute the action [of concept formation wholly] to the intellect (I don’t care about that), an object, in whatever way it is required, cannot lead [the intellect] to a concept that is more perfect than the concept that is adequate to it; the latter is a proper, quidditative concept. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise [= “The latter is a proper”]: among the equivocal effects of one and the same cause the most perfect effect is the one that is most similar to the cause. Such is the intellectual offspring or the perfect word of the object [cf. Ord. 1.27]. Proof of the major premise [= “in whatever way an object ... adequate to it”]: otherwise the perfection of the intellective power (*intelligentia*) would surpass the full power of memory.

49 It seems that we must grant absolutely that through the action of a created object no concept of God can arise in us that is more perfect than the perfect concept of that [created] object itself. Consequently, no concept [of God] can arise in us to which this proper concept of the object that moves [the intellect] can be attributed. On the contrary, a concept of God based on a created object is less perfect than the word of the object [itself] because as an equivocal effect it is less similar to its cause.—We must, therefore, distance ourselves from Henry’s opinion if he says that the concept of a stone is attributed to a concept of God that is caused by a stone.²⁴ One can only maintain [with respect to Henry’s opinion] that an object as conceived is

attributed to an object, but not that a concept is attributed to a concept. And this is very well possible because from a more perfect conceived [object] a less perfect concept is obtained than from a less perfect conceived [object]. And how would it be reasonable that the same intellect has a proper concept of God that is unqualifiedly less perfect than the concept of a stone or of something white? And how would there be natural happiness (*beatitudo*) in the cognition of God (from *Ethics* X)²⁵ [cf. n. 18]?

50 But the same difficulty seems to arise for univocity [as for analogy]. Every concept of God will be less perfect than the proper perfect concept of white. For every such concept [of God] is contained in whiteness as a common concept in a special concept, and a common concept is unqualifiedly less perfect because it is potential and partial with respect to the special concept. So how will this partial common concept give rise to happiness in natural cognition of God?

51 Reply: according to the univocity approach any unqualifiedly simple concept [cf. n. 71 below] is positively less perfect than the word [or concept] of white—that is, it does not posit as much perfection [as the latter does]. Yet, in a less strict sense (*permissive*) it is more perfect because it abstracts from limitation and thus is conceivable under the aspect of infinity. And so the concept of infinite being, which is indeed simple, but not unqualifiedly simple, will be more perfect than the word [or concept] of [something] white. And so this concept will be proper to God but not the prior concept that is common and abstracted from whiteness. Therefore, in contrast to the analogy approach, the univocity approach maintains that every proper concept of God is more perfect than the word [or concept] of any created thing.

52 There are two counterarguments against this reply. First, one may argue that the difficulty for the univocity approach remains. Two concepts, both of which are less perfect than the word of white, do not seem to give rise to a concept that is more perfect than that word. But it was granted [in n. 51: “Any unqualifiedly simple concept”] that the concept of being is less perfect than that of [something] white or of a line, and the same goes for the concept of the infinite. Proof: the infinite is conceived by us through the finite and the finite through [the concept of] a line or some similar object that moves [the intellect] to the concept of the relevant attribute (*passio*). Therefore, the concept of the infinite is less perfect than that of a line. Corroboration of this argument: a concept that includes an affirmation and a negation is not more perfect because of the negation, or it is at least not more perfect than by conceiving the affirmation corresponding to that negation. But the concept “infinite being” is not a concept of something positive other than being. Therefore, infinity does not make a perfect concept, or the

concept of an infinite being will at least not be more perfect than that of a finite being.²⁶

53 The second counterargument in support of Henry's view runs along similar lines. An unqualifiedly simple concept is less perfect than the word or the concept of a creature, as has been argued [in n. 51]. However, many such concepts can be joined together, one determining the other, and then the complete concept will be more perfect.²⁷ And there is no more difficulty here [in the analogy approach] than there [in the univocity approach] except for two points. First, here each concept, be it determining or determinable, is said to be proper to God; there, one concept is said to be common and another proper. Second, here a concept proper to God is conceded to be less perfect than the word [or concept] of a creature; there, no such concept is acknowledged. But the first point is not inconvenient, for an attribute truly determines its subject, as, for example, "man" [is determined by] "able to laugh," while nevertheless both are equally common. The second point must be fully granted because of that second argument [in n 35: "So let us formulate the following argument"] when we are talking about the concept—that is, about the act of conceiving—but not when we are talking about the object conceived.

54 As for these counterarguments [in nn. 52 and 53]: a sufficiently appropriate answer seems to be that each opinion claims that a concept that is not absolutely simple [i.e., a complex or composed concept] is more perfect than the word of that which moves [the intellect] to just a part of it. But the gist of the counterarguments seems to be against both opinions. However many concepts may be joined together, each of them will be a concept imprinted [in the intellect] by the motion of a creature. Therefore, it is less perfect than the word of that creature. Now, how can a bundle (*aggregatio*) of less perfect concepts constitute a concept that is more perfect as to intensity? The corroboration [in n. 52] is also a good counterargument against what is said concerning the infinite. Therefore, it is not for this reason that the opinion [concerning univocity] is to be abandoned, since the difficulty is common to both opinions and affects them equally, even when the analogy of concepts is explained in terms of the objects conceived.

55 But perhaps the counterarguments [in nn. 52–53] do prove that the act [of intellection] concerning God is not the most perfect as to intensity. The latter condition, however, is not required for natural happiness (*beatitudo*) to occur. What is required is that the act be linked to the most perfect object (according to what is said in *On Animals* II: "Knowing little").²⁸ And perhaps some created object is loved more intensely than God; nevertheless, that loved object does not confer happiness now as God does (on this matter, see book IV: "How do we find happiness in an object" [Ord. 4.49.1–2]). The

remark concerning infinite being would be true if “infinite” were precisely a mode of conceiving an object and not a part of the concept, or a mode as conceived in itself, in the manner in which a certain degree of intensity is precisely a mode in which this whiteness is seen (compare the distinction made in the question about the unity of God regarding singularity as conceived and as precisely a mode of conceiving [Ord. 1.2 n. 83]). But we do not understand infinite being in that way, but rather as including two concepts, although the one [= infinite] determines the other [= being]. Perhaps the privative concept of the finite does not posit anything, although it gives the understanding of something positive, just as when we have a positive concept of the necessary, God is still more perfectly understood in a positive manner as an unqualifiedly necessary being. Perhaps we conceive both the necessary and the eternal only as the negation of an imperfection—for example, of the potentiality to be in a different way, or of something capable of change, or of the beginning or the end. “Eternal” means some sort of infinite, for infinity is definitely not more perfect in duration than in the amount of perfection, just as an infinite magnitude would be more perfect than infinite time.}

In its present state man cannot know God as to his proper essence

56 Third, I say that the wayfarer does not naturally cognize God in particular and in a proper way—that is, under the aspect of this essence as *this* [particular] essence and as it is in itself. But the argument for this thesis given by the supporters of the preceding opinion [in n. 20] is not conclusive. When they argue that something is only cognized through a likeness, this can either be understood with respect to a likeness of univocity or with respect to a likeness of imitation. If the first meaning is intended, then nothing can be known about God according to that opinion because, following that way of speaking, nothing whatsoever exhibits a likeness of univocity vis-à-vis God. But if the second meaning is intended and if creatures do not only imitate God’s essence under the aspect of a general attribute but also as this essence (or, as Henry himself has it, as it is a bare essence, existing in itself),²⁹ as such [i.e., as this essence] the essence is more an idea or an exemplar than under the aspect of a general attribute. And because of that kind of likeness a creature could be the principle of cognizing the divine essence in itself and in particular.

57 So there is another argument for the conclusion that God as *this* essence in itself is not naturally known by us. That argument runs as follows: under the aspect of being a certain knowable object, God is a voluntary object, not a natural object. He is only a natural object of his own intellect. Therefore, God cannot be naturally known by any created intellect under the

aspect of this essence as *this* essence. And no essence that we can naturally know sufficiently shows God's essence as *this* essence, whether through a likeness of univocity or through a likeness of imitation. Univocity only occurs in general notions (*rationes*). Imitation, too, falls short, for it is imperfect, since creatures imitate God only imperfectly. Whether there is another reason for this impossibility [of knowing God in particular and in a proper way]—namely, one based on the aspect of being the first object of our intellect, as some authors claim³⁰—will be discussed in the question about the first object [cf. nn. 110–18, 119, 185–87].

A concept proper to God alone: Infinite being

58 Fourth, I say that we can attain many concepts proper to God that do not apply to creatures, such as the concepts of all pure perfections taken in the highest degree. And the most perfect concept, in which we know God most perfectly as if in a kind of description, consists in conceiving all pure perfections in the highest degree. Yet, the most perfect and at the same time the simplest concept that we can have is the concept of “infinite being.” That concept is simpler than the concept of “good being” or “true being” or other similar concepts. For “infinite” is not a quasi-attribute or a property of being or of that of which “being” is predicated: it means an intrinsic mode of that entity. So, when I say “infinite being” I do not have a quasi-accidental concept composed of a subject and a property but rather a *per se* concept of a subject in a certain degree of perfection—namely, infinity. It is like “intense whiteness,” which is not an accidental concept in the way “visible whiteness” is. Intensity means an intrinsic degree of whiteness in itself. So the simplicity of this concept “infinite being” is obvious.

59 The perfection of this concept [“infinite being”] is proved as follows: first, this concept virtually includes more things than all [other] conceivable concepts do. For just as “being” virtually includes “true” and “good” in itself, so “infinite being” includes “infinitely true,” “infinitely good,” and all [other] pure perfections taken under the aspect of infinity. Second, the existence of an infinite being is the ultimate conclusion attained by means of a demonstration of the simple fact (*demonstratio quia*) (as is clear from the first question of distinction 2 [Ord. 1.2 nn. 74, 111–36, 147]). The most perfect things are the things that are cognized at the ultimate stage of a demonstration of the simple fact that starts with creatures, since their remoteness from creatures makes it most difficult to attain conclusions about them on the basis of creatures.

60 You [Henry] might say with respect to “highest good” or “highest being” that these notions [just like the notion “infinite being”] mean an intrinsic mode of being and virtually include the other concepts.³¹ I reply, if

“highest” is understood in a comparative sense, it means a relation to something external. But “infinite” means a concept in relation to itself. If, however, you understand “highest” in an absolute sense—namely, as a perfection that from its very nature cannot be surpassed—then this perfection is conceived more explicitly in the notion of an infinite being. For “highest good” does not in itself indicate whether it is infinite or finite.—This makes clear how to refute the view of the preceding opinion [in n 20: “In a general way”]—that it is most perfect to know attributes by leading them back (*reducendo*) to the divine being for reasons of God’s simplicity. For knowledge of God’s being under the aspect of infinity is more perfect than knowledge of God’s being under the aspect of simplicity, given that simplicity is shared with creatures, but infinity not, in the way it applies to God.

God is known through species of creatures

61 Fifth, I say that the things that are known about God are cognized through species of creatures. For whether the more universal and the less universal are cognized through the same species of the less universal or whether each has its own intelligible species, at least that which can impress a species of the less universal in the intellect can also cause a species of anything more universal. So creatures, which impress their own species in the intellect, can also impress [intelligible] species of the transcendentals that apply commonly to themselves and to God. And then the intellect can by its own power use many species at the same time to conceive at once the things of which they are species. For example, [the intellect can use] the species of good and the species of highest and the species of an act in order to conceive something that is the highest and most actual good. This is clear from the topic “from the lesser” [*locus a minori*: what can be done by a lesser power can be done by a higher as well]. The imaginative power [which is lesser than the intellect] can use species of various kinds of sensible things in order to imagine something that is composed from these things, as is clear when we imagine a golden mountain.

[*Interpolation*] I say that in this way our intellect knows that God is an infinite being, the highest good, and so on, for the concept of being is included in the concept of a creature. Hence, by understanding this being, for example this white [thing] or this stone, the intellect can, moving upward in abstraction, know the concept (*intentio*) of being and stay there. Similarly, the intellect can abstract [the notion] “highest” from “this highest” and “that highest” and thus know what “highest” means and then combine the notion “highest” with the notion “being” or “good” and so

understand highest being and highest good. And the same goes for infinite being. It is the same as when the imaginative power imagines a golden mountain, of which only the constituents [gold and mountain] exist in reality, not the combination of the constituents. In this way, by abstracting common notions (*intentiones*) from creatures and by combining them, we can know God in general and also that concept predicated of God that applies to him in the strongest sense, insofar as we know it [cf. *Lectura* 1.3 n. 56].

62 This argument clearly refutes what was said in the preceding opinion concerning digging [cf. the interpolated text at n. 21], for no amount of digging can dig up what is not there. Under the concept of a creature there is no concept or species representing something that is proper to God alone and entirely different from what applies to creatures, as is proved by the second argument in the second article [n. 35]. So no such concept can be found by digging. As for the comparison with the estimative power, I say that it seems to be a case of bringing in something false to confirm something else that is false. Indeed, if a sheep were to retain the same nature and to preserve the same natural affection toward the lamb but nevertheless were to change miraculously with respect to all its sensible accidents, like color, shape, sound, and other similar things so as to be similar to a wolf, then the lamb would flee from the sheep that had been so transformed just as it would flee from a wolf. And yet in the sheep that had been so transformed there would be nothing that was to be perceived [by the estimative power] as harmful (*intentio nocivi*) but only things that were appropriate [to the sheep's nature (*intentio convenientis*)]. Therefore, the estimative power of the lamb would not dig to find under the sensible species the proper nature, but would be moved according to its sensitive inclinations in precisely the same way as the sensible accidents would move it. Perhaps you will say that in this case the [species of the] proper nature is not transmitted because there are no accidents appropriate for it and that the proper nature cannot be transmitted without the appropriate accidents. But this is pointless, for if the lamb is to flee from the wolf because of the perception of harm conceived by the estimative power and this is not transmitted with these sensible accidents (as we assume in this [miraculous] case), then, in this case, either the lamb digs up a stimulus of harmfulness that is not there or, if it does not flee here because of what it digs up, then it does not do so in other cases, either.

REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS OF QUESTION 1

63 To the first argument [in n. 1], I say that the comparison must be

understood with respect to the first time the intellect is moved by the object, since [only] then has the phantasm, together with the agent intellect, the role of an object that first moves [the intellect]. But it must not be understood with respect to every act that follows upon the first movement [of the intellect]. The intellect can abstract every object that is included in the object that first moves [it], and it can consider that abstracted item (*illud abstractum*) without considering that from which it is abstracted. And by considering this abstracted item, the intellect thus considers what is common to the sensible and the not-sensible, since in the object both what is not-sensible and what is sensible are considered in general (*in universali*). And the intellect can consider this abstracted item and another one in terms of what is proper to the other, namely, the not-sensible. But the senses are not capable of abstracting. And hence in every action, both the first and the second one, they require some proper object that moves [them]. But the phantasm does not relate to the intellect in this way.

64 To the second argument [in n. 2] I say that the Commentator explains the comparison of the Philosopher as pertaining to things that are difficult,³² not as pertaining to things that are impossible. And his argument is that in the latter case nature would have made in vain these separate substances, which are intelligible yet impossible to be understood by any intellect. But this argument is not valid—first because it is not the purpose of these substances, insofar as they are intelligible, to be understood by our intellect. Therefore, if it did not suit them to be understood by us, it would not be the reason their intelligibility is to no purpose. Second, the following inference —“these substances are not intelligible for our intellect, therefore, they are not intelligible by any intellect”—does not hold because they could be understood by themselves. So here we have a fallacy of the consequent. Therefore, even though the testimony of the Philosopher could be explained in more than one way, I say that the eyes of an owl only have intuitive and natural cognition. And as for these two conditions [difficulty and impossibility], the testimony of the Philosopher can be explained as pertaining to impossibility: just as it is impossible for that eye [of the owl] to contemplate that object [i.e., the sun] intuitively, so too it is impossible for our intellect to cognize God naturally and intuitively.³³

65 To the third argument [in n. 3] I say that the potentially infinite is unknown, for things are knowable only insofar as they are in act. But the potentially infinite is not unknown in the sense that it resists being known by an infinite intellect. The [potentially] infinite cannot be known by an intellect that knows it according to the mode of its infinity, for the mode of its infinity consists in accepting one thing after another, and an intellect that cognizes in this manner—namely, by taking one thing after another—would

always cognize something finite and never the infinite. An infinite intellect, however, can cognize this [infinite] whole all at once, not part after part. When the argument invokes the passage from *Metaphysics* II concerning infinite things and the infinite, I say that the case is not similar because knowledge of an infinite number of objects would lead to an infinite cognitive power (as was made clear in the first question of distinction 2, article 2, concerning infinity [Ord. 1.2 n. 127]). For there [= in the case of an infinite number of objects] the plurality of objects leads to the conclusion of a greater power in the intellect. But the understanding of something infinite does not lead to the infinity [of the intellect], as it is not necessary that an act has the same real mode [of being] as the object has because an act under the aspect of the finite can be directed toward an object under the aspect of the infinite except when it is an act that comprehends its object. And I grant that we do not and cannot have such an act with respect to an infinite object.

66 To the passage quoted from Gregory [in n.4], I say that it must not be understood to mean that contemplation comes to a halt beneath God in some creature (for that would amount to “enjoying something that must [rather] be used,” which according to Augustine, in question 30 of his *Eighty-three Questions*, is the “utmost perversity”). But [it must be understood as meaning] that the concept of God’s essence as a being (*sub ratione entis*) is less perfect than the concept of that essence as it is this essence; and because it is less perfect it is of a lesser intelligibility. But in the normal run of things contemplation comes to a halt in such a common concept and hence comes to a halt in a concept that is of a lesser intelligibility than God in himself, as he is this essence. Therefore, the phrase “[our mind attains] something that is beneath God” [cf. n. 4] must be understood as follows: “[our mind attains] something under the aspect of being intelligible which has a lesser intelligibility than the intelligibility of God in himself as this singular essence.”

REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS FOR HENRY’S OPINION

67 To the arguments for the first opinion [n. 20]: it was argued that God cannot be understood in a concept that is common to himself and to creatures in a univocal way because he is a singularity. But the inference is not valid. Indeed, Socrates, insofar as he is Socrates, is singular. Nevertheless, we can abstract several predicates from Socrates. Therefore, the singularity of something does not preclude that some common concept can be abstracted from that singular. And although everything that exists in a thing is from itself singular in its existence, so that nothing in it contracts something else

to singularity, still the very same thing can be conceived either as a real this (*hoc*) or somehow indistinctly—that is, [it can be conceived either] as something singular or as something common [e.g., Socrates can be conceived as “this man here” or as “a man”; cf. n. 72].

68 Concerning what is said in favor of this opinion about cognition by accident [in n. 20], there is no need to refute that, for God is cognized quasi accidentally in an attribute but not precisely, as was proved [in n. 25].

SCOTUS’S REPLY TO THE SECOND QUESTION

69 To the second question I say that in this matter there are three ways of ordering intelligible things. The first is an order of origin or of generation, the second is an order of perfection, and the third is an order of adequacy or exact causality [cf. QDA 16 n. 8; QDA 19 n. 18; QDA 21 n. 6].

70 Of the two first ways of being prior we read in *Metaphysics* IX, chapter 7: “What is prior according to generation is posterior according to substance.”³⁴ The third primacy is discussed in *Posterior Analytics* I in the definition of the universal, for there “first” means exclusiveness or adequate matching.³⁵

The first object in the order of origin

71 Talking first about the order of origin, we must first consider actual cognition and then habitual cognition. As for the first kind of cognition, I have two preliminary remarks. The first is that an absolutely simple concept is a concept that cannot be resolved into several other concepts—for example, the concept of being or of ultimate difference. A simple concept that is not absolutely simple is a concept that can be conceived by the intellect in a [single] act of simple intellection, although it could be resolved into several, separately conceivable concepts.

72 The second preliminary remark is that there is a difference between thinking of (*intelligere*) something confused (*confusum*) and thinking of something confusedly (*confuse*). Confused (*confusum*) means the same as indistinct (*indistinctum*). And just as there are in the matter at hand two possible ways of making a distinction—namely, by distinguishing the essential parts of an essential whole [i.e., the components of an essence: its genus, species and difference] and by distinguishing the subject-like parts of a universal whole [i.e., the singular subjects of which a universal is predicated]—so too are there two ways of being not distinct corresponding to the two aforesaid wholes and their respective parts. We think of something confused when we think of something that is not-distinct according to one of the two aforementioned ways. But something is said to be conceived

confusedly (*confuse*) when it is conceived as expressed by a name, whereas something is conceived distinctly (*distincte*) when it is conceived as expressed by a definition [cf. QDA 16 n. 9 and QMet 1.10 n. 18].

73 With this presupposed, let me first discuss the order of origin in the actual cognition of what is conceived confusedly. With respect to this topic, I say that the first [object] that is actually known in a confused way is the most specific species whose singulars are the first in moving the senses in a most effective and powerful way,* provided that they [i.e., the singulars] are present to the senses in the required proportion.

{So if you suggest some case where the senses do not at first perceive the specific nature (for example, when it is not immediately clear whether a color is red or green) and where, consequently, the intellect by means of this perception does not immediately grasp the specific nature, then I will claim always that the required proportion of the singular to the senses is lacking: either because of an imperfection of the power, when it is surpassed by this particular visibility of a certain nature as such; or because of a deficiency in the medium—for example, insufficient light; or because of a distance that is too great [cf. QDA 16 n. 10–11; QMet 1.10 n. 18].

* [*Interpolation*] be it audible, or visible or tangible. For the species of any individual whatever that most strongly moves the senses is what is first known in a confused way.

74 So it is clear how to reply to the following objection: “two eyes are at the same distance from something red; one of them immediately perceives redness distinctly, the other perceives it confusedly; therefore, given the required proportionality [between the perceived object and the senses], the specific nature is not immediately perceived.” Reply: the required proportion for the one is not the same as that for the other because of a disproportion in the experiencing subject.

75 Objection: if the object generates the species of red up to point X and beyond X generates the species of color or something that represents red in an indeterminate way, then none of the eyes will see the redness distinctly when they are beyond point X.—Reply: whatever may be the condition of the medium (whether it conveys a proper species everywhere or a confused species beyond a certain distance), the species will be more indeterminate in a less well-disposed eye, other things being equal, at least beyond a well-determined distance.}

76 I prove the conclusion formulated above [in n. 73] as follows: a natural cause acts toward its effect according to its utmost power when it is not obstructed.³⁶ So it first acts toward the most perfect effect that it can produce first. All factors involved in producing that first act of the intellect

are purely natural causes, since they precede any act of the will and they are clearly not obstructed. Therefore, they first produce the most perfect concept they are able to. But that is none other than the concept of the most specific species. Now suppose that some other concept—for example, the concept of something more common—were the most perfect concept that the factors involved could produce. Then it would follow that they could not produce the concept of the most specific species, since the concept of something more common is less perfect than the concept of the most specific species (just as a part is less perfect than the whole). And so they would never cause that concept [of the most specific species].

77 Second, [I prove the same conclusion] as follows: according to Avicenna (*Metaphysics* I, chapter 3), metaphysics is the last science in the order of learning. So the principles of all other sciences as well as their terms can be conceived prior to the principles of metaphysics. But this would not be the case if the more common concepts had to be actually conceived prior to the concepts of the most specific species. For then “being” and other such concepts had to be conceived first. And thus it would rather follow that metaphysics is the first science in the order of learning. Therefore, etc.

78 Third, suppose it were necessary to conceive the more universal concepts before the concept of the most specific species. Then, with the senses activated with respect to a singular that moves them and the intellect being unconstrained, it would be necessary to assume a long period of time before the species of such a primarily sensed singular would be conceived, for it would be necessary to understand previously, one by one,* all the more common predicates that are quidditatively said of that species.

* [Interpolation] This makes clear why the intellect understands one intelligible thing prior to another, although the species of many of them are [simultaneously] present to it. This is not by reason of the will, for then the intellect would not have an act of understanding [of its own, proper to itself]. But the cause of this is that a singular of one species moves the senses more forcefully than a singular of another species.—This [may suffice] with respect to confused cognition [cf. Lect. 1. 3 n. 74].

79 {As for the first of these three arguments [n. 76]: notice that the order that exists in productions where the imperfect is the medium gives a reply here; otherwise, the first thing caused by an object would be the defining concept (*conceptus definitivus*) (for that is what an object is able to produce), or it will never cause anything at all. Why is the defining concept not caused first? What kind of perfection does discursive and analytical reasoning add to the causation of that concept? Reply: a defining concept is an explicit concept based on several partial concepts. So one needs to understand each

of the latter first, at least according to the order of nature (and in us also according to the order of time) for a concept, becomes known by us through its parts.}

80 Second, I discuss the actual cognition of things that are distinctly conceived. And I claim that this kind of cognition functions the other way around, starting with a general concept. For the first object that is conceived distinctly is what is most common. And what is nearer to that comes earlier, and what is more remote comes later. I prove this as follows: from the second preliminary remark [n. 72] we conclude that nothing is conceived distinctly unless everything that is included in its essential notion (*ratio*) is conceived. Being (*ens*) is included in all lower quidditative concepts. Therefore, no lower concept is conceived distinctly unless being is conceived. But being can only be conceived distinctly, since it has an absolutely simple concept. Therefore, being can be conceived distinctly apart from other concepts, but other concepts cannot be conceived without the distinct conception of being. So being is the first concept that can be conceived distinctly. From this it follows that what is nearer to being is prior [in the case of distinct knowledge] because cognizing distinctly comes about through a definition, which we investigate by a process of division starting from being and leading up to the concept of what is defined. But in division what is first conceived is attained first, like the concepts of genus and difference, in which the more common concept is conceived distinctly [cf. QDA 16 n. 18].

81 Second, I prove that metaphysics, according to Avicenna (as quoted above [n. 77]), is the first science in the order of distinct knowledge. Indeed, its task is “to certify the principles of the other sciences.” So what can be known in metaphysics are the first things that can be known distinctly. Avicenna does not contradict himself when he states that metaphysics is the last science in the order of learning and the first science in knowing distinctly. It has been made clear in the question concerning self-evident propositions [cf. Ord. 1.2 nn. 18–19] that the principles of the other sciences are self-evident on the basis of a confused concept of their terms. But as soon as knowledge of metaphysics is acquired it becomes possible to investigate distinctly the quiddity of the terms involved. And so the terms of the special sciences are not conceived, nor their principles known, before metaphysics [is known]. Similarly, many things can be obvious to a metaphysician-geometer that were not known earlier to the geometer on the basis of an undetermined concept. An example: a geometer *qua* geometer only uses as self-evident those principles that are immediately evident from a confused concept of their terms that arises from sensibles right away—for example, “a line is a length.” He does not care to which category a line belongs—for example, whether it is a substance or a quantity. But now, once geometry

and the other special sciences are known, metaphysics follows with the knowledge of common concepts from which one can by means of division return to the investigation of the quiddities of the terms used in the special sciences as they were known there. And then, on the basis of these quiddities as they were known, the principles of the special sciences become known more distinctly than before. In addition, many principles become known that were not known before on the basis of terms that were known in a confused way. And so it is clear in what way metaphysics is the first science and in what way it is not the first science [cf. QDA 16 n. 19].

82 But if we compare the order of conceiving confusedly and the order of conceiving distinctly, I say that the entire order of conceiving confusedly comes first [cf. QDA 16]. Therefore, what is first in that order is first *simpliciter*. This is proved from the testimony of Avicenna, quoted earlier, concerning the order of metaphysics in relation to the special sciences.

83 Here an objection arises,³⁷ for in *Physics* I it is said that “what is confused”³⁸—that is, what is more universal, “is known first,” which is clear because “children at first call all men ‘father,’ and later they distinguish between them.” So a child knows his father under the aspect of man before he knows him under the concept of this man.

84 Avicenna proves the same by referring to what is seen from a distance,³⁹ for a man is first cognized under the concept of body, then under that of animal, and first under the concept of animal, then under that of man, and first under the concept of man, then under that of this man.⁴⁰

85 This seems to be the case indeed, for in reasoning the process of composing comes before that of division. So this also applies to simple concepts.

86 To the first objection [n. 83] I say that the confused is of two kinds: the universal whole and the essential whole [cf. n. 72]; accordingly, each is first in its own order. But absolutely first is what is first in the order of cognizing confusedly, for the natural progression from the imperfect to the perfect is through what is intermediate. Cognizing confusedly is a kind of intermediate between not-cognizing and cognizing distinctly. Therefore, cognizing in a confused way comes before any distinct cognition. As for the remark on the cognition of children, I grant that the species is known before the singular (I have said that the species is what is first intelligible [in nn. 73–78]). But the argument is not conclusive with respect to genus and species. For in the order of cognizing confusedly whiteness is actually conceived before color because color as such is known only on the basis of an abstraction that is broader than the abstraction of whiteness from this whiteness. And this broader abstraction is more difficult because it starts from less similar things.

87 To the argument taken from Avicenna [n. 84] I say that, when an object is not sufficiently near it does not move [the intellect] to cognition of that object under the most perfect aspect but only under some imperfect aspect. And then the intellection following upon the perception of such an object must be of such a universal as was perceived by the senses under the aspect of a singular. But when the object is in the required proportion so as to be able to move the senses under its own perfect nature, then, subsequent upon such a perception, the intellect obtains a confused cognition of the relevant object in terms of the species before it obtains such cognition in terms of the genus. {But this does not mean that the real, less perfect aspect from which the genus is taken is the aspect that moves [the intellect] when the object is further away and that the more perfect aspect, from which the difference is taken, is the aspect that moves [the intellect] when the object is less distant. On the contrary, the more effective active aspect is the aspect that acts from a larger distance. But the specific form is an aspect that leads to being assimilated imperfectly when the object is far away and to being assimilated perfectly when it is at the right distance. Therefore, it does not follow that “color does not generate any species of itself” but [just that it does] not then [do so]. [What generates a species is] only this whiteness or this blackness, not *this* [whiteness in particular] but rather the *nature* [of whiteness].

88 How then can we talk of an intelligible species of what is more universal or less universal? [cf. n. 61]—It can be said that both are generated by the same phantasm.

89 Alternatively, the more universal as virtually contained in what is below it (*in inferiore*) is what generates the intelligible species, since in that manner it [i.e., the more universal] is something intelligible *per se*. It does not generate a sensible species, since it [i.e., the more universal] is not sensible in that way because sense perception is of things that exist as such.

90 Objection [to what the author proposes in n. 87]: according to you [i.e., Scotus] sensation is not of the singular but of the nature in the singular. Moreover, even if one accepts a proper sensible species and a proper phantasm of whiteness and another proper phantasm of color, one cannot accept a proper phantasm of quality or of being. Indeed, given their lack of differentiation, these surpass the genus of sensible things and cannot as such shine out in a phantasm. And yet proper intelligible species of these items [i.e., quality or being] are caused [in the intellect]. Therefore, this does not occur by different phantasms nor by these items [quality and being] themselves as distinct and virtually existing there (for under these aspects they are clearly not there in the mode of a representation nor in a different mode). Therefore, the former alternative [n. 88] holds.}

91 To the third objection [n. 85] I say that in both cases, in simple as well as in complex concepts, one proceeds from what includes to what is included. But in simple concepts what includes is lower, whereas in complex concepts what includes is the principle with respect to the conclusion.

92 As for habitual or virtual knowledge [cf. n. 71], I first explain how I understand these terms. I call knowledge “habitual” when an object is present to the intellect under the aspect of being actually intelligible, so as to make it possible for the intellect to have an immediately elicited act with respect to that object. I call knowledge “virtual” when something is understood (*intelligitur*) in something else, as part of what is understood first, but not as what is first understood itself. For example, when we understand “man” we understand in man also “animal” as part of what is understood (but not as what is understood first, or as the whole that is the term of the act of understanding). This is quite properly called “what is understood virtually,” as it is sufficiently near to what is actually understood. It [= what is understood virtually] could only be understood with more actuality if it were understood through an act of understanding of its own, of which it would be the first and complete end term.

93 Regarding this habitual and virtual knowledge, I say that what is more common is known first in the way of generation (*via generationis*). Proof: different forms, perfecting the same perfectible item in some order, are naturally suited to perfect it in a more direct and in a more indirect way. So, too, one and the same form, containing in itself virtually the perfection of these ordered forms, will perfect that perfectible item by a quasi-similar order of nature. For example, [the first case is] if the forms of body, of substance, etc. were different forms and if the form of substance were to inform first and subsequently the form of body, etc. Similarly [second case], a single form, if it were to include virtually all of these [aforementioned] forms, will perfect matter under the aspect of substance before (as it were) it perfects it under the aspect of body. And by this way of generation the less perfect will always be prior because progress is from potency to act. Therefore, just as several concepts, both more common and less common, habitual or virtual, are naturally suited to perfect the intellect by the way of generation in such a way that the less perfect always comes first, so, too, one concept, if it were to include virtually all of the [aforementioned] concepts, will perfect [the intellect] under the aspect of the more common and universal concept before it does so under the aspect of a particular concept. So far for the order of origin or of generation.

94 {Objection: why not similarly in actual cognition? Reply: here [in the case of habitual cognition] the relevant items [concepts] have a natural order in moving [the intellect], although they are simultaneous in duration. But in

the other case [of actual cognition] it is different. There they are moving [the intellect] successively, and what is more powerful moves [the intellect] more forcefully, thus obstructing other items in moving [the intellect]. That is not the case here.}

The first object in the order of perfection

95 Now as regards the order of perfection, I make a distinction. What is more perfectly intelligible for us can be understood in two ways: either absolutely or proportionally. An example: an eagle's vision of the sun is absolutely more perfect with respect to the sun than my vision is with respect to candlelight [because the eagle's eyes are better absolutely]. Yet my vision is more perfect proportionally—that is, in relation to the visibility of candlelight, my vision has proportionally more of the intrinsic nature (*ratio*) of vision than the vision of an eagle has with respect to the visibility of the sun [because I can see more of the candlelight than the eagle can see of the sun].

96 This distinction is taken from the Philosopher in *On Animals* II,⁴¹ where he wants to say that, even though we have only minimal knowledge of immaterial things (proportionally, that is), still that kind of knowledge is more desirable than the extensive knowledge we can have of material things, which is extensive compared with the aforementioned [immaterial] knowable things [cf. QDA 16 nn. 20–21].

97 Talking of the order of absolutely more perfect cognition, I say that the most perfect thing we can know, even naturally, is God (hence, according to the Philosopher, *Ethics* X,⁴² this knowledge constitutes happiness). After him comes the most perfect of the most specific species in the universe, and then the species that is nearest to that, and so on up to the last [most specific] species. And after all the most specific species comes the nearest genus that can be abstracted from the most perfect species and so on, always analyzing further. And the reason of all this is that the attainment of a more actual and more perfect object constitutes an absolutely more perfect intellection [on two grounds]. From the side of the intellect, the latter [i.e., the absolutely more perfect intellection] has an essential perfection that is equal to any other intellection or [at least] not less. From the side of the object it has a much greater perfection, too. These two elements—namely, the perfection of the power and the perfection of the object—are the cause of the most perfect [act of] intellection [cf. QDA 16 n. 22].

98 When we talk about perfection or about knowledge that is more perfect in proportion to what is knowable, I say that the sensibles known by the more perfect senses and the things that move the senses in a more effective way are more perfectly knowable proportionally. This is so because

our intellect can better attain them [= the sensibles] according to their degree of knowability. And what is more remote from them is less knowable, according to the proportion of its knowability [cf. QDA 16 nn. 23–24].

99 The third kind of primacy—that is, that of adequacy—will be discussed in the next question [nn. 108–201] or elsewhere.

REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS OF THE SECOND QUESTION

100 To the initial arguments of this question: to the first [n. 6] I say that the following inference is not valid: “God is the first being (*ens*), therefore God is what is first known,” although it does follow “therefore God is what is first knowable” as far as he himself is concerned. Accordingly, one must understand the truth about which the Philosopher is talking in *Metaphysics* II as concerning evidence of a thing in itself or as concerning the intelligibility of a thing in its own right. But it is not necessary that a thing be related to being cognized in the way it relates to existence (*entitatem*). This only holds for being cognized by the kind of intellect that comprises all intelligible things according to their proper degree of knowability. But that kind of intellect is not ours; our intellect knows sensible things best.

101 To the second argument [n. 7], I say that the inference is valid only in cases of exclusive causes (*in causis praecisis*). This is obvious in an example: if an eclipse is knowable on the basis of two causes, through two powers—namely, through the senses and through the intellect having demonstrative proof—then it is never known in the most perfect way unless the principle of the demonstrative proof is known in the most perfect way. But it does not follow; “therefore it is never known unless the principle of the demonstrative proof is known,” since it has another cause through which it can be known [i.e., the sense], as the demonstrative proof is not the exclusive cause. Yet, it cannot be known as perfectly through the other cause [the senses] as through the demonstrative proof through which it can be known by the intellect, since that proof is a more perfect cause of its knowledge than the other through which it can be known—namely, the senses.

102 This applies in the case at hand. Apart from the divine essence as the cause of cognizing a creature, there is another cause of cognizing it—namely, its own essence, which is naturally suited to generate knowledge of it. But a thing is never as perfectly cognized through its own causal activity (*motionem*) as through the divine essence. Therefore, this inference from effect to cause does not follow: “if most perfectly, then most perfectly; therefore, if absolutely, then absolutely.” For what is taken most perfectly can be an exclusive cause of most perfect knowledge in general, whereas what is taken absolutely is not an exclusive cause of its effect in general.

103 To the third argument [n. 8], I say that the major premise is true regarding the primacy of perfection, not regarding the primacy of adequacy. An example: nothing is ever seen precisely under the aspect of color [in general] and not under the aspect of this or that [specific] color—for example, white or black—unless when it is seen from a distance or in an imperfect way. Now, seeing something precisely under the aspect of color is not the most perfect but the most imperfect kind of vision. So it is true that the most perfect operation of a power is directed toward its first object—not, however, with respect to the first in adequacy but with respect to the first in perfection. For it [the first perfect object] is the most perfect of what is contained in the first adequate object. That is why the Philosopher says in *Ethics* X that “perfect delight resides in the operation that is directed toward the best of the objects that are in the scope of a power,”⁴³ which means toward the best of what is contained in the adequate object of that power. So he proves the thesis that God is what is first known—that is, what is most perfectly known. This I grant. But I do not grant that he is the first adequate object (this will be explained in the next question) [nn. 108–201].

REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS FOR HENRY'S OPINION ON QUESTION 2

104 As for what the other opinion holds, in the first part [of its reply to] the second question [i.e., concerning natural knowledge; cf. n. 22], regarding what is negatively and privatively indeterminate: if this is understood in terms of the primacy of origin, I have already argued for the opposite in the first part [of my reply to] the second question [cf. n. 73–78].

105 And when it is argued [in n. 22] that “what is negatively indeterminate is more indeterminate than what is privatively indeterminate,” I deny this when we are talking about the kind of indetermination that applies in the present case—namely, as it occurs in what is first understood, for the negatively indeterminate is something singular that is not more indeterminate than the privatively indeterminate. Negative indetermination—that is, repugnance to being determined—is indeed in some way greater than privative indetermination. Nevertheless, what is indeterminate in that way [= negatively] does not present itself to the intellect first of all, since it is not some confused knowable item but rather a most distinct knowable item, as said earlier [in n. 80].

106 And what he argues in the second part [of his reply to the second question, concerning rational knowledge; cf. n. 22], that God is the last thing known in rational knowledge, since “that upon which abstraction operates” is known first: this is not true unless abstraction means a kind of discursive reasoning that goes from one known thing to another in such a way that the

thing upon which abstraction operates is known first and the other thing is known through it subsequently. If he understands abstraction in this way, such knowledge through abstraction is not the first knowledge of what is abstracted, for if God is known in that way through creatures, one must have some concept of God first toward which discursive reasoning can advance, since discursive reasoning presupposes some concept of the final term toward which it is heading. So either the proposition he accepts is false, or, if it is true, it leads to the conclusion that God is known before he is known rationally, which he would perhaps concede.

107 What he adds, however, is that God as being the first thing naturally known “is not distinguished from other things” because he is not conceived in something in which he can be distinguished from a creature [cf. n. 23]. Here he seems to contradict himself, for earlier he said that God is the first thing naturally known by the intellect as being something negatively indeterminate [cf. n. 22], and he says that in this concept he is distinguished from creatures because that [concept] does not apply to creatures [cf. n. 20].

QUESTION 3

IS GOD THE FIRST NATURAL AND ADEQUATE OBJECT OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT IN ITS PRESENT STATE?

108 Following up what has been said in the third article of the second question concerning the first adequate and precise object of the intellect [cf. nn. 69, 99], we now face the question of whether God is the first natural and adequate object with respect to the intellect of the wayfarer.

INITIAL ARGUMENTS

Arguments [of Henry of Ghent] for a positive answer: from the preceding question we have that God is the first—that is, the most perfect of all knowable things.¹ But “the first thing in any category causes all other things in that category to be the way they are” (*Metaphysics* II).² This is obvious, for “the first hot thing is the cause of heat in all other things.” Therefore, God is the reason for knowing all other things. So he is the first object of the intellect.

109 Also, “everything stands to cognition as it stands to being (*esse*).” But nothing is a being through participation unless by the being that does not participate. So it is not known unless the not-participating being is known first. This is confirmed through Augustine, *On the Trinity* VIII, chapter 5: “We would not judge one thing to be better than another, when we are speaking the truth, if we did not have impressed within us knowledge of what is good.” He seems to talk here of what is good as negatively indeterminate about which he says, in the same chapter, “Look at good itself if you can, you will see God in any case.” This seems not to be true unless he is talking of the negatively indeterminate good, which is the good that cannot have a determination, such as the first good is.

[*Interpolation*] Objection: of the first object according to the primacy of adequacy one predicates everything that is contained in it. But such predicating does not apply to God. Therefore, etc.

110 In this question there is an opinion saying that the first object of our intellect is the quiddity [or “whatness”] of material things because there is a proportional match between power and object.³

111 Now there are three kinds of cognitive power. One is fully separated from matter, both in its being (*in essendo*) and in its functioning (*in operando*); such is the separate intellect. Another is conjoined with matter both in being and in functioning; such is an organic power that perfects matter in its being and only functions by means of an organ from which it is not separated, either in its functioning or in its being. Another is conjoined with matter in its being only, but it does not use a material organ in its functioning; such is our intellect.

112 Corresponding to these [three powers] there are [three] absolute, proportionally matching objects. To the fully separated power—that is, to the first power—the quiddity that is fully separated from matter must correspond. To the second power, the singular, which is fully material. To the third corresponds the quiddity of material things, for, although the latter exists in matter, it is not knowable as existing in singular matter [cf. QDA 19 n. 5].

113 Against this: this view cannot be upheld by a theologian because the intellect, which always exists as the same power, knows by itself quiddities of immaterial substances, as is obvious from what our faith says concerning the blessed soul. But a power that remains the same cannot have an act with respect to something that does not fall under its first object [cf. QDA 19 n.6].

114 If you say that the soul will be promoted by the light of glory to a level where it knows these immaterial substances, I object. The first object of a habit is contained within the first object of a power, or at least it does not exceed it. For if a habit regards an object that is not contained within the first object of a power but exceeds it, that habit would not be a habit of that power. It would make it to be not that power but another one. Confirmation of the argument: since a power right from the first moment in which it is a power has a certain first object, no later entity that presupposes the nature of that power can make something else the first object of that power. But every habit naturally presupposes a power [cf. QDA 19 nn. 7–8].

115 Suppose that the Philosopher, too, has put forward this view: that our intellect because it has the lowest position among other intellects—namely, the divine and the angelic intellect—and because it is in its cognitive activity connected to the power of imagination (*virtute phantastica*), has a direct relation to phantasms, just as phantasms have a direct relation to the common sense. He would say, then, that, just as the imagination is only moved by an object of the common sense, although it [i.e., imagination] knows that very object in another way [than the senses do], our intellect

would be unable to understand anything except what can be abstracted from phantasms, not only because of some [contingent] condition, but because of the very nature of the power.⁴

116 Three arguments against this: first, in the intellect that knows an effect there is a natural desire for knowing the cause. And in the intellect that knows a cause in general there is a natural desire for knowing it in particular and distinctly. But a natural desire is not for something that is impossible from the part of the nature of the person who has the desire, for then it would be in vain [cf. QDA 19 n.10]. So it is not impossible that the intellect for its part knows an immaterial substance in particular on the basis of knowing something material that is an effect of the immaterial substance. And so the first object of the intellect does not exceed that immaterial entity.

117 Moreover: no power can know an object under a more common concept (*ratione*) than that of its first object. This is obvious, first, from reason because otherwise that concept of the first object would not be adequate. It is also obvious from an example: vision does not know something through a concept that is more common than that of color or light, which is its first object. But the intellect knows something under a concept that is more common than that of what can be in the fantasy, since it knows something under the concept of being in common. Otherwise, metaphysics would not be a science for our intellect. Therefore, etc.

118 Moreover, third, and almost amounting to the same as the second argument: whatever is known *per se* by a cognitive power is either its first object or is contained under that first object. Being as being (*ens ut ens*) is more common than the sensible and is *per se* understood by us, otherwise metaphysics would not be a more transcendental science than physics is. Therefore, something that is more particular than being cannot be the first object of our intellect, for then being in itself would not be understood by us in any way [cf. QDA 19 n. 13].

119 It seems, therefore, that the view under discussion [cf. n. 110] presupposes something false about the first object when we are talking about the power [of the intellect] as considered in its very nature. From this it is obvious that, if the first question is solved in the way this opinion does [cf. n. 1] by saying that the sensible quiddity, not God or being, is the first object of our intellect, the solution rests on a false foundation.

120 Also the correspondence that is marshaled for this opinion [in n. 112] is of no value. It is not necessary that a power and an object are comparable in their modes of being. They are related as what moves (*motivum*) and what can be moved (*mobile*), and as such they are related as dissimilar things—namely, as act and potency. They are proportional, however, for the relevant proportion does require a dissimilarity of the proportionally related elements

because this is generally the case with a proportion, as is obvious from matter and form, part and whole, cause and caused, and other proportionally related items. Therefore, one cannot on the basis of a certain mode of being (*modo essendi*) of the power conclude a similar mode of being in the object [cf. QDA 19 n.15].

121 Against this argument an objection can be raised,⁵ for although an agent that makes something can be dissimilar to the object that undergoes the action, in cognitive operations the agent must become similar to the object of the operation, the latter being here not something that undergoes the action but rather something that acts and induces similarity—for everyone agrees with the thesis that cognition happens through assimilation, and Aristotle does not disagree on this point.⁶ So here not only a proportion is required but also similarity [cf. QDA 19 n.16].

122 Reply: it is one thing to talk of the mode of being of the power itself in itself [i.e., to consider its nature], and it is another thing to talk about the power insofar as it is under a secondary act or a disposition that is near to a secondary act, the latter being different from the nature of the power. Now it is the case that the cognitive power (*potentia cognoscens*), when it actually cognizes something, becomes similar to it. This is true. It happens through its act of cognizing, which is a kind of likeness of the object, or through the species, which causes a disposition next to cognizing. But to conclude from this fact that the intellect itself naturally and in itself has a mode of being that is similar to that of the object or the other way around is to commit the fallacy of the consequent and of figure of speech, just as the following inference is invalid: “The bronze becomes similar to Caesar because it is made similar through the form that it gets. Therefore, the bronze has in itself a mode of being that is similar to Caesar’s mode of being.” Or, more pertinent to our case: “The eye that perceives through the species of an object, becomes similar to the object. So vision has a mode of being that is similar to the mode of being of the object.” Or, further: “Some visible things, such as mixed things, have matter, which is the cause of corruption and is in potentiality to contradiction, whereas other visible things do not have such matter, such as the celestial bodies. Therefore, there will be a kind of vision in such matter and a [different] kind without such matter,” or, “[therefore] there will be some organ of such a kind and some organ of a different kind.” Or, even more pertinent: “An idea in God’s mind that is a likeness of an object is immaterial. Therefore, the stone, of which he has an idea, is also immaterial.” Therefore, congruence is not a good reason for restricting the intellect to sensible objects on the basis of its nature as a power in order not to let it exceed the senses; such a restriction would go in the mode of knowing only [cf. QDA 19 n. 17].

123 {Here Aristotle and Harclay agree that now [i.e., in this life] the quiddity of sensible things is the adequate object, interpreting “of sensible things” properly as what is included either essentially or virtually in sensible things. (It is different when we take the quiddity as specific, be it remote or virtually included, which amounts to the same). So now [in this life] the adequate object of the intellect does not consist in the object of the highest sensitive power because it [i.e., the intellect] understands all that is included essentially in sensible things, up to being, and that indifference does not hold at all for sense knowledge. It also knows what is included virtually, and the senses do not. One must not make the distinction here that only the sensible is a moving (*motivum*) object. Being (*ens*) as an end term (included in the sensible, one way or the other) is not only an end term, but also moves at least the intellective power through the appropriate species in memory, be it generated by itself or by something else.

124 They disagree [on the following point]. From the point of view of the nature of the power the adequate object of the intellect is nothing below being [cf. nn. 186–87]. This point is made by Harclay against Aristotle. The first argument against Thomas [in n. 113] is effective here. But does natural reason show this? If so, then Aristotle is contradicted more strongly [cf. n. 115]. If not, I reply to what is said above [in n. 116] as “three arguments against this.” To the first [n. 116], every premise concerning a natural desire for something is more obscure than the possibility [of such desire itself], unless it can be proved *a posteriori*. And if it is proved [to be] in us on the basis of an inclination to an act of desire, then this is no good, unless it is shown that a true apprehension precedes that act. The relevant act follows immediately upon a true apprehension. To the second [n. 117], being (*ens*) as it is “one intelligible thing” is contained in the sensible quiddity, as explained above [cf. n. 123, first sentence]. The other argument, about metaphysics [n. 118], proves that a being as “this intelligible thing” is understood by us. But if it were to be the first object, it would be so according to a complete indifference with respect to everything in which it is preserved, not as one thing intelligible in itself, and any element of that indifference could be understood [cf. Ord. Prol. n. 33]. Therefore, it is for now not the adequate object. We still have the major premise of the second argument and the major premise of the third [n. 117: “No power”; n. 118: “Whatever is known”]. Being as being (*ens inquantum ens*) is more common than any other first intention concept (a second intention is not the first object, anyway) and so is understood without any contraction being co-understood as well, or any relation to sensibles, or any relation at all.}

125 There is another opinion [held by Henry of Ghent],⁷ stating that God is the first object of the intellect. Its fundamental reasons have been presented as the principal arguments at the beginning of this question [nn. 108–9]. And for the same reasons Henry holds that God is the first object of the will, since he is “the reason of willing all other things.” He brings in an authoritative text from *On the Trinity* VIII, chapter 10 or 27: “Why do we love someone whom we believe to be just, and not the form [of justice] itself in which we see what a just soul is, so that we too can be just? Is it not true that only by loving that form we love him whom we believe to be just and whom we love through that form? But as long as we are not just we love it less than we value being just.”

126 Against this view I argue as follows [cf. QDA 21 n. 10]: the first natural object of a power has a natural relation to that power. God does not have a natural relation to our intellect as a mover (*sub ratione motivi*) unless, perhaps, under the notion of a general attribute as this opinion proposes. Therefore, he is not the first object unless under the notion of that attribute {and then that general attribute will be the first object} [cf. QDA 21 n. 11], or as I proposed earlier [in the first question, nn. 19ff.]: God is only understood under the notion of being, and he will not have a natural relation unless under such a general concept. But a particular that is not understood unless in some common concept is not the first object of the intellect; rather, that common item is. Therefore, etc.

127 Moreover, it is certain that God does not have the primacy of an adequacy on account of commonness that would allow him to be predicated of every object that is through itself intelligible for us. If he has any primacy of adequacy, it will be on account of virtuality, for he contains virtually in himself everything that is through itself intelligible. But he will not for that reason be the adequate object of our intellect because other beings move our intellect by their own power without the divine essence moving our intellect toward the cognition of itself and all other knowable things. As was said in the question on the subject of theology [Ord. Prol. nn. 152, 200–201], God’s essence is the first object of the divine intellect because it alone moves the divine intellect toward knowing itself and everything else that can be known by that intellect.

128 Through the same arguments it can be proved that we cannot take substance as the first object of our intellect on the argument that all accidents are attributed to a substance because accidents have their own power for moving the intellect. Therefore, substance does not move toward the cognition of itself and of everything else [cf. QDA 21 nn. 10–12].

129 To the question [in n. 108] then, I say, briefly, that one cannot posit a natural object of our intellect on account of a kind of virtual adequacy for the reasons we touched when arguing against the primacy of a virtual object in God or in substance [nn. 127, 128]. So, either no first object is posited or we must look for something that is the first adequate object on account of the commonness it has. Now, if being is held to be equivocal to the created and the uncreated, to substance and accident, then, since all of these are *per se* intelligible for us, it does not seem possible to propose any first object of our intellect, not for reasons of virtuality nor for reasons of commonness. But by holding the position I took in the first question of this distinction [cf. nn. 26–55] about the univocity of being, it is somehow possible to save the proposal that something is the first object of our intellect.

130 To facilitate understanding this, I first explain what the univocity of being is and to what things it extends [in nn. 131–36], and, from that, second, I explain my proposal [nn. 137–51].

The meaning and extension of univocity

131 As for the first issue, I say that being does not univocally express “what” for everything that is intelligible through itself, for it does not do so in the case of the ultimate differences or in the case of the proper attributes of being. {An ultimate difference is so called while it does not have a difference [specifying it further] because it cannot be analyzed in a quidditative and a qualitative concept or in a determinable and determining concept. Its concept is only qualitative just as the ultimate genus has a quidditative concept only.}

132 For the ultimate differences, first, I have a twofold proof. The first one is this: if differences include being said of them in a univocal sense and they are not entirely the same, they are different beings while also being something that is the same. Such are differences in the proper sense (from *Metaphysics* V and X).⁸ So the ultimate differences will be properly differences; they are different through other differences. Now, if these latter differences include being in a quidditative way [i.e., if they are something that allows determination], the same conclusion follows for them as for the former. And so there will be an infinite regress in differences. Or we will stop at some differences that do not include being quidditatively, which is what is proposed {for they alone will be the ultimate differences}.

133 Second proof: Just as a real composite being (*ens compositum*) is composed of act and potentiality, so a composite concept that is *per se* one is composed of a potential concept and an actual concept or of a determinable concept and a determining one. The analysis of composite beings ultimately

comes to an end with absolutely simple things—namely, the ultimate act and the ultimate potentiality that are fundamentally different in such a way that nothing of the one includes anything of the other (otherwise the one would not be a primary act or the other a primary potentiality, for that which includes something of a potentiality is not a primary act). The same must hold for concepts. Every concept that is not absolutely simple, although it has a unity *per se*, is to be analyzed in a determinable concept and a determining one, so that the analysis comes to an end with absolutely simple concepts—that is, with a concept that is only determinable and does not include anything determining it and with one that is only determining, not including any determinable concept. That “merely determinable” concept is the concept of being, and the “merely determining” concept is that of an ultimate difference. So they will be fundamentally diverse: each of them does not include anything of the other.

134 Second, I prove with two arguments the proposition concerning the attributes of beings. The first is this: an attribute is predicated of a subject *per se* in the second mode (*Posterior Analytics* I),⁹ meaning that the subject is put in the definition of the attribute as an added element (*Posterior Analytics* I again, and *Metaphysics* VII).¹⁰ So “being” is part of the notion of its own attribute merely as an added element, for it has proper attributes, as is clear from the Philosopher, in *Metaphysics* IV, chapter 3, where he insists that, just as a line as such has attributes [being straight or curved] and a number as such has attributes [being even or uneven], so, too, are there some attributes of a being as such [one, true, and good].¹¹ But “being” comes into their notion as something added. It is not part of their quidditative notion *per se* in the first mode. This is confirmed by the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* I, “On the nature of principles,”¹² where he insists that *per se* [or essential] predications cannot be converted, for if a predicate is said of a subject *per se*, the converse predication is not *per se* but by accident. So, if the proposition “a being is something one (*ens est unum*)” is a predication *per se* in the second mode, then “something one is a being (*unum est ens*)” is not *per se* in the first mode but merely accidental, as it were, just as this one: “What can laugh is a human being.”

135 Second: in view of the division of “what is” (*ens*) into classes that include it quidditatively, “what is” seems to be sufficiently divided into uncreated being and the ten categories and into the essential parts of the ten categories. At least, it does not seem to have more quidditative divisions, whatever can be said about them. So, if “one” (*unum*) and “true” (*verum*) include being quidditatively, the latter will fall under one of the former. But it [i.e., either one of the two: “one” or “true”] is not any of the ten categories, obviously. Nor is it from itself an uncreated being, for it [also]

applies to created beings. So it would be a species in some category or an essential principle of some category. But this is false, for every essential part in any category and all species of a category include a limitation. And so any transcendental would of itself be finite and consequently, incompatible with infinite being (*enti infinito*), and it could not be formally said of the latter [i.e., infinite being], which is false because all transcendentals mean absolute perfections and apply to God in the highest degree.

136 A third argument is possible by which the first argument for this conclusion can be confirmed. If “one” includes being quidditatively, it does not include being exclusively, for then being would be an attribute of itself. So it includes being and something else. Let that something be X. Either X includes being or it does not. If it does, “one” would include being twice, and an infinite regress would arise. Or [if it does not], wherever one will stop, the ultimate item having the nature of “one” and not including being may be called X. The fact that “one” includes being does not make it an attribute, for something is not an attribute of itself. Consequently that other included element, X, is an attribute immediately, and it is such that it does not include being quidditatively. So, what is an attribute of being in the first place *ipso facto* does not include being in a quidditative way.

How being is the first object of our intellect

137 As for the second article [cf. n. 130], I conclude the following from these four arguments [in nn. 132–35]: since nothing can be more common than being (*ente*), and since being cannot be a common univocal term said *in quid* of all that is *per se* intelligible (for it cannot be said of the ultimate differences and of the attributes), it follows that nothing is the first object of our intellect on account of being quidditatively common to all that is intelligible in itself. Yet, in spite of this assertion I say that the first object of our intellect is being because in it lies a twofold primacy—namely, not only one of commonness but also one of virtuality. Everything that is *per se* intelligible either includes essentially the notion of being (*entis*) or is virtually or essentially contained in what includes essentially the notion “being.” All categories, species, and individuals as well as all essential parts of the categories and the uncreated being include being quidditatively. But all ultimate differences are included essentially in some of these, and all attributes of being are included virtually in being and what comes under it. So the things to which being is not a univocal term said *in quid* are included in the things to which being is thus univocal. So it is obvious that being has a primacy of commonness in relation to the first intelligibles—that is, in relation to the quidditative concepts of categories, species, and individuals as well as of the essential parts of these and of the uncreated being. And it has a

primacy of virtuality in relation to all the intelligibles that are included in the first intelligibles—that is, in relation to the qualitative concepts of the ultimate differences and the proper attributes.

138 My assumption that being (*entis*), said *in quid*, is common to all the quidditative concepts mentioned above [in n. 137], is proved (with respect to all of them) by the two arguments given in the first question of this distinction for the commonness of being in relation to created and uncreated being [nn. 27 and 35]. For the sake of clarity I dwell on them a little more. The first one [cf. n. 27]: with respect to each of the mentioned quidditative concepts [in n. 137], it can happen that the intellect is certain that it is a being, while it is in doubt as to the differences that contract it to a certain concept.* And so the concept of being as it applies to that concept is different from the lower concepts about which the intellect is in doubt. And so it is different from the one included in each of the lower concepts because the contracting differences presuppose an identical common concept of being that is contracted by them [cf. QDA 21 nn. 7, 21].

* [Interpolation] whether it is such a being, or not, is [yet] another concept (of quidditative being and of differences) about which it is in doubt [cf. n. 147].

139 The second argument [cf. n. 35] I treat as follows: just as it was argued that God is not naturally knowable by us unless being is univocal to the created and the uncreated, so it can be argued in the case of substance and accident [cf. QDA 20 n. 25]. If it is not the substance that immediately moves our intellect to some understanding of it but only a sensible accident, it follows that we could not have any quidditative concept of the former [i.e., the substance] unless some such concept could be abstracted from the concept of an accident. But the only quidditative concept that can be abstracted from the concept of an accident is the concept of being.

140 Proof of the assumption [in n. 139] that substances do not immediately move our intellect toward an action concerning them: if anything that is present affects (*immutat*) the intellect,* then its absence can naturally be known by the intellect when it does not [actually] affect. This is evident from *On the Soul* II: the sense of vision perceives darkness when light is not present, and consequently, the sense of vision is not affected.¹³ Therefore, if the intellect were naturally moved immediately by a substance to an act involving the latter, it would follow that it, when the substance were not present, could naturally know that it is not present. And so it would be possible to know naturally that the substance of bread is not present in the consecrated host of the altar, which is clearly false.

* [Note by Scotus] “[if the intellect is moved by something when it is present,] it cannot be moved in that manner in its absence.” This is true of the senses, which cannot be moved in the absence of an object. But what is added—namely, “it can be known when it is absent”—is of course true of the intellect that reflects upon its own act when present and upon the lack of it when it is absent. But then the example of vision [in n. 140] must be explained [cf. n. 144]. The first major premise “[if anything that is present ...]” will do for my purposes here. The second [major premise: “in its absence it cannot ...”] is evidently more conclusive: it is of course true, but it is not proved by the example [of vision].

141 {Reply [or rather: an objection]: The proof disproves the intuitive knowledge of substance for which the major premise is true. But it is not true for abstractive knowledge, since the latter is not deficient on account of the real absence of the object and so does not perceive its absence.

142 Also [another objection]: what is assumed concerning the senses is doubtful. How can a sense know darkness when it does not keep a species of an object that is absent and does not receive a species of darkness?

143 [Reply to these objections] Against the first [in n. 141]: abstractive cognition [of a substance] necessarily presupposes that at some time there has been the real presence of that on which it [i.e., the abstractive cognition] is based or of the species that is its principle. A person who only saw the Eucharist [i.e., who saw only the consecrated bread] never had the real presence of the object that indirectly [i.e., through accidents] causes an abstractive understanding. Another person, who saw another bread [not consecrated] did have it indeed. So the first person will never have abstractive knowledge of [the substance of] bread, whereas the second will have it, which is immediately against our experience, for each of these persons can experience in himself the same act of understanding bread. If this is flatly denied by saying, “Well, the first person later saw another bread, so later he could come to the abstractive knowledge of bread that he could not have before,” I reply, “That person experiences the opposite [of what is suggested], for he is in the same state both now and earlier.” Also: anyone who is able to know abstractly an absent object is able to know it intuitively when it is present in its existence. And if you know the substance of what you know abstractly, then you know it intuitively when it is present, and then the absence, etc. [cf. n. 140: “when the substance were not present, the intellect could naturally know that it is not present”].

144 To the objection concerning the senses [in n. 142]: darkness is known by reasoning (*arguitive*), not through the visual power but through the intellective power reasoning as follows: “The eye looks, it is not blind, and it

does not see anything. Therefore, there is darkness.” This is obvious. If any of the three premises [“the eye looks,” etc.] is left out, the conclusion no longer follows. The visual power (*visu*) does not know any of the three propositions: not their conjunction nor their disjunction (in particular not the third one, of which it would seem more obvious [that it would be known]). It does not know its own activity when it occurs nor that it is lacking when it is absent. Aristotle’s saying that “the visual power sees darkness” can be explained as follows: it [darkness] means that the visual power lacks its object. This is the reason that the power is not moved and so darkness is perceived, not by the visual power but by another power, using the fact that the visual power has no activity.}

145 Therefore, of a substance no quidditative concept can be had naturally that is immediately caused by the substance. One can have only a concept that is caused or abstracted from accidents first, and that is only the concept of being.

146 The same reasoning goes for the conclusion concerning the essential parts of a substance, for if matter does not bring (*immutat*) the intellect to an act concerning itself and if substantial form does not do so either, I ask, what simple concept of matter or form will be had in the intellect? If you say “some relative concept, for example, of a part, or an accidental concept, for example, of some property of matter or form,” then I ask, what is the quidditative concept to which that relative or accidental concept is attributed? If there is no quidditative concept, there will be nothing to which that accidental concept can be attributed. But no quidditative concept can be had if it is not impressed by or abstracted from that which moves the intellect—for example, from an accident. Such a concept will be the concept of being. So nothing will be known of the essential parts of a substance if being is not common and univocal to these essential parts and accidents.

147 The arguments for univocity do not include the univocity of being said *in quid* of the ultimate differences and the attributes. This is shown for the first argument [n. 27]. The intellect is certain about any of these [ultimate differences or attributes] that it is “something that is” (*ens*), while in doubt as to whether it is this or that. It is not certain that it is a being quidditatively or [that it is a being] as if by accidental predication. Put differently, and better: any such concept [of the ultimate differences and the attributes] is absolutely simple (*simpliciter simplex*). Therefore, it cannot be known according to one part and not known according to another. As is clear from the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* IX,¹⁴ at the end, concerning absolutely simple concepts there can be no deception in the way there can be concerning the quiddity of complex concepts. This must not be understood as if the intellect engaged in an act of simple understanding (*intellectus simplex*)

is formally deceived concerning the intellection (*intellectionem*) of a quiddity, since in simple intellection false or true are not relevant [as false and true pertain to propositions, where concepts are combined]. But simple understanding can be virtually deceived concerning a composite quiddity, for if the latter's conception is false in itself, it includes virtually a false proposition. But what is absolutely simple does not include virtually, directly, or formally a false proposition, and so there is no deceiving about it, for it is either fully attained or not attained at all (and then it is completely unknown). Therefore, concerning an absolutely simple concept there can be no certainty with respect to one element and doubt with respect to another.

148 This also makes clear what to say to the second argument given above [n. 35]. An absolutely simple concept is completely unknown unless it is fully conceived according to itself.

149 A third way of responding to the first argument [n. 27] is this: a concept about which certainty obtains is different from concepts about which there is doubt. If the certain concept is kept together with any of the doubtful ones, it is truly univocal, as it is upheld with any of the others. But it is not necessary that it is part of the quiddity of any of these other concepts. It can be so, but it can also be univocal to them as a determinable concept with respect to determining concepts [e.g., as “animal” with respect to “man” and “cat”] or as a concept that can be denominated (*denominabilis*) with respect to concepts that denominate it (*denominantes*) [e.g., as “white man” with respect to “white,” where “white” is univocal in both cases] [cf. n. 133].

150 Briefly, being (*ens*) is univocal for all concepts. For concepts that are not absolutely simple it is univocal, and of them it is predicated *in quid*. For absolutely simple concepts it is univocal, but as something that can be determined or denominated—not, however, as said *in quid* of them, for that includes a contradiction [cf. nn. 132–36].

151 From the foregoing it is clear how in being (*ente*) two primacies go together: a primacy of a quidditative commonness with respect to all not absolutely simple concepts and a primacy of virtuality, in itself or in its subordinates, with respect to all absolutely simple concepts. This simultaneous double primacy of being is sufficient to make it the first object of the intellect, even though none of the two primacies has an exclusive relation to all intelligibles. I explain this by an example: if the visual power (*visus*) were through itself able to know all common attributes and differences of color and all specific and individual instances and if, nevertheless, color were not included quidditatively in the differences and attributes of colors, then the visual power would still have the same first object it has now. The reason is that, if everything is checked, nothing else would be adequate for it. So the first object would not be included in all *per*

se objects, but every *per se* object would include it [i.e., color] essentially or would be included in something that included it essentially or virtually. And so two primacies go together there—namely, a primacy of commonness for its own part and a primacy of virtuality, in itself or in its subordinates. This double primacy would be sufficient for the notion of first object of a power.

Dispelling some objections against univocity

152 Arguments against the univocity of being:¹⁵ according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* III,¹⁶ being (*ens*) is not a genus, for then a difference would not be a *per se* being, as he argues there. But if being is something that is common to and said *in quid* of several specifically different things, it seems to be a category [cf. QDA 21 n. 29].

153 Also in *Metaphysics* IV, at the beginning, he insists that “being” is said of beings in the way “sane” is said of what is sane and that metaphysics is “one” science, not because all of its subjects are said to be one thing [in one and the same sense] but because they are related to one thing, not univocally but analogously.¹⁷ So the subject of metaphysics is not something univocal, but something analogous.

154 Also, in *Metaphysics* VII, he says that accidents are beings only because they belong to a being, just as logicians say that nonbeing is and that what is not knowable is knowable, just as a jug is said to be salubrious.¹⁸ In each of these examples there is no univocity of that which is said of several things.

155 And Porphyry says, “If someone calls all things beings, he will do so equivocally.”¹⁹

156 Also, Aristotle, in *Physics* I, against Parmenides and Melissus: “The principle is that being is spoken of in many ways.”²⁰ And he argues, “if all things are one being, [then] this one being or that one being.” This would not follow if being were univocal, just as it does not follow that “every man is one man, so this one man or that one man.”

157 Also, through reasoning: if being were to be univocal to the ten categories, it would come down into them through some differences. Let X and Y be two such differences. Either these two include being, and then the concept of any most general category would include something redundant, or they are not beings, and then nonbeing would be part of the concept of being [cf. QDA 21 n. 30].

158 To the first argument [n. 152]: even though one should not say that the arguments of *Metaphysics* III are conclusive (because the Philosopher there means to provide arguments for both sides of the questions he is discussing, as he states in the preface)²¹ [I still deal with them]. Two opposite conclusions cannot be drawn unless one of the arguments is a

sophism (that is why his Commentator says that the first argument to the first question that is discussed there commits the fallacy of the consequent: “If contraries pertain to the same science, then non-contraries do not pertain to the same science”).²² This argument [n. 152] in particular must not be taken as conclusive. Aristotle infers at the same place: “If for these reasons ‘one’ or ‘being’ is a genus, no difference will be ‘one’ or ‘being’ ”²³ (I ask, either he means to infer that a difference is not “being” or “one” in the first mode of *per se* predication—then the conclusion is not inappropriate with respect to “one”—or he means to infer the negative conclusion absolutely; then the inference is not valid, for if “rational” is a difference with respect to “animal,” it does not follow that “what is rational is not an animal,” but only that “it is not an animal *per se* in the first mode”). In spite of all this, if one holds that the argument [n. 152] is valid, it leads to the opposite conclusion rather than to what is being proposed, for it removes from being (*ente*) the notion of a genus, but not for reasons of equivocation. On the contrary, if it [i.e., the notion of being] were equivocal to the ten categories, it would be ten genera, for the same concept, by whatever name it is signified, has the same notion of a genus. But it removes the notion of a genus from being (*ente*) because of an excess of commonness,²⁴ since it is predicated of differences *per se* in the first mode. From this one could conclude that it is not a genus.

159 To see how this is true, whereas it was said earlier that being is not predicated *per se* in the first mode of the ultimate differences [cf. nn. 131–33], I make a distinction concerning differences. One kind can be based on an ultimate essential part that is another thing and another nature than the one on which the concept of category is based. For example, when a plurality of forms is posited and the category is based on a prior essential part and the specific difference on the ultimate form, then, just as being is said *in quid* of that essential part on which a certain specific difference is based, it is said *in quid* abstractly of that difference. Just as “the intellective soul is a being (*ens*)” is a proposition *in quid* (taking the concept of being as the same when said with respect to man or with respect to whiteness), the proposition “rationality is a being” is also *in quid*, if rationality is such a difference. However, none of these differences [just mentioned] is ultimate, since several realities are contained in them, in some way distinct (by the kind of distinction or nonidentity that, as I have discussed in the first question of the second distinction [Ord. 1.2 nn. 388–410], exists between the essence and a personal property [of God], or by a stronger distinction, as will be explained elsewhere [Ord. 2.1 n. 272; Ord. 4.11 n. 278]). And then such a nature can be conceived in a qualified way—that is, it can be conceived according to some reality and perfection while others are being ignored. And therefore the

concept of such a nature is not absolutely simple [cf. n. 133]. But the ultimate reality or the real perfection of such nature, on which the ultimate difference is based, is absolutely simple. That reality does not include being in a quidditative way, but it has an absolutely simple concept. Hence, if X is such reality, then the proposition “X is a being” is not a predication *in quid*, but a predication by accident. This is so irrespective of whether X refers to that reality or abstractly to the difference based on that reality.

160 I said earlier that no absolutely ultimate difference includes being quidditatively because it is absolutely simple [cf. nn. 133, 150]. But a difference based on an essential part, a part that in a thing is a nature different from the one on which the genus is based, such a difference is not absolutely simple, and it includes being *in quid*. And from the fact that such a difference is a being *in quid* it follows that being is not a genus for reasons of the excess of commonness of being. For no genus is said *in quid* of a lower difference, either of a difference based on a form or of a difference based on an ultimate reality of a form (as will become clear in distinction 8 [n. 95ff.]). For that on which the concept of a genus is based is in itself always in potentiality with respect to that reality on which the concept of a difference is based or with respect to that form if the difference is based on the form.

161 You might argue against this: if “rational” or any similar difference (that is, a difference based on an essential part, not on an ultimate reality of it) includes being quidditatively, then adding such a difference to a genus would be a pleonasm, since then being would be said twice [i.e., if “rational” includes “being” quidditatively, then saying “rational animal” would amount to saying “a being (animal) is a being (rational)”].—I reply: if two items, both ordered below a third one, are related in such a way that one of them denominates the other, that particular common item denominates itself. For example, [in the expression “the animal is white”] “whiteness,” which is below “being” (*ens*), denominates “animal,” which is [also] below “being.” Now, just as “the animal is white” is denominative [with “whiteness” denominating “animal”], so “being,” which is above “whiteness,” can denominate “animal” or a particular being that is taken for animal. If the denominative term [of being (*ens*) taken as a noun] were, for example, [the adjective] “being-ish” (*entale*), the following proposition would be true: “a being (*ens*) is being-ish.” I admit that the “accidental denomination” is not pleonastic here, although it is not the case that the same thing fully denominates itself, conceived in the same way [because *ens* and *entale* are conceived differently]. The same I admit in the case of “rational animal,” for in “animal” “being” is included quidditatively and in “rational” “being” is included denominatively. And just as rationality is a being (*ens*), so rationality is denominated by being (*ente*). So the expression “rationality

animal” would be pleonastic, but not this one: “rational animal,” just as “whiteness animal” would be but not “white animal” [cf. QDA 21 n. 34].

162 Reply to the other point [in n. 153] concerning *Metaphysics* IV: in *Metaphysics* X the Philosopher grants that there is an essential order between species of the same category.²⁵ He insists that in a genus there is one first element that is the measure of the other members. But things that are measured have an essential order in relation to the measure. Yet, in spite of such an attribution, everybody would concede that the concept of a genus is one. Otherwise the genus would not be predicated *in quid* of several specifically different elements. If a genus did not have one concept, different from the concepts of the species, no concept would be said *in quid* of several things, but each concept would be said only of itself, and then nothing would be predicated as a genus with respect to species but [only] as the same with respect to the same.

163 Similarly, in *Physics* VII the Philosopher says that “in categories equivocations lie hidden” because of which no comparison according to category can be made.²⁶ But there is no equivocation as far as logicians are concerned; they simply posit diverse concepts. There is, however, equivocation for the philosopher concerned with reality, since one does not have unity of nature there [i.e., in the case of the categories]. Therefore, all authorities that might be found in [Aristotle’s] *Metaphysics* and *Physics* on this matter could be explained by the diversity of the things in which there is attribution, while the unity of the concept that can be abstracted from these things still remains compatible with that diversity, as was clear in the example [of measurement, in n. 162]. I grant, then, that all that is an accident has an essential attribution to substance; yet from this and that accident a common concept can be abstracted.

164 Concerning what was said about *Metaphysics* VII [in n. 154], I reply that the text of the last paragraph about this matter solves all authorities from the Philosopher (the text begins at “But obviously, that ...”), for there the Philosopher says, “what is primarily and absolutely a definition and the whatness too is something of substances, although not just of them but also of other things, absolutely but not primarily.”²⁷ And he gives a proof. The formal concept (*ratio*) that signifies the “what” of a name is the definition, if that to which the conceptual content *per se* belongs, is *per se* one. “But *one* is used in the same way as *being*” (read: as *per se* being). But *per se* “being can signify this something [or this particular substance] or [accidents, such as] quantity and quality.” This is true with respect to *per se* being, since in *Metaphysics* V, he divides *per se* being into the ten categories.²⁸ Each of them is one *per se*, and so their concept is a definition. And he concludes, “For this reason there is a concept and a definition of *man* and a different one of *white*

and of *substance*.”²⁹ For the definition of *substance* expresses what is *per se* and primarily, of *white* it expresses what is unqualified and *per se* but not primarily, of *white man* it expresses what holds in a relative sense and is accidental. So in that chapter he mainly deals with being by accident, as exemplified by *white man*, of which there is no definition.³⁰ So “being” or “what” or “having a definition” or any of such things is said unqualifiedly of both accidents or attributes and substances, but not equally primarily. And despite the order, there can well be univocation.

165 Concerning Porphyry [cf. n. 155], he quotes someone else, saying, “equivocally, he says.” Who “says”? Aristotle, of course, about whom he is talking. In the logical writings one cannot find where he might have said that. He says it in *Metaphysics*, as has been mentioned already and explained [in n. 164]. If someone would like to discuss how the authoritative text of Porphyry and its argument based on Aristotle’s authority is of value for his proposal, it would be possible to do so, but I will not dwell on it.

166 As for the arguments from *Physics* I, I reply. With an eye on defeating the opinion of Parmenides and Melissus, “the principle” is to accept that being is said “in many ways”: not “equivocally” but “in many ways”—that is, of many things. One has to find out of which things they understand it. For example, if they would say “everything is one single animal,” then one must oppose them by distinguishing “animal” and ask what they have in mind: whether everything is one single animal or one single horse. Also, when you say that the argument of the Philosopher would not be of any use against them, if being were to be univocal [cf. n. 156], I reply, when one descends below a predicate that is merely confused, that consequence does not formally hold; it is a figure of speech and a fallacy of the consequent. Yet, if they themselves had in mind what the Philosopher does attribute to them, that “everything is one,” not talking of “one” in a confused way, but of some particular “one,”³¹ then, with the antecedent understood in that sense, the consequence follows well: that everything is this one thing or that one thing.³²

HENRY OF GHENT’S OPINION THAT THE TRUE IS THE FIRST OBJECT OF THE INTELLECT

167 Now that we have treated being (*ente*) we face a further problem: could some other transcendental be proposed as the first object of the intellect because it seems to have the same commonness as being? And there is a positive answer [given by Henry of Ghent]³³—namely, “the true” (*verum*) is the first object of the intellect, not being. A threefold proof is given.

168 First this way: distinct powers have distinct formal objects, from *On the Soul* II.³⁴ The intellect and the will are distinct powers, so they have

distinct formal objects. But it seems that this cannot be maintained if being is put forward as the first object of the intellect. If “the true” is put forward, then distinct objects can well be assigned³⁵ [cf. QDA 21 n. 5].

169 Second, thus: being (*ens*) is of itself common to the sensible and the insensible.³⁶ But the proper object of a power is its object under some proper aspect. So, if being is to be the proper object of the intellect, it must be determined and contracted to an intelligible being through something by which sensible being is excluded. But such contracting element seems to be “the true” that of itself points to the formal content of what is manifest or intelligible.

170 Also, third, thus: an object is only proper to some power insofar as it is a mover (*motivum*) for that power. But something only moves a power insofar as it has a relationship to it. Therefore, being, insofar as it is something absolute, not having any relationship to the intellect, is not its nearest and immediate object. But that according to which being formally has a relationship to the intellect is truth because, according to Anselm in *On Truth*, “Truth is rightness, only perceivable by the mind.”³⁷

171 But I argue against this conclusion concerning “truth” (*veritate*) as follows [cf. QDA 20]: a first or adequate object is made to match [a power] either according to commonness or virtuality or both primacies at the same time. “The true” does not match the intellect in any of these ways, whereas “being” matches it, as was made clear above [in n. 137]. Therefore, etc. Proof of the first part of the minor premise [concerning commonness]: “The true” (*verum*) is not said *in quid* of all that is in itself intelligible, since it is not said *in quid* of being, nor of anything that is in itself subordinate to being. The second part of the minor [concerning virtuality] is proved together with the third part [concerning the co-occurrence of commonness and virtuality]. Although the subordinates of “the true” include it essentially, they do not include virtually or essentially all that is intelligible, for “this true” (*hoc verum*), which is in a stone, does not virtually or essentially include the stone. But, conversely, “this being” that is a stone does include truth—and so for any other being and its truth.

172 Also, “true” is an attribute of being and of anything subordinate to being. So, when being or anything subordinate to being is understood precisely under the aspect of “true,” then it is only understood by accident and not according to a quidditative notion. But knowledge of anything according to a quidditative notion is the first and most perfect knowledge of it, from *Metaphysics* VII (chapter 1).³⁸ Hence, knowledge of something precisely under the aspect of truth is not the first knowledge of an object. And so truth is not precisely the first, exclusive basis for knowing an object [cf. QDA 20 n. 16].

173 Confirmation of the argument on the basis of *Prior Analytics* II: Simultaneously with a science of mules as such there can be ignorance with respect to this particular mule.³⁹ By way of comparison, consider a habit that is primarily concerned with some higher-order item: there a subordinate item lies outside the scope of the higher-order item, which is the habit's primary subject matter. Even more so will an object lie outside the scope of its attributes when it is related to a habit or to a power.

174 Also, the object of a habit does not naturally precede the object of the power [in which the habit resides]. But the first object of metaphysics, which is a habit of the intellect, is being, which is naturally prior to "the true," which is an attribute of being and is not the first subject of metaphysics [cf. QDA 20 n. 17].

175 To the arguments for the opposite view I reply by leading them to opposite conclusions. As for the first [n. 168]: just as the will cannot have an act with respect to something that is unknown, so, too, it cannot have an act with respect to an object in accordance with the formal notion (*ratione*) of the latter if this notion is fully unknown. Therefore, every notion according to which something is presented to the will can be known by the intellect. And so the first notion of an object cannot consist in a notion that is distinguished from that of what can be willed, if there is such a notion.

[*Interpolation*] Also, the intellect construes a difference between "good" and "true" but also an agreement. Therefore.

176 This is also clear with respect to the various attributes of being of which we have distinct knowledge—for example, the knowledge of "good" under the notion of good and of "true" under the notion of true. For, according to Avicenna, *Metaphysics* VI, final chapter, "If there were some science of all causes, the most noble science would be that of the final cause" whose nature is goodness according to many philosophers⁴⁰ [cf. Ord. Prol. n. 195].

177 To what is assumed in the argument concerning the distinction between objects, I reply, distinct powers can be related to each other in three ways. Either they are entirely disparate, or they are ordered, and this either within the same category, as higher and lower cognitive powers are, or in different categories, as the cognitive power in relation to the appetitive power [cf. QDA 20 n. 20].

178 In the first way two distinct powers have objects that are entirely different because none of the powers operates *per se* on the object of another, due to the fact that they are different. The exterior senses, like vision and audition, are of this kind.

179 In the second way distinct powers have subordinate objects. And just

as the higher power can *per se* act upon anything on which the lower power can act, the first object of the higher power includes the first object of the lower power; otherwise it would not be an adequate object for the higher power. Therefore, the first object of vision is according to its commonness included as a lower object in the first object of the common sense.

180 Third, powers can be related to each other as follows: if the appetitive power is matched (*adaequatur*) to the cognitive power in operating on any object, the first object of each power would be the same and have the same formal notion from the part of the object. But if the appetitive power has an act regarding certain knowable things but not regarding some others, then the object of the appetitive power will be subordinate to that of the cognitive power.

181 Applied to the issue at hand: the intellect and the will fall into the third class. If the will is posited to have an act regarding every intelligible item {understood under whatever notion}, it will be said that the object of both the will and the intellect is the same, understood under the same notion. If not—that is, when the will has only an act regarding intelligible items that are a goal or that lead to a goal [i.e., practical things] and not regarding things that are purely theoretical—then the object of the will is posited to be in some way particular compared to the object of the intellect. But it will always be the case that being is the object of the intellect.

182 I lead the second argument [n. 169] to the opposite conclusion. An object that is proportionate to a higher power is common to the proper object of a lower power; this follows from the distinction mentioned above [n. 179]. As it abstracts from sensible or insensible things, being is truly the proper object of the intellect because the intellect can as the higher power have an act regarding both sensible and insensible things. Hence, the relevant abstraction, which seems to be a nonappropriation [of sensible and insensible aspects], is appropriation enough for the higher power. By this I reply to the argument [in n. 169]: the commonness of being in relation to the sensible and the insensible is the reason that it can be appropriated to a power that is active {with respect to both *per se* objects, such as the intellect is [i.e., the intellect, as the higher power, can be active with respect to objects that are proper to a lower power precisely for reasons of the commonness of being]}. Although the sensible is contained in being as common, what is common itself is not the sensible or the object of the senses but only the intelligible content, which is adequate to the intellect, since an aspect proper to a lower level need not be proper to a higher level. The “sensible” is such an aspect: it applies fully and alone to a quality. But even though “intelligible” (in contrast to “sensible”) applies to a being, it does not apply to it fully and alone. It applies only uniquely to being in common, not insofar as it is “this

thing,” an intelligible singular thing, but as being common to everything that is intelligible according to a mode of commonness as described above [in n. 137].}

183 I bring the third argument [n. 170] to its opposite. I say that the hallmark (*rationem*) of an object consists in what makes the object a mover for a power, just as the hallmark of something active or of acting is said to be that form according to which the agent acts. But for an object this hallmark cannot lie in a relation to the power. The Philosopher, too, says something like that in *On the Soul* II when he specifies the first object of vision.⁴¹ He says, “The object of the visual power is ‘what is visible,’ ” not *per se* in the first mode but in the second mode in such a way that the object is given the character (*ratione*) of being visible. But if the formal character of the object of a power were a relation to that power, the first object of vision would be what is visible *per se* in the first mode since visibility itself would then be the formal character of the object. And then it would be easy to specify first objects, because then the first object of any power would reside in the correlate of the power, for example, for vision “what is visible” and for hearing “what is audible.” But this is not the way the Philosopher specified first objects of powers.⁴² He specified absolute things, for example, for vision “color” and for audition “sound,” and so on. Therefore, if “true” means a formal relation to the intellect (see elsewhere [nn. 171–83, 323]), we get the opposite of what was [meant to be] proposed, for it would follow that its character [i.e., the relational character of “true”] is not the formal character of the object [of the intellect] but something different from it.

184 From what has been said it is clear that nothing can be presented as the first object of the intellect as suitably as being: not something that is virtually the first (*virtuale primum*), nor some other transcendental (since with respect to the latter one can argue in the same way as was done for “true”).

REMARK ON THE SCOPE OF THE AUTHOR’S CLAIMS

185 But one problem remains. If being, according to its most common formal notion (*rationem*), is the first object of the intellect, why cannot anything that is contained under being naturally move the intellect, as was argued in the first argument for the first question [n. 25]? Then it would seem that God could be naturally known by us and the immaterial substances, as well. But this kind of knowledge was denied [in nn. 56–57]. It was even denied with respect to all substances and all essential parts of substances, since it was said [in n. 137] that these are not conceived in some quidditative concept unless in that of being.

186 I reply. As the first object of a power one assigns that which is

adequate for it on the basis of the very nature (*ratione*) of the power, not that which matches the power in some particular state. Just as the first object of the visual power is not said to be that which matches the visual power, when it is active only in a medium that is illuminated by candlelight, but rather that which is naturally suited to match the visual power insofar as it is based on the nature of the visual power. Now, as was argued against the first opinion concerning the first adequate object of the intellect (that the quiddity of the material thing is the first object [n. 110]), in view of the power's nature and with an eye on its first object, only what is most common can be adequate to our intellect [nn. 113–19]. Yet, in its present state the quiddity of sensible things is adequate to it [i.e., the intellect] as its [fundamental] mover. Therefore, our intellect in its present state does not naturally understand other things that are not contained under that initial mover (*primo motivo*).

187 But what is the nature (*ratio*) of this [present] state? I reply, a “state” seems to be nothing but a “stable permanence” fixed by the laws of wisdom. It is fixed by these laws that our intellect in its present state understands only things whose species shine out in a phantasm. And this is so either because of the punishment for the original sin or because of the natural harmony of the soul's powers in their functioning, since we see that a higher power functions with respect to the same object as a lower power does, if each will have a perfect function. And as a matter of fact it is the case with us that we actually imagine a singular for whatever universal we are thinking of (*intelligimus*). Although this harmony is a matter of fact for the present state, it is not of the nature of the intellect as intellect or of the intellect as embodied because then the same harmony would obtain in the glorified body, which is false. So, from wherever this state arises, either from the mere will of God or from his punishing justice (the latter cause is suggested by Augustine in chapter 5 of *On the Trinity* XV: “What causes the fact that you cannot fix your eyes on the light itself unless, for sure, weakness? And what did bring that to you unless, for sure, wickedness?”)⁴³—whether, I say, this is the whole cause or something else, there is at least no other first object of the intellect, given its power and its nature, than something that is common to all intelligible things, even though the first object that is adequate for moving it in the present state is the quiddity of a sensible thing.

188 Perhaps you say, “Even given that in the present state being in common is the common adequate object, the separate substances would not move the intellect unless in a light that is greater than the natural light of the agent intellect.”—This argument seems to be of no value, for one thing because, if such light is needed, there is no reason on the part of the intellect considered as this kind of power that it cannot have such light right now, for

the intellect of itself can receive such light; otherwise it would, while remaining the same, never be able to receive it. For another thing, because, when two agents concur for some effect, the amount of perfection in one of them is lesser to the extent that the other can take over its role, and it is even zero if the other agent completely takes over its role. Now, in order to affect the possible intellect, the object and the light concur. So less light is needed to the extent that the object is more perfect and more able to take over the role of the light; at the very least not more light is needed. But the first intelligible is light to the highest degree and to the highest degree able take over the role of the intellectual light. So, for its part, if it [i.e., the first intelligible] is conceived under the first adequate object of our intellect in our present state, it would not be a failure on the part of the light if it could not move our intellect.

REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS

189 I reply to the initial arguments of this question: to the first [n. 108], I say that “what is most perfect” is not always a cause with respect to imperfect things {when the imperfect things are compared to some third item}, just as perfect white is not the cause of visibility for all visible things. Or if it is the cause, it is not the exclusive and adequate cause. And even if it is the maximally moving factor, it is still not exclusive and adequate. But the first object of the intellect we are talking about in this question must be the first and adequate object of the power.

190 To the second argument [n. 109] I say that if one reasons correctly, it must be concluded that “no participating being can be cognized (*cognosci*) unless it is a being [caused] by the being that does not participate.” The conclusion must not be that “it cannot be cognized other than through the notion of the not-participating being as cognized first,” for in the latter case there are four terms, because in the conclusion the term “being cognized through the not-participating being” occurs, which did not occur in the second proposition [the minor premise]. And the real reason for this flaw in the form of the argument was mentioned before, in the reply to the first argument of the second question of this distinction [n. 100], for, even if knowability (*cognoscibilitas*) proportionally follows being (*entitatem*), it does not follow it in [actually] being cognized unless in comparison “to that intellect that knows anything according to its degree of knowability.” So I reason as follows here: although participating being (*entitas*) necessarily leads to the knowability of what does not participate, which is why participating being has knowability on account of the not-participating knowable, it does not have “being cognized” through the not-participating knowable as being

cognized but as being the cause that gives it being. And this was touched upon in an argument concerning “fruition” in the fourth question of the first distinction [Ord. d. 1, n. 48].

191 As for the quotation from *On the Trinity* VIII [in n. 109], I say that it talks of knowledge of “good in common” that has been “impressed”—that is, it is easily impressed in the intellect by singulars, since universal concepts (*intentiones*) occur rather easily in anyone. The proof of this I take from the author himself, in the same book, chapter 7, where he says, “We possess a knowledge of human nature imprinted according to certain rules according to which we know that there is a human being or the form of a human whenever we see something of the sort.”⁴⁴ Just as we, according to this notion of human being (which, he says, is imprinted according to certain rules—that is, is easily abstracted from sensibles) judge something to be a human or not, so, too, we are able to judge by the same notion the excellence in humanity if the latter is present in what we meet with.* This is apparent from the notion of whiteness by which we judge not only that something we meet is white but also that it is whiter than something else. Similarly, I say here, the “good” of which chapter 5 is talking and “the notion of which is naturally imprinted in the intellect” is “good in common.” With respect to the things we meet it makes us judge that this is better than that.

* [Interpolation] just as we judge, concerning what we meet with, that this is better than that.

192 And that he is talking of the privatively undetermined good and not of the negatively undetermined good (in which God is understood) is seen from this: after having itemized many particular kinds of good, he says, “This good, and that good: take away ‘this’ and ‘that’ and look at ‘good’ itself, if you can.”⁴⁵ This means, “take away the elements that contract the nature of good to creatures and look at the nature of good in common” and therein “you have seen God,” as in the first common concept in which he can be naturally seen by us (but not in particular, as “this essence”).

193 Similarly, one should understand what he introduces in chapter 3, at “God is truth”: “Do not want to ask what truth is, for immediately phantasms will come in the way.” I understand this as follows: when a universal concept is abstracted from a singular, then, the more universal it is, the more difficult it is for the intellect to stay with such a concept because, as was said above [in n. 187], whenever “we think of a universal, we imagine its singular.” And we can think of a universal more easily and for a longer time when it is more similar to the singular that shines out in the phantasm. And the most universal items are more distant from the singular itself, and therefore it is most difficult to stay with the concept of these most universal items. So, in

conceiving God in a most universal concept, “do not ask what that is,” and do not want to descend to some particular concept that preserves the more universal concept, which is nearer to a phantasm, as it is a more particular concept. By descending into such a concept, which shines out better in the phantasms we have, “one immediately loses that clarity of the truth in which God was understood,” for one immediately thinks of a contracted truth that does not pertain to God, to whom the truth conceived in common, not contracted, was appropriate.

194 {Against this: chapter 5 or 10: “If you could see ‘good’ in itself, you would see God and if you were captured with love, you would be made permanently happy.”⁴⁶ Happiness does not consist in the universal good or in good as it is privatively indeterminate. Also, chapter 10 or 26: “By what could people be righteous if not by being captured by the very form they see and that forms them that way.”⁴⁷ To be formed by the form of justice does not come about by thinking of a universal.}

195 By the same argument, I reply to the text of book VIII, chapter 5, concerning good and will: “Since other things are not loved unless they are good, it is deemed shameful to cling to them and not love the very good itself by which they [i.e., the other things] are good.”⁴⁸ This argument rightly proves that the highest good itself should be loved more than participating goods, but it does not prove that it is the first thing loved in terms of the primacy of adequacy. For even if it [the highest good] is the reason of goodness in other things and so the reason of their loveliness, it is not as being loved that it is the reason of other things being loved. For one can love something when it is not loved, as is clear “when one uses what is to be enjoyed, or enjoys what is to be used.”

196 Augustine’s intention can be captured from chapter 7 of book IX,⁴⁹ where he discusses the love for somebody because that person is believed to be just. When that person later is found out not to be just, he says, “The love that attracted me to him is immediately repelled as by a reaction and stays in that form in which I loved him as he was before”—that is, if I loved justice and him because I believed justice to be in him, then, if I find him unjust, the will turns back from him, but the love of justice itself as an object still remains. This is not about some not-participating justice but about the common concept of justice, which is loved for its own sake and because of which everything in which it is, is loved.

197 {Objection: the will is not concerned with universals, both because it aims at a thing as it is in itself and because the love of friendship as well as of desire pertains to something according to its real existence, present or possible.

198 I reply: to the first practical principles in the intellect corresponds an

act of the will that is the principle of moral goodness, just as these principles are the principles of practical truth in the intellect. Also [second] it is clear that any concept (*ratio*) of what is good or attractive can be thought of (*intelligi*) in general. And if it is thus shown to the will, why can the will not have an act with respect to the proper object shown? Third, the appetitive power for the singular as merely singular does not have a [corresponding] cognitive power for the universal proper to itself.

199 To the metaphor of the movement of the soul toward the thing [n. 197]: This is to be understood causally because the soul demands to be joined to the desired thing in itself—not formally, though, unless when the will is the agent of its own act, and not about the thing under an aspect of existence greater than apprehended by the intellect; on the contrary, desire and abstractive intellection are about the thing as existing under the same aspect as the object (as with vision and fruition of what is present). But desire moves effectively toward a thing because it is in command; abstractive intellection is not.

200 To the second I say that a human being as shown in a universal notion is loved by the love of friendship; and for that reason “this human being” is loved. So, too, one longs for justice in general, and hence for “this justice” in this person.}

201 This interpretation explains the testimony of book VIII, chapter 10 or 27: “Why do we love someone else, etc?”⁵⁰ [n. 125]. In this authority, the form “in which we see what a just person is” must be understood as justice in common itself, just as the form of a human in common is that by which we see what is required for being a human person. And by that form we judge whether what meets the eye is a human person or not, as he says in the same place, chapter 7: “Unless we loved that form in common we would not love the person whom we believe to be just and whom we love for reason of that form.” Likewise, if you do not love the form of a human person in common, you will never love a particular person on the basis of the love of the form of a human person. {“And as long as we are not just, we love justice in common less than we should,” for then we love by some act of the will or a simple delight, which is insufficient for being just. But we should love it [= justice in common] by an efficacious act of the will, an act by which the willing person would choose to obey it in itself as a rule for his own life.} So here justice is privatively indeterminate, according to which we judge about a just mind and for the love of which we love a mind that we believe to be just.

QUESTION 4

CAN WE KNOW A CERTAIN AND GENUINE TRUTH BY NATURAL MEANS WITHOUT ANY SPECIAL ILLUMINATION?

202 Finally, concerning the question of what can be known, I ask if the intellect of the traveler can know any certain and genuine truth by natural means without any special illumination from the uncreated light.

INITIAL ARGUMENTS

I argue for a negative answer. In chapter 6 or 15 of *On the Trinity* IX, Augustine says, “Let us look at the unbreakable truth from which we determine how the mind of man must be in accordance with eternal reasons.”¹ And, in chapter 15: “When we approve or disapprove of something, rightly or wrongly, we are constrained to approve or disapprove by other rules remaining above us.”² Also, in chapter 17: “Grasping by simple understanding (*simplici intelligentia*) an ineffably beautiful art beyond the eye of the mind.” And in the same work, in chapter 8 or 18: “In that truth from which all temporal things have been made, we see the form and so we have conceived within us true knowledge as the ‘word.’ ”

203 Also, chapter 2 of book XII: “It belongs to a more exalted reason to judge these corporeal things according to eternal reasons.”³

204 Also, also in book XII, chapter 14 or 32: “There are immutable reasons not only of the sensible things having positions in space, etc.”⁴ Here he means the eternal reasons in God; this is proven by the fact that he says, at the same place, that “arriving at them is given to few people.” If he had meant the first principles, “arriving at them” is not “given to few people” but “given to many people,” for they [i.e., these principles] are common knowledge for everyone.

205 Also, in chapter 15 or 34 of book XIV, he says, talking of an unjust person, who “correctly praises and reproves many things in human behavior,” “By what rules does he judge? Etc.”⁵ And at the end he adds, “Where are these rules laid down, if not in that book of light?” “That book of light” is the divine intellect. So he means that the unjust person sees in that light what is to be done justly and that this is seen in something or by

something impressed in him by that light. As he says there: "From there every just law is transferred to the heart of man, not by leaving its origin but by being impressed as it were, just as an image from a ring passes into the wax without leaving the ring." Therefore, we see in that light from which justice is implanted in the heart of man. But that light is the uncreated light.

206 Also, in *Confessions* XII: "If both of us are seeing the true (*verum*), you do not see it in me, nor do I see it in you, but both of us are seeing it in the unchangeable truth (*veritate*) which is above the mind."⁶ There are many testimonies of Augustine, in many places, to prove this conclusion.

207 For the opposite, Romans 1 has, "Since the creation of the world the invisible things of God can be seen by understanding the things that have been made."⁷ The "eternal reasons" are God's invisible things, so they are known from creatures. Therefore, before they are seen themselves, we can have certain knowledge of what has been created.

THE OPINION OF HENRY OF GHENT

208 In this question there is one opinion saying that general concepts (*intentiones generales*) have a natural order among themselves.⁸ Let us talk about the two that are relevant here: the concept of "being" (*entis*) and the concept of "true." The concept of being comes first, as is proven by the fourth proposition of *On Causes*: "First among what is created is being (*esse*)." And in the comment on the first proposition we read, "Being (*esse*) adheres more strongly." And the reason is that "being" (*entitas*) is something absolute, whereas "truth" means a relation to an exemplar. From this it follows that a being (*ens*) can be known under the aspect of "being" (*entitatis*) without being known under the [relational] aspect of "truth."^{*} This conclusion can also be proved with respect to understanding (*intellectus*), for a being can be conceived in a simple act of understanding (*simplici intelligentia*), in which case, one conceives that which is true. But the idea (*ratio*) of truth is only grasped in an act of understanding that consists of composing or dividing. Simple understanding precedes composing and dividing.

^{*} [Interpolation] and, consequently the very thing that is true can be known before its truth itself is known.

209 As for the question concerning knowledge of being or what is true (*quod est verum*), it is said [by Henry] that the intellect (*intellectus*) can understand what is true merely on the basis of its natural powers. The following proof is given: according to Damascene it is unacceptable that "a nature exists without its proper operation." This is even less acceptable for a more perfect nature, according to the Philosopher in *On Heaven and Earth* II,⁹

where he is talking of the stars.* Since the proper operation of the intellect is to understand what is true, it seems unacceptable that nature would not have given the intellect the qualities that are appropriate for this function.

* [Interpolation] because it would be very inappropriate for stars to have the power of moving forward without having the instruments for moving forward [cf. Lect. 1.3 n. 155].

210 When we are talking about knowledge of the truth (*veritatis*), however, the following is said: according to Plato in *Timaeus*,¹⁰ there is an exemplar that is made and one that is not made, or an exemplar that is created and one that is not created. The created exemplar is the species of the universal that is caused by a thing [in our mind]. The uncreated exemplar is the idea in the mind of God. Just as there are two exemplars, one created and one uncreated, so too there is a twofold agreement (*conformitas*) with an exemplar and a twofold truth. One consists in the agreement with the created [or acquired] exemplar. And in this sense Aristotle held that the truths of things are known through their agreement with the intelligible species.¹¹ Augustine seems to hold the same in *On the Trinity* VIII (chapter 7), where he says that we obtain from sensible things a general and special knowledge by which we judge of whatever we meet the truth as to its being so and so.¹²

211 But it seems to be completely impossible that we can have fully certain and infallible knowledge of the truth of a thing through such an acquired exemplar. Three proofs are given for this claim. The first is based on the thing from which the exemplar is abstracted, the second on the subject in which it is, and the third on the exemplar in itself. Here is the first proof: the object from which the exemplar is abstracted is changeable, so it cannot be the cause of something that is unchangeable. But when we have certain knowledge of something under the aspect of truth, we have it through an unchangeable reason (*rationem*). It is, therefore, not had through such an exemplar. This is supposed to be Augustine's reasoning, in question 9 of his *Eighty-three Questions*, where he says, "One should not expect the truth from sensible things," for "sensible things are continuously changing."

212 The second argument is this: the soul is of itself changeable and subject to error, so it cannot be corrected or steered away from error by something that is more changeable than itself. But the exemplar in it is more changeable than the soul itself is. Therefore, that exemplar cannot perfectly steer away the soul from error.* This is supposed to be Augustine's reasoning in *On the True Religion* ("The law of all arts, etc.").¹³

* [Interpolation] Therefore, some special, higher influence, is required [cf.

213 The third argument: nobody has certain and infallible knowledge of the truth unless he has a basis for discriminating between “what is true” (*verum*) and “what is seemingly true” (*verisimili*). For if a person cannot discriminate between true and false or what seems to be true, he can [not avoid] being in doubt as to being misled. But one cannot discriminate between what is true and what seems to be true on the basis of the created exemplar. Proof of the minor premise: such a species [i.e., the created or acquired exemplar] can present itself either as itself [i.e., as representing and hence pointing to the object to be known] or it can present itself as the object [to be known], as in dreams. If it presents itself as the object, falsity results. If it presents itself as itself, truth results. So with such a species one does not have a sufficient criterion for discriminating between whether it presents itself as itself or as an object. One has, therefore, not a sufficient criterion for discriminating what is true from what is false.

214 This leads to the following conclusion: if someone happens to have certain and infallible knowledge of the truth, this does not happen by looking at the exemplar of the thing obtained through the senses, no matter how purified and universalized it may be. Rather one has to look at the uncreated exemplar. This is meant to work as follows: it is not as being known that God has the character (*ratio*) of an exemplar giving genuine truth when looked at, for he is known in general attributes. But he is the reason (*ratio*) for our knowledge as being the naked exemplar and the proper reason of created essences.

215 An example is given to show how God can be the reason for our knowledge without himself being that which is known. The rays of the sun originate from its source and are sometimes seen in an oblique way [i.e., in what they illuminate] and sometimes in a direct way. The sun is the reason for seeing what is seen in the first kind of rays, though not as seen in itself. But with the second kind of rays the sun is the reason for our knowledge, and it is also known itself. So when the uncreated light illuminates the intellect as if seen directly, it is as being seen that it is the reason of seeing other things in it. But it illuminates our intellect in its present state as if seen indirectly, and therefore it is for our intellect the reason for seeing while not being seen itself.

216 It is maintained that it [the uncreated light] has three roles (*rationem*) with respect to the act of seeing: being the light that incites [the organ]; being the species that alters [the sense]; and being the exemplar that informs [the mind].¹⁴ From this it is concluded further that a special influence is required, for just as that essence [the uncreated exemplar] is not naturally

seen by us in itself, so too it is not naturally seen as it is an exemplar for some creature. As Augustine says in *On Seeing God*, it is in his power to be seen, “If he wants so, he is seen, if not, he is not seen.”¹⁵

217 Finally, it is added that perfect knowledge of the truth results when both exemplar species are in the mind together: one inhering in it—namely, the created one—and the other brought into it—namely, the uncreated one. And in this way we attain the word of perfect truth.

[*Interpolation*] in the illumination of the mind: from these two species, made into one reason for understanding the thing which it pertains to, the mind conceives.

AGAINST HENRY’S OPINION

218 Against this opinion I will, first, show that these arguments cannot be the foundation of a true position and that they do not represent the intention of Augustine but rather the view of the Academicians [= “First article,” nn. 219–28]. Second, I show how the view of the Academicians, which appears to follow from these arguments, is false [“Second article,” nn. 229–45]. Third, I reply to the arguments themselves insofar as they are inconclusive [“Third article,” nn. 246–57]. Fourth, I argue against the conclusion of this view [“Fourth article,” nn. 250–60]. Fifth, I answer the question [“Fifth article,” nn. 261–79]. And sixth, I show how the arguments insofar as they are Augustine’s lead to a conclusion in accordance with his intentions and not to the conclusion that is drawn from them here [“Sixth article,” n. 280].

[*Note by Scotus*, suggesting an alternative structure for the text] I argue [first] against this opinion [of Henry of Gent] in itself, second against the fundamental reasons that are given for it [in nn. 211–13], or the other way around [i.e. first against the reasons and then against the opinion]. The first [against the opinion] includes the fourth article, which is *ad hominem*, and the second [article], which is strictly to the point. The second [against the arguments] includes the first article, and the third, and the sixth. The fifth article, therefore, is the answer to the question.

219 The [three] arguments [in nn. 211–13] seem to lead to the impossibility of certain natural knowledge. First, if an object changes continuously, one cannot have any certainty concerning that object under the aspect of what is unchangeable. Worse even, one cannot get certainty in any light whatsoever, for there is no certainty as to when the object is known differently from the way it is. There is also no certainty in knowing the changeable as such. It is, moreover, obvious that the antecedent of the

argument—namely, that “sensible things are continuously changing”—is false. This is the opinion that is ascribed to Heraclitus [by Aristotle] in *Metaphysics* IV.¹⁶

220 Similarly, if the changeability of the exemplar in our mind (*anima*) were the reason of there not being certainty, it follows that there is nothing in the mind that can prevent it from erring, since anything that is posited in the mind as in its subject is changeable, the act of understanding (*intelligendi*) too.

[*Interpolation*] Then it follows also that the act of understanding itself will never be true, nor contain the truth, since it is more changeable than the mind in which it is.

221 Similarly, this opinion holds that the created species inhering in the mind cooperates with the [uncreated] species brought into it [cf. n. 217]. But when something that is adverse to certainty cooperates, it is impossible to get certainty at all. Just as from a necessary proposition and another contingent proposition only a contingent conclusion can follow, so, too, no certain cognition can follow when certain and uncertain elements go together in a cognitive act.

222 The same is obvious with respect to the third argument [n. 213], for if the species that is abstracted from a thing cooperates in every act of cognition and if one cannot discern when it is representing itself just as itself or when it representing itself as the object, one cannot get the certainty by which to tell the difference between what is true and what is seemingly true, no matter what other element cooperates. Therefore, these arguments seem to lead to complete uncertainty and to the opinion of the Academicians.

223 I show that this conclusion is not what Augustine had in mind. In *Soliloquies* II, Augustine says, “Everybody admits without any doubt that the proofs of the sciences are most true.”¹⁷ And Boethius, in *On the Hebdomads*: “Common understanding (*conceptio*) by the soul consists in what is approved by everybody as soon as it is heard.”¹⁸ And the Philosopher, in *Metaphysics* II: “The first principles are known to everyone like the door of a house, for, just as the door is clearly visible even though the interior of the house stays hidden, so the first principles are known to everybody.”¹⁹

224 From these three testimonies the following argument is construed: what belongs to every member of a species follows the specific nature. Therefore, since everyone has infallible certainty concerning the first principles, and since, in addition, everyone has a clear natural understanding of the form of the perfect syllogism (on the basis of the definition of the latter given in *Prior Analytics* I),²⁰ everyone can have natural knowledge of any conclusion that can be demonstrated from principles that are known *per*

se because the knowledge of conclusions depends only on the evidence of principles and on the evidence of syllogistic inference.

225 Second, it is clear that Augustine allows certainty with respect to things that are known through sensory experience. That is why he says in *On the Trinity* XV (chapter 12 or 13), “Be it far from us to doubt the truth of the things that we have learned through the bodily senses, for through them we have learned of heaven and earth and sea, and all that is in them.”²¹ If we do not doubt the truth of these things and if we are not deceived, as is obvious, then we are certain with respect to the things we know by the senses for certainty obtains when doubt and deception are excluded.

226 It is also clear, third, that Augustine admits certainty with respect to our own acts in *On the Trinity* XV (chapter 12 or 31): “Whether he is asleep or awake, he lives, for to sleep and to see in dreams are proper to someone who is alive.”²²

227 In case you say that “to be alive” is not a second act but the first, he proceeds: “If someone says ‘I know that I know that I am alive’ he cannot be deceived,” no matter how often he reflects upon the first “know.” And in the same place, “If someone says: ‘I want to be happy,’ would it not be a shame to respond: ‘maybe you are deceived?’ ” The same goes for reflecting endlessly, “I know that I want,” etc. And in the same place, “If someone says ‘I do not want to err,’ will it not be true that he does not want to err?” “And, he says, other points can be found that are valid against the Academicians, who assert that ‘nothing can be known by man.’ ”²³ The same conclusion follows from the three books of *Against the Academicians*: “If someone has understood them, he will not be affected at all by their many arguments against the perception of the truth.”²⁴

228 Also, in the same book, in chapter 15 or 38: “Things known in such a way that they can never be lost belong to the nature of the soul itself, such as that we know that we are alive.”²⁵

[*Note by Scotus*] Note that there are four kinds of knowledge (*cognitiones*) in which we necessarily have certainty—namely, knowledge of things that can be known simply (*simpliciter*) [nn. 230–34], of things that can be known through experience [nn. 235–37], of our own acts [nn. 238–39], and of what is known by us through the senses as here and now (*ut nunc*) [nn. 240–45]. The first kind is evident [n. 230]; the third kind can be concluded to be known *per se*, for otherwise one would be unable to judge what is known *per se* [cf. n. 238]; the second and the fourth kind comprise infinitely many [propositions] that are known *per se* [cf. nn. 235, 241], by which they combine with others, from various senses [cf. n. 241]. An example [of the first kind]: “A triangle has three [angles equal to two

right angles”; cf. Ord. 1 d.2 n. 27]; [of the second kind:] “The moon is eclipsed”; [of the third kind:] “I am awake”; [of the fourth kind:] “that is white.” The first and the third kind do need the senses only as an occasion, for there is absolute certainty, even if all the senses were mistaken [cf. nn. 234, 238–39]. The second and the fourth kind obtain through the following [principle]: “What frequently comes from something that is not free has that as its *per se* natural cause” [cf. nn. 235, 240]. From this [principle] what is proposed follows. A necessary proposition [e.g., as the one mentioned in n. 236: “When something opaque etc.”; also n. 242, “some proposition that corrects, etc.”; n. 244: “size when applied, etc.”] is sometimes added both in the second and in the fourth kind.—In this way you postpone Augustine’s testimonies [nn. 225–28] to the second article, which deals with the matter directly or provides the solution [in the spirit of the Note to n. 218].

So the first article is clear:

[*Interpolation*] in showing that his [Henry’s] reasoning is inconclusive, and that it is false and against Augustine.

THE POSSIBILITY OF CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE (AGAINST SKEPTICISM)

229 As for the second article, in order to make sure that the error of the Academicians does not occur with respect to anything that can be known, we must see how to deal, [first], with the three kinds of knowable things mentioned earlier [cf. nn. 224, 225, 226–28]—namely, principles known *per se* and their ensuing conclusions—, [and] second, things known through experience, and third, our own acts: is it possible to naturally have infallible certainty here?

230 As for the certainty with respect to principles, I say the following: the terms of principles that are known *per se* have an identity in such a way that each of them evidently and necessarily includes the other. Therefore, when the intellect combines these terms, it has, as soon as it apprehends them, within itself the necessary cause for the agreement (*conformitatis*) between the act of combining and the very terms that are combined {and also the evident cause of such an agreement. Therefore, the agreement is necessarily clear to the intellect, since its cause was apprehended in the terms.} The intellect cannot apprehend the terms and combine them without there being also agreement between the composition and the terms, just as it is not possible to have one white thing and another without there being similarity. But this agreement between composition and terms constitutes (*est*) the truth of the composition. Hence, it is not possible to have a composition of such

terms that is not true. So, too, it is impossible to apprehend (*perceptio*) the composition and to apprehend the terms without also apprehending the agreement between the composition and the terms and apprehending the truth, because the things that were apprehended to begin with evidently include the apprehension of that truth.

231 This argument can be corroborated by a similar one of the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* IV, where he insists that the opposite of a first principle cannot cross one's mind (*intellectu*)—for example, of this one: “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be”²⁶—for then two contrary beliefs (*opinionones*) would be simultaneously present in the mind. This is true of all contrary beliefs—that is, beliefs that are formally incompatible, since believing of something that it is the case (*esse*) and believing of the same thing that it is not the case (*non esse*) are formally inconsistent.

232 I argue that in the case at hand there is in the mind a similar incompatibility between thoughts, even when it is not formal. Suppose the mind has knowledge (*notitia*) of “whole” and “part” and their combination. Since the relevant [separate] cognitions [= A] include as a necessary cause the agreement between the combination and the terms [= B], [it follows that] if the mind fosters the belief that the combination itself is false, it will have incompatible cognitions, not in a formal sense, but the one cognition [i.e., A] will stay together with the other [i.e., B], and yet the former will be a necessary cause of a cognition opposite to the latter, which is impossible. For just as it is impossible for black and white to be present simultaneously as they are formally contraries, so, too, it is impossible that whiteness is present simultaneously with that which is precisely the cause of blackness. This is necessarily the case in that it is impossible for there to be the one [= A, or whiteness] without the other [= B, or blackness] without contradiction.

233 Once we have certainty with respect to first principles, it is obvious how it can be obtained with respect to the conclusions that are inferred from them. The reason is that the form of a perfect syllogism is evident, and the certainty of a conclusion depends only on the certainty of the principles and the evidence of the inference.

234 But will the intellect not err in the cognition (*notitia*) of the principles and conclusions if all the senses are deceived about the terms? As for this cognition, I reply that for the intellect the senses are not a cause but only an occasion. The intellect cannot have cognition of simple terms unless by taking it from the senses. However, once it has taken that cognition, it can by its own power combine simple terms [in a proposition]. And if the combination is evidently true on the basis of the nature of such simple terms, the intellect will assent to that combination by virtue of itself and of the

terms, not by virtue of the sense from which it takes the terms as from outside. For example, if the notions of “whole” and of “greater” are taken from the senses and the intellect forms this combination—“Every whole is greater than its parts”—the intellect will by virtue of itself and of the terms assent to this proposition without any doubt. And not just because it sees the terms combined in something real, as when it assents to “Socrates is white,” where it sees the terms united in something real. I put it even more strongly: if all senses from which such terms are taken were wrong, or, what is much more in the way of deception, if some senses were wrong and other senses were right, the intellect still would not be deceived with respect to such principles, for it would always have within itself the terms that are the cause of truth. For example, if the species of whiteness and blackness were miraculously impressed in a sleeping person who was born blind, and if they remained later while he was awake, the intellect would abstract from them [= the species] and form this proposition: “white is not black.” And the intellect would not be deceived with respect to that proposition, although the terms are taken from an erring sense. The reason is that the formal content (*ratio formalis*) of the terms is the necessary cause of the truth of that negative proposition.

235 Regarding the second kind of knowable things—namely, the things that are known by experience—I say this [cf. QMet. 1.4]: although experience does not involve all singulars but only a large number of them, and although it does not pertain to what always holds but only to what holds in the majority of cases, it is from experience that one knows infallibly that things are always so and in all cases. This [is known] by the following proposition that resides in the mind: “What in the majority of cases comes about by a cause that is not free is a natural effect of that cause.” The intellect knows this proposition, although it has its terms taken from the senses, which are fallible, for a cause that is not free is unable to produce, “in the majority of cases,” not freely, an effect opposite to what it is ordered to (*ordinatur*)—that is, to produce an effect it is not destined to in virtue of its form. A chance cause (*causa casualis*), however, is destined to produce or not to produce the opposite of a chance effect. Therefore, something cannot be a chance cause of an effect if that effect is frequently produced by it. So, if it is not free, it will be a natural cause,^{*} and the effect comes from such a cause “in the majority of cases.” This [piece of knowledge] is based on experience, for, while we find that a certain nature sometimes comes with this accident and sometimes with that, we find that this nature is always followed by that sort of effect, no matter how many accidental differences there are. Therefore, that sort of effect does not follow in virtue of some accident of that nature but in virtue of the very nature itself.

* [Interpolation] So it is the natural cause of an effect frequently produced by it because it is not a chance cause.

236 It must be noted, further, that sometimes experience concerns [not a principle itself, as was the case in the preceding paragraph, but rather a] conclusion, as, for example, that the moon is at times eclipsed. Then one assumes that the conclusion holds and investigates the cause of such a conclusion by means of an analysis. And sometimes an empirical conclusion (*conclusio experta*) leads to principles that are known from their terms. In that case, one can on the basis of such principles known through their terms get more certain knowledge of the conclusion that was initially only known empirically (*secundum experientiam*). This is an instance of the first category of certain knowledge [cf. n. 229–30], for it is deduced from a principle known *per se*. For example, it is known *per se* that “when something opaque is put between a light source and a clearly visible body, it prevents the propagation of light to the body.” If, then, it is found out by analysis that the earth is such a body put between the sun and the moon, knowledge [of the eclipse] will be had with maximal certainty based on a demonstration giving the reason or the cause. The conclusion will not just rest on experience, as was the case before the [explanatory] principle was found.

237 But there is also a kind of empirical knowledge of a principle where a further principle, known by its terms, happens not to be found by means of analysis. Then one stops at something that is “true as in the majority of cases” where the components are known empirically to occur frequently together—for example, that an herb of a certain kind is hot. One does not find a prior mediating factor by which one might demonstrate the reason the attribute belongs to the subject, but considers the fact itself as an empirically based elementary piece of knowledge. Even though uncertainty and fallibility may be eliminated on the basis of the proposition that “an effect that comes up as in the majority of cases from a cause that is not free is its natural effect,” this is the ultimate [lowest] degree of scientific knowledge. Perhaps one does not have actual knowledge of the co-occurrence of the components: one may just be disposed to think so. For if the attribute in question is something absolute and different from the subject, it could be separated from the subject without contradiction. In the case of such experiences one would not know the true state of affairs but only that things are by nature apt to be so.

238 Concerning the third kind of knowable things—namely, our own acts—I say this: for many of them there is certainty, just as for first principles that are known *per se*. This is obvious from *Metaphysics* IV, where the Philosopher discusses the arguments of those who say that “all appearances

are true.”²⁷ He says that their arguments want to settle the question “are we awake or asleep?” All such doubts boil down to the same thing, for they consider it to be axiomatic that all things have a reason. He adds, “They are looking for the reason of things that do not have a reason, for there is no demonstration for the principle of demonstration.” According to him, therefore, the fact “that we are awake” is known by itself, as is a principle of demonstration. That it is a contingent proposition is no problem because, as was said elsewhere [Ord. Prol. n. 169], there is an order in contingent propositions: one of them must be first and immediate, for [otherwise] either there would be an infinite regress in contingent propositions or some contingent proposition would follow from a necessary cause, both of which are impossible.

239 And just as there is certainty about “being awake” in the same way as about something that is known *per se*, so, too, there is certainty about many other acts that are at our command—for example, “that I think” (*me intelligere*) and “that I hear” and about other things that are perfect acts. Although there is no certainty that I see something white out there or in a certain subject or at a certain distance (for an illusion can occur, in the medium or in the organ, and in many other ways), there is still certainty that I see, even if the organ is subject to an illusion. Such an illusion is strongest when the organ is active while there is no object present, but the act still is of the kind that is properly produced by the presence of an object. If a power were to show its activity under such conditions, there would truly be that which is called seeing, be it an action or a passion or both.

But suppose that the illusion were to occur not in the proper organ [i.e., the optic tract] but in something nearby that seems to be the organ; for example, suppose that the illusion were not to occur in the optic tract (*concurso nervorum*), but that in the eye itself an impression were to arise of a species of the kind that is usually caused by something white. In that case the visual sense still would see, since the relevant species (or whatever is apt to be seen in it) would be seen because it [i.e., the relevant species] is sufficiently near to the organ of vision that is in the optic tract. This is evident from Augustine, in chapter 2 of *On the Trinity* XI: with closed eyes one can still see the residue of what was seen just before as it remains in the eye [in the form of an after-image].²⁸ Also from the Philosopher, in *On the Senses and What Is Sensed*: the flash (*ignis*) produced by a violent upward movement of the eye is propagated and is seen with closed eyes.²⁹ These phenomena are true visions, although not the most perfect ones because in each case there is a sufficient distance [i.e., nearness] between the species and the principal organ of vision.

240 But how can one get certainty concerning what underlies the actions

of the senses—for example, that something out there is white or hot, the way it appears? I reply: regarding such an object of knowledge, either the same things appear opposite to different senses or not, meaning that all senses involved in knowing this object have the same judgment about it.

241 In the second case one can have certainty regarding the truth of such an object of sensory cognition on the basis of the proposition mentioned earlier [in n. 235]: “When a particular effect comes from something in the majority of cases, then the latter is the natural cause of that effect, if it is not a free cause.” Therefore, when a certain alteration (*immutatio*) of the senses comes from such a factor (when it is present) “as in the majority of cases,” then it follows that the stimulation, or the species that is produced, is a natural effect of such a cause. Then there will be out there something white or something hot or something of the kind that is naturally apt to be presented by the species produced by it “as in the majority of cases.”

242 The other possibility is that different senses judge differently concerning what is seen out there. For example, the sense of vision tells us that a stick is broken when it is partly under water and partly not. The sense of vision always tells us that the sun has a smaller size (*quantitatis*) than it actually has and that everything that is seen from a distance is smaller than it is. In such cases there is certainty about what is true and which sense is in error on the basis of a proposition [or rule] that resides in the soul and is more certain than every judgment of the senses and on the basis of the joint activity of several senses. There is always, then, some proposition that corrects the intellect with respect to the acts of the senses, telling which is true and which is false. And this proposition does not depend on the senses as its cause, but as its occasion.

243 An example—the intellect has the following proposition: “A hard object does not break when touched by a soft object that gives way to it.” This proposition is known *per se* from its terms in such a way that, even if they were taken from erring senses, the intellect cannot doubt it. What is more, the opposite includes a contradiction. Both the sense of vision and that of touch tell us that a stick is harder than water and that water gives way to it. Hence the conclusion is, “the stick is not broken” in the way the visual sense judges it to be broken. And so the intellect judges which sense is in error and which not with respect to the stick’s being broken on the basis of something that is more certain than any act of the senses.

244 Likewise, in the other case [that of the sun’s size], the proposition that “the quantity (*quantum*) applying to [or used to measure] a quantity remains fully equal to itself” is known to the intellect, no matter the extent to which the knowledge of the terms is taken from senses in error. The same size applies to something that is seen nearby and far away; this is told by

both the sense of vision and that of touch. Therefore, a quantity as seen from nearby or from a distance is equal. Therefore, the sense of vision is in error when it tells that the size is smaller.

245 This conclusion is derived from principles that are known *per se* and from the acts of two senses that know that this state of affairs holds “as in the majority of cases.” Whenever reason judges that the senses are in error, it does so not on the basis of knowledge acquired exclusively from the senses as its cause but on the basis of knowledge for which the senses were [only] the occasion and in which it is not deceived (even if all senses are deceived) and on the basis of some other knowledge acquired from the senses “as in the majority of cases.” This knowledge is known to be true by the proposition repeatedly referred to: “What in the majority of cases, etc.”

[*Interpolation*] But note the following: suppose that all senses were mistaken about everything that is common to each of them—for example, about shape, quantity, or this shape and this quantity—or [that they would tell] that one thing was two—for example, that this one head was two heads. Then the intellect would be unable to acquire certainty on these matters on the basis of the senses due to the fact that all senses are mistaken or that each sense is mistaken with respect to its own proper object. This can occur in two ways: with respect to this color or that one, or with respect to white or black. In the first case the sense is not misled with respect to its first object, and hence the intellect is not either. But if the sense is misled with respect to its secondary object as, for example, vision, etc. [in the case of white and black] then either every vision [i.e., in all people] is misled with respect to such a secondary object, and then there can be no certain knowledge in the intellect, or vision is misled in some person but not in another, and then it is possible to have certainty in the latter individual but not in the former.

REPLY TO HENRY'S ARGUMENTS

246 As for the third article [cf. n. 218]: the three arguments [marshaled by Henry of Ghent] must be answered on the basis of the foregoing [cf. n. 280].

[*Note by Scotus*] Note the following: the knowledge (*notitia*) of a principle cannot change from true to false [cf. n. 250]: it cannot be otherwise, as it is absolutely indestructible. Thus the intelligible species (not the phantasm) can be deleted, but it cannot change from giving a true representation into giving a false one [cf. n. 251]. Although the object [of knowledge] is perishable, it cannot change from being a true entity into

being a false one [cf. n. 246], and so it gives knowledge in conformity with itself; it causes true knowledge of itself in being what it is (*in essendo*), since a true entity (*entitas*), which cannot be changed into a false one, virtually contains true knowledge in an unchangeable way—that is, in conformity with a true entity.

Note: according to Augustine, necessary truth or unchangeable truth is beyond the mind (*supra mentem*) [cf. n. 206]; read: in its quality of evident truth because it [the necessary truth] causes of itself the latter [evident truth] in the mind [cf. n. 230]. But as to its evidentiality it is not subject to the mind in such a way that it can appear true or false in the way a probable truth is subject to the mind and can be made true or false [cf. n. 250] by the mind's looking here and there for reasons to prove or disprove it [cf. n. 202]. In this sense one must understand the fact that the mind does not judge with respect to unchangeable truth because the verdict "this is true" (which is an act of judging) is in the mind's power with respect to what is probable, not with respect to what is necessary. Nevertheless, when the mind asserts of what is necessary that it is true, this is not a less perfect kind of assertion. With Aristotle this assertion can be called a judgment [cf. n. 231], but Augustine wants that a judgment is in the power of the judging person, not that it [a judgment] is determined immediately and necessarily by something else [cf. n. 203]. In this way it is clear how the mind judges about a necessary conclusion [cf. n. 233]. Since it [a necessary conclusion] is not immediately evident from itself, it does not from itself establish its own evidence in the mind. For the mind is able to marshal sophisticated arguments against it by which it [the mind] disagrees. But it cannot do so against what is first [or *per se*] known; *Metaphysics* VI ("emerge in the mind, etc.") [cf. n. 255].

To the first [cf. n. 211], concerning the changeability of objects: the antecedent is false.* And it does not represent the opinion of Augustine but the error of Heraclitus and his disciple Cratylus, who did not want to talk but [only] move his finger, as is told in *Metaphysics* IV.³⁰ And even when the antecedent is taken to be true the inference is not valid, for, according to Aristotle, one could still have certain knowledge concerning the fact that "everything is continuously moving." Moreover, it does not follow that "if the object is changeable, then anything arising from it cannot represent something under the aspect of invariability." The changeability of an object is not the reason for causing knowledge. Rather the nature of the variable object itself [is the reason]. What is caused by it [the object] represents its nature *per se*. Hence, if the nature by its very origin has an invariable relation to something, both the latter and the nature itself will be represented as

invariably united, each through its own exemplar. And so one can have invariable knowledge of their union through the two exemplars generated from two variable things, not insofar as they are variable but insofar as they are natures.

* [Interpolation] For sensible things are not continuously moving. On the contrary, they remain the same for some period of time.

247 {[Question:]} Maybe it does not generate insofar as it is changeable but if it is changeable, how, then, can it have an unchanging relation to something else? I reply: the relation is unchanging in the sense that it is impossible that the relation between the members is opposite to what it is, or that, given the members, it is impossible for it to be other than it is. But when one or both members are destroyed, the relation is destroyed also.

248 Objection: how can a necessary proposition be affirmed if the identity of the members can be destroyed? I reply: when a thing does not exist (*est*), it does not have a real identity. But if it exists in the intellect, it has the identity of an object that is thought of. This identity is necessary in a qualified sense (*necessaria secundum quid*) because that kind of being [i.e., in the mind] is a necessary condition for such an identity. Yet it is possible for it [the identity] not to exist—for example, when a member [of a relation] fails to be thought of. Therefore, the relevant proposition in our mind is in a qualified sense a necessary proposition because it cannot change into a false one. An unqualifiedly necessary proposition (*simpliciter necessaria*) can only exist in the divine intellect, where the relevant members have an identity that is unqualifiedly necessary in no other kind of being than in being thought of.}

249 It is obvious that a representative that is changeable in itself is able to represent something under the aspect of immutability, since God's essence will be represented in the [human] intellect under the aspect of immutability through something that is entirely changeable, be it a species or an act. This is obvious by considering an analogical case: something infinite can be represented [in our mind] by something finite.

250 As for the second [cf. n. 212], I say this: changeability in the soul can be understood as being of two kinds. One [involves a change] from affirmation to negation and, conversely—for example, from not-knowing to knowing or from not-understanding to understanding. Another is like [a change] from one contrary to another contrary—for example, from being correct to being mistaken or conversely. The soul has the first kind of changeability with respect to any object, and nothing that formally exists in it can remove this kind of changeability. But the soul has the second kind of changeability only with respect to those propositions that are not evident on the basis of their terms. With respect to propositions that are evident from

their terms, it cannot be subject to the second kind of changeability, since the terms grasped by it are a necessary and evident cause of the agreement between these terms and their conjunction in the proposition [cf. n. 230]. Therefore, even if in an absolute sense the soul can change from being correct to being mistaken, it does not follow that “it cannot be corrected by something that is different from itself.” It can at least be corrected regarding the objects about which the intellect cannot be in error as soon as it has grasped the terms.

251 As for the third argument [cf. n. 213], I say this: if it had some face value (*apparentiam*), it would conclude against the view that there are no intelligible species,* since the species that can represent something sensible as an object in a dream would be a phantasm rather than an intelligible species. Therefore, if the intellect uses only the phantasm by which the object is presented to it and not an intelligible species, one cannot see how it could differentiate what is true from what seems to be true on the basis of something in which the object shines forth. But when species in the intellect are accepted, the argument is not valid because the intellect cannot use them [such species] by way of object, as it cannot use them while asleep.

* [Note by Scotus] which is the opinion of the author who holds the opinion that is under discussion here [in nn. 211–13].

252 Suppose you object: “If a phantasm can present itself as an object, then the intellect can be in error through that error of the power of the imagination or it can at least be chained so as not to function, as is clear in dreaming persons and in madmen.” Then the reply can be that the intellect, even if it is chained when such an error occurs in the power of the imagination, still does not err itself because then it does not have any act at all.

253 But how will the intellect have knowledge, or how will it be certain when the power of imagination does not err, since the latter’s not being in error still is a prerequisite for the intellect’s not being in error? I reply that the following truth resides in the intellect: “A power does not err with respect to its proportionate object unless it is indisposed.” And the intellect knows that the power of the imagination in a state of being awake is not indisposed by the kind of condition that makes the phantasm present itself as an object. For it is self-evident to the intellect that it, when it thinks (*intelligens*), is awake in such a way that the power of imagination is not chained as it is in dreams.

254 But one can still insist against the proposed certainty with respect to acts as follows: “It seems to me that I see or hear, while I do not [in fact] see or hear, so there is no certainty.”

255 I reply: to show that a proposition is true to a person who denies it is one thing; to show how it is true to a person who accepts it is another thing. An example, from *Metaphysics* IV:³¹ against people who deny the first principle [i.e., the principle of contradiction] the Philosopher does not mention the absurd consequence that in that case “contrary opinions would simultaneously be present in the mind [cf. n. 231],” since this would be granted by them as a premise. He rather brings in other absurdities that are more evident to them (but not more evident in themselves). But to those who accept the first principle, he shows what its knowledge amounts to—namely, that “its opposite cannot possibly emerge in the mind.” He then proves it by pointing out when it is denied “then contrary opinions could be upheld simultaneously.” That sort of conclusion is more absurd than the hypothesis.

256 Likewise here: if you allow that no proposition is known *per se*, I do not want to have a discussion with you. As a matter of fact, you are vexatious and you will not be persuaded, as is obvious from your behavior (*actibus*). See how the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* IV reacts: “if you are dreaming that you are on the verge of getting hold of something and you wake up later, you will not pursue that thing in the way you would do if you were in a state of being awake and on the verge of obtaining that item.”³² But if you admit that some propositions are self-evident and that an ill-disposed power can be in error with respect to any of them, as is obviously the case in dreams, then, in order to know that a particular proposition is self-evident, it is [only] necessary to know when the pertinent power is disposed and when not. So, from our own acts we can have knowledge that tells us that the relevant power is disposed in such a way that a proposition that appears to be self-evident is in fact self-evident.

257 As for the substance of this sophistical reasoning [in n. 254], I say this: just as it appears to a dreaming person that he is seeing, so the opposite of a self-evident principle can appear to him. Yet it does not follow that the principle in question is not self-evident. So, too, it does not follow that it is not self-evident to a hearing person that he is hearing, for with respect to each of these things an ill-disposed power can be in error, but a well-disposed power cannot. And it is self-evident when it is well-disposed and when not [the disposition of a power is self-evident just as being awake is self-evident]. Otherwise it would be impossible to know any self-evident proposition at all, for it would be impossible to know which proposition will be self-evident: the one that the intellect assents to in this disposition or rather the one it assents to in another disposition?

258 As for the fourth article [cf. n. 218], I argue against the conclusion of Henry's opinion, as follows: I ask, what does he understand by "certain and genuine truth"? Either infallible truth [first possibility]—that is, without doubt or deception: in the second and third articles [nn. 229–45, 246–57] it was proven and explained that such truth can be had on the basis of purely natural means; or [second possibility] his understanding relates to the truth that is an attribute of being (*entis*). Then because being can be understood naturally, true can also be understood, as it is an attribute of being. And if true [can be understood], then by abstraction truth also, for whatever form can be understood as it is in a subject can be understood as in itself, abstracted from the subject. Or, another [third] possibility, he understands by truth the agreement with an exemplar. If the intended agreement is with the created exemplar, then we have our proposal. But if it is with the uncreated exemplar, then agreement with it can only be understood when that exemplar is known, since a relation is only known when the relevant members are known. Therefore, it is false to claim that the eternal exemplar is the reason for [true] knowledge and that it is not known itself.

259 Moreover, second, everything that is understood confusedly in an act of simple understanding can be known in a definition by finding out the definition of that known item by means of division [or analysis]. This definitional knowledge seems to be what is most perfect, as far as an act of simple understanding goes. But from this most perfect knowledge of the relevant terms the intellect can understand most perfectly the principles involved, and from the latter the conclusion. And in this way intellectual cognition seems to be made complete: apart from the truths [emerging in the process] just described, no knowledge of truth is necessary.

260 Also, third, the eternal light that you call necessary for obtaining genuine truth [in n. 215] either causes something that is naturally prior to the act [of knowing] or not—if so, then either in the intellect or in the object. Not in the object, however, for insofar as the object has being in the intellect it has only intentional being, not real being. It is, therefore, not capable of having a real accident. If in the intellect, then the uncreated light can only bring the intellect to the cognition of a genuine truth by means of its effect. In that case the common view that posits that knowledge arises in the uncreated light seems to be as perfect as the view under discussion,³³ since the former holds that truth is seen in the agent intellect, which is an effect of the uncreated light and more perfect than the accidental created light would be. But if it [i.e., the eternal light] does not create anything before the act [of understanding], then either the light alone or the light together with the object and the intellect causes the act. If the light alone, then the agent intellect does not have any function in the cognition of genuine truth, which

seems to be absurd, for knowing genuine truths is the most noble function of our intellect. So the agent intellect, which is the most noble [power] in the soul, would somehow concur in that action.

[*Interpolation*; cf. Lect. 1.3 n. 188] Further: the act of understanding would not be more rightly said to be of this person than of another, and so the agent intellect would be superfluous, which is not something to say, for its function is “to make everything,”³⁴ just as the function of the possible intellect is “to become everything.” Also, according to the Philosopher in *On the Soul* III,³⁵ the agent intellect has the nature of something active, the possible intellect of something passive. So the agent intellect is related in an active way to anything the possible intellect receives.

The absurd conclusion inferred here [namely, that the agent intellect has no function] also follows from Henry’s opinion in another way. According to what he claims, an agent that uses an instrument cannot perform an action that exceeds the action of the instrument. So, when the power of the agent intellect cannot bring about the cognition of genuine truth, it follows that the eternal light with the use of the agent intellect (to the extent that the agent intellect would have the role of an instrument) could not bring about an act of knowing genuine truth. If you say that the uncreated light together with the object and the intellect causes such genuine truth, we have the common view again: it holds that the eternal light causes every certain truth as a remote cause. Therefore, the opinion under discussion will either be absurd or it will not be different from the common view.

SCOTUS’S REPLY TO THE QUESTION: HOW WE ATTAIN INFALLIBLE TRUTH

261 Regarding the question then, I say this: because of what Augustine says, it must be granted that infallible truths can be seen in eternal rules. Here “in” can be taken as “in an object,” and this in one of four ways: either as in the proximate object, or as in what contains the proximate object, or as in that in virtue of which the proximate object moves [the intellect], or as in a remote object.

262 Regarding the first possibility I say this: all actually intelligible things in the divine intellect have “intelligible being,” and in them all truths about them shine out in such a way that the [divine] intellect that understands them and in virtue of them understands the necessary truths about them—sees in them these necessary truths as in objects. Insofar as these intelligible things are secondary objects of the divine intellect [the first object is God’s own essence] they are “truths,” for they are in agreement with their exemplar—namely, the divine intellect itself. And they are “light” (*lux*)

because they are manifest and unchangeable and necessary. But they are eternal in a qualified sense because eternity is a condition of what exists, and they do not have existence unless in a qualified sense. So this is the first way we can be said “to see in the eternal light”—namely, in a secondary object of the divine intellect, which is truth and eternal light as just explained.

263 The second way is also obvious because the divine intellect contains these truths as a book, as Augustine explains in *On the Trinity* XIV (chapter 15): “These rules are written in the book of the eternal light.”³⁶ This means in the divine intellect insofar as it contains these truths. Although that book itself is not seen, the truths written in that book are seen indeed. And to that extent one can say that “our intellect sees the truths in the eternal light,” meaning in that book as it contains objects. And each of the two modes [mentioned so far] seems to reflect Augustine’s intentions expressed in *On the Trinity* XII (chapter 14): “The notion ‘square body’ remains uncorrupted and unchanged.”³⁷ It can only stay so to the extent that it is a secondary object of the divine intellect.

264 But a doubt can be raised against the first way, for if we do not see these truths as they are in the divine intellect (for we do not see the divine intellect), how, then, can we be said to “see in the eternal light,” since we are seeing only in a qualified kind of eternal light, a light that has its being in the uncreated light as in a cognizing intellect?

265 The third way answers this objection as follows: the things that are secondary objects of the divine intellect only have being (*esse*) in a qualified sense. But a real and true operation does not belong to what is precisely a qualified being (*enti*). If it [such an operation] belongs to a qualified being, it does so in virtue of something that has being in an unqualified way. Therefore, it does not fit secondary objects to move the [human] intellect unless in virtue of the being (*esse*) of the divine intellect [itself], which is being in an unqualified sense and by which they [= the objects] have being in a qualified sense. In this way, therefore, we see [truths] “in the eternal light in a qualified sense” as in a proximate object [cf. n. 262]. According to the third way, we see “in the uncreated light” as in a proximate cause, which by its power makes the proximate object move [the intellect].

266 Following this line of reasoning, one can also say, as far as the third way is concerned, that we see in the eternal light as in the cause of the objects in it, for the divine intellect brings them [the objects] into intelligible being by its own act. By its own act it gives a certain being to this object and different being to another object, thus giving each of them the content (*rationem*) of an intelligible object. Through this content they subsequently move the intellect to certain knowledge. That it is right to say that our intellect “sees in the light because this light is the cause of the object,” is

obvious in a similar case: we are rightly said to understand in the light of the agent intellect, although this light is only the active cause or what by its own activity makes the object, or by the power of which the object moves, or both.

267 So the divine intellect has a double causality. It is the true uncreated light that brings secondary objects in intelligible being, and it is that by which the secondary, produced objects actually move the intellect. This double causality can, so to say, integrate the third element [i.e., “the third way”] by which we can truly be said to see in the eternal light.

268 Perhaps the following objection is raised against these two ways as making up the third one for a cause: it seems that we are said to see in God’s willing or in God as he is will rather than as he is light, for God’s will is the immediate principle of any act *ad extra*. I reply: the divine intellect produces these objects in intelligible being (*in esse intelligibili*) insofar as it [i.e., the intellect] is somehow prior to an act of the divine will. With respect to these objects, therefore, it seems to be a purely natural cause, for God is only a free cause with respect to things that somehow presuppose the will as an act of will. And just as his intellect, being prior to an act of the will, produces objects in intelligible being, so, too, it seems to co-operate as a prior cause with these intelligible things in [causing] their natural effect. This effect consists in the fact that when they [i.e., these intelligible things] are being apprehended and combined [in a proposition], they cause the conformity between the apprehension and themselves. It seems, therefore, contradictory to hold both that any intellect forms a certain proposition and that the latter is not in conformity with its terms (although it is possible to not to make a combination of the terms). God voluntarily co-operates in letting the intellect combine terms or not. Yet after it [i.e., the intellect] has made a combination it seems necessary for that combination, in order to be in conformity with its terms, that such an agreement follows the intelligible content of the terms, which they get from God’s intellect that naturally causes these terms in intelligible being.

269 The foregoing makes clear why a special illumination is not necessary for seeing in eternal rules. Augustine does not state that truths are seen in these rules unless they are necessary in virtue of the relevant terms. In the latter kind of truths the highest degree of naturalness (*naturalitas*) occurs with respect to the effect both of the remote cause and of the proximate cause—that is, both of the divine intellect regarding the moving objects and of the objects regarding the truth of the proposition involving them. Although the naturalness regarding the perception of the truth that “the opposite includes a contradiction” is not of the same degree, there still is naturalness on the part of the proximate cause assisted by the remote cause,

for the apprehended and combined terms are naturally suited to cause an evident conformity between the terms and their combination. Perhaps one says that God by a general [causal] influence, not by a natural necessity, co-operates in letting the terms have their effect. However, whether it is a general influence or, what is more, a natural necessity that leads the terms to producing their effect, it is obvious that a special illumination is not required.

270 The assumption concerning Augustine's purpose is obvious from *On the Trinity* IV (chapter 35) where he says, talking about philosophers, "Some of them were able to raise their mind's eye beyond the entire created world and to attain, however feebly, the light of the immutable truth. And they laugh at many Christians who live by faith alone, for not having accomplished the same."³⁸ He means to say that Christians do not see in eternal rules the truths they believe, whereas philosophers see many necessary truths in these rules.

271 Similarly, in *On the Trinity* IX (chapter 6), "Not as the mind of just anybody etc.,"³⁹ as if he said, one does not see contingents truths there but necessary ones.

272 And in chapter 36 of book IV of the same work he argues against the philosophers: "Is it because they rightly claim that all temporal things come about by eternal reasons that they could see in these very reasons how many categories of animals there are or how many seeds of every one of them there were in the beginning?"⁴⁰ And so on. "Did they not look for all these things, not through that immutable knowledge but through the history of places and times? And did they not believe what was observed and written down by others?" So he thinks that these contingent facts are not known through eternal rules but only through the senses or through the records of history. And yet a special illumination is required much more strongly in what must be believed than in the knowledge of necessary propositions. In the latter case a special illumination is definitely out of place; a general illumination alone is sufficient.

273 Objection: what does Augustine mean in *On the Trinity* XII (chapter 14) when he says, "To arrive at the intelligible reasons through the mind's eye is given to few men only"?⁴¹ And in question 46 of *Eighty-three Questions*, "Only pure souls can attain them."

274 I reply: purity here must not be understood in terms of not having vices. In *On the Trinity* XIV (chapter 15) he means to say that an unjust person sees in the eternal rules the just deeds he should be perform.⁴² And in the chapter cited from book IV [cf. n. 270] he means that philosophers even without faith can see truth in the eternal rules.⁴³ And in the same question [i.e., q. 46, cf. n. 273] he means that no man can be wise without knowledge

of the ideas (in the way they would perhaps allow Plato to be a wise man). This purity must be interpreted as meaning that the intellect rises to a higher level in order to contemplate truths as they shine out in themselves, not just as they shine out in a phantasm.

275 Here one must take into account that the sensibles out there cause a confused phantasm, something that is accidentally “one” in the imagination—that is, something that represents the thing according to quantity, according to form, color, and other sensible accidents. As a phantasm represents only in a confused and accidental way, many people, accordingly, perceive only an accidental being. But the first truths are precisely such on the basis of the proper content (*ratione*) of the terms insofar as these terms are abstracted from everything that comes with them accidentally. The proposition “Every whole is larger than a part” is not primarily true insofar as “whole” applies to a stone or a log but insofar as “whole” is abstracted from everything to which it is accidentally connected. Therefore, an intellect that never grasps totality unless in an accidental concept—for example, in the totality of a stone or a log—never grasps the genuine truth of this principle because it never understands the precise meaning of the term through which the truth obtains.

276 It is given to few people to arrive at the eternal reasons because it is given to few people to have understanding *per se*, and it is given to many people to have accidental concepts. These few people are said to be different from others not because of a special illumination but either because of better natural capabilities (because they have an intellect that can abstract better and is more perspicacious) or because of deeper probing (*inquisitionem*), by which someone who is equally intelligent comes to know the quiddities that another person, who does not inquire, does not know. This is the way to understand Augustine’s words, in *On the Trinity* IX (chapter 6), about the man on a mountain who sees mist below and clear light above.⁴⁴ A man who understands things only in terms of accidental concepts in the manner of the accidental beings as represented in phantasm is like a man in a valley surrounded by misty clouds. But for a man who dissects quiddities that shine out in a phantasm in combination with many other accidents and understands them precisely in an essential concept, the phantasms are underneath like a misty cloud. Such a man is “on a mountain” insofar as he knows the truth and sees the true up there as a higher truth, in virtue of the uncreated intellect that is the eternal light.

277 In a final way it can be granted that genuine truths are known in the eternal light as in a remote known object, for the uncreated light is the first principle in the domain of theoretical things (*entium speculabilium*) and the ultimate goal in the domain of practical things (*rerum practicarum*). That is

why the first principles, both the theoretical and the practical ones, are taken from it [= the uncreated light]. Therefore, knowledge of all sorts of things, both theoretical and practical, acquired by the principles obtained from knowledge of the eternal light is more perfect and more pure than cognition obtained by the principles of their proper categories. In this sense knowledge of everything belongs to the domain of the theologian {as was said in the question on the subject matter of theology [Ord. Prol. n. 206]. And this knowledge is more excellent than any other. This is the way in which genuine truth is said to be known because in this manner it is known through what is truth only, unmixed with any speck of what is not true—namely, through the first being, from the knowledge of which the principles of that kind of knowledge are taken. But all things from which the principles of knowing general categories are taken are true in a deficient way. In this manner God alone knows everything genuinely because, as was said in the question on the subject of theology [Ord. Prol. nn. 200–201], he alone knows everything precisely through his essence. By his power every other intellect can be moved (*moveri*) by another object so as to apprehend a truth.} Consider the fact of knowing that a triangle “has three [angles equal to two right angles].” As this knowledge is a kind of participation of God and in the order of things sort of expresses God’s perfection more perfectly, it is a nobler way of knowing that a triangle “has three etc.” than the way based on the concept of a triangle [e.g., as a plane figure having only three sides; cf. Ord. 1.2 n. 27]. So too, knowing that “one should live temperately” in order to reach ultimate happiness, which consists in attaining the essence of God in itself, is a more perfect way of knowing that practical piece of knowledge than knowing it by some principle in the category of morals—for example, the maxim that “one should live honestly.”

278 And this is the way Augustine talks of the uncreated light as known by us, in *On the Trinity* XV (chapter 27 or 82), where he says to himself, “You have seen many true things, things that you have detected by that light that you saw while it was shining. Raise your eyes up to that very light and focus on it, if you can. For so you will see how much the birth of God’s Word is away from the procession of God’s Gift.”⁴⁵ And a bit further: “These and other things has that light shown to your inner eyes. What, therefore, is the reason of your not seeing it even with your eyes fixed upon it, if not your weakness?” Etc.

279 From the foregoing [the “fifth article,” in nn. 262–78] it is clear what should be said to all the authoritative statements of Augustine that were brought in for the opposite view. The authorities of Augustine that pertain to this matter can be explained according to one of the various modes of “seeing in” mentioned above.

280 Regarding the sixth article [cf. n. 218], we must see how the three arguments given for the first opinion [nn. 211–13], insofar as they are based on Augustine, lead to a true conclusion, although they do not lead to the false conclusion for which they were brought in.—Here one must know [here the text breaks off]

[*Interpolation*] that genuine truth is not to be expected from sensible things as from a *per se* and principal cause, since sensory knowledge is truly something accidental, as has been said [cf. nn. 234, 245], even though sensory acts, at least some of them, are certain and true. But the quiddity of a thing is known in virtue of the agent intellect (which is a participation in the uncreated light that illuminates phantasms), and in this way genuine truth is obtained. And this solves the first argument of Henry [in n. 211], which, following Augustine's intentions, does not permit a further conclusion.

To Henry's second argument [in 212] I say that the soul can change from one different act to another according to a diversity of objects and according to its unlimitedness and immateriality, for it stands in relation to any being whatsoever. The soul can also change from activity to non-activity, for it is not always in act. But with respect to first principles, whose truth is known from their terms, and with respect to the conclusions that are evident on the basis of the terms, the soul cannot change from one contrary position to another, from true to false. For the intellect is corrected by rules in the light of the agent intellect, and although the intelligible species of the terms is changeable in its being (*in essendo*), it represents [the terms] in an immutable way when it is representing [them] in the light of the agent intellect. The terms of a first principle are known through two intelligible species, and so their union is true and evidently certain.

As for the third argument [of Henry, in n. 213], one must say that it concludes against him, for it only assumes a sensible species or a phantasm, but it does not conclude anything concerning an intelligible species that represents a quiddity. One must say, however, that a sensible species, when the sensitive powers are not obstructed, truly represents a real thing. But during sleep the external sensory powers are chained. Therefore, the imagination, which conserves sensible species according to the varying flow of the humors in the head, perceives them as the things whose likeness they are because they have the force of these things, according to the Philosopher in *On the Motion of Animals*. The third argument does not conclude anything else.

PART 2

ON THE TRACE OF THE TRINITY

SINGLE QUESTION

Is there in every creature a trace of the Trinity?

281 Regarding the trace I ask if there is a trace of the Trinity in every creature.

[*Interpolation*, at “Regarding the trace”] “Now it remains to show, etc.” Concerning the second part of the third distinction, where the Master treats the possibility of God’s being known by means of a trace, one question is asked.

INTRODUCTORY ARGUMENTS

Against such a trace: by means of a trace one can find out what left the trace. Therefore, one would be able to naturally find out the Trinity by means of creatures, which is false because that is beyond natural reason.

282 Also, in our intellectual nature there is an image of the Trinity, not a trace. The inference is obvious, as these notions [image and trace] have opposite ways (*rationes*) of representing. So they do not belong to the same thing.

283 Also, an intellectual nature is nobler than lower natures and has a different way (*rationem*) of representing—for example, by way of an image. But below the intellectual nature there are many other natures, ordered on a scale of perfection like the animate above the inanimate and the mixed over the simple. Hence, there will be in them a different way of representing, and so the way of the trace will not be common to them all.

[*Interpolation*; cf. Rep. 1A.3 n. 73] Moreover, an effect only represents its cause according to what comes from the latter. But every creature comes from God as being one, not as being three, since every action *ad extra* is essential, belonging to the three persons [in common]. Therefore, an effect represents God as being one, not as being three.

284 For the opposite is what Augustine says, in the final chapter or chapter 28 of *On the Trinity* VI: “Looking at the creator ‘through the things that have been made’ we should understand the Trinity, the trace of which

appears in creatures as worthy as possible.”¹

[*Interpolation*; cf. Rep. 1A.3 n. 74], where he says that number, shape (*species*), and order are found in every created being. In these [three aspects] “the first origin of beauty (*pulchritudinis*) is presented” (see there [in Rep. 1A]). Or so [cf. n. 300].

285 In this question there are three things to consider. In view of the Philosopher’s maxim “every metaphor is based on some similarity,”² we must first consider the meaning (*ratione*) of “trace” in the corporeal domain from which the word is borrowed and applied to the case at hand. Second, we must consider the meaning of “trace” as used in its metaphorical sense in the case at hand: in what does it consist and with respect to what in God is there a notion of trace in creatures? Third, we must consider the foundation of the relation of the trace or, in other words, the foundation of the relation of a creature to God* of whom the creature is said to be a trace.

* [Interpolation] or of God to a creature.

[The first two issues, or “articles,” as Scotus says, are interwoven with the discussion of the opinion of some unknown author(s), in nn. 286–301; the third issue, treated in “the third article,” is also settled by discussing another opinion, in nn. 302–29.]³

THE OPINION OF A CERTAIN AUTHOR

286 As for the first issue [cf. n. 285], it has been said that a trace is an impression left when something passes over a void or non-void space and that it represents the subject imperfectly—“imperfectly” because a trace represents something indistinctly (*confuse*), signaling the kind of thing only, [whereas] an image represents perfectly as it signals an individual as such. On the basis of a trace one can distinguish a horse from an ox or that it was a horse that passed by, not an ox. But this particular horse cannot be distinguished from that particular one. An image, however, is distinctive, since the image of Jove does not represent Caesar.

287 As for the second issue, it is said that creatures have a threefold relationship to God,⁴ according to the three ways in which things can be related that the Philosopher proposes in *Metaphysics* V.⁵ In the first way a creature is related to God by a relation founded on “one,”—namely, the relation of resemblance (*similis*). This obtains insofar as a creature is something that has an example (*est exemplata*) and is related to God inasmuch as he is the exemplar cause. In the second way—namely, that of potentiality—a creature is related to God as what is made is related to its

maker. In the third way—namely, the way of a measure—a creature is related to God as it is ordered to him as the final cause. So these three aspects together make up the complete notion of a trace. Any one of them without the remaining ones is not sufficient, as can be gathered from Augustine in question 74 of his *Eighty-Three Questions*: “Concerning two eggs, etc.” [cf. n. 575].

288 So this establishes what makes up the trace in creatures. But under which aspect does the trace correspond to something of God? Reply: under the aspect of what can be properly attributed to the three persons. For by the first aspect (that of resemblance) a creature represents the art of exemplifying, which is appropriated to the Son; by the second it represents the power of the maker, which is appropriated to the Father; by the third it represents the goodness of what is our destiny, which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit.

AGAINST THE CITED OPINION CONCERNING THE MEANING OF “TRACE”

289 Against the first part of this opinion [in n. 286]: if in the whole world there were only one animal and no other, its trace still would not be its image, as its trace still would not be the resemblance of a whole but only of a part, whereas an image is the resemblance of a whole. Still, it [the trace] would not represent it [the animal] indistinctly—that is, according to some aspect that was common to itself and something else.

290 {[Objection] It will be said that there is indeed an indistinct representation analogous to the way the sun is a universal (*universale*), even though it is impossible for there to be more suns. The knowledge (*scientia*) we have concerning the sun pertains to it under the aspect of a universal; it is not about this particular sun. And so the intelligible species [of the sun] represents a universal (*universale*), not “this particular thing,” even though a universal can only be in this particular thing.

291 [Reply] Against this: if with respect to something insofar as it is “this particular thing” a trace is not [the same as] an image, we have our thesis. It holds also when it is somehow supposed that from “this particular thing” nothing can be abstracted. Even when that is supposed, something could still represent “this whole thing” as “this thing,” and something [could still represent] a part of this thing as “of this thing.”

292 Also, if the parts of specifically different animals that make an impression in soft ground were similar in size and form, the trace would not lead to knowledge of the relevant species but of the relevant genus only. If such parts, differing in size and shape, were to occur in one and the same species [thereby differentiating individuals], the trace would lead to

knowledge of an individual as “this particular” but not of the whole, as completely represented. Therefore, whether a species is involved or not is just an accidental difference.}

SCOTUS’S OPINION ON THE MEANING OF “TRACE”

293 As for this point, I say therefore that a trace is something that resembles a part of an animal and is impressed by that part in something that gives way to it. But the resemblance expressing the part is not a resemblance expressing the whole, whether in terms of the notion (*rationem*) of “whole” in itself or in terms of the notion of “whole” as immediately known. The whole is only known by means of discursive reasoning and on the basis of knowing that what is represented [in the trace] is something of that whole. So if the assumption is false—for example, when the part that makes the impression is separated from the whole, as when an amputated foot made an impression—the soul would err with respect to the whole to which the part that makes the impression naturally belongs. It is clear too that if the whole body left an impression in the dust just as the foot leaves an impression, the impression left would be truly an image and a resemblance of the whole, just as the trace is a resemblance of a part.

294 When we apply this to the issue at hand, the first distinction between trace and image [proposed in n. 286] does not seem to be true because any creature represents God only according to common concepts and not according to the specific concepts of most specific species. Therefore, there is no difference between creatures in representing God under a common and a non-common aspect.

AGAINST THE CITED OPINION ON WHAT MAKES UP THE TRACE

295 What is said regarding the second issue—namely, that the trace consists in three relations [n. 287], seems not to be true, either. Indeed, the notion (*ratio*) of trace implies a relation, since resemblance is really a relation. Nevertheless, just as resemblance is not said to consist exclusively in the relation but in something absolute on which the notion of resemblance is founded, so, too, the notion of trace seems not to consist exclusively in a relation but in something on which this relation is founded. This is proven as follows: a trace is a resemblance to the thing of which it is the trace. This thing is known through the knowledge of the trace. Therefore, a trace can be known naturally before the thing of which it is the trace is known. But a relation cannot be known naturally before its terms. Therefore, etc.

296 Also, the assertion [in n. 287] that the three relations pertain to the

three ways in which things can be related seems to be false. In *Metaphysics* V,⁶ the Philosopher distinguishes the first two ways from the third way, and he insists that the relation is mutual in the first two cases but not in the third case. In the third case one thing [X] is only said to be related to something else [Y] because the latter thing [Y] depends on the first [X] (*est eius*). But every relation of a creature to God is nonmutual. God is only said to be related to a creature because the creature is related to him. Therefore, every relation of a creature to God is of the third kind.

297 What is put forward concerning the first way, about resemblance, is of no use. The resemblance between what exemplifies and what is the exemplar (*exemplati ad exemplans*) is not of the first kind, since it is not a resemblance of univocation. On the contrary, it belongs to the third kind, as is clearly evident from the Philosopher. He puts the relation of knowing to what can be known and, generally, the relation of what is measured to the measure in the third category. But an exemplar has the character (*ratio*) of a measure with respect to what exemplifies it. Therefore, etc.

SCOTUS'S OPINION ON WHAT MAKES UP THE TRACE

298 Regarding the second article, I admit that every relation of creatures to God belongs the third kind of relatives. But the trace does not consist in relations alone but in something absolute [i.e., the two relevant terms]. And, if we follow the way Augustine assigns the components of the trace, it can perhaps also have a relation as its third component. See what Augustine says of creatures in the final chapter of *On the Trinity* VI: "All these things, which have been made by the divine craft, show a kind of unity in themselves and splendor (*speciem*) and order."⁷ Unity is an absolute perfection, as is clear from the examples he gives there: "What is one is something, like the natures of corporeal things." Also, "splendor or form (*forma*)" is something absolute, as is clear from his examples at the same place: "Just as there are qualities of corporeal things and knowledge states of the mind (*doctrinae animarum*)."⁸ But "order" means a kind of relation, not with respect to the ultimate goal but with respect to an operation. That is why he says, "Some order obtains, as with weights, the components of bodies, and loves or pleasures of the soul." These three things [unity, form, and order], taken as such, represent by way of resemblance the corresponding three things in God, for unity represents the highest unity of the first principle from which things have their origin. On this score Augustine says, "In the Trinity is the highest origin of all things." Splendor in creatures represents the highest beauty. Hence he adds, it is "the highest beauty." Order or operation in creatures represents the most perfect operation in God, for which he adds, "and the most joyful pleasure."

299 Many other things in creatures can be pointed out that are symbols representing some aspect appropriate to the divine persons—for example, one, true, and good. A creature's being one represents the unity appropriated to the Father, being true the truth appropriated to the Son, and being good the goodness appropriated to the Holy Spirit. And all these perfections are absolute and represent absolute perfections of God, proper to the persons.

300 A trace can be designated in many other ways. Things that are proper to the divine persons can be represented according to the notion of resemblance (*rationem similitudinis*) but also according to the notion of proportionality (*rationem proportionalis*). I use the expression “representing by proportionality” when not the notion (*ratio*) of the representing thing itself is formally in God but something that is proportionally related to that notion. This is the case when we call “moderation (*modus*), form (*species*), and order” a trace, a designation that seems to be the same as the one in *Wisdom* 11: “in number, weight, and measure,”⁸ for “moderation” is taken for limit, and “measure” is taken for the same thing. “Weight” is taken here for order and “number” for form (*specie*). Number or form and weight or order are explained as in the first formulation of the trace. But measure (*mensura*), which here is the same as limit, does not represent something according to the notion of resemblance but according to that of proportionality, as the limitedness of what has been made represents the limitlessness of the maker. And so the things in creatures that make up the trace are clear. It is also clear to what they are related in the divine things—namely, to the things that are appropriated to the divine persons.

* [Interpolation] Augustine, *On Genesis* IV: “Measure (*mensura*) fixes the norm (*modum*) of everything, number gives everything its shape (*figuram*) and weight pulls everything to rest and stability.”⁹ And, further: “So let us recognize the saying that ‘all things are set in measure, number and weight’ as if saying that they are arranged in such a way that they have their own measures and their own numbers and their own weight, which according to the changeability of each in its own kind change in them in terms of increase and decrease of many and few and of light and heavy.”¹⁰

301 But how can we apply the notion of trace (which is resemblance of a part) to God when there are no parts in God? Reply: the Trinity is a kind of numerical whole, at least in the way our intellect conceives of it. But a [divine] person is in our mind quasi a part of that whole. Something that is appropriated to a [divine] person is in our mind as quasi a part of it [i.e., of the person], since it is taken for the person to whom it is appropriated. Not only this, also what *can* be appropriated, even when it is not yet taken as appropriated, is in our mind as quasi a part of it, since its meaning (*ratio*) as

it is and as it is accepted is fully retained in one person. Consequently, its meaning does bring to mind the Trinity, but it does at the same time bring to mind the unity of any person in which it is present. So a creature generally does not represent a person as a person who is represented in our mind as a part of the Trinity, nor does it represent what is appropriated as appropriated because that is only known as appropriated when it is known to whom it is appropriated. In spite of this, a creature still represents what *can* be appropriated, in which as it were the notion of a part is retained with respect to the Trinity, as has been explained above.

THE OPINION OF AN UNKNOWN AUTHOR ON THE FOUNDATION OF THE TRACE RELATION

302 Regarding the third article, it has been said, following Boethius in *On the Hebdomads*, that “by which something is and what something is (*quo est* and *quod est*) are different things.”¹¹ That by which something “is” is called its “ratification” (*ratitudo*), but that by which it is “what it is” or “what” is called its “somethingness” (*aliquitas*).¹² Given these definitions, it is said that the trace relation in a creature is not based on the ratification of a thing but only on its somethingness and that it [the trace relation] formally constitutes its ratification [i.e., the ratification of the creature].

[*Note by Scotus*] This is relevant in the second book [of the Sentences], in the question on the relation of creatures to God [cf. Ord. 2.1.4–5].

303 The reasoning goes like this: according to Avicenna, in *Metaphysics* V, “humanity is just humanity.”¹³ Therefore, the notion (*ratio*) of humanity is not [in itself] a ratified thing (*res rata*). Therefore, it must be a ratified being (*ens ratum*) through something else, outside the formal notion of humanity.

304 It is also argued that it is the trace relation (*respectus vestigialis*) by which the formal ratification of it [= humanity in n. 303] comes about—first, in this way: what is included in the very concept (*intellectu*) of something as being this kind of thing is that by which the thing is such a thing or what is formally the same as the thing in its being such as it is. But the trace relation is included in the concept (*ratione*) of any ratified being. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor: there is a being (*ens*) that is “being itself” (*ipsum esse*), such as God. And there is a being that *has* being, such as any being other than God. The latter is not of itself “being” (*esse*); it is only a being to which “being” belongs. Then one argues as follows: any arbitrary being (*ens*) that is not of itself “being” (*esse*) but a being to which “being” belongs is not a ratified being unless by participating in “being” itself or insofar as it participates in “being” itself. Everything other than God is something to which “being” belongs and not “being” itself; therefore, it is not

ratified unless insofar as it participates in “being.” So it is formally ratified through that participation.

305 Second, thus: anything that is different from God can only be known perfectly by knowing all of its intrinsic and extrinsic causes (*Physics* I: “Then anything etc.”).¹⁴ But if the essence of such a thing were absolute, without essentially including a relation to its extrinsic cause, it could be perfectly known without any knowledge of its extrinsic causes. Therefore, it [its essence] must include such relation.

306 Augustine is brought in here, in chapter 5 of *On the Trinity* VIII: “Good of every good, etc.”¹⁵

307 Again: Boethius, in *On the Hebdomads*: “If you for a moment mentally take away the First Good itself, there are still good things, but they will not be good by the [mere] fact that they exist.”¹⁶ So, when the First Good is mentally removed from things, the notion of “good” is taken away from them. Consequently, goodness in them formally amounts to a relation to or participation in the highest good.

308 One might argue against this opinion [in n. 302] by referring to Averroes. He says in *Metaphysics* XI that “a relation has the weakest degree of being (*esse*).”¹⁷ Therefore, a relation is not and cannot be formally the ratification of a ratified being. To this the reply is given that there are two kinds of relation: an accidental and a substantial relation. This distinction is borrowed from Simplicius, in *On the Categories*,¹⁸ where he means to say that some cases of “in” do not constitute a category in the way other cases do [e.g., “being in” or inherence, where “in” defines categories of accidents]. This is taken to mean that some relations are essential or substantial and others not—they are accidental. So they say that the claim of the Commentator is true of an accidental relation, not of a substantial one.

309 If it is objected that every relation presupposes a foundation in ratified being (*esse rato*) and so cannot be the very ratification of the foundation, it is said that this is true of a relation that follows (*adveniente*) the foundation but not of the relation that constitutes the foundation.

REFUTATION OF THIS OPINION

310 Against this: to understand this explanation I adopt a distinction from the doctor on whose writings the opinion seems to be based [Henry of Ghent].¹⁹ According to that doctor, the word “thing” (*res*) is used in one way as originating from [the Latin verb] *reri*, which means “to think,” and in a second way as originating from [the Latin word] *ratitudo* [which means ratification, validation]. Instead of these terms I will use clearer terms. By “thing” as coming from *reri* I understand “a thinkable reality” (*realitatem*

opinabilem), which, according to him, applies to both fictitious and nonfictitious things. By “thing” coming from *ratitudo* I understand, following his intentions, “a quidditative reality,” since he holds that a quidditative thing is ratified through the fact that it has an exemplar [i.e., an idea in God], which does not apply in the case of fictitious things. Beyond these [two realities] nothing is left except the reality of actual existence. So we have three things, in order: thinkable reality, quidditative reality, and reality of existence.

311 Now I ask: what does he [the author of the view outlined above, in nn. 302–9] understand by “somethingness” (*aliquiditatem*)? If it means thinkable reality, it is nothing of itself because that [i.e., being thinkable] is common to something and nothing [i.e., fictions]. So if ratification is founded on somethingness thus understood, it is founded on nothing. Therefore, it is nothing because what is not related to itself is not related to something else (*On the Trinity*, chapter 3).²⁰ Therefore, ratification is nothing; the whole thing, composed of ratification and somethingness, is nothing twice.

312 If “somethingness” means quidditative reality, I ask what he understands by ratification: either quidditative reality or reality of existence. If it is quidditative, then saying that a ratification is founded on somethingness amounts to saying that a quidditative reality is founded on a quidditative reality, which is not something to be said, for then one and the same thing would be founded on itself, according to the same being (*esse*). If [somethingness means] reality of existence, I object. In that case ratification is presupposed by it [= somethingness], for, according to the opinion, a thing has truly ratified being (*esse*) before it has being (*esse*) of existence, so the being of existence cannot be the first ratification of it.

[*Interpolation*] Or, better. If you understand by ratification the reality of actual existence, this is in contrast to what you maintain. You maintain that the reality of actual existence presupposes a somethingness on which the ratification or the reality of actual existence must be based or founded in order to be a kind of ratified somethingness. Therefore, if somethingness is presupposed as the foundation of ratification (and so somethingness as such will have being of existence (*esse existentiae*) and ratified being (*esse ratum*) before the ratification gives it ratified being), it follows that ratification, taken as the reality of actual existence, cannot give the very somethingness its ratified being or its first being of existence, since it does have that of itself, just as a foundation has ratified being and being of existence before that which is founded on it. So, too, a relation does not give to something its ratified being, for it presupposes a subject in ratified being and in being of existence on which it can be

founded.

313 [Objection] Perhaps you say that the somethingness that is a thinkable reality is the “what” that is common to something and nothing, but that it is different from the somethingness proper to a thing having possible being and that it does not apply to fictions. A thing that has the somethingness [of a thinkable reality] is composed of this [somethingness of a possible being] together with being (*esse*) itself, which gives it its ratification. Reply: this amounts to saying that there are two somethingnesses, one that applies to something and nothing and one that applies only to something, as if one were to say that there are two whitenesses, one that applies to white and black and one that applies to white only. Apart from this, I question the somethingness that is proper to a possible being—either it is just a relation and is founded on the common somethingness (for the latter alone precedes it), and then it is founded on nothing, as was said earlier, and then it will be nothing, or the proper somethingness is absolute, and through it a thing that has it can be distinguished from fictions, according to you. Therefore, it is the first ratification of a thing and absolute, and so the relation will not be the first ratification of the thing.

314 Moreover, second, as follows: humanity refers either to a concept to which it is not of itself contradictory that something is in fact a realization [of that concept] (*aliquid subesse in effectu*) [first case]; to a concept to which it is of itself contradictory that it has in fact a realization [second case]; or to a concept that has of itself in fact a realization [third case]. According to all opinions the third case does not obtain, on the ground that this is proper to God only. If it is assumed [second case] that it is of itself contradictory to the concept [of humanity] that it has some realization, it can through no additional respect whatsoever be fitting to it that it has a realization. Indeed, what is contradictory to something from the part of the thing itself cannot be noncontradictory to it, given its nature. Therefore, it cannot become noncontradictory through an added relation. Therefore, [first case] the concept of humanity is such that it is not of itself contradictory that it has a realization. But such is the concept of ratified being, according to the opinion of that master because to have a realization is contradictory to the concept of a figment.

315 Moreover, third, in *Metaphysics* IV, from the view that “all appearances are true,” the Philosophers infer the impossible proposition that “all things will be related to something.”²¹ And he does not understand this in a derived sense (*denominative*) only, for in that sense it is true that “all things are related to something,” at least all things other than God. So he

understands the inference in the sense of the utterly unacceptable conclusion that “all things are essentially related to something.” But the opinion under discussion holds that “all things are essentially related to something”; therefore, the conclusion that “all things are related to something” is more absurd than the conclusion that “all appearances are true.”

316 [Objection] Perhaps you say that the Philosopher says that “all things are related to something” in the sense of “related to thinking and sensing.”²² Reply: in an argument the conclusion that leads to an impossibility must be equally or more impossible than the premises. As an inferred result, this conclusion [i.e., “all things are related to thinking and sensing”] differs from the premise (which states that all things are true because of their appearance to thought and sense) only in that it implies that “all things are related to something.” Therefore, if it somehow has a greater impossibility than the premise, it is the impossibility that “all things are related to something in an absolute sense.”

317 Fourth, as follows: humanity, insofar as it is humanity, either has just a nominal definition (“*quid*” *nominis*) or it has a real definition (“*quid*” *rei*) that is incompatible with fictions. In the first case there is no more a science of humanity as such than there is of chimeras. Consequently, metaphysics, which is about quiddities, will be no more a science than if it were about fictions, which are unintelligible because of the contradictions they include. But if humanity as humanity has a real definition, which is incompatible with fictions, humanity is a ratified being of itself.

318 [Objection] It is replied that humanity of itself has some definition, but this definition does not yet point to a ratified being, for figments, too, can have a genus and a difference [i.e., a definition]; but in order to get the complete notion (*rationem*) of a ratified being, it is necessary to add a relation to nonparticipating being.

319 [Reply by Scotus] That does not answer the argument that metaphysics would be no science at all. Also, what is said about figments, that they have a genus and a difference, is false. Any such figment has a concept that is intrinsically false, since it includes a contradiction because one part contradicts another part. Genus and difference can never be such parts, for a difference is by itself a determinant of a genus and, consequently, is not contradictory to it.

320 Second, there are some arguments against the opinion itself, based on what its proponent says. First, thus: everything is formally active through its ratification.* Proof: it is formally in act through its ratification, but according to him, nothing is formally active through a relation, for a relation is not a principle of acting. Therefore, ratification is not a relation.

* [Interpolation] According to him [= the proponent of the opinion under scrutiny] God is only ratification, yet maximally active. Therefore, formally a thing is active through its ratification, not through its somethingness.

321 Also, second, insofar as it is ratified, no creature is, according to him, specifically different from the being (*esse*) that is God. But the very being (*esse*) that is God is something absolute, according to all opinions. So how can there be no specific difference between what is formally a relation and what is absolute?

322 Also, according to him, a being of reason (*ens rationis*) participates in a ratified being or in the first being but is not formally a ratified being. Therefore, the relevant participation is not formally the ratification itself.

SCOTUS'S VIEW ON THE FOUNDATION OF THE TRACE RELATION

323 Regarding this article, I say that for no entity does a relation constitute its ratification (or that by which something is a solid being or a true being or a certified [*certum*] being). Indeed, every relation has something on which it is founded, something that by itself is not related to something else. If in that first moment, in which it is essentially related to itself, it is not essentially a certified being or a solid being, it is not capable of some relation through which it becomes a ratified being because if what is not ratified becomes ratified, it becomes ratified either of itself (which includes a contradiction, for what is of itself such or such [*aliquale*], is necessarily so) or it becomes ratified by some causal factor. If the latter is the case, something absolute rather than a relation can naturally terminate that action, since the formal reason of any produced first term necessarily is not a relation.

REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE OTHER OPINION

324 To the arguments for the opposite opinion on the matter of this third article: to Avicenna's point concerning humanity [n. 303], I reply that his saying "horseness is just horseness" does not exclude the things that *per se* belong to the notion of horseness, such as ratified being (*entitas rata*), but it excludes the things that are attributes of being, like "one" and "actuality," as is clear from his text.

325 To the second [cf. n. 304]: both the major and the minor premise are false—the major because [the notion of] animal is formally or *per se* and essentially included in [the notion of] man as man. But animality or animal is not formally the same as man. However, if one adds to the major

“anything that is *per se* included in the concept of something as an ultimate constituent of it,” then the major is true. Even so, the minor is still false.

326 As for the proof in the other pro-syllogism (“a being that has being,” etc. [cf. n. 304; specifically, “Now, one argues as follows”]), I say that the major premise of the pro-syllogism is false, if “insofar as” is meant to reduplicate something [that is said of or belongs to the *ens ratum*] *per se* in the first mode or if “by participating” in the major premise is taken as a gerund. And to the extent that it [i.e., “insofar as”] is interpreted as “because,” if the causality is understood as pertaining to [what is said of or belongs to the *ens ratum*] *per se* in the first mode, then the major is likewise false, since “participation *per se* in the first mode” itself is not that by which something is formally a ratified being. But if one understands by “insofar as” a causality that pertains to [what is said of belongs to the *ens ratum*] *per se* in the second mode (as is the case in a subject with respect to its proper attributes), I grant that “such a being insofar as it is such a being” (for example, a stone insofar as it is a stone) participates in being (*esse*) itself. Yet the proposition is not true conversely: “insofar as it participates it is a being.” For example, strictly speaking, the proposition “a man is a man insofar as he is capable of laughing” is false when the predication is understood as *per se* in the second mode and even more so when it is understood as *per se* in the first mode. The following proposition, however, is true (second mode): “A man is capable of laughing insofar as he is a man.” Nevertheless, one can in a way grant the other proposition, the first one—namely, that a stone participates in being itself insofar as it is a stone. This means that a stone, given its ratified being (*entitate rata*), necessarily and *per se* in the second mode has a relation of participation without which its “being” (*esse*) includes a contradiction, just as [when we would say that] a subject exists without a proper attribute or that a necessary foundation of a relation exists without the relation [itself], given the term of that relation. So, my interpretation is as follows: in the first moment of nature there is a being (*ens*) that is being itself (*ipsum esse*)—namely, God. In the second moment of nature there is the stone as a ratified being, taken absolutely, in the sense that it is not understood as participating or not. In the third moment there is the participation itself, a relation, following the stone itself.

327 To the other argument, from *Physics* I, concerning causes [n. 305], I say that the following two things are different: a relation’s being prior to the knowledge of what is caused by a cause and the relation’s being included in the knowledge of what is caused, for although a stone has a relation to God before it is known (and that is why it is not perfectly known unless God is known [cf. n. 277]), the stone can be known without knowledge of its relation to God. From this it follows that the relation does not belong to the

essence of the stone, for nothing is known unless by the knowledge of what belongs to its essence.

328 Regarding Augustine [cf. n. 306], I admit that every “other good” is good through participation, but the authority does not mean that participation belongs to the essence of that good.

329 Regarding Boethius [cf. n. 307], it must be said that the authority leads to the opposite conclusion. Indeed, it assumes that the First Good is mentally taken away. And then, given this assumption and talking about creatures, it says, talking about their being (*esse*), that “although they are and although they are good, they are not good insofar as they are.” So while he is mentally taking away the First Good, Boethius talks about creatures under the aspect of their being (*esse*). But if the being of creatures were a relation to the highest good, it would be not just contradictory to take away the First Good and to talk about the being of creatures; it would even be unintelligible. It is unintelligible to posit a relation while taking away the term of that relation, so he means that the being of creatures is something absolute. But according to him, goodness means a kind of influx from the First Good, and it is true that that word indicates a relation. Therefore it [= goodness] cannot belong to a thing in an absolute sense; therefore, if things according to their being (*esse*) did not come from the First Good, they were not good insofar as they are, for insofar as they are they did not flow from the First Good. Yet they would be good by accident if they were to flow from the First Good according to another “being” (*esse*). Here is an analogy: if a stone were to come from the will of the First Good, not in terms of itself [i.e., as a stone] but in terms of hardness, it would be good insofar as it was hard (since it came from the will of the First Good), though not insofar as it was a stone or insofar as it was a being. So it is clear that by “good” he means the relation of flowing from the First Good. And in this way there is no goodness in other things different from God if it does not come from the will of the First Good. But that goodness is not an absolute and intrinsic perfection of a creature. Therefore, goodness in the other, absolute sense does not indicate a relation to the creator, although goodness, as he takes it here, indicates such a relation.

REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS

330 Regarding the first argument [n. 281], I say that through a trace one can distinctly find out what it is an image of—namely, a part of a whole. But the whole itself is only found out indistinctly in the way a whole is known from a part. This is what applies here. Through a creature one can find out what is appropriated [to each person of the Trinity]—not, though, insofar as

it is [in fact] appropriated, but as it is something that *can* be appropriated. And therefore, the Trinity, the concept of which in our mind is like a whole, can be found out, as it were, through the resemblance of parts.

[*Interpolation*, at “not, though ... of parts”] but not what is proper to the persons, and therefore not the Trinity, the concept of which in the intellect is a kind of “whole.”

331 Regarding the second, I say that any created essence insofar as it is that particular created essence is in agreement with a certain exemplar. Therefore, viewed as a trace, any creature represents God. But the intellectual nature has in itself one essence and many operations, related by an order of origin. As such it represents the Trinity, by virtue of all the elements that come together in such a nature, in such a way that the intellectual nature is not in the same way a trace *and* an image, as will become more evident in the question concerning the image [cf. nn. 575–80].

332 Regarding the final argument, I say that in the essences of creatures* there is no other way (*ratio*) of representing than the way of a trace. But when in a nature many things occur together, representing both unity and trinity, such a nature has the character (*ratio*) of an image, as [is the case with] the intellectual nature. But such a co-occurrence does not occur in any nature below the intellectual nature. Therefore, all other, lower natures have only the character of a trace.**

* [*Interpolation*] because of the order of creatures.

** [*Interpolation*; cf. Rep 1A.3 nn. 82–83] As for the argument given in the *Lectura* [i.e., Rep. Par.; cf. the interpolation at n. 283]: One can say that the Trinity is a kind of whole that has parts. A perfection that can be appropriated as a part is a kind of unity for that Trinity. And in this sense it has the character of a part and does not lead to the knowledge of another part. This makes clear that the following inference does not hold: “A creature leads to the knowledge of God insofar as he is one, so it is not a trace of the Trinity,” because a trace does not perfectly lead to the knowledge of what it is the trace of but to the knowledge of something that can be appropriated to what it is the trace of.

PART 3

ON THE IMAGE OF THE TRINITY

QUESTION 1

DOES THE INTELLECTIVE PART OF THE SOUL CONTAIN MEMORY AS HAVING AN INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES NATURALLY PRECEDING THE ACT OF THINKING (INTELLIGENDI)?

333 Concerning the third part of this distinction, about the image, I ask whether memory as having an intelligible species that is naturally prior to the act of thinking resides (*sit*) in the intellectual part, taken properly.

[*Interpolation, at “Concerning ... properly”*] “But now, etc.” Concerning the third part of this distinction, where the Master discusses the image, there are four questions. The first is whether memory, having an intelligible species that is naturally prior to the act of thinking, resides in the intellectual part, taken properly? The second is about the production of [actual] cognition (*de notitia genita*): what is its cause or its generating principle? Specifically: is the intellectual part of the soul, taken properly, or a component of it, the total cause generating actual cognition or the reason for generating it? The third is: is the object as present in itself or in its species or the intellectual part of the soul the main cause of the production of the act of cognition? The fourth is: is there an image of the Trinity distinctly present in our mind?—Concerning the first question.

INITIAL ARGUMENTS

There are arguments for the negative. Every species impressed by an object represents the latter under precisely the aspect (*ratione*) according to which it is impressed by it. And if it is impressed by something else [not the object itself but some intermediate representation], it still represents under the same aspect in which it would represent if it had been impressed by that object [directly]. Otherwise it would not be a true species of it [= the object]. But when a species is impressed by an object, it is impressed by the latter as being singular because an action is of a singular. Therefore, a species, by whatever it is impressed, cannot represent a universal. Only a universal in its quality of being represented to the intellect can do so. Therefore, no impressed species represents the intelligible precisely under the aspect of something intelligible [cf. QDA 17 n.1].

334 Also, the presence of an object is the cause of the presence of a species, not the other way around. Indeed, it is not because there is a species in the eye that something white is present, but conversely. Therefore, the first representation of an object is not by means of a species. Given the presence of the object, it is superfluous to posit a species [cf. QDA 17 n. 2].

335 Also, any species in the intellect would be a form naturally leading to an intellection. But if one [species] is admitted in the intellect, then it is possible for many to be present there simultaneously, and then all of them would naturally act toward the corresponding intellections. Therefore, there would be several intellections at the same time in the intellect corresponding to those several species [cf. QDA 17 n. 3]. For if any one of them [i.e., of the species] were to act naturally without there being an intellection corresponding to it, it would follow that there would never be an intellection corresponding to it because if a natural cause acting according to its utmost power cannot have its effect, it will never have it. Now, the multitude of species that follow from the hypothesis is disproved by the argument of Algazel in his *Metaphysics*: “Just as one body cannot at the same time be modeled in different forms, so it appears not to be the case that one and the same act of thinking (*intellectus*) is an expression of different objects at the same time.”¹ Yet this would be the consequence of proposing several intelligible species simultaneously.

336 Also, fourth: [if species are introduced] it appears to follow that the intellect does not experience (*patietur*) the intelligible *qua* intelligible but only experiences it with real passivity (*passio*) by receiving some form that is like a real perfection of it, for it receives that species just as a subject receives a real accident, and thus the intellect does not experience the intelligible as such. From this it follows that “to think of” (*intelligere*) will not consist in “the thing’s affecting the soul” (*motus rei ad animam*). Indeed, every thought will then be an absolute action with respect to it [= the thing thought of], like a form standing in itself, not having some external end term.

337 {Also, it would then be possible for that species to be preserved without an act, and so it would not be necessary to go back to phantasms. [See below, n. 343; also Scotus’s note at n. 554.]

338 Also, the will has its object sufficiently present to itself so as to be able to act with respect to that object, although it does not receive in itself anything from the object. The same can be the case here, to the extent that the object is the end term of the act [of thinking]. Confirmation: it [= the object] is present to the will because it is in the intellect, so why not similarly in the case of intellect and phantasm [i.e., why cannot an object be present to the intellect on account of being in the phantasm; cf. n. 340 below]?}

339 For the opposite: sometimes the intellect is in a state of proximate and accidental potentiality to thinking (*intelligendum*), when before it was in a state of essential and remote potentiality. This cannot happen in the intellect unless by some change—not [a change] in the object, obviously; therefore in the intellect itself. The relevant change, which leads to such proximate potentiality, appears lead to some form by which the intelligible object is present to the intellect. Now, this form is prior to the act of thinking because the proximate potentiality, by which one is able to think, is naturally prior to the act of thinking itself. That form by which an object is present [to the intellect] is called “species.” Therefore, etc. [cf. QDA 17 n. 6].

[*Interpolation*; cf. Rep 1A.3 n. 88] The argument can be derived differently, as follows: when the intellect is in essential potentiality before acquiring any cognition at all, it is in a different state than when it is in accidental potentiality before it has an intellection. The object, however, is not in a different state; it stays the way it is. So the intellect behaves differently because it has been changed. But every change terminates in some form. So some form precedes the act of thinking, and that form is precisely what I mean by “species.”

THE OPINION OF HENRY OF GHENT

340 In this question there are many approaches. In one approach one denies every intelligible species naturally prior to intellection because of the arguments given in the first part of the question [i.e., the initial arguments for a negative answer].² The idea is this: when the impression of a sensible species has occurred in a sense organ and when the whole process has reached the imaginative power [resulting in a phantasm or sense image], the agent intellect abstracts from the object in the phantasm and brings the possible intellect to a simple apprehension of the essence. However, this happens in such a way that the possible intellect does not receive any impressed species from the phantasm. Nor is the object present to the intellect in another way than by being present in the imagination.

341 And this is proved by the following line of reasoning: the senses receive a species that differs from the act itself either because the sense organ is of the same nature (*eiusdem rationis*) as the medium or because the received species is the proximate disposition toward receiving the act of sensing. Neither of these cases occurs in the intellect, for the intellect is a nonorganic power and of itself (*de se*) maximally disposed toward intellection. Therefore, etc.

342 This [n. 340] is said to be what Aristotle wants to express in book III

of *On the Soul*, where he praises the ancient philosophers, who said that “the soul is the place of the species, not the whole soul, but the intellective soul.”³ This distinction seems not to be true when it is understood as meaning that other parts [of the soul] do not have species, for there are species in the sensitive part, too. But [it is true] because the other parts do not have species in the way places do [have or contain something] but in the way subjects are having accidents. The intellect [in contrast] has species in the way a place [has something], for [it has them] as an expressed form, not as an impressed form [cf. QDA 17 n. 42].

343 This [n. 340] can also be taken from Aristotle’s *On the Soul* III,⁴ where he says that “in phantasms we are looking at what-a-thing-is,” and “phantasms relate to the intellect as sensibles to the senses,” and “without phantasms we have no intellection.” He says many similar things. From these claims it is concluded that he [Aristotle] does not posit an intelligible species at all because, if it were posited, the intellect would not be looking at “what the thing is” in phantasms but in intelligible species. Likewise, there would be no need [for the intellect] to turn to phantasms. Because the intelligible species would be enough, as it [the intellect] would have the object present in the species and could turn to that.

344 If one counters this [n. 343] by quoting what the Philosopher says at the same place [*On the Soul* III], that “either the things [themselves] must be in the soul or the species of the things; the things are not there, therefore the species are,” he [= Henry of Ghent] replies as follows: on the part of the intellect—that is, in the intellect—we have an impressed species (which is a habit or an act) or an expressed species (which is a species in the phantasm) or the quiddity (which shines out [in the phantasm] and is a species with respect to the singular, for not “this stone” is in the soul but its quiddity is, which is the species with respect to such a stone).

345 This [opinion, n. 340] is also presented as being of Augustine’s mind. He wants that the word (*verbum*) originates not from an intelligible species but from a habit, for he says in *On the Trinity* XV (chapter 10 or 24) that “the word is born from the very knowledge (*scientia*) that we are keeping in our memory,”⁵ and in chapter 12 or 28 of the same book he says that “the word is produced from the knowledge which resides in the soul.”⁶

THE OPINION OF GODFREY OF FONTAINES

346 The same idea is put forward by another doctor who denies intelligible species.⁷ He develops the argument about the organ, which was touched upon in the previous position [cf. n. 340–41].

347 He also presents another argument, as follows:

[*Interpolation*; in Rep 1A.3 n. 92 Scotus reports the following argument.] Something does only receive from an object that is proportionate to it the element to which it is primarily and *per se* in potentiality and nothing else. The cognitive power is primarily and *per se* in potentiality with respect to its proper cognition. Therefore, it receives cognition from the proportionate object and not a species.

Any power (*potentia*) that is in potentiality (*potentia*) with respect to some act gets its perfection primarily in accordance with such act from an agent that is proportionate and actually present. But the apprehensive power is the power that is primarily ordered to the act of apprehending. Therefore, it gets its perfection primarily from the proportionate agent in accordance with that act, which is apprehending.

[*Note by Scotus*] Godfrey holds the same conclusion as in the reported opinion [i.e., the conclusion stated in 346 that is in agreement with the opinion reported in 340] in his *Quodlibet* IX q. 19: “That to which something is *per se* in potentiality, has *per se* being (*esse*) from a proportional agent and nothing else. The apprehensive power is by itself alone in potentiality for cognition.” Augustine, in *On the Trinity* XI (chapter 4): “the very form which is impressed upon the eye, is called vision.... In effectuating change the organ agrees with the medium.”⁸

SCOTUS'S OPINION: ARGUING FOR SPECIES

348 I argue against this position, for now I do not care whether the singular is cognized (*intelligatur*) or not. [What matters here, is that] it is certain that a universal can be cognized by the intellect. The intellect is posited by philosophers as a power different from the sensitive powers for reasons of the intellection of universals, for reasons of composition and division, and for reasons of syllogistic reasoning, rather than for reasons of the cognition of the singular (if it can know the singular at all).

349 Based on this obvious fact—namely, that the intellect can cognize a universal—I accept the following proposition: “There is in the intellect, naturally prior to the act of cognizing, an object that is a universal in act and that is present to it [i.e., the intellect] in the quality (*in ratione*) of an object [to be cognized].”^{*} From this the proposed thesis follows: in that prior entity it [= the intellect] has the object present in an intelligible species, and so it has an intelligible species before the act [of cognizing].

^{*} [*Note by Scotus*, inserted at the word] “universal”: so a species of the nature [of a thing] may be posited because we can think of the nature [a]

when it is not present in itself and [b] as it is different from the species of the universal (because it does not give an idea [of the nature] in such an indifferent manner) and [c] [as it is made present] by the action of the agent intellect (for the possible intellect does not make its object present). Nevertheless, this [= the preceding threefold proposition, a–c] is not a premise in the present question [cf. n 333] but rather the conclusion. From the solution [presented in nn. 348–70] we have the conclusion: there is an intelligible species for everything that is thought of while it is not present, so the arguments that are based on universality [six in number, cf. below: nn. 352, 357, 359, 363, 364, 365] conclude to the necessity of species, but the arguments from the presence [of the object, three: nn. 366, 367, 368] conclude to their possibility from the nobility of the intellect in the category of created cognitive powers.

350 The assumed premise [= the “obvious fact” in n. 349] appears to be quite obvious because the object [of the intellect] naturally precedes the act [of thinking]. Therefore, universality, which is the proper condition of an object as such, precedes the act of the intellect or of thinking. Therefore, the object must also be present under that aspect [of universality] because the presence of the object precedes the act [of thinking].

[*Note by Scotus*] Note that an object is cognized (*intelligitur*) in a certain (*determinato*) organ [i.e., the imagination]. Although what is cognized [i.e., the intelligible content] is not received in the organ, it still will be determined (*determinabitur*) to the organ as to that in which the object is present precisely in its quality as object.

351 I prove the consequence [“from this follows” in n. 349], first, from the universality of the object [in nn. 352–65 below], and, second, from the availability [of the object; in nn. 366–69 below].⁹ From the universality of the object I argue in three ways: one is taken from the representing phantasm [n. 352 ff.], one from the agent intellect [nn. 359ff.], and one from [the difference between] more common and less common [notions] [nn. 364ff.].

Arguments based on the universality of the object

352 First I argue as follows: from the fact that a species is this particular kind of species, it has this particular way (*rationem*) of representing, a way that is proper to the object that is represented under this particular aspect. Therefore, as long as it remains the same species, it does not have two modes (*rationes*) of representing. Nor does it represent with respect to two aspects (*rationum*) of that which can be represented. But to think of an object under the aspects of the universal and the singular requires two modes of being

representative or representing and involves two aspects of what can be represented. Therefore, the same thing, remaining the same, does not represent in this way *and* in that way. Therefore, the phantasm, which of itself represents an object with respect to what is singular, cannot represent the very same object under the aspect of the universal [cf. QDA 17 n. 8, 14].

[*Interpolation*; cf. Rep 1A.3 n. 97] The argument can also be construed in this way: the same species, of the same aspect, is by itself not capable of representing the object under a possible opposite aspect. The aspect of the singular and that of the universal are opposite aspects in things that can be known and represented. Hence, no species of a single aspect is capable of representing an object under the aspect of both the universal and the singular. Now, the species in the phantasm represents a singular object under the aspect of “singular”; therefore, it cannot represent it under the aspect of “universal.” Proof of the major premise: the aspect under which a species represents an object is measured by (*mensuratur ab*) the object [i.e., the object provides the criterion for the representing species]. But one and the same thing cannot be measured with two opposite measures, or the other way around because then the same would be said two times, according to the Philosopher, in *Metaphysics* V.¹⁰ Therefore, the same species cannot represent two opposite objects or one and the same object under opposite objective aspects.

353 Reply [of an opponent]: In different lights the same representative [*representativum*: something that can represent something else] may represent an object under different aspects, just as phosphorescents represent themselves under the aspect of being colored in daylight but under the aspect of being luminous in the light of the night [cf. QDA 17 n. 9–10].

354 Rebuttal [by Scotus]: “this representative” is something in itself, naturally prior to representing something in this or in that particular light. Because it [= this representative] is “this kind of species,” the light in which it represents one thing and not another is proper to it. Otherwise one might propose or could propose that the same species represent color *and* sound (whereas the species as existing in vibrating air represents sound and as existing in illuminated air represents color), and so it would be impossible to show any difference in representatives. By the relevant prior item one must, therefore, understand the unit of the species in itself, which is accompanied by the unit of the representation and of the object that is represented by it [= the species] insofar as it [= the object] is represented in it or through it. And so, something that is the same in that prior item cannot have different modes of representing, nor can it [= something that is the same] represent it [the object] under different aspects of what has to be represented.

{This can be confirmed because light (*lumen*) does not formally represent; nor is it the formal nature of a representative. It is just that in which something is represented. And one can see that the more light is perfect the more precise and the more distinctly that which is represented by the representative shines in it.}

[*Interpolation*, cf. Rep 1A.3 nn. 99–101] Or put it this way: light (*lumen*) does not [itself] represent anything, but it is that in which a representative represents, for light in a medium is of the same nature, whether I see something white or something black, since [not light, but] reason essentially distinguishes one representative from another. But the species and the representatives of white and of black are different. Consequently, a distinction of light does not cause a distinct aspect of what is to be represented or of what does the representing, but as long as the nature of the representative remains the same, it always represents the same thing under the same aspect—not, therefore, under different aspects.

This argument can be corroborated, for in more perfect light something is not represented as another thing; rather, it is represented as the same thing but more clearly than in less perfect light. This is obvious with respect to the species of white and black in the light of the sun and the moon. Therefore, even though a species in the organ of the imagination does represent the singular more clearly in the light of the agent intellect, so that the intellect can have a better intellection of it than [when it appears] in its own light—namely, that of the imagination—it still never represents a universal object under the aspect of the universal, in whatever kind of light there is.

Their example of the phosphorescents [cf. n 353] is not valid. I ask, are they represented by the same representative but in different ways by day and at night or by two different representatives? Not by the same, for then the representation would be the same at night and by day, since a representative is something in itself before it [actually] represents something in this light or in that light. If different aspects of phosphorescents are represented by different representatives, then we have our thesis, irrespective of whether the light is the same or not.

355 The example [of the phosphorescents, n. 353] is of no use for the thesis at all [i.e., the thesis of the opponent—that the same representative represents in the light of the phantasm the singular and in the light of the agent intellect the universal; cf. n 353]. It even points toward the opposite [whichever of the following cases you take. First,] two qualities are in a particular body, like light (*lux*) and color, and one of them propagates itself in the presence of more intense light (*luce*) and the other in weaker light,

while nothing else is acting [upon the senses] in a more efficacious way. Or [second case] both of them may be propagating simultaneously in more intense light, but the one that is acting more efficaciously can be perceived, whereas the one that acts less efficaciously cannot be perceived, as happens when the stars are propagating their rays during the day but are not seen because something more luminous and more efficacious is affecting sight. Or [third case] when a single sensible quality is present in a particular body, it may under various degrees of light (*lumine*) cause different representatives: one in more intense [light] and another in weaker [light]. [In these three cases] it is always the case that what represents the object under different aspects of what can be represented is not the same, no matter how much one light (*lumen*) is joining another.

356 If you [Henry of Ghent] say that one and the same thing can by the same quality be similar to different other things, just as one white thing by the same whiteness may be similar to different other white things,¹¹ this is not relevant to the proposition at hand for the following reason: in relations of an essential order something [such as in a hierarchical system] cannot have [bring about] different dependencies to two elements at the same level (*in eodem ordine*)—as, for example, with the dependency of the same measured thing in relation to two measures in the same level, or [as with the dependency] of the same participant in relation to two participated things in the same level, or [as with the dependency] of the same effect in relation to two total causes at the same level. This was proved earlier in the question on the unity of God [cf. Ord. 1.2 n. 73]. Therefore, in this relation [which we are discussing now], where there is not only similarity (*similitudo*) but also imitation or passively being an example (*exemplatio passiva*), it is impossible that the same absolute thing refers to different things. And so it is not possible for the same species to have the character of representing different things under the aspect of different things.

357 The second argument in this first series [out of the three mentioned in n. 351] is this: a representative representing with all its power an object under one aspect cannot at the same time represent the same thing or something else under another aspect; but at the very moment in which there is an intellection of a universal, the [associated] phantasm represents with all its power an object as singular for the imagination (*virtuti phantasticae*) because there the actual imagination of the object in its singularity occurs. It is clear that [this happens] with all the power of the phantasm because otherwise the imagination could not have that perfect act with respect to the object that for the object naturally consists in being represented by the phantasm. Therefore, the phantasm cannot represent the object under another aspect.

358 {Why can there in the imagination not be an act with respect to an object that is actually universal, if there can be there a species with respect to such an object, since an act is a kind of species?}

359 The second line of reasoning [out of the three mentioned in n. 351] is this: according to the Philosopher in *On the Soul* III, the agent intellect is purely an active power¹²—for one thing because it is “what makes all things [intelligible]”; for another because it relates to the possible [intellect] “as craftsmanship to matter”—therefore, it can have a real action. Every real action, however, has a real end term. The real end term [of the agent intellect] is not received in the phantasm {because the thing received would be extended, and then the agent intellect would not bring about a transfer from one order [i.e., the sensible, material domain] to another [i.e., the intelligible domain, which is immaterial], and it [= the thing received] would not be better matched to the possible intellect than the phantasm [itself]}. Nor does the agent intellect cause anything in phantasms because the latter are not its passive counterpart, according to the cited authorities [Aristotle, *On the Soul*]. Therefore, it [the end term of the agent intellect] is received only in the possible intellect, since the agent intellect [itself] does not receive anything [cf. QDA 17 n. 11]. What is first caused [by the agent intellect] cannot be said to be the act of thinking (*intelligendi*) because the first end term of an act of the agent intellect is that which is actually universal as it [= the agent intellect] “transfers from one order to another.” And the actual universal precedes the act of thinking (as was assumed in the antecedent [n. 349]) because the object in its quality (*sub ratione*) of object precedes the act [cf. n. 350].

[*Interpolation*; cf. Rep 1A.3 nn. 104–5] It will be said that the end term [or result] of the action of the agent intellect is the universal object under the aspect of the universal shining out in the phantasm. Against this: a universal object under the aspect of being universal has only diminished being (*esse deminutum*) in the form of being cognized (*cognitum esse*), just as Hercules in a statue has only diminished being—namely, being represented in an image. But if it [= the universal] has some real being (*esse reale*), this [merely] obtains insofar as it exists in something that represents it under that aspect—namely, in such a way that the agent intellect (as said earlier) makes something that can represent the universal out of what was representing the singular. Therefore, since the result of a real action does not consist in an object that has diminished being (like cognized being or represented being) but in something real, it follows that such an action of the agent intellect terminates in a real existing form, which formally represents the universal as universal. And this real form is

accompanied by an intentional term—namely, the universal object according to the represented being it has in the species.

{We are not arguing here that the phantasm together with the agent intellect cannot cause intellection but that it does not cause intellection of the universal unless [there is] a species first because “the actually universal” naturally precedes its being thought of and the universal is the first end term of intellection.}

360 The argument may be confirmed as follows: it is [commonly] held that the agent intellect makes “the universal out of the non-universal” or “what is actually thought out of what is potentially thought,” as testimonies of the Philosopher¹³ and the Commentator¹⁴ have it. Now, the universal as universal is not something that exists in reality (*nihil sit in exsistentia*) but only in something that represents it under a certain aspect (*ratione*). These phrases [quoted above] do not make any sense unless the agent intellect creates something that represents the universal out of what represented the singular, in whatever sense the “out of” [in the quoted phrases] is understood: either materially or virtually. The real action [of the agent intellect] only terminates in something that represents the object under the aspect of the universal, so a real action of the agent intellect terminates in some real existing form that formally represents the universal as universal because otherwise the action could not terminate in the universal under the aspect of the universal.

361 {Here we may look at the opinion of Godfrey of Fontaines concerning the agent intellect.¹⁵ [According to him,] it removes obstacles [preventing the cognition of the universal] by separating the quiddity from the singularity, not with respect to its being, but with respect to its influence [on the possible intellect] (*non in essendo sed in immutando*).¹⁶ It does not operate upon the phantasm or upon the possible intellect but touches the phantasm in a virtual way. This is explained [by Godfrey] as follows: in the phantasm [we have] both “what” (*quid*) and “this” (*hoc*). In the light (*lumine*) that is co-created with the possible [intellect], “what” is what moves (*motivum*) the illuminated power, not “this.” An example: when something is white and sweet at the same time, the white affects the illuminated medium; the sweet does not. Thus the light abstracts the color from the sweetness and separates it insofar as affecting [the senses] is concerned and removes an “impediment so that it does not affect [the senses].”

362 Against this view, either the “what” as contained in the phantasm has sufficient active power (*virtutem*) to push the possible [intellect] toward thinking of the universal—and then it follows that the universal is not the end term of the action of the agent intellect—or it [= the “what”] does not

[have that power] and then another suitable active factor is required that acts in the way of the appropriate active power that is not present in the “what.” Also, “this” in conjunction with “what” is not an obstacle. Just as “what” is not [an obstacle] for being (*esse*), it is not [an obstacle] for moving the intellect. Also, something that removes an obstacle has an action preceding the action of that from which the removing occurs. Show me this [preceding action]: upon what [does it act]? And toward which end term?—But this argument is resolved [in favor of Godfrey] by “This is explained as follows” [in n. 361] because it [= this argument] speaks against something that properly removes, not against something that disposes a passive [subject] toward receiving.}

363 The second argument in this line of reasoning [= the series that started in n. 359]: the agent intellect does in its quality of being an active factor (*ratio activi*) not surpass the possible intellect in its quality of being a passive factor. Therefore, whatever is caused by the agent intellect is received in the possible intellect; the first end term of the action of the agent intellect is received in the possible intellect. And so, while the first action of the agent intellect is concerned with the actually universal, that universal or that by which it [the universal] has its characteristic being (*esse tale*) is received in the possible intellect.

364 The third line of reasoning [announced in n. 351] is this: [first argument of this series]: less universal and more universal habitual cognitions are distinct habits in their own right; otherwise, metaphysics as such would not be a [distinct] habit of the intellect because it has an object that is most universal with respect to all other objects. However, it so happens that the use of a more universal habit does not involve the use of some other, less universal habit, just as having an act of thinking (*intelligendi*) about something more universal (which act is similar to the way the habit considers it) does not involve having an act of thinking about something less universal. But we do not have an act of thinking about something more universal unless it is present to the intellect in that particular respect. Therefore, something more universal can be present to the intellect by something else than that by which some lesser universal is made present to the intellect. But if an object were thought of exclusively in the phantasm, the more universal would never be present unless in the imaginable singular. Therefore, etc. [we need a distinct representation in order to take care of the more universal].

365 A final argument in this [third] series: when a more universal item is perceived in what is below it [i.e., in something more specific], it is never perceived with respect to its full indifference.* The full indifference of a more universal item consists in the fact that as a concept it [= the more universal]

is the same as any of its inferiors. However, what is more common as a concept in some inferior [concept] is never identical with any inferior [concept as such] whatsoever but precisely with that in which it is conceived. So whatever universal concept is [contained] in the singular or whatever more common concept [is contained] in a lesser common concept, it is not conceived according to its full indifference. However, the intellect is able to conceive that [more universal] concept according to its full indifference. Therefore, it [the concept] is not conceived precisely as the more common in the lesser common or as the universal in the singular and so not precisely as the universal in the phantasm. For a phantasm has no reason for being unless [as a representation] of the singular itself—namely, insofar as it is a singular of a most specific species, and this [only] if the phantasm is impressed by something that was met in the required manner.

* [*Interpolation*; cf. Rep IA.3 n. 106] The more universal cannot according to its full indifference be thought of or represented in something that represents what is less universal. But the species of the phantasm essentially and primarily represents an individual as “this [singular entity]”; therefore, it cannot represent the universal according to the complete indifference it has with respect to all of its individuals. Proof of the major premise: the more universal is never known according to its complete indifference unless it is known as one knowable item [which is the same] for all its inferior [more specific] items. But as the universal has being (*esse*) in one singular, it is impossible for it to be known as identical to all other singulars below it. It is known exclusively as identical to the one in which it is. Therefore, in the representative of one singular it is not known according to its complete indifference. Nevertheless, the intellect is capable of understanding the universal according to its full indifference. Otherwise, there would be no universal predicates, no definitions, no species, no genera, nothing of the sort. Therefore, the universal is not conceived in the phantasm because the latter is only [a representative] of the singular itself in the proper sense—that is, as a singular of a most specific species.

Arguments based on the presence of the object

366 Now a second proof [cf. the main division of the arguments in n. 351] will be given of the first consequence [stated in n. 349].

[Note by Scotus] This second approach [has] three arguments [cf. nn. 366, 367, and 368] against the view of Henry of Ghent [in nn. 340–45]; note [in particular] the first one and the third.

First argument [cf. QDA 17 n. 15]: either it is possible for the intellect to have present to itself an object as being intelligible while disregarding what is present to some lower faculty or not. If not, then it cannot operate without lower faculties (because it cannot have an object present [to itself] without the latter). And if it cannot operate without the latter, it also cannot be (*esse*) without them, according to the argument of the Philosopher in the preface of his *On the Soul*.¹⁷ If, however, it is possible for it to have an object present [to itself] without that object being present to a lower faculty, then it does have it indeed. Proof of the consequence: the agents concerned with such presence of an object—namely, the phantasm and the agent intellect—are sufficiently close to the possible intellect, and they act by the force of nature (*per modum naturae*). Thus, they necessarily cause in the latter [the possible intellect] that of which it [the possible intellect] is receptive.

[*Interpolation*; cf. Rep 1A.3 n. 107] The intellect as it is distinguished from the sensitive part [of the soul] either can have an object that is present with its own presentiality [= way of being present] or not. If so, then we have our thesis, since, before an act of abstractive cognition is elicited, the object of such cognition is only present through something that represents it—what I call a species. If not, then it [= the intellect] cannot have an operation of its own without the sensitive part and consequently it cannot be (*esse*) without the latter, according to the Philosopher's reasoning in book I of *On the Soul*: "If the intellect cannot have an operation of its own, then it cannot be separated."¹⁸ And so it cannot have an operation of its own in which it would be independent of the sensitive part.

367 Second argument: other cognitive powers have their objects present to themselves not just secondarily (that is because they [i.e., the objects] are [also or already] present to lower powers), but with a presence of their own, just as the common sense has color present to itself not merely insofar as it [= color] is present to [the exterior sense of] vision but because it has its [= the color's] species in the organ of the common sense. Therefore, because the perfection of a cognitive power consists in having an object present to itself [precisely] in that respect in which it is an object of such power, it follows that this power not only can have an object present to itself just because it is present to the imaginative power but [that it can have it also] with a presence of its own—namely, insofar as it shines out to the intellect by something that is present in the intellect [cf. QDA 14 n. 18].

368 Third argument: if a power that cannot be active unless with respect to an object that is present to it cannot have that object present to it unless by another power to which it happens to be joined, it depends for its operation on the power it happens to be joined to, and so it is imperfect. But

the intellect can only have an act concerning an object that is present to it, and, according to you [Henry of Ghent; cf. n. 340], it cannot have an object present unless in the imaginative power. But the imaginative power happens to be joined to the intellect insofar as it is a power. So the intellect depends for its operation on another power to which it happens to be joined, and this fact imposes on it an imperfection in its power for cognition. However, no imperfection should be imposed on any nature unless there appears to be in such nature a necessity for it. Therefore, such imperfection should not be imposed on the intellect.

369 If you object that “multiplicity should not be proposed unless in case of necessity and no necessity arises here [because the presence of an object in the imaginative power is sufficient]; therefore, etc.,”¹⁹ this is my reply: necessity arises when the perfection of a nature does require so. Although a human is the kind of subject that can have an object present in the phantasm because he is a human, still, the intellectual nature of man *qua* intellectual does not have an object sufficiently present if this presence is only begged from the imaginative power. So this strongly vilifies the intellectual nature *qua* intellectual because one takes away from it what constitutes the perfection in the cognitive power and what is [already] found in a sensitive power such as the imaginative power. Therefore, in this case multiplicity is proposed in order to save the perfection of the more perfect nature [namely, the intellect], [a perfection that is] greater than or at least equal to that of the less perfect nature [namely, imagination].

370 To the question [n. 333], then, I say this: for the intellect to have the character (*rationem*) of memory it is necessary to assume in it [the intellect] an intelligible species* representing the universal *qua* universal and naturally prior to the act of thinking. This is based on the arguments given above regarding an object insofar as it is universal and insofar as it is present to the intellect. These two conditions, universality and presence, naturally precede [any act of] thinking.

* [Note by Scotus, added to “intelligible species”] Anything that is *per se* and primarily thought of has its own species—*Collationes* [Paris. Collat. 4]

DISCUSSION OF SOME AUTHORITIES

371 What I just proved appears to be Aristotle’s intention as expressed in book III of *On the Soul*.²⁰ There he wants that the soul is “somehow all things,” and he explains this by sort of proving that it [= the soul] is “sensible things through the senses and knowable things through knowledge (*scientiam*).”

372 Others [Henry of Ghent] gloss this statement of the Philosopher by saying that in the latter text Aristotle refers to different things. He understands the phrase concerning the senses with respect to the impressed species and the one concerning the intellect with respect to the habit of knowledge (*scientiae*).

373 This explanation appears not to reflect what the Philosopher has in mind, for just as the older philosophers (*antiqui*) held that the soul is all things really so that it would cognize all things, so the Philosopher posits that it [the soul] is all things not really but through a kind of likeness.²¹ But if it [= the soul] were “sensible things through the senses” on account of species or impressed likenesses [i.e., sensible species, not intelligible species!] and “intelligible things through the intellect,” this would happen either because of knowledge that is in the intellect, and then it [= the soul] would be “knowable things” not on the basis of likeness because knowledge in itself, disregarding the species that represents the object, is not a likeness of something intelligible, or [it would happen] because of something else that represents the intelligible object, and then the intellect would not be intelligible things through intelligible species, but the soul [would be intelligible things] through the phantasm, for, according to this [latter] position, there would be nothing that represents the intelligible, only the phantasm.

374 {Also, in *Physics*, book VIII (comment 30 according to the Commentator) Aristotle states that, when knowledge has been acquired, the intellect is brought from a [state of] essential potentiality into [a state of] accidental potentiality.²² I ask, what does he mean by “knowledge” (*scientiam*)? Not the habit that follows upon the act, because when it [= the intellect] acted [i.e., actually used its knowledge], it was not in a state of essential potentiality. Therefore, [he means] the form preceding the act: the intelligible species [cf. QDA 17 n. 6]. Proof: for one thing, the phantasm is not what brings the intellect into a state of accidental potentiality; for another, then all so-called habitual knowledge of the quiddity of the first object would reside in the imagination (*phantasia*), and so the whole habit concerning one and the same thing [would reside] there because, according to the Philosopher, understanding (*intellectus*) and knowledge (*scientia*) are the same habit.²³}

375 More to the point, here is the view of Augustine, as I will now show. No power is sufficiently fit to produce actual knowledge (*notitiam*) if it does not have an object that is naturally preceding the act, an object that is present to the power either in itself or in something representing it. But when intelligible species are denied, the whole intellective part [of the soul] does not have an object at its disposal prior to intellection—not in itself or in

some representation. Therefore, when intelligible species are denied, nothing in the intellective [soul] will be sufficiently fit to produce an act of thinking. And so nothing in the intellective part will serve adequately as memory for such intellections, which is what Augustine denies in *On the Trinity* XII (chapter 4)²⁴ and book XV (chapter 10).²⁵

376 [Objection] Suppose you reply as follows: “Memory resides in the intellective part [of the soul] taken properly on account of the fact that the intellect (*intellectus*) is put in the first act of thinking (*intelligendi*) [i.e., has acquired knowledge]. It [= the intellect] is active with respect to the second act of thinking [i.e., it engages in an act of thinking] in the sense that, while first having a confused notion (*notitiam confusam*), it is active with respect to a second, distinct notion.” [Scotus] This is against the view of the adherent of this opinion [i.e., Henry]²⁶ and against Augustine. It is against the adherent of the opinion because he states that “the universal as present in the phantasm is there as if in memory but as a factor causing an act of thinking it is present there as if in intellect (*intelligentia*).” So by this opinion an act of thinking does not belong to memory but to intellect. It is also clearly against Augustine, in *On the Trinity* XV, (chapter 63 or 21): “attributing to intellect everything that is being thought,” etc.

377 There is also a rational argument [against the objection given in n. 376]. [If the objection is valid, then] either the act by which memory is in the first act will be identical to the act of the intellect (*intelligentiae*) and so it will be identical to the principle (*ratio*) that produces it, or it will be different. In the latter case, it will either be simultaneous with the act of the intellect, and then there are two acts simultaneously, or it will not be simultaneous, and then memory will formally produce it [i.e., the act of the intellect] while it [= memory] is no longer there, for memory exists (*est*) formally by what according to you [the opponent in n. 376] is not there when the second act is generated.

378 If you say that “memory exists through the habit of knowledge,” this is not in agreement with the opinion [of Henry of Ghent], for he says that “by a habit an object is only present in the phantasm,” and therefore “someone having habitual knowledge [of something] must resort to phantasms in order to actually think [of it]. Therefore, an object is not present by habitual knowledge indeed, but by a phantasm, which is not in the intellective part [of the soul]. This will become clearer in the reply [in nn. 393–97 below] to the authorities of Augustine [cited in n. 345 above], who posits that knowledge (*scientia*) is in memory and is not a species impressed in the intellect, as is argued by him [Henry of Ghent, in n. 345] from his [Augustine’s] words.

[*Interpolations*] But note that he [= Scotus] puts it differently in the Parisian Lectures [cf. Rep 1A. 3 nn. 108–114]:

“As for the question, therefore, I say that in order to ensure that the intellect has the character of memory it is necessary to posit an intelligible species in it, naturally preceding the act of thinking and representing the universal. And the necessity rests on two considerations. One is based on the condition of the *per se* object [of the intellect], which consists in universality. This universality is as an essential feature (*ratio*) of the object, and as such it always precedes the act [of thinking]. This could not be the case if a species were not impressed in the intellect. The other consideration is the condition and the dignity of a higher power, which should not be vilified [cf. n. 370]. And how this vilification might arise has been explained in the present question [cf. nn. 368–69].

For a better understanding of the question it should be noted that memory or the intellect in its quality of memory can be taken in three senses. In one sense memory is the storeroom of species of things that are past as such. This is how the Philosopher refers to it in *On Memory and Remembering*.²⁷ In another sense memory is the storeroom of species representing objects in themselves, irrespective of whether they really exist or not. This is how we are talking about it in this question [i.e., of the *Reportatio*: ‘Does memory have distinct intelligible species?'], to which I give an affirmative answer, both because of universality and because of dignity. In the third sense memory is something that contains the principle of eliciting actual cognitions (*notitiam actualem*), which [principle], however, does not remain without the second act. In this sense Avicenna posited species in our intellect, and this will be the topic of the next question [in the *Reportatio*: ‘Does memory retain the species after an intellection?']. What I showed above [i.e., in Rep 1A.3 nn. 95–107] seems to be to the mind of the Philosopher in *On the Soul* III, where he says that the soul ‘is through the intellect somehow every intelligible thing as it is sensible things through the senses [cf. Ord. 1.3 n. 371].’ This cannot be understood as ‘through a habit,’ because a habit is not a likeness that represents an object since a habit follows an act.

And this can be confirmed. For the habit of knowledge by which the intellect is brought from a state of essential potentiality into a state of accidental potentiality with respect to the acts of which the Philosopher talks in *On the Soul* II and *Physics* VIII [cf. Ord 1.3 n. 396] necessarily precedes an act of thinking. But the knowledge (*scientia*) that is a habit follows an act [of thinking], since it is produced by acts. Therefore, the knowledge that reduces the intellect from essential potentiality to accidental potentiality is a species that is truly a habit because it is

naturally suited to be rooted and firmly fixed in the intellect. Nevertheless, not every habit is a species, because a habit that is actually rooted and strengthened is not the species that precedes an occurrent act and is naturally suited to become rooted and strengthened, for they [i.e., habits] are strengthened by subsequent acts [cf. Ord 1.3 n. 396, 374].

Also, according to them [i.e., Henry of Ghent c.s.] it seems that habits must be posited not in our intellect but only in the imaginative power [cf. Ord 1.3 n. 378] because for everything virtually contained in an object the kind of being [it has in a power] follows the mode of being that the object itself has in the power. Therefore, if a universal object is not in the intellect through its representative but in the imaginative power, everything that must be and can be explained of that object would be there, too. And so there will only be a habit in the imagination (*habitus phantasticus*), especially if phantasms are linked in an orderly manner and this habit will explain all the truths that can be known about that object. And all knowledge (*scientia*) will be in the imagination and making up its perfection; and it [the knowledge] will not be the perfection of the intellect, which is against the Philosopher. And so the act of the intellect will reside in the imagination since the species in the imagination virtually contains that act [cf. Ord 1.3 n. 397].

Also, Augustine investigates the Trinity in book XII (chapter 4) and book XV of *On the Trinity* [cf. n. 375]. And he says that it is impossible to obtain an image of the Trinity on the basis of our soul or in the mind unless through the fact that there is something in [intellective] memory by which something else is expressed. Now I reason as follows: if there is something in the mind that is the parent of a word [i.e., of an actual thought], it must be so through something that is internal or that exists in [intellective] memory. But there is no parent of a word unless memory has within itself the object present to the mind; otherwise, it will not be a parent. The object [itself] is not quidditatively and really present in memory, nor the phantasm, so it [= intellective memory] will necessarily be a parent through the intelligible species.”

REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS

379 To the first argument for the opposite [n. 333]: first of all, it appears that the argument is not convincing, because if it were valid it would run against the generally accepted view in concluding that the universal cannot in any way be cognized [cf. n. 348], for whatever it is by which the universal is represented [if it is not represented by a species], it will represent it [i.e., the universal] in the same way as if it were impressed by the object. But if it

were impressed by the object, it would be impressed by something singular, because an act is of something singular, as is argued [in n. 333].

380 Therefore, I reply that the principle of acting (*ratio agendi*) is different from the principle of what acts (*ratio agentis*). Singularity is a condition of the agent; it is not the principal of acting. The latter consists in the form itself [as residing] in the singular, and it is according to this form that the singular acts. Therefore, when one accepts that “whatever species is generated by some object, it represents the latter in that respect in which it is generated by it [the object],” this proposition is false if it is understood as referring to the principle of what generates. It can be granted as referring to the principle of being generated, and then it follows that it [the species] represents [the object] not under the aspect (*ratione*) of the singular [as such] but under the aspect of the nature [of the singular], since the intelligible content of the nature (*ratio naturae*) is the principle of generating [cf. QDA 17 n. 16].

381 But this response is not satisfactory because in this way it looks as if a species in the senses would represent something universal, not something singular, because the principle of the species’ being generated (*ratio gignendi*) in the senses does not lie in singularity but in the intelligible content of the nature [of the object, represented in the species]. Therefore, I give the following general answer: when a species is generated by something [i.e., an object] as by a total cause, it represents that object according to the aspect by which it is generated (speaking of “principle of being generated”), and at the same time it represents it [= the object] with respect to the principle it has as the generator, not with respect to something that is opposite to the principle of the generator. Therefore, the species in the senses does not represent the object under the aspect of the universal, which is a condition opposite to the principle of the singular generator. However, the object is *not* the total generating cause of the intelligible species, because the agent intellect acts together with the object as the other partial cause. And so what is generated by these two [causes] can represent the object under an aspect opposite to singularity, which is the principle of the generator [the generating object].

382 To the second argument, concerning the presence* [of an object; n. 334], I answer as follows [cf. QDA 17 n. 17]: from the point of view of the [cognitive] power an object first is really present by the kind of proximity that enables it to generate in the intellect the species, which [species] is the formal reason of intellection (*ratio formalis intellectionis*). By the generated species, which is an image of the generator, the object is then present in its quality of something that can be known or represented. The first presence naturally precedes the second one because it precedes the impression of the species by which the second presence formally comes about. Therefore, if one

assumes that “the species in the intellect is not the cause of the presence of the object,” I say that this proposition is false with respect to [the second kind of] presence, which shows something as to be known, at least in abstractive intellection, which is what we are now talking about. And when it is proved that “the object is present earlier than the species,” this is true with respect to the real presence by which something active is present to something passive. This is what I mean: in the first moment of nature (*in primo signo naturae*) the object is present to the agent intellect, either in itself or in the phantasm; in the second moment of nature, in which they [= the object and the agent intellect] are present to the possible intellect as agents to something passive, the [intelligible] species is generated in the possible intellect, and at that moment the object is through the [intelligible] species present under the aspect of something that can be known.

* [Interpolation; cf. Rep 1A.3 n. 118] I say that there is ambiguity concerning the meaning of presentiality. One kind is the real presentiality of object and power or of what is active in relation to what is passive. Another kind is the presentiality of the knowable object of a power. The latter kind does not require the real presence of the object in itself, but it requires something in which the object shines out. I say, therefore, that the real presence of the object is the real cause of a species, and in the latter the object is present. In the first kind of presence the object itself is the efficient cause, but in the second kind the species is present formally, for a species is of such a nature that an object is present in it as what can be cognized (*cognoscibiliter*), not effectively or really, but by way of shining out [cf. QDA 17 n.17].

383 To the third [initial argument, in n 335]: in *On the Trinity* XIV (chapter 6) Augustine states that memory involves many things that are known simultaneously and habitually, as is clear from someone who is experienced in many disciplines or areas of knowledge.²⁸ Therefore, we must according to every opinion accept that in memory many matters are known habitually. And as being in memory these matters somehow are a cause in producing [actual] cognition, according to Augustine. They can only be a natural cause insofar as they precede an act of the will. Therefore, if the argument were valid, we must by every opinion conclude that several things are actually cognized simultaneously.

384 Therefore, I repeat what was said in the second question of this third distinction [n. 73] about what is known first. When the [sensible] species of a singular item moves the senses first and stronger, its phantasm becomes impressed more effectively and moves the intellect first. And with respect to this first act it is not in our power [to decide] what will enter our intellect

(*quid intelligamus*), for according to Augustine, in *On the Free Will* III, it is not in our power [to decide] by which things that we see we are affected.²⁹ But, given this [first] act, actual knowledge of anything that is habitually known is in our power (this will be discussed in the sixth distinction [Ord. 1.6. un. nn. 16–22]). Therefore, when it is said that “either the species can bring about intellection or it cannot,” I say that it can indeed, but if another species has a stronger influence, the first one is blocked in its influence. Subsequently, however, the species of anything that is habitually known may give rise to [actual] cognition by a command of the will [cf. QDA 17 n.18].

385 {Concerning Algazel [in n. 335] I reply that the analogy is not valid because here [i.e., in the case of thought] that which is the reason of incompatibility in the other case [the case of a sculpture] does not apply. This is proved by what Aristotle and the Commentator say in *Metaphysics* VII, where they maintain that notions of opposites are [themselves] not opposites in the intellect.³⁰}

386 To the fourth [initial argument, in n. 336] I say this: the intellect is not only really affected by a real object impressing a certain real species; it is also affected in an intentional way by the object as it shines out in the species. And that second kind of being affected is the “reception of an intellection,” which [intellection] is of something intelligible as such, shining out in the intelligible species. That [second] “being affected” constitutes “[actually] thinking of” (*intelligere*), as will become clear in the next question [Ord. 1.3.3.2].

387 When you infer further that intellection “does not consist in the thing’s affecting the soul,” this does not follow because the impression of the species is a kind of the thing’s affecting the soul insofar as the thing has being (*esse*) in that species. Also, the intellection following upon the impressed species amounts to the thing’s affecting the soul insofar as the object through intellection has actual “being cognized” in the soul, whereas before it had only being [cognized] in a habitual way.

REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS OF HENRY OF GHENT

388 When it is argued, in the first opinion, that “receiving a species fits the senses precisely because they are organic powers” [n. 341], I say that this is not correct because that is not the exact cause. For any power the exact cause of having a species that represents that power’s object as its very own consists in the fact that it is a cognitive power and that nature has given it the possibility of having an object naturally present to itself before the act of cognition. But to an organic power it was given that the object is present to it not in the power itself but in the organ—that is, in the part of the body of

which the organic power is the perfection. That kind of presence is enough, since the organ is made up by the whole that is composed of the suitably constituted (*sic mixta*) part of the body and of the power. For this whole the object is sufficiently present when the species is [present] in that part of the body. Since the intellect as a cognitive power does not suffer any loss of perfection by the fact that it is not organic and even gains in perfection, it follows that it can have its object present to itself before the act [of intellection], just as is the case with other cognitive powers. But that presence will not obtain by something that is impressed in an organ because it does not have an organ. {It will, therefore, obtain by something that is impressed in the power itself. I call such an impressed and representing entity, which is in the intellective power before the act of thinking, the intelligible species.}

389 In brief, therefore, the senses have their object present in that part of the body which is called the organ of the relevant sensory power. The intellect has the object present to it before the act and the act itself on account of being one and the same recipient for it.

390 It is not correct, therefore, to hold that such an intelligible species only exists (*est*) precisely because of an organ, for nature causes a certain suitably constituted part of a certain body in order that it get its perfection from a certain power of the soul and be adapted to its operation because “matter is there in view of form,” not the other way around [cf. Averroes, in his commentaries on] *Physics* II and *On the Soul* I: “The limbs of a lion are only different from the limbs of a deer because the soul [of the former is different] from the soul [of the latter],”³¹ so form is not there in view of matter but the other way around. And therefore a certain [bodily] part is made receptive with respect to a certain species to ensure that by that kind of species an object becomes present for that kind of composite which is the whole organ. Therefore, the first reason of the presence of the object in the species is not a certain disposition of the body; it consists in making sure that the apprehensive power has an actually cognizable object present to itself, be it in itself or in some part of the organ involved in the relevant function.

391 The Philosopher’s remark that “the intellect is the place of the species” [n. 342] can be explained as follows: the intellect is called “the place of the species” because it keeps them, just as one says that the very meaning of “place” is to keep whatever is located in it. Other powers [other than the intellect] are not “places” because they do not keep something in a similar way. Intelligible species appear not to be deleted in the way sensible species are because the latter are in an organ in such a way that they are destroyed by what is formally contrary to them or by a disposition in the receiving part that is not in agreement with a certain form. This is clear from what the

Philosopher says in his book on *Memory and Remembering*: older people and youngsters and children cannot remember well because they have an abundance of humors and also because the organ may be damaged or indisposed.³² The intelligible species is not in the intellect in either of these ways—[that is] in such way as to be deleted *per se* by something that is contrary to itself or by an indisposition of the receiving part.—Many more similar things could be put forward with respect to the word “space,” but now we should no longer dwell on the topic.

392 As for the quotation from the Philosopher, “in phantasms we are looking at *what the thing is*” [n. 343], and all such testimonies, I say this: in our present state the connection between the powers of the imagination and the intellect is such that we cognize nothing in a universal unless we imagine a singular of it. “Turning to phantasms” is nothing else than the fact that someone who is thinking of a universal imagines a singular of it. The intellect does not see in phantasms *what the thing is* in the sense of “seeing.” When the intellect thinks of *what the thing is* precisely as it shines out in the intelligible species, it sees it [= the “what”] in the corresponding singular that through the imaginative power is seen in the phantasm.

393 To what is brought in about “Augustine, who does not posit an intelligible species in memory, but knowledge (*scientiam*),” [n. 345] I answer as follows: where he posits knowledge, he immediately posits something that includes an intelligible species, although he does not use that word. For in *On the Trinity* XV (chapter 10) he states first, “the word is born from the very knowledge (*scientia*) that we are holding in memory,” and then adds, “the thought that is formed out of the thing we know, is the word.”³³ And in chapter 12 of the same book, after having stated, “[the kind of] seeing in thinking (*cogitationis*) is most similar to seeing in knowing (*scientiae*),” he adds, “when what is in the cognition is [expressed] in a word, then we have a true word.”³⁴ And in the same chapter 12, at the end, after “the word is most similar to the known thing from which it arises and from the vision of knowledge originates the vision of thought,” he adds, “When someone tells what he knows, it does not matter when he has learned it.”³⁵ Similarly, in chapter 22, “When I turn my mind’s eye (*aciem cogitationis*) towards memory, it is like saying to myself ‘I know,’ etc.”³⁶ {Also, in *On the Trinity* XV (chapter 27 or 82) , when he talks about the light in which we see what is true, he says, “That [light] itself shows you that you have a true word in yourself when it [the word] is born from your knowledge, that is, when we tell what we know.”—So far his words.³⁷}

394 From all this the following is evident. What Augustine attributes to memory as the principle of generating knowledge can always be explained in terms of an object that is present in memory. But the object is not present in

memory insofar as the latter is intellective through knowledge (*scientia*) that is a habit, distinct from a species. Therefore, it must be the case that he understands that presence as obtaining by an intelligible species, specifically under that aspect by which it is distinguished from habitual knowledge (*habitu scientiae*) in the proper sense.

395 In the same way [as in n. 394] should one take the words of the Philosopher in *On the Soul* III.³⁸ Having stated that the soul “is somehow everything,” he adds, “by the senses it is the things that are sensible, by knowledge the things that are knowable” [cf. n. 371]. Now, with both the Philosopher and Augustine, in the quotations given above [in nn. 371, 345, 393], knowledge (*scientia*) stands for the habitual presence of an object in intellective memory. Habitual presence virtually amounts to knowledge of a certain object because in an object thus present virtually all knowledge concerning that object is contained.

396 {The [intelligible] species is [the same as] the knowledge that causes the change from essential to accidental potentiality [cf. n. 374], according to Aristotle, *Physics*, book VIII³⁹ and *On the Soul* II.⁴⁰ However, it is not [the same as] knowledge in the proper sense [referred to in n. 393], which is a habit-based competence (*habilitas*) remaining from acts [of intellection], because for that competence the intellect must already have been reduced from essential to accidental potentiality in a previous phase, for else it would not be working at all. But it is not inappropriate to call the species in which the quiddity shines out “[habitual] knowledge” [cf. n. 392, 395]. Not just virtually, as it contains the whole quiddity, but also formally can it be called “cognitive habit” because it is a quality residing in the intellect and a disposition toward an act.}

397 From this {that is, from the first condition [i.e., containing knowledge virtually]} we have an argument in favor of intelligible species because it is difficult to see how some complete body of knowledge (*scientia*) can be called “one” on the basis of its primary object unless insofar as that knowledge is contained virtually in that primary intelligible object. That complete knowledge is not called “one” from the object insofar as the latter, containing that knowledge, shines out in the phantasm, since that would not be a unit of an intellectual habit but a unit of something of the imagination.

REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS OF GODFREY OF FONTAINES

398 As for the subsequent argument, in favor of the second opinion, holding that “a potentiality directed toward some act is made actual primarily in accordance with that act” [n. 347], I say this: any apprehensive power as such is in potentiality to apprehending “right away” by a priority of

perfection but not by a priority in the line of production [cf. n. 69, 71, 95]. Still, sometimes [it is in potentiality to apprehending] “right away” by a priority of production—namely, when the object is in itself present to such a power as being actually cognizable by the latter. But in that case it is not necessary for the object that before the act [of being apprehended] something else arises in it [i.e., the object] in which it would be present, but the first thing that arises from it [the object] is the act [of being apprehended]. However, when an object is not naturally fit to be in itself present in the quality of something that is actually cognizable by such power, then each apprehensive power is in potentiality [both] toward [the act of] apprehending and toward that in which the cognizable thing will be present. And [the potentiality] toward having that presence is prior (in the order of origin) to having the act [of apprehending]. This is the case here. Sense objects are not naturally apt to be in themselves present to the intellect under the aspect of being actually intelligible. They can only be present that way in an intelligible species, and for that matter only insofar as abstractive cognition is concerned, which is what we are now talking about. Therefore, an apprehensive power for such [sensible] things is in potentiality toward a double act: it will receive first (in the order of origin) the prior act from the proximal agent and then the second act.

399 I do not mean that these acts are ordered in such a way that the first one is the basis (*ratio*) for receiving the second in the way a surface is the reason for receiving whiteness. In that case the intellect would be unable, with respect to any intelligible [object], to receive the second act (which is intellection) if it had not had the first act before (i.e., the species of the same object). What I mean is that the intellect is of itself the immediate reason for receiving both acts. Still, these [acts] are ordered when the object is not naturally apt to be present in itself, for in that case that act by which the object is present as being intelligible must by nature precede the one that is elicited about the intelligible object as being present, and this can only be guaranteed in the intelligible species.

400 Also, the highest possible perfection of the cognitive power cannot be posited unless it is posited that it [= the cognitive power] can preserve an intelligible species beyond the act [of obtaining it] and so can have its object present, preserved without the act [by which it was obtained; cf. QDA 14 and Rep. 1A 3.5], because this is [already] allowed to the sensitive [power of imagination or sense memory]. And the perfection of the intellective cognitive power consists in the fact that it is not dependent for its cognition on something else but can have its object present independently of another power.

QUESTION 2

IS THE INTELLECTIVE PART OF THE SOUL, TAKEN PROPERLY, OR A COMPONENT OF IT, THE TOTAL CAUSE GENERATING ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OR THE REASON FOR GENERATING IT?

401 My second question concerns knowledge as generated (*notitia genita*): what is its generating cause, or what is the reason (*ratio*) of generating it? Specifically, I ask, is the intellectual part [of the soul] taken properly or a component of it the total cause in generating actual knowledge or the reason of generating it?

INITIAL ARGUMENTS

Arguments for a negative answer: [First], in the second book of *On the Soul*,¹ the Philosopher proves that the senses are passive, not active. He appeals to the fact that if they were active, they would be working all the time, just as “if something combustible could set fire to itself, it would always be burning.” I argue the same way in this case. If the intellectual part would be active with respect to an act of thinking (*intellectio*), it would always be [in a state of] thinking (*intelligere*), even without an object. This is false.

402 {This is confirmed by the following text from *On the Soul* II: “the act of the sense object and of the sense is the same”²—for example, “sounding and hearing are the same act.” Analogously, the object’s active motion and the intellect’s passive motion, which is intellection, are the same acts. Therefore, intellection comes from the object.}

403 Also, according to *On the Soul* III, the possible intellect is “that by which ‘becoming everything’ obtains,” just as the active intellect is “that by which ‘making everything’ obtains.”³ Therefore, the possible intellect will certainly not be the active cause with respect to cognition, just as something active does not behave passively with respect to an act.

404 Also, third, {actions are differentiated because we can differentiate active principles. So if the intellect is the active principle of every intellection without being differentiated,} then every intellection would be of the same kind. If this went for every intellection, then it would go also for all ensuing habits, and thus for all sciences.

405 For the opposite, we have Avicenna in book IX of his *Metaphysics*.⁴ Immateriality is the hallmark of being intelligent and of being intelligible (*intellectivitatis et intelligibilis*). Therefore, based on its immateriality, the intellect or the intellective part [of the soul] alone is active with respect to intellection and its reception.

406 Also, if an object or some part of it were the formal reason of acting, thoughts (*intellectiones*) of specifically different objects would be specifically different, which is false [cf. n. 404]. Proof of the inference: because effects are specifically different when they arise from specifically different causes. Proof of the falsity of the conclusion: because in that case there would be a proper science of every most specific species, and so there would not be one science concerning several most specific species. The same—namely, the falsity of the conclusion—is also proved by the Philosopher in *Nicomachean Ethics* I, where he states that thinking (*intelligere*) is the proper operation for humans as humans,⁵ but a single species has just one specific activity.

FIRST OPINION (PETER OF JOHN OLIVI): INTELECTION IS EXCLUSIVELY CAUSED BY THE SOUL ITSELF

407 Concerning this matter there is one view that attributes all activity with respect to intellection to the soul itself.⁶ This view is attributed to Augustine, who says, in *On Genesis* XII (chapter 28), “The image of the body is in the mind (*in spiritu*),” which is “nobler than the body”; therefore, “the image of the body in the mind is nobler than the body itself in its own substance.”⁷ In chapter 29 he continues, “One should not think that the body does something in the mind as if the mind would be subordinate to the body’s activity, as a kind of matter. Indeed, something that makes is in every way nobler than the thing from which it makes. And the body is in no way nobler than the mind, rather is the mind nobler than the body. Hence, although an image [of the body] emerges in the mind, it still is not the body that makes that image in the mind but the mind itself makes it in itself at a marvelous speed.” Then, “for as soon as an image has been seen with the eyes, it is formed in the mind without delay” [cf. QDA 17 n. 20].

408 Also, in *On the Trinity* X (chapter 5), “The soul turns around and grabs corporeal images, made in itself and from itself. And, when forming them [i.e., the images], it gives them something of its own substance, but it keeps something in itself by which it freely judges the form of the images. That ‘something’ is the mind (*mens*), that is, rational intelligence (*rationalis intelligentia*), which helps it in judging. We have, as we know, those parts of the soul that are informed by the likenesses of corporeal things in common with animals.”⁸ Therefore, the soul itself forms in itself images of the things

we know, as the cited testimony says in a very explicit way.

409 There are also rational arguments for this view. [First,] an effect does not surpass its cause in perfection. “All living things are better than nonliving things,” according to Augustine in *The City of God*.⁹ A vital operation can therefore only arise from a vital or living principle of action. The cognitive operations at issue are vital operations and must therefore arise from the soul as the source (*ratio*) of the action.

410 Also, [second], to the extent that a form is more perfect, it is more actual and consequently more active because being active pertains to something as far as it is in act. But the intellective soul has the highest actuality among all forms. It is therefore maximally active. Hence it can of itself alone engage in its activity because even less perfect forms can do so, as is clear from the forms of the elements and their mixtures.

411 Also, third, in *Nicomachean Ethics* I, in *Metaphysics* IX, and in *Physics* III, the Philosopher distinguishes between acting and making (*inter actionem and factionem*),¹⁰ and he insists that an action in the proper sense remains in the agent, as he shows there [in *Metaphysics* IX] with respect to “theorizing.” So intellection (*intellectio*) is in its proper sense an activity remaining in the agent. But it remains in the intellective part; therefore, it will come from it as from its agent.

412 Fourth, and equivalently, acting in its proper sense and as distinguished from making points toward an agent, but “thinking” points toward man according to his intellective part. Therefore.

413 Against this view [cf. n. 407 above]: this is not Augustine’s view, as is clear from *On the Trinity* IX (the last chapter and chapter 30 according to the smaller divisions): “We must clearly hold that every thing we know, co-produces (*congenerat*) its knowledge in us because knowledge originates from both parties: from the one who knows and from the thing known,” etc.¹¹ Similarly, in *On the Trinity* XI (chapter 2), “Vision originates from something that is visible and someone who is looking,” etc.¹²

[*Interpolation*, at “etc.”; Augustine’s text continues as follows:] “So when the mind knows itself, the mind alone is the parent of its self-knowledge, for what is known and what knows are the same. It was knowable for itself before it knew itself but it did not have self-knowledge before it knew itself.” Also, in chapter 10 of book XV of *On the Trinity* (chapter 10), as quoted earlier [in n. 393], “The cognition formed from the thing we know, is the word.”¹³ So he wants to attribute some causality to the object.

414 The same point can be made by reason. When two causes that are prior to the thing itself—namely, the efficient and the material cause—are

perfect in themselves and in contact (*approximatae*) with each other and not obstructed, the effect follows or can follow. Therefore, if the soul is the total active cause in generating knowledge (and itself constitutes the proper (*disposita*) material or the receptive subject of the latter and itself is always actually present to itself), then, because it is a natural cause, there will *always* be in it some actual intellection of which it is itself the *per se* cause, or at least an intellection for which its activity is the strongest.

415 By this [argument] various positions of those who hold the opinion under discussion [n. 407] can be refuted,¹⁴ for if one assumes a necessary object in the role of a necessary condition (*causae sine qua non*) or an end term or a stimulus (*excitantis*) while not accepting any *per se* causality of the soul (even though the soul is always perfect in itself and in contact with what it experiences) or the removal of some newly appearing obstacle, how can one maintain that this [object] is necessarily required, unless by positing five categories of causes?

416 In particular the position of the object as a stimulus (*excitatione*) seems to be invalid, for I ask, what is it “to act as a stimulus” (*excitare*)? If it amounts to “causing something” in the intellect, then an object causes something before the intellective part acts of itself. Therefore, the intellective part is not the complete active first cause with respect to whatever has been caused in it, but the object is a cause, too. If “stimulating” does not amount to “causing something” in the intellective power, the latter is not related to itself in another way after the stimulation than before, and so it is no more stimulated now than before.

417 {This argument [in n. 414] would seem to be valid in an analogous way against the activity (*actionem*) of the will. Hence the following answer may be given: when [two] forms have an essential order as they are received, either in the same nature or in the same power (received either from the same agent or from different agents), and when neither of them is the reason for the reception of the other, then the second form can never be imposed upon the recipient by the agent if the first has not been imposed earlier. Here is an example from willing and enjoying (*volitione et delectatione*): given that they are really different acts, the second [= enjoying] is never received unless the first [= willing] has been received earlier, although the second has a natural active cause [namely, the object] present to itself before volition arises. Where forms are essentially ordered, as in the given example, the major premise [n. 414, first sentence: “When two causes, etc.”] is denied. The same goes for the intelligible species in relation to intellection, given that the intelligible species is neither the cause nor the recipient of an intellection. The same goes for light in its medium [cf. below, nn. 471–73] if it is neither the active nor the receiving principle of the species of color.

418 Note: a certain author [i.e., Peter of John Olivi] has it differently.¹⁵ Whenever the reception of some form in its potential counterpart requires necessarily that another form is received in its own recipient first, then the major premise,¹⁶ “a perfect agent in contact with a recipient and not obstructed, can act” [n. 414, first sentence], is false when understood with respect to the proximate power. This [applies in the following four cases:] [a] when the same power is the recipient of the prior form and of the subsequent form (as is the power of the will with respect to volition and enjoying); [b] when the same nature is the recipient (example: as is the soul for intellection and volition, when it is assumed that the will is the total active principle in willing); [c] when the forms are received in the same subject, which is not one nature or one power (example: the phantasm and intellection, if intelligible species are denied and all activity is attributed to the intellect); or [d] when the first and the second form are received in different substrates (example: light from the sun, in air and water).

419 One cannot save here [in n. 418] the claim that “the prior form is active with respect to the posterior form or is the reason for the reception [of the latter],” as in the case of light in its medium with respect to the species of color. If this is proposed in such cases, it will not do because there [i.e., in this claim] the proximate active principle or the proximate passive principle is missing. In the four cases mentioned above [in n. 418] neither of these conditions [i.e., the lack of an active principle or of a passive principle] applies because the act of willing is not the active cause of enjoying; rather, the object is the cause; nor is it [i.e., willing] the recipient; rather, the will is the recipient. The same goes for the other cases, following the views given there [in n. 418].*

* [Explanatory note by the editors of the critical edition: i.e., the following three cases: intellection is not the active cause of volition (the will is), nor is it the receptive cause (the soul is); and the phantasm is not the active cause of intellection (the intellect is), nor is it the receptive cause (the *supposit* is); and light in air is not the active cause of light in water (the sun is), nor is it the receptive cause (water is).]

420 Nor should one say that the major premise [referred to in n. 418] is true only when two effects are necessarily producible in an ordered way by the same agent. It is also not true when there is necessarily an ordering between forms that may be imposed by different agents, as is clear in the cases stated above [in n. 418].

421 In general, then, whenever a form [Y] requires for its being received in its recipient that another form [X] is being received first in something and by something, the active [principle] of the second form [Y] is never in

accidental potentiality to acting upon its recipient unless the first form has been imposed already. Therefore, as for “becoming,” the posterior form depends essentially on something that is different from its own *per se* causes of “becoming,” which are an agent and matter.

[*Note by Scotus:*] One can say that, at the instant of being causable, it [i.e., the posterior form] does not depend on “other things”; it is not causable unless naturally following after the other, which is required first.

This conclusion [i.e., the preceding proposition] may be granted because “essentially prior” does not apply to the order of causality only (as is clear from the first chapter of *On the First Principle*). Nevertheless, that [major premise]¹⁷ probably cannot be denied [by the conclusion] unless the priority of the other form [= the first form] is demonstrated, either in being active with respect to the second one, or as what accounts for the reception of the latter, or as the effect of a more proximate common cause or of a cause that is necessarily causing first.}

SECOND OPINION (GODFREY OF FONTAINES): THE SOUL IS COMPLETELY PASSIVE

422 There is another opinion that is completely situated at the other extreme.¹⁸ It holds, as may be gathered from various writings of its proponents [Godfrey of Fontaines], that the intellective soul as such has no activity with respect to intellection. The possible intellect, be it informed by an intelligible species (but they deny species [cf. nn. 346–47]) or be it naked, does not have the relevant causality because, according to them, the same thing cannot act upon itself. They prove this as follows: when an agent is in actuality what a recipient is in potentiality (Aristotle, *Physics* III; *On Generation and Corruption* I),¹⁹ it follows that the same thing would be in potentiality and in actuality [at the same time]. This seems to be directly opposite from the first metaphysical principles concerning act and potentiality as they are known by reason.

Also, then the same thing would be efficient [cause] and material [cause] [at the same time]. This seems to contradict what the Philosopher says in *Physics* II: “material and efficient [causes] do not coincide.”²⁰

Also, the same would relate to itself in a real relation, which seems to be impossible, according to *Metaphysics* V, on account of the fact that the relevant relations are opposites [i.e., the relation actor-recipient is real when and because its terms are really distinct, whereas the relation actor-itself is not real, since its terms are identical, not really distinct].²¹

Finally, then, one could maintain that anything whatsoever can act upon itself and can move itself. For example, in the presence of the sun, the air

would illuminate itself, not the sun the air; and in the presence of fire, wood would heat itself, not the fire the wood. [One could maintain this] because nothing would prevent something to cause something new to exist in itself, and there would also be no objection against everything causing naturally something new to exist in itself.

On the basis of these proofs they maintain that an agent and a recipient are distinct as subjects, and by way of confirmation it is added that, whatever difficulties happen to arise in some issue, these difficulties should never allow the denial of these metaphysical principles [mentioned in the preceding sentences] because then every investigation of the truth by means of such principles would be abolished, for if they are for some reason denied in one issue, they can be denied in another issue, too.

423 By the same reasoning, they say that the agent intellect cannot effectively cause something in the possible intellect because the former [the agent intellect] is not distinct from the latter [the possible intellect] as to subject, but it [the agent intellect] sort of formally illuminates the latter by perfecting it with its light, analogous to the following phenomenon: “When some luminous body is produced (in which these two perfections are present: transparency and light (*lux*) itself), it is said that light makes such a transparent body luminous. [This happens] not by transforming it from a potentiality preceding the relevant act into that act but happens all at once by the external agent, conforming to the nature of an efficient cause.” This agent brings the relevant body to the relevant kind of being. But the reason for saying that light makes the body luminous is that it is formally perfecting that body. Similarly in the case at hand, the agent intellect does not act upon the possible intellect in the role of an efficient cause; rather, “he himself who created the soul by way of efficient causation produced this illumination by creating or producing these powers at the same time in the same substance.”

424 Similarly, they maintain that the agent intellect does not operate with respect to intellection unless insofar as it operates on the intelligible object—namely, insofar as it arranges for the latter to have the character (*rationem*) of moving [the intellect] and of [being] an object in act. Therefore, save for these two features, the agent intellect will not have any immediate activity for intellection itself.

425 What, then, will effectively cause the act of thinking (*intellectionem*)?—Their answer is that “one and the same object” brings about intellection and volition. It does so inasmuch as it shines out in the phantasm that is illuminated by the agent intellect, [the latter acting] not as an efficient cause but as sort of formally concurring with respect to the intelligible.

426 How is it possible that the phantasm acts upon the possible intellect when the imaginative power and the possible intellect are in the same

substance of the soul and the phantasm and the possible intellect are not distinct as to subject?—They say that the soul can be considered in two ways, either according to its essence or according to its powers. In the first way it is complete in any part [of the body], and it is not a principle of some secondary operation. In the second way, one power appropriates to itself a certain part of the body, as [is the case with] an organic power, whereas another power does not do so, as with the intellectual power, because “the latter, being the kind of power it is,” does not “reside in this part or that part of the body because it resides in no part at all,” because “by itself it is not in the whole [of the body] nor in some part of it, and neither are the functions that are performed by it. So, just as a power that would reside in another part of the body than where the phantasm is could be affected by that which is in the imagination (*phantasia*), so a power that is not confined to the part where the phantasm is but is external to it—in such a way that it is no more there than in the foot [i.e., in such a way that it is in fact nowhere else in the body]—could be affected by that which is in the imagination. This applies to the proposition at hand [= n. 425]: those powers [= the intellect and the will] are not tied to and immersed in matter as other powers are.”

427 Against this opinion: according to this opinion, the agent intellect does not cause anything that formally exists in the phantasm. What happens is just the removal of an impediment by a kind of spiritual impact of a certain kind of light on the phantasm. When this removal has been brought about by the power of the agent intellect, the possible intellect gets informed.

428 From this it follows that nothing in the intellectual soul (taken as including the possible and the agent intellect) will in some way have the character (*rationem*) of being active, either as an agent or as the principle (*rationis*) of an agent with respect to any intellection or with respect to the object of intellection. And so only the phantasm is effectively related to intellection. If there is another efficient activity by which the phantasm is irradiated or illuminated, it will be exclusively the efficient activity of God himself, who created that kind of light in the possible intellect. {So apart from God nothing else but the phantasm alone is actively related to any intellection.

429 This seems to be absurd because it vilifies seriously the nature of the soul, for the phantasm seems to be unable to cause in the intellect any perfection that exceeds its own nobility [i.e., of the phantasm itself] because an effect does not exceed its cause but falls short of it, especially as an equivocal effect. Therefore, nothing is caused in the intellect precisely by the phantasm, as this opinion claims, for either every intellection is more perfect than a phantasm or man will have none of it at all.}

430 Also, second, it follows from that position that an angel, where such a

distinction [between imagination and intellect, cf. n. 426] cannot be posited, could not have new acts of intellection, no matter how many objects it may have habitually present. It even cannot effectively have any intellection at all unless [caused] by God because, given the opposite, the intellect will be moved by itself and agent and patient will be indistinct as to their subject.

[*Note by Scotus*] To the second argument against Godfrey [in n. 430]: this seems to be against him: how does an animal imagine anything without external sensations? For what will in that case move an organ to act? There seems to be nothing there that is distinct as to subject, unless he [Godfrey] posits a sensitive memory in another organ, different from the phantasm or from imagination, and [posits] that that [memory] brings the imagination to imagining.

431 He seems to admit this himself, because he states “that an angel can have new intellections” is something we merely believe [i.e., is based on faith only].

432 {But he cannot get away with this [n. 431], for nothing we believe is incompatible with a conclusion following from true principles. From the principle that “agent and patient are necessarily distinct as to their subject” it follows that an angel cannot have by itself an intellection in an active way. Therefore, if the opposite of this conclusion is a truth of faith [namely, that an angel can indeed have intellection in an active way], then the principle from which this conclusion follows will be false. This is more obvious in the case of “willing,” for it is certain that an angel did not receive the first [deed of] “willing evil” immediately from God. So there the agent was indistinct from the patient as to its subject.

433 Third, it follows that one should not posit habits in the intellect because what is necessary and sufficient for thinking orderly (*ad ordinate intelligendum*), according to that opinion, is that phantasms do occur orderly and, while occurring, move the intellect orderly. But the fact that they [the phantasms] occur orderly cannot happen through a habit in the intellect because nothing in the recipient can give “moving orderly” to what moves. If anything they are able to occur orderly by a habit in the imagination when there is no habit in the intellect. Therefore, and so on.

434 This is confirmed, for according to them, a habit is denied in the will because the latter is easily moved in agreement with the intellect. So, likewise, when the intellect is moved by phantasms as they occur, according to them, a habit in the imagination suffices in order to let them influence in an ordered way.—These three points I consider against this view [that is, nn. 428–29, 430–32, and 433–34; six more objections follow in nn. 435–43; cf. nn. 444–49].

435 There are, however, still other arguments against them. First this one:} if a phantasm effectively causes every act of thinking and if a natural cause does nothing unless according to the nature by which it is in act, then the phantasm will never cause any action in the intellect unless according to the phantasm itself, and so it will never cause a false combination (*compositionem*) inconsistent with the content (*rationibus*) of the constituents whose phantasms are present in the imaginative power. And if it would somehow be possible (as they reply [by referring to the following maxim:] “when one of two opposites is known the other opposite can be known”), this can only happen because it [the intellect] can know by one true combination that the opposite [combination] is false. But will the relevant phantasm ever cause some false understanding as if it were true, or the other way around? If you say that a phantasm can represent an object falsely and for that reason cause a false understanding in the intellect, it still follows that one and the same phantasm never can cause the opposite judgment, and so the intellect will never be able to apprehend the same proposition as true this time and as false another time.

436 Also, {second}, according to the Philosopher, the act of thinking (*intellectio*) is an immanent action (*actio*).²²

437 [Objection] They reply that in the grammatical sense “thinking of” (*intelligere*) signifies an action and “being thought of” (*intelligi*) a passive event (*passio*), but that in reality “thinking of” is a passive event and that “what is being thought of” is something active. {—However, what does “thinking of” have of what characterizes an action?—They say that} “thinking of” does not mean that something has being (*esse*) in a subject, in itself and absolutely, but it means that something is sort of reaching out (*tendens*) toward something else, which is its object or end term. “And because it is typical for an action to proceed from an agent and to reach out to something passive (*passum*), therefore such perfections,” which in reality are passive events, residing in that which is named after them on the basis of the action, “are said to be immanent actions.”

438 [Reply by Scotus] Against this: when the Philosopher distinguishes acting from making in *Ethics* I and VI and in *Metaphysics* IX,²³ he assigns to acting and making different principles and properties. This would have been unnecessary if he had thought that what he calls an “action” would be a “passive event,” because then it would not have been necessary to assign to it a proper active principle. It would not have been necessary that wisdom (*prudentia*) is active in the way art is a habit of “making” if action is nothing but a form received in something else, as in what is called the “agent.”

439 Also, {third,} a habit is not posited exclusively in relation to experiencing (*ad patiendum*), and certainly not in something passive that is

most disposed toward a form. What in itself is maximally disposed toward receiving does not need any help in receiving. The intellect is maximally disposed toward any intellection whatsoever because it does not have anything contrary to it. Therefore, one should not posit some habit in the intellect if it were to be exclusively passive with respect to thinking. Proof of the first proposition [i.e., “a habit is not posited, etc.”]: a habit is that “by which we utilize [knowledge] when we want to” and a habit “perfects the one who has it and makes his accomplishments good,” etc.; *Ethics* II.²⁴ All this attributes some activity to habits.

440 Also, {fourth,} how would the intellect engage in discursive reasoning by drawing conclusions and by arguing if a phantasm caused all intellection? It does not seem to be intelligible that the occurrence of phantasms causes all discursive reasoning.

441 Also, {fifth,} how will logical concepts (*intentiones logicae*) or conceptual relations [or “relations of reason”] be caused? If a phantasm causes every intellection, every concept caused by it will be real because we speak of a “real concept” (*intentio realis*) when it is immediately caused by a thing (*res*) or by a species representing a thing in itself. Therefore, no intellection whatsoever will cause logical concepts or conceptual relations because the intellect will not be able by any act of itself to compare one object to another, and it is that kind of comparison that causes a conceptual relation or a second intention with respect to the object.

442 {This can be confirmed as follows: when the intellect brings together A and B with respect to a certain relation that belongs to them by the nature of things, it does not cause a conceptual relation—for instance, when it compares them as being different or as being contraries or as part and whole and the like. Hence, a conceptual relation [between two items] is only caused by a comparison that in its “being” (*esse*) or in its “being known” (*cognosci*) does *not* follow the items on the basis of their nature. Therefore, the members are not the cause of that comparative act.}

443 Also, {sixth,} how can the intellect reflect upon its own act?

[*Note by Scotus*] [In reflection] the [initial cognitive] act is the object of a second act, so it moves the intellect toward the latter [second act], and it is in it, therefore, and so on; [this is argument number] 8 [i.e., the argument of n. 443 was the eighth one in the original text].

In addition, how will this [reflection] be at the command of the reflecting power? If a phantasm, when causing an intellection, can naturally cause a reflection over that intellection, then by the same token [it can cause] a reflection upon the reflection, and so *ad infinitum*, as Augustine says in *On the Trinity* XV (chapter 12 or 31).²⁵ If, however, it cannot cause a reflection, but

only an absolute act, after which another phantasm occurs, then it seems that no rational explanation (*ratio*) can be given of how there could be any reflection upon any act.

444 {Of the last six arguments, the first one [n. 435] is not compelling because it presents a difficulty that is common to every opinion, for whether the active cause of intellection is said to be the phantasm or the intelligible species or the intellect, one can (since each of them is a principle of acting naturally, not freely) in each case ask equally well how opposites can be caused in the intellect, as happens when there is at one time a true opinion or knowledge (*scientia*) concerning something and at another time a false opinion or error concerning the same thing.

445 The second argument [nn. 436, 438] is not convincing, for prudence can be posited as an active principle on account of another act, which is an “action.” Its own act extends to that other act as a rule extends to what is ruled. It is similar to how the proper act of art extends to another act, which is “making,” even though none of these two habits is a principle that is properly active with respect to its act.

446 This leads to the third argument [n. 439], for a habit inclines the patient in the way a prior form inclines to a fitting posterior form, as is said elsewhere, on the issue of habits [Ord 1.17 n. 12 and n. 89]. Although a patient is of itself maximally disposed by the removal of something opposite, it is not so by the delivery of something fitting. The text from the second book on *Ethics*, concerning “making good” [cf. n. 439], must be understood not as “making effectively” but as “making by inclining (*inclinative*).”

447 The fourth [argument, n. 440] amounts to the third of the charges considered above [nn. 433–34]. How does a habit arrange that phantasms occur in an orderly way during the process of reasoning unless that habit is placed in the imaginative power and not in the intellect?—Maybe he would grant this point.

448 The sixth [argument, n. 443] only asks how it is in our power to have an intellection by means of another intellection and by what means we know the act upon which we reflect. Concerning the first point, this is due to our will. Concerning the second, this obtains by the trace left by the [initial] act (or else by the phantasm, which first shows the object and second is caused by the object; even then it is not necessary that it [i.e., the phantasm] itself actually causes an intellection of the [first] intellection, unless when the will commands it). So, through the eliciting influence of the trace that has been left a reflective act may obtain at the will’s command, and it may not obtain when the will commands another intellection.

449 It seems that the fifth [argument, nn. 441–42] must be taken into consideration if “no comparison is a conceptual relation when the relevant

items are naturally able to produce it in the intellect.” If that proposition is true, then, although the intellection of the separate items is caused by the latter [i.e., the relevant items], still the comparison that consists in the act of comparing by which the conceptual relation is caused in an item is itself not [so caused]. One could say that a certain kind of relation comes along with the relevant items in reality and that it comes along in cognition as soon as the items are known—for instance, in the case of contraries and the like. Such relations are real. Other relations do not come along with the relevant members in reality or necessarily in cognition. Nevertheless, these items can cause an act of comparing in an eliciting way (*elicitive*) when the will commands it [i.e., the act]. But when such an act of comparing has been caused in accordance with a certain respect that does not come along with the items in reality, a conceptual relation is caused.}

THIRD OPINION (HENRY OF GHENT): THE INTELLIGIBLE OBJECT IS THE ACTIVE CAUSE OF INTELLECTION; THE INTELLECT IS (INITIALLY) PASSIVE

450 The third view focuses on the intelligible [object] as being simply present to the intellect not by way of an intelligible species [cf. n. 340] but by way of a phantasm as illuminated by the agent intellect.²⁶ It holds that the intelligible item simply is present to the possible intellect as in memory [a]. In order to induce an act of intellection (*actum intelligendi*), it is there as in [the faculty of] intelligence (*intelligentia*), [b], which has a cognition of it that terminates in the object itself. The intellect (*intellectus*) is passive as far as these two aspects [a and b] are concerned—namely, [a] as far as it [i.e., the intellect] is memory, having the object simply present, and [b] as far as it is intelligence, moved to the first act of thinking by the object that is thus present. Thus brought to the first act, the intellect is with natural insight (*acumen*) able to delve further and go into every “what” (*quid sit*) by composing and dividing the different features that come with the object under analysis and thus to investigate the “what” (*quid sit*) with respect to understanding a simple item and the “why” (*propter quid*) with respect to a complex item—for example, with respect to what can be concluded from it. In this process of reasoning (*discursu*) the intellect is active as far as it is reasoning, but passive as far as it is conceiving.

FOURTH OPINION (HENRY OF GHENT): THE INTELLECT DOES HAVE SOME ACTIVITY OF ITS OWN

451 This view of passivity with respect to simple and confused primary cognition and of activity with respect to the elaboration (*investigatae*) of a distinct cognition seems to be retracted and corrected by the same doctor in

another place,²⁷ where he asks about the active principle of vital actions—that is, of sensation and intellection. He now states that this principle is something in the ensouled subject itself and that it is not the object outside. Thus for the senses, too, he states that the species impressed upon the sense organ merely nudges (*inclinat*) and by nudging arouses (*excitat*) the power and sort of invites it into operation. Therefore, the phantasm in the imaginative power nudges the intellect in such a way that the “nudged intellect” is ultimately disposed toward eliciting an intellection as its own operation. For this view he offers the argument [a] that the relevant actions are vital and that “no action exceeds the perfection of the agent.” Another argument [b] comes from the fact that the action remains in the agent (and the relevant actions are properly actions, properly denoting the agent itself, in the way that “emitting light” [*lucere*] is related to the very thing that is emitting light, whereas “enlighten” [*illuminare*] is not). An argument of Augustine’s [c] complies with this: the soul “forms in itself images of the things that are known.”²⁸—These three arguments [a, b, and c] have been presented earlier in favor of the first opinion [see nn. 408–12].

452 Neither of these two opinions seems to be true—not the revised one or the revising one. The revised opinion [in n. 450] is not true because the intellect (brought to actuality after the first, confused cognition) is active with respect to the second intellection either by virtue of itself or by virtue of that first confused cognition. If it is active by virtue of itself, it seems not to make sense that a cause can be active with respect to something that is more perfect in the species [namely, the distinct content], whereas it can in no way be active with respect to something less perfect [the confused component] of the same intelligible content (*rationis*). The confused and distinct intellections of “something white” seem to be intellections of the same intelligible content (*rationis*) because they are of the same object. So it seems to be absurd that the intellect can by itself be a cause with respect to the second intellection, which is more perfect, and not with respect to the first [intellection, which is less perfect]. If you say that it is active with respect to the second act in virtue of the first act, here is a counterargument: a less perfect act cannot be the formal reason (*ratio*) of causing a more perfect act because there would be no way by which it could be proved that God is the most perfect being if an effect could exceed its own total cause in perfection. Distinct cognition (*cognitio*) is nobler than confused cognition. Therefore, confused [cognition] is not the formal reason of eliciting or causing distinct [cognition].

453 The revising opinion [n. 451] seems not to be true, either, because I ask, what is to be understood by “nudging”? Either that some form is in the intellect by which it is nudged or that there is nothing in the intellect. If

there is nothing, the intellect is no more nudged now than it was before. If some [form is present in the intellect], it is either the act of thinking (*actus intelligendi*), and then [we have] the opposite of their view [n. 451] that the object will cause the act [of thinking], or it is something that precedes the act of thinking, like a species, which they deny [n. 340].

454 {Reply [to Scotus's argument]: it [= what causes the second act of intellection] is not a habit, nor the [first] act, nor a species, but some fourth factor.—Contra: although that seems to be absurd right away, I still give an argument. Let that [fourth factor] be A. Now, the total active power (*virtus activa*) with respect to intellection resides in the intellect either without that factor [A] or not. If the former obtains, then the intellect is able to achieve “this particular intellection” without that factor [A], and so [it is able to achieve] the full determination that is required (because “this” as such is maximally determined), and so it [A] will not be necessary at all. If not [i.e., if there is indeed a factor A], then A provides the active power (in full or in part) to the intellect itself, and then the relevant action [i.e., this particular intellection] will not come from the intellect or from within as from the total active principle.}

455 Also, in ordered causes a lower [cause] does not nudge a higher, but conversely.* But with respect to intellection the intellective part is a higher cause than the species of an object, as will become clear in the next question [below, nn. 559–60, 562]. Therefore, the object does not nudge the intellect.

* [Note by Scotus] But this is false; each of them rather nudges the other; for example, a habit nudges the power [cf. n. 446].

FIFTH OPINION (GILES OF ROME AND THOMAS OF SUTTON): THE SPECIES IS THE TOTAL CAUSE OF INTELECTION

456 The fifth opinion holds that the species of the object in the intellect or the object present in itself produces or is the formal reason of producing actual cognition in the intellect and that the intellect itself only functions as the material basis, being informed by that species or as having an object supplied by the species.²⁹

457 The following argument is given: in the fifth comment [of Averroes] on book III of *On the Soul* [we read,] “The intellect relates to universal forms as prime matter relates to individual forms.” And elsewhere [in the same comment], “The soul is the lowest in the domain of intelligible things, as is matter in the domain of beings.”³⁰ And in *On the Soul* II and in *Physics* VIII [Aristotle says,] “Prior to [having] a habit, the intellect is in [a state of] essential potentiality, just as matter is, prior to form.”³¹ And in *On the Soul* III he says, “The intellect is none of the things that are there before thinking.”³²

From all this it is concluded that the power (*potentia*) of the intellect with respect to intelligible things is something that is purely potential (*pure potentiale*). But something purely potential cannot be the active principle of an act, unless it is informed by some form, and then the form will be the formal principle.

458 Next it is argued that the form itself, which is the principle of acting, consists of (*sit*) a similarity because, just as the “activity of making” formally consists in the form by which the maker is assimilated to what is being made, so “acting” seems to consist in that form by which the agent is assimilated to the object. Therefore, that similarity will be the formal principle of acting.

459 To this the following is added: an indeterminate agent cannot perform a determinate act or act upon a determinate object unless it becomes determinate. The intellect is of itself indeterminate to all intelligible things and to all intellection. Therefore, to ensure that it may think of something, some determination is required. This can only be realized by a species. Therefore, the intelligible species is the determinative principle [QDA 12 n. 8].

SIXTH OPINION: THE SPECIES IS INTELLECTION

460 The sixth opinion, which amounts to the same [as the fifth one, n. 456] as far as the conclusion of this question [n. 401] is concerned, is that actual knowledge itself, produced either in the senses or in the intellect, consists in (*est*) the species. Since the formal principle of producing “the actual species, which is called actual knowledge,” consists in the intelligible content (*ratio*) of the object (or of the species of the object) in memory, it follows, for the issue at hand, that the formal principle of producing actual knowledge is the object itself or some species in virtue of the object. This [is to be understood] as follows: when an object is present in itself, a species is generated by it, which constitutes (*est*) the intellection. When, however, it is not present in itself but by means of a species in memory, then by this species or in virtue of this species another [species] is generated, which will constitute the intellection [cf. QDA 12 n. 13].

461 In favor of this opinion, insofar as it says that the intelligible species constitutes actual knowledge, Augustine is called in,³³ who, in *On the Trinity* XI (chapter 2), maintains: “The kind of being informed (*informatio*) called ‘vision’ is generated only by the corporeal object that is seen.”³⁴ But what is generated by the corporeal object alone is the species. So that species is vision, according to Augustine [cf. QDA 12 n.15].

462 The same is proved, second, by referring to the Philosopher, who, in *On the Soul* II,³⁵ maintains that sounding (*sonatio*) and hearing (*auditio*) are

the same because the acts of the active and the passive [principles] are the same, as he himself argues in *Physics* III.³⁶ But actual sounding causes in the ear the species of sound; therefore the species thus caused is the same as audition, and so the sensible species and sounding are the same [cf. QDA 12 n. 14].

463 The conclusion of the two final opinions [in nn. 456 and 460] can be refuted by means of several arguments marshaled against the second opinion [in nn. 422 and 427–43]. Indeed, an equivocal effect cannot exceed an equivocal cause in perfection but necessarily falls short of it. If intellection were caused by the intelligible species alone, it would be an equivocal effect of the latter alone, and so it would be simply less perfect than the intelligible species, which is not true [see n. 429 above].

464 {This argument [n. 463], which was the first one against the second opinion, is less evident against these [two final opinions: the fifth and sixth] because the intelligible species is nobler than the phantasm. The second and third arguments against the second [opinion; in nn. 430–32 and nn. 433–34] are not against these [final opinions]. The other six arguments, which I did not consider against the second opinion [nn. 435–43], can be made here. For, first,} a habit seems not to be necessary then, as was argued above [in nn. 433, 439]. Similarly, in the second place, how would discursive reasoning come about [n. 440]? Third, how [would] reflection [arise] [n. 443]? Fourth, how would conceptual relations or logical intentions be caused [nn. 441–42]? Fifth, how [would] a false proposition (*complexio*) that would be endorsed as if it were true [arise], if only the intelligible species, generated by the phantasm, would be the formal reason (*ratio*) of all intellection [n. 435]? {Sixth, how will an action be immanent [nn. 436 and 438]}?

465 Against these [final opinions] three more arguments can be added, which are not to be given much weight either. The first one is this:} then the species would be the intellective power rather than the intellect, and so it [= the species] would, when separated [from the intellect], have the same act, just as hotness, when separated [from the subject it is in—namely, fire] would be able to make hot.

466 Similarly, then, “thinking” seems not to be the proper perfection of the intellect, for nothing is essentially ordered to an operation (or to the principle of an operation) to which it stands in a relation of potentiality for contradiction, as in a relation to an accidental accident, just as “becoming hot” seems to be not the proper perfection of wood, given that wood stands to being hot as to an accidental accident. But according to the opinion under discussion [the fifth and the sixth, insofar as they conclude to the same; cf. n. 460], the intellect would stand in that way to the intelligible species, which would be the principle of intellection. Therefore, and so on.

467 Similarly {third}, both in the senses and in the intellect a more intense concentration (*major attentio*) results in a more perfect act, given the same representative. With the same intelligible species or phantasm a person has a more perfect intellection when he tries harder for its intellection and a less perfect one when he tries less. So, too, in sense perception: when the same object is present in the same light things are seen more perfectly as a result of looking with more concentration. This is also clear from the fact that sometimes [the sense of] vision (*visus*) is damaged as a result of more intense concentration. It is even possible that, other things being equal, one eye, as it exercises more concentration, would become much more sore in looking at something, whereas the other eye would be less sore, as is clear from experience. This is also clear from Augustine, in *On the Trinity* XI (chapter 2): “In someone who has exercised much concentration, species remain after looking (*visionem*)”³⁷ These species do not remain in the eye of someone who does not concentrate in looking.

468 {By way of reply to the first of these three arguments, in n. 465}, it can be said that the power of thinking is that by which we think (*potentia intellectiva est qua intelligimus*). But we think by it insofar as it formally has the act of thinking. A species is not naturally apt to have that act or to be the reason (*ratio*) for having it. As for the addition that it [i.e., the species] “when separated [from the intellect] would have the act” [n. 465], this is clearly useless if “having [the act]” is understood with respect to a subject [because intellection is an act of the intellect]. When [it is understood] with respect to an effect, the answer is [that] it [the species] does not have a passive correlate upon which it acts, especially not if it is not apt to be a principle of acting in something else because [it is] not [a principle] of “making” but only of an action that is immanent in the same subject where it resides itself.

469 To the second point [in n. 466] it can be said that the major premise “seems not to be essentially ordered, etc.” is false when applied to things that cannot by themselves pursue the goal toward which they are ordered but only by an act of something external, which gives them some accident by which they operate and reach their goal. This holds for the intellect.

470 To the third point [n. 467]: “Concentration” (*attentio*) is [an act] of the will. The more intensely it devotes itself to an object, the more intensely the lower cognitive power is affected by that object. Therefore, it does know [the object] more perfectly, although it does not bring about the act [of intellection].}

471 There are some special arguments against the second of these [two final opinions], which is the sixth one overall [cf. nn. 407, 422, 450, 451, 456, 460]. This opinion is false, both regarding the senses and regarding the

intellect. Consider the senses [and the proposition that actual knowledge in the senses is constituted by the species; cf. n. 460]. If the species that constitutes [the act of] vision (*visio*) is somehow of the same nature as the one that is in the medium, then the species in the medium will formally constitute vision, so the medium as formally having it [i.e., the species] will be seeing (*videns*) [which is absurd]. If, however, apart from the species in the visual sense (*in visu*), which is assumed to constitute vision (*visio*), there is another one, which is of a different nature, and another that is of the same nature as the one in the medium, then we have what I propose, [namely] that, even though that which constitutes vision is called “species,” there is something else in the eye before the latter [i.e., before the species that is said to constitute vision], which is of another nature [and] which is commonly called “species.” And so, in the proper sense, “species” is different from vision [cf. n. 473] [cf. QDA 12 n. 16].

472 If you say that the species in the medium differs from the species in the eye because the recipients are different, that does not mean anything,³⁸ for just as whiteness has the same nature in a horse and in a stone, which is why both are formally white according to the same nature of whiteness, so, too, if the quality that is called a species is of the same nature in the eye and in the medium, if that quality by itself formally constitutes vision, then seeing will formally be in both, and anything in which vision is formally present is formally seeing (*videns*).

473 The main proposition [that the opinion under scrutiny is false—namely, the opinion that identifies vision and species] is also clear from the following: when an eye is blind but of the same physical makeup as before, a species can be caused in it. Likewise [a species must be able to occur] in the eye of a sleeping person; otherwise that person would not be alerted when something highly visible is present, nor would he be alerted by a heavy noise if the latter were not first [as a species] in the ear. Yet there is no [actual] vision in these persons. So, too, a species of the same nature as that which is in the medium is received in the eye when it is well disposed. This is because the organ itself is of the same disposition as the medium, due to the transparency of both (from *On the Soul* II),³⁹ and that [species] will not formally constitute seeing, but it precedes vision [cf. QDA 12 n. 17–18].

474 That it [i.e., this opinion, the sixth one, n. 460] is false regarding the intellect, too [cf. n. 471], is clear when some of its doctrines are combined, for they posit that in the beatific vision there is no other species than the divine essence and that beatitude essentially consists in vision alone.⁴⁰ Add the proposition that “vision formally is the species” and it follows that our beatitude will formally be the divine essence.

[*Interpolation*] Proof: according to them [= the adherents of the sixth opinion] beatitude formally equals (*est*) vision, and vision, according to them, formally equals the species; therefore the species formally equals the divine essence.

Therefore, if this conclusion does not suit them, let them either deny the premise that “vision is the species” or posit that the divine essence has a species different from itself or [posit that] beatitude essentially consists in something else than the act of vision [cf. QDA 12 n. 19].

475 {Reply [presumably given on behalf of a defendant of the sixth opinion]: where an intelligible species is different from the object, it constitutes intellection, but where the species is not different from the object, intellection is not the object. In beatitude, therefore, they [= those who hold the sixth opinion] would deny a species different from object *and* act, but it is not denied to be different from the object.

476 Against [this reply]: according to them [= those who hold the sixth opinion], there is no other “intelligible species” for an object apart from intellection. Therefore, when the intellection of an object is different from the latter, the “intelligible species” is of that object. Therefore, one must admit a species in the vision of God just as in the intellection of any other object.

477 Remark on the relation of knowledge (*scientiae*) to its object: note that the relation between an intellection and its object as far as the latter moves (*motivum*) the intellect or, more properly, as far as it is a causal factor (*causativum*) of intellection, pertains to the second kind of relatives. It is of the same kind as the relation between a son and his father or between heat as produced and what produces it [= R1: relation of causality]. The relation between the intellect as something that can be moved and the object as something that moves also pertains to the second kind, just as the relation of what can be heated to that which can heat.

478 But apart from these relations of the second mode there is another relation between intellection and object: as between that which has an end term (*terminati*) and that which is the end term (*terminans*) because intellection is not only coming *from* the object as from its efficient cause [R1], total or partial, but is also directed *toward* the latter as toward its end term (*terminans*), or as that about which (*circa quod*) it is [= R2: relation of termination or being-about].

479 The difference between these [two types of] relations [R1 and R2] is clear because each of them can exist without the other: the first [R1] without the second [R2] in heat that is produced and the second without the first in my intellection of a stone, if that would be directly produced in me by God.

The first relation [R1] is not an identical relation [or not a relation that is invariably the same, always involving the same terms or cause] because the same [effect—namely, cognition] taken by itself could arise from a different cause. The second [relation, R2] seems to be invariably the same because no act that by its nature is about an object could be the same without terminating in that very same object. The second relation [is a relation between intellection and its content; it] is not a relation toward a cause as such because, even when all causes are given, something additional is required in the relevant act that is the end term [“thinking” cannot be empty, whatever the cause of the thought]. This [need for an additional element—namely, the end term of an intellection] is also clear by successively checking [the possible causes]. Obviously it [= the end term] is not a formal or an efficient cause [of the intellection]; nor is it a final cause because the object, being primarily what the act is about, is not the thing for the love of which the act is elicited; nor is it a material cause because it [= intellection] is “about” the object without being “in” and “from” the object [cf. Ord. Prol. n. 188]. The second [relation, R2] can be declared to be of the third mode [of being related, cf. n. 296], not because it is a relation of what is measured [to its measure] but because it is similar to that, since it is nonmutual, for in general an act requires the thing it is concerned with (*illud circa quod sit*) but not conversely. And not just the measurement relation is of the third mode but every similar [relation]—namely, [every relation that is] nonmutual, as is [the relation] of what has an end term (*terminati*)—in the sense indicated above—to what is the end term (*terminans*). Still, here [i.e., in the case of intellection], there is between the same absolute items [at the same time] also [i.e., in addition to R2] the relation of something that is measured and the measure [= R3, the relation of measurement proper], but it can be posited to be formally different from the relation of having an end term [i.e., from R2].

[Cf. Lect. 1.3 n. 392 and below, n. 537. R2 is *like* a measurement relation in that it is nonmutual. An act of thought is related to its content, not conversely. But in addition to this there is another nonmutual relation, which *is* measurement in a strict sense (R3). Scotus elaborates the latter in his *Quodlibet* 13.]

480 Against the third and the fourth points [in n. 479: “The second relation seems to be ... is the end term”]: how can something have an identical relation when it is “not toward a cause” unless it depends essentially on a non-cause, in which case the four causes would not be sufficient for a thing’s being (*esse*)? Also, it is possible for it [i.e., intellection] not to be actually existing: how, then, will the relation be an identical

relation?

481 These two [questions] appear to establish that intellection is an absolute form, like whiteness. It is clear that it is immediately causable by God. Therefore, it is essentially dependent on him alone. When an object causes an intellection, the latter does not depend on the former in the manner of an identical relation [i.e., as a cause the object is not intrinsically linked to the intellection] because the same intellection [i.e., the same *qua* content] could be caused from elsewhere (and frequently it arises from something that is not there [*de non-ente*: nonexistent or not present]).

482 And if you say [that intellection itself is not an absolute form, but that] it is something in the species (*est ens in specie*), then it will be argued [by me] that the species is an absolute form, or there would be an infinite regress, and that it [i.e., the species] itself is not the terminating object, but [that the latter consists in] that *of* which it is the species. How, then, [should we understand] the Philosopher in *Physics* VII and other statements concerning habits [statements to the effect that habits are not absolute forms, but related to something else]?⁴¹ How, then, [could we, given Aristotle's propositions, talk, with respect to intellection, of] a relation as being an identical relation, when it is possible for it [= intellection] not to be in actual existence, or [how could the relevant relation be] real, when there is no end term?

483 Also, the difference between these relations [in nn. 477 and 478] is posited [in n. 479] because sometimes the intellect in its act of intellection terminates in something by which it is not moved—as, for example, the divine intellect in relation to creatures or to the intrinsic relations or [divine] attributes*—because the essence alone moves to intellection. If otherwise, what would be its prime object [i.e., of the divine intellect]?

* [Note by Scotus] This is false, unless secondarily.

484 Objection: then God's intellection would have a real relationship to a creature or to another object. Also, second, why does the unity of the act require one moving factor (*motivum*) rather than one end term (*terminans*)?

485 [Reply] to the first of these two [objections, in n. 484]: why can a relation of the third mode not be just a relation of reason, like the one of the second [mode] by which the divine essence is said to move its intellect, and conversely? Thus the difference of Aristotle's modes does not arise on account of the kind of being of something real and that of something conceptual (*esse rei et rationis*) but on account of mutuality and nonmutuality—and if on account of mutuality, the difference would be on account of quantity and quality, of something substantial or something accidental, of something in the first act or in the second act. Consequently any mode could

be sometimes real, sometimes mental [the second objection in n. 484 is not answered]}.

SCOTUS'S VIEW: CO-CAUSALITY OF OBJECT AND INTELLECT

486 My answer to the question is that actual intellection (*intellectio actualis*) is not something that is in us permanently, but something that exists after not having existed, as we experience. It is necessary to posit some active cause for this somehow in ourselves, for otherwise it would not be in our power to have a thought (*intelligere*) when we want to, which is against what the Philosopher says in *On the Soul* II.⁴²

487 But here cooperation is clearly required of the soul and the object as being present in the intelligible species, as was said in the preceding question [n. 370] because otherwise it is not present as actually intelligible, speaking of sensible and material objects.

488 I say, then, that the object is not the total active cause of intellection, neither in itself nor in its species. This is clear from {the first argument} against the {second} opinion [n. 429] and because otherwise [i.e., when the object is assumed to be the total cause of intellection] one could not save the image [of the Trinity] in the mind (*in mente*) as such because then nothing of the mind itself would have the character of being a parent [which is against Augustine's view; see below, nn. 583–87].

489 Nor is the intellectual soul (or something that is formally a part of it) the total cause of an intellection because of the argument {about the four causes put forward} against the first opinion [n. 414]. {This argument elaborates the argument of the Philosopher in *On the Soul* II, and it was touched upon in the initial argument in the first part [of this question, see n. 401: "Arguments for a negative answer"].

[Note by Scotus] Answer [to this argument for the negative]: the senses are first and do not presuppose that something else is perfected before them.

For this [conclusion, n. 489] other plausible arguments (*probabilitates*) may be given too.

490 First,} because [when the intellectual soul would be the total cause of an intellection], the act would not be a likeness (*similitudo*) of the object. {Second, because} then it [= the act] would not be distinguished essentially on the basis of a distinct object because an essential distinction does not come from something that is not a cause.

491 {Third,} because then the intellection of a more perfect intelligible item would not be absolutely more perfect, given equal effort (*conatu*) on the

part of the intellect in both cases, which is not true because, given a more effectively operating total cause, a more perfect action follows. Thus, if the soul were the total cause, it would produce more perfect understanding whenever it, for its part, would act more perfectly and with more effort. And so an intellection concerning God would not be more perfect than an intellection concerning a fly, which is against what the Philosopher says in *Ethics X*,⁴³ where he posits that happiness consists in contemplating the most perfect object.

492 Also it appears, {fourth}, that [if the intellect were the total cause of intellection], then the activity in the intellect would be infinite insofar as the intellect is active with respect to all intellections. The reason is that [in the case of more intellections,] for one intellection some perfection is required in the cause of that intellection and for another intellection of another nature an equal perfection is required or a greater one {because it [i.e., the intellect] virtually contains the two perfections of its own causes, in the one case and the other}. So, having both the one and the other perfection, it will be more perfect than having only the latter. And so, as the total cause [of all intellections], it has infinitely many such perfections, and it is something infinite in perfection.

[*Note by Scotus*] In the same vein one may argue about the partial causality [of the intellect] with respect to infinite things; look in the *Parisian Collations*.

493 Similarly, {fifth,} one could not see how a complete body of knowledge (*aliqua tota scientia*) would be contained virtually in an object if the intellective soul alone had causality with respect to acts and habits.

[*Note by Scotus*] For the activity of the intellect, at least for its partial activity, note the first three arguments [labeled a–c in the following list: references to the relevant paragraphs as given by the editors]. Otherwise [i.e., if these arguments were not valid], [a] how would there be an image in the mind [cf. n. 488: “the nature of parenting in the mind as such”]; [b] the intellect [would be] more degraded than another cause [nn. 488 and 429: “an equivocal cause is nobler than its effect”]; [c] concentration would be of no use [nn. 467, 470]. How [could there be] reflection? How a conceptual relation? How discursive reasoning [n. 464]?

That it [i.e., the intellect] is not the total active cause [of an intellection] [is based on the following arguments]: [d] the argument in *On the Soul II* [nn. 489 and 401] and, in the same place, the claim that “sounding and hearing are the same act” [n. 402]; [e] “being more perfect” [as a property] of something more perfect [n. 491]; [f] infinity

[n. 492].

Of these six points [= a–f just mentioned], with the first three proving that not only the object causes [intellection] [cf. nn. 486 and 488] and the other three proving that not the soul alone causes [intellection] [nn. 489, 491–92], two must be taken into consideration—namely, for the first side [“not only the object”], that an equivocal cause is nobler than its effect [= b]; for the other side [“not the soul alone”], [the point] on the four causes [= d above]. On balance, the former point [concerning an equivocal cause] seems to be weaker than the latter [concerning the four causes]. Also, the two corollaries of the former point [concerning the equivocal cause, the corollaries being “we understand when we want to” and “the nature of parenting in the mind as such”], which Augustine bases on [the nature of] concentration and on [the nature of] the image [respectively] (he speaks about concentration in chapter 2 of *On the Trinity* XI, and elsewhere he links parenthood and offspring)—these corollaries, I say, appear to be weaker than the corollaries of the latter point [concerning the four causes]—namely, the remark “on the differing perfections of acts” [= e above; cf. n. 491] and “on the infinity of the activity in the intellective power” [= f above; cf. n. 492]. Therefore, the second conclusion [= based on the latter of the two points just mentioned and its corollaries] is more certain.

{Of these five plausible arguments [enumerated in nn. 490–93], the third and the fourth can be considered [cf. nn. 491 and 492].

494 From the foregoing [nn. 486–93] the question may be resolved as follows:} if, therefore, neither the soul alone nor the object alone is the total cause of actual intellection (and these are the only factors that appear to be required for intellection), it follows that these two are one integral cause with respect to the genesis of cognitions. That is the view of Augustine in the final chapter of *On the Trinity* IX, as was put forward in the argument against the first opinion [n. 413] (“We must clearly hold, etc.”).

495 How should this be understood? I make a distinction with respect to the situations where several causes concur toward the same effect.

496 Some [causes] concur on a par, like two men dragging the same body [who, as causes, are on equal footing, even though they may differ in strength]. Some are not on a par but are essentially ordered in one of two ways. [1] The first way occurs when a higher cause moves a lower cause in such a way that the lower does not act unless moved by the higher; [1a] sometimes such a lower cause obtains from the higher one the power (*virtutem*) {or the form} by which it moves, {[1b] sometimes not, when it has the form from something else and from the higher cause only the actual

motion in order to produce an effect}. [2] The second way occurs when the higher does not move the lower, nor does it give the latter the power (*virtutem*) by which it moves. Then the higher has of itself the more perfect power to act, and the lower has the less perfect power to act. An example of the first member of this division [1 above, particularly 1b] comes from the power (*potentia*) of moving that is in the hand, and a stick and a ball [an example of 1a is given below: nn. 509, 545, and 567]. An example of the second member [2 above]: if the mother is assumed to have an active power (*virtutem*) in generating offspring, that power and the active power (*potentia*) of the father concur like two partial causes but in an ordered way because the latter power [of the father] is more perfect than the other [of the mother]. Still, the less perfect cause does not take its causality from the more perfect cause, nor is the total causality located preeminently in the more perfect cause. The less perfect cause contributes something in the sense that the effect [caused] by the more perfect cause and the less perfect cause [together] can be more perfect than [when caused] by the more perfect alone.

497 [Let us apply this] to the case at hand. The intelligible object, present in itself or in an intelligible species, and the intellective part of the soul do not concur as causes on a par in producing an intellection because then the imperfect causality of the one would be supplemented by that of the other. And if one of them were perfect, it could have in itself alone the total causality of both. The case would be the same as when it, if its own moving power were perfect, would supply the power of the other. Then the species would be like a certain amount of intellective power (*quidam gradus intellectivitatis*) supplementing the intellect's shortage of intellective power, and by this supplement the intellect would become more perfect and would be able to have the act of thinking without the species and without the object—which is false.

498 So these two [object and intellect] concur as things that have an essential order, but not in the first way [mentioned in n. 496] because the intellect does not give the object or the species the reason (*ratio*) of their causality. The object is not (in itself or in a species) naturally fit to produce an intellection through something that it receives from the intellect; it is so by its own nature. Nor does the intellect receive its causality from the object or from the species of the object, as has been proved in the first argument against the fifth and sixth opinions [n. 463]. So the two causes are essentially ordered, to be precise, in the last way [mentioned in n. 496], meaning that one of them is simply more perfect than the other, but in such a manner that each of the two is perfect in its own causality and not dependent on the other.

499 [Objections]: suppose one argues against this [n. 498] as follows: [a] in such essentially ordered causes, neither of the two is the perfection of the other, so the intelligible species will not be a form of the intellect itself. [b] Similarly, against the same point [n. 498]: if it [the species] is a perfection of the intellect and the combination [of the intellect and species] is the reason of the act, then one operation, such as intellection, will not have one formal reason for its activity. [c] Similarly, then an accidental entity (which is what this combination, the intellect with the species, is), will give rise to *per se* one operation, which is absurd because what is not *per se* one entity is not a formal principle of acting.

500 Reply to the first [= a and b in n. 499]: insofar as the species is a partial cause with respect to intellection and concurs with the intellect as the other partial cause, it is accidental to it that it perfects the intellect, for even though it perfects it, it does not give the intellect any activity with respect to the causality of the intellect. Example: in order to cut through a body, the moving power in the hand can use a knife insofar as the latter is sharp. If that sharpness were in the hand as in its subject, then the hand could use it for the same operation. Yet insofar as the hand has the power to move, it would be accidental to it that there was sharpness in it (and conversely) because the sharpness would not give any perfection to the hand pertaining to its moving power. This is obvious because the moving power is equally perfect without that sharpness, and it uses the latter in the same way when it is in something else that is coupled to the hand (a knife, for instance) as when it is in the hand. Such is the case in the present issue. If a species could exist in the intellect without inhering in it in the way a form does, if it would in that manner exist in the intellect or would be coupled to the intellect in the right way (*sufficienter*), then these two partial causes, the intellect and the species coupled to each other, would be able to perform the same operation as the one they can perform now when the species informs the intellect. This is also evident when an intelligible item is supposed to be present without a species.* Such an object is a partial cause, and it does not inform the intellect, which is the other partial cause. But when these two partial causes come in contact without the one informing the other they cause one common effect by the required contact alone.

* [Note by Scotus] “Supposed”: note that the object or something playing the role of the object need not necessarily be the principle of an action that is immanent to that in which the object or its stand-in is [present].

501 {[Objection]: if this second possibility [i.e., “This also evident” in n. 500] is assumed, it is perhaps not without reason (*sine causa*) impossible that an accident, which is the principle of immanent and intransitive actions, is

sufficiently connected to its passive subject (*passo*) unless it is [present] in the latter as in a subject. This is why it is called “accident” [i.e., for an accident the only way to be sufficiently connected to its subject is by being in that subject]. Is the divine essence [as enjoyed] in the intellect of the blessed not the principle of an intuition that is not immanent in that essence or in something of which it is itself the form? Similarly, love in heaven (*in patria*) is the principle of its own intuition, and yet it is not in the intellect of the one who is intuiting. Therefore, intellection is an immanent action, taking action as meaning operation.

502 Against this: then there is not [a difference between] an “immanent” and a “transitive” action. I answer by saying that several meanings of the word are to be distinguished. Put differently, an action belonging to the category of “action” stays in (*immanet*) one of the causes—namely, the intellect—and is immanent with respect to the latter, but not with respect to the other [cause]—namely, the object [cf. the note added at the end of n. 500].}

503 By the same [argument, in n. 500] the answer to the second [point, actually the third: c in n. 499] is obvious. In every single order of causes it is necessary to posit for one effect one *per se* cause and one principle (*ratio*) of *per se* causing. In this way the intellect is in its own order of causality one cause and has one formal principle of causing. The species or the object is in its own order of causing one special cause and has one principle of causing. But it is not necessary that the total cause, as comprising all partial causes, has a single principle of causing over and above the unity of order. And if the unity of order goes together with an accidental unity, this is accidental, indeed, but the unity of order is *per se*. Example: in its own order of causality the sun has one principle of causing with respect to offspring, and in his own order the father is [also] one cause with one principle. But the total cause, comprising the sun and the father, is not a single cause and does not have some single formal principle of causing apart from the unity of order. If it happens that such ordered causes in addition to the unity of order have an accidental unity (insofar as the one happens to be together with the other), this does not belong to them *per se* as ordered causes.

REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS OF THE FIRST OPINION

504 Reply to the arguments of the cited opinions, successively: first, to the authoritative statements of Augustine [nn. 407–8], I say that “the image,” which is claimed by him to “exist in the mind (*spiritu*),” must be understood to exist in the soul or in something of the soul as in its subject and not exclusively in the body with its particular material composition. Otherwise it

could not be concluded that the image is nobler than the whole body, which, though, is what he himself says in *On Genesis* XII. However, what exists in the soul or in something of the soul as in its subject is not the species that is commonly called “species.” The latter is received in a part of the organism that is a body of a certain material composition [cf. n. 471]. But what is received in the soul or in a power of the soul is the act of cognizing (*cognoscendi*). By “image” he means that kind of act.

505 This interpretation can be supported by an argument taken from what he says in *On the Trinity* XI (chapter 2).⁴⁴ There he maintains that informing the senses, which is achieved by the body alone, is called “vision.” The relevant “informing” is the proper species, received in a part of an organ that is in a body, as it has a certain material composition. This is clear from the fact that he says that “it stems from the corporeal object that is seen” [cf. n. 461]. Therefore, just as what is properly an image [namely the species] is called “vision,” so, conversely, vision may be called “image,” and in a much truer sense, because “vision” truly is some quality. It is the kind of quality that consists in a likeness to the object, and it is perhaps more perfect than that prior likeness that is usually called “species.”

506 When this is well understood, it is easy to see how to deal with the authoritative statements [nn. 407–8], for I grant that not the body as a total cause causes in the mind that “image” that is “sensation,” but the soul does cause it [the image] in itself “at a marvelous speed”—not as the total cause, though, but together with the object. This is why he says there, in book XII, that “as soon as it seen, etc.” [cf. n. 407], suggesting that the presence of an object is required in the role of being visible in order to let the soul produce vision in itself and that it is only required as a partial cause, as he puts it in *On the Trinity* XI (chapter 2): “Vision originates from something that is visible and someone who is looking”⁴⁵ [n. 413].

507 This conclusion [in n. 506], understood as explained, is proven by the argument that he [Augustine] advances first [in n. 407], for the conclusion that “the agent is nobler than the patient [n. 407]” is not an immediate one, but depends on the following three propositions: the agent is more excellent than the effect; the effect of the agent is the form and the act of the patient; and act is nobler than potentiality. When these propositions are true, the proposition that Augustine accepts is true also [n. 407]. But the proposition “the agent is more excellent than the effect” is only true of an equivocal and total cause. However, a cause can be partially acting toward an effect that is nobler than the cause, just as an element by virtue of the celestial bodies can act toward the production of a mixed entity that is nobler than the element itself, which acts as a partial cause [cf. Ord. 1.2, nn. 333, 331].

508 By this argument [in n. 506] it is evident what to say to the

authoritative statement of Augustine in *On the Trinity* X (chapter 5) [cf. n. 408], for the soul forms in itself an image—that is, a sensation. And it does so of itself (*de se*)—that is, it has a natural potentiality to sensation, not a neutral potentiality in the way a surface has a neutral and not a natural potentiality to whiteness. This naturalness is indicated by the qualification “of itself.” And he is talking there [in n. 408] only of sensations, as is evident, because he says there “we have those parts of the soul that are informed by the likenesses of bodies in common with animals.” This is true of those [parts of the soul] that are informed by images—that is, sensations, when the word “image” is taken to include sensation.

509 To the first argument for that opinion [in n. 409], it leads to my own conclusion, for thinking (*cogitatio*), being the operation of a living being, does not come from a nonliving thing as the total cause. Nevertheless, a nonliving thing can be a partial cause of a living being or of a living effect, just as the sun, which is nonliving, is a partial cause joining the father in order to generate a living son. This is much more possible in the issue at hand because here the more important cause is “life,” as will become clear in the next question [cf. nn. 559–60, 562].

510 Next there is the argument of the perfect form [n. 410]. This concludes that it [i.e., the soul] has *some* activity with respect to its own operation. But does it seem to conclude that the *total* causality with respect to its own operation is in it? I answer as follows: that form [the soul] is by its perfection ordered to operate with respect to all being (*totum ens*), as is said in the third question of this distinction [nn. 185–87]. But since it is not absolutely perfect as it is not infinite, it cannot contain in itself all being. Therefore, from its perfection and its imperfection, one may conclude that it has *some* activity, but not enough, because it cannot have the total causality of cognition regarding all being unless it would contain in itself all being. Therefore I say that *less perfect* forms may well be total causes as to their operations because their operations are limited with respect to some things, with respect to which having total activity does not entail some active perfection unless it is limited. But in the kind of a *perfect* form that is ordered toward all beings [i.e., a form like the soul], one cannot assume such causality with respect to all there is, for then one would assume an unlimited active power (*virtus*) in it. Yet one can assume partial causality in it and partial causality in the object so that it may contribute to its own perfection regarding any object, just as any object, too, may contribute to it [= the soul’s perfection], a great [object contributing] to a great perfection of it and a small [object contributing] to a small perfection.

511 The other two arguments, the one about “acting” being distinguished from “making” and [the one that says] that action refers to the agent [nn.

411 and 412]: these I grant. For I hold that the act of thinking (*intelligendi*) truly remains in the agent that is its partial cause. [The act of thinking remains] not just in the acting person, as when the act does not go on outside the subject, but it [also] does not go on outside the intellective part [of the soul] toward the sensitive [part], nor outside the intellective [part] toward the appetitive [part], nor outside its active principle toward another power. It stays in the intellective part, which is its partial cause. However, [in order to be immanent] it is not necessary that an action, properly called so, stay in its total cause, but it suffices that it remains in its partial cause.

REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS OF THE SECOND OPINION

512 To the arguments of the second opinion [n. 422]: although here we could take up the question of whether the causality that is attributed to the intellective part properly belongs to the agent intellect or to the possible intellect, I will postpone that difficult issue until some other occasion [cf. Quod.15 nn. 13–20, 24; cf. n. 554 below].

513 When it is argued that the possible intellect cannot have any causality because “one and the same thing cannot act upon itself” [n. 422], I reply this: this proposition is only true of a univocal agent. The proof given for it—namely, “then the same thing would be in act *and* in potentiality” [n. 422]—is only valid when the agent acts univocally—that is, [when the agent] induces in the recipient (*passum*) a form of the same nature (*rationis*) as the one by which it acts, for if something would act upon itself in this way, it would have at the same time the form of the same nature as that to which it is moved, and while it is moved to that, it would lack it. So it would have it and at the same time not have it. This, at least, follows in the case of two forms of the same kind (*species*) or in the case of the same form. In equivocal agents, however—that is, in those agents that do not act by forms of the same nature as the one intended by their action—the proposition that “nothing moves itself” is not necessarily true. And the proof that “something is in potentiality and in act with respect to the same thing” is not conclusive, for in these cases the agent is not such that it is formally in act in the way the recipient is formally in potentiality [cf. n. 422]. Indeed, the agent is such that it is *virtually* in act in the way the recipient is *formally* in potentiality. And that the same thing is virtually such as to be in act and formally such as to be in potentiality involves no contradiction at all.

514 This comment on agents acting univocally and equivocally [in n. 513] is necessary, for the Philosopher put “motion” (*motus*) not only in the category of quality but also in that of quantity and place.⁴⁶ In quantity and place, however, there is no univocal agent because in the category of

quantity and place there is no form that is the principle of inducing a similar form. On the contrary, as is generally said, every motion that is “not toward an active form” is not [accomplished] by a univocal agent because from [the fact] that a terminating form is not active [it follows that] no one [form] of the same nature is the principle of acting. So there are in the Philosopher’s view many “motions” that are not by a univocal but by an equivocal agent, and in those cases the agent is virtually in act in the way the recipient is formally in potentiality.

515 Perhaps you will argue as follows: “So in all cases [mentioned above] the same thing could be virtually in act and in potentiality to a formal act [cf. n. 513, at the end] and so anything can move itself.” I reply that there is no causal connection here. The general notions of virtual act and potentiality to a formal act are not incompatible because, if they were, the incompatibility would occur in everything. Yet there are things in which a virtual act occurs together with something that makes it sometimes impossible for such things to be in potentiality or in act in such a formal way. An example: being hot “virtually in act” and “formally in potentiality” does not of itself contain a contradiction or an incompatibility, and thus [these two states] do not contain any incompatibility in any subject by which it would be impossible for them to be present simultaneously or for the one to be present while the other is present, too. The sun, however, which is hot virtually, cannot be formally hot. But this is not due primarily to the incompatibility of these two [states] because Saturn is cold virtually and still cannot be formally hot. Therefore, not the virtual act was the cause of incompatibility in it but something else that is common to the sun and to Saturn—for example, that they are incorruptible bodies and that heat is a corruptible quality.

516 If you object that “such metaphysical principles, on which general propositions are based, should not be denied for reasons of some special difficulties” [cf. nn. 422 and 513, “nothing moves itself”], my reply is this: principles for which many particular cases are false are not metaphysical principles at all. The assertion that nothing is [both] virtually in act and in potentiality to a formal act and that this incompatibility is taken from the notions of act and potentiality faces a lot of particular cases that are obviously false. Hence, it is sufficiently clear that here no metaphysical principle is involved. But that nothing is in formal act *and* in potentiality with respect to the same formal act is true—that is, in that manner nothing is simultaneously in act and in potentiality.

517 And if you squarely maintain that “even when talking about virtual act and potentiality to a formal act the metaphysical principle [that nothing moves itself] obtains”—how could other people be so blind (and he alone

[i.e., Godfrey of Fontaines] seeing) as to be unable to grasp the meaning (*rationem*) of common metaphysical terms and to apprehend from them the truth of such composite proposition that he posits as a “metaphysical principle”—[a principle] that not only is not posited by others as a principle but that is even false in many cases and that nowhere is necessary in view of the meaning of the terms?

518 When it is argued, second, about the material and the efficient cause [in n. 422], that they do not coincide, that is true regarding matter that is pure potentiality but not regarding matter in a relative sense, as in the case of the subject of an accident, for it is necessary that the very same thing sometimes is the material and the efficient [cause] with respect to the same. This is clear, for otherwise an attribute (*passio*) would not be predicable of a subject *per se* in the second mode. Proof: when it [i.e., an attribute] is predicated of the latter [the subject] *per se* in the second mode, it [the subject] is its material cause in the same way as matter is in accidents because it [the subject] is put in the definition of it [the attribute] as an addition [cf. n. 134]. If, in addition, the predication is *per se*, then it is necessary. But what is only the material cause with respect to something does not have any necessity regarding that thing. So in order to ensure necessity one must posit efficient causality in a subject in addition to material causality.

519 As for the next point, concerning real relations of opposition [cf. n. 422], I say this: some relations of opposition [i.e., relations involving opposite terms] are incompatible in the same nature, some are not incompatible in the same nature but are so in the same subject, and some are incompatible neither in the same nature nor in the same subject. Therefore, the nature of real relations in general does not permit any conclusion as to their incompatibility in one and the same thing. Examples: “cause and what is caused” are incompatible in the same nature or in the same subject because otherwise the same thing would depend on itself. “What produces and what is produced” are not incompatible in the same nature if the nature can be communicated without division, as is the case with the divine nature; they are incompatible in the same subject. “What moves and what is moved” are incompatible neither in the same nature nor in the same subject. Here [i.e., regarding the alleged “incompatibility in one and the same thing” mentioned above, particularly the alleged incompatibility of possible intellect and intellection in the same nature of the soul, *casu quo* the incompatibility of virtual act and formal potentiality] one does not posit an essential dependency as given by the relations between cause and effect. Nor does one posit that the same thing exists before it exists, which is what the notions of product and producer appear to imply. Here it is only maintained that the

same thing depends on itself to the extent that an accidental act is involved, just as something that is moved depends on a mover to the extent that it receives an accidental act from the latter. So the incompatibility of some real relations must be traced back to some prior incompatibility, and where that prior incompatibility does not obtain, the incompatibility of opposite real relations does not follow.

520 This can be clarified further. Just as the relations between “producer and product,” which are incompatible in the same subject, can be founded in the same “unlimited” nature, as in the divine nature, so, too, the relations between “what moves and what is moved,” which have a much weaker incompatibility, can be founded in a same nature that is “unlimited in some way.” Now, what is “formally” in potentiality to some act and nevertheless also has “virtually” the same actuality, as [happens] when the same thing moves itself, is somehow unlimited. It is posited not only as capable of [having] that perfection but also as causing it. So here those opposite relations are very well compatible, owing to a certain unlimitedness.

521 To their “Achillean point” [i.e., the presumably fatal argument presented in n. 422], that any odd thing would move itself, I say this: as was argued against the first opinion in excluding a necessary cause [in n. 415], nothing is the total and perfect and natural effective cause of something unless it causes the latter when it is in contact with the whole recipient and not obstructed. Wood is always in contact with itself and to a sufficient degree. And when there is no fire one cannot posit some permanent obstruction, for the following reason: if one posits “this one” obstacle, let it be removed and it will no longer be there. If [one posits] “another [obstacle],” let that be removed [too]. Thus dealing [with the obstacles] one by one, one will get the wood being present to itself and in no way obstructed. If, then, it was itself the total active cause with respect to heat and [if it was] itself the total receptive cause, it would always be hot, just as an animal always can sense. So when it is not possible to posit the case of “no total causality” on account of an obstruction or on account of not being in close contact or on account of the receiving part, it will be concluded that in wood there is no total causality, which is the thesis at hand. In that way, therefore, nothing at all will move itself as a total cause because no cause that does not *always* have an act is a natural total cause of that act.

522 If you say, “At least I may say that wood is a partial cause in such a way that in the presence of fire it cooperates in becoming hot on account of being something that is partial effective or active,” this hair-splitting will not do because one does not posit two partial causes with respect to the same effect when one of them precisely has the total effect in its power (*virtute*), univocally or equivocally. Proof: if one of them has in its power the total

effect, it can produce the whole of it, so the other partial cause cannot produce anything, or the same thing would be produced twice. But from the preceding argument [in n. 521] it was concluded that fire has the active role with respect to heat in wood and it has in itself virtually all of the wood's heat. So wood does not have here any partial causality whatsoever.

523 Now let us apply this to our thesis. The soul is not always in act with respect to intellection, even when it is itself the recipient of an intellection and is itself in contact with itself and is not always obstructed. Therefore, it is concluded that it [the soul] is not the total active cause. Something else is [required, too]. That "something else" is concluded to be the object because when that is present, the effect follows, and when it is not present, no effect can obtain. So some sort of causality in the object is established right away; but not total causality because on account of its imperfection an object cannot have in its power (*virtute*) the full intellection, for reasons of the latter's perfection. So it is concluded that together with the object some other active partial cause is required but not one that is different from the intellective [power] because when the latter joins the object [an act of] intellection obtains. Therefore, it is concluded that in this case there are two partial active causes and that here as in many other [cases] no same thing moves itself, neither totally nor partially. And that which was given in support for the Achillean point [cf. n. 522] does not appear to be very successful. It appears to be a kind of defense that switches the role of the opponent and the role of the respondent. Having no arguments, one takes the role of a respondent in order to bring up an argument to prove the necessary proposition—namely, that wood does not heat itself.

524 {[Objection]: as for the response to the Achillean point [made in n. 521], one may insist [as follows]: wood does not heat itself unless something else is present as a necessary cause, just as, according to you [= Scotus], the will does not make itself willing (*non volificat se*) unless an object is present through cognition. And if you argue that always one of the two [wood or fire] will do the heating because it has the power (*virtutem*) of heating, the answer is this: it heats itself before it heats something else, and this first thing does not occur unless a necessary cause is present. Or perhaps it never does heat something else, just as the will does not make another will willing. Indeed, granted that some action of the category of action is immanent, it will be said that any [action] is. Why not?

525 [Reply]: another refutation of the Achillean point [cf. n. 521]—when several pieces of wood are in the presence of fire and have the same dispositions, all of them will become hot. However, when the same object is present to several willing subjects (*voluntatibus*), not all of them will engage in willing in the same way (cf. Augustine, *The City of God* XII, chapter 6). So

here [in the one case] it is the fire that is acting, and there [in the other case] it is not the object [alone] because then it would be affecting all willing subjects equally.

526 [Another objection]: one may insist against this [n. 525] [as follows]—if willing subjects are not affected in the same way when a necessary cause is present, this is so because they act freely, according to you. In the presence of a necessary cause, pieces of wood act in a natural way. So prove that fire here is a cause other than a necessary one. [Reply]: but [with this objection] one only says that wood is a natural agent and the will is not.

527 Here is a third way of responding to the Achillean point [cf. n. 521, which has the first response; the second is in n. 525]: whatever is affected (*patitur*) is affected by some factor. So where something cannot be affected by itself, one must assume that it is affected by something else. Where it cannot be assumed that it is affected by something else, it must be assumed that it is affected by itself. The will (*voluntas*) cannot be affected by something else (we are not talking about God). For one thing, because then willing (*volitio*) would not be in its command (*potestate*); for another, because then some other mover, behaving in the same way and with respect to the same patient, would [act] indifferently upon each of two opposites because the will can be willing and not willing the same thing made present in the same way. Thus it is necessary to ascribe the motion toward “willing” mainly to the will itself because the latter alone has the indifference in acting that is appropriate to that particular patient. But a piece of wood does not have the indifference in acting that is appropriate to itself (the wood) under the aspect of a patient. It is the recipient of dissimilar and also contrary qualities, and one of these qualities, when made intense, even can destroy it. Nor does it have so many univocal principles [as the qualities it receives]. This is clear, since nothing moves itself in a univocal way, not even a single univocal principle. What else would its [i.e., the will’s] being thus unconstrained mean if not that anything is possible as to the qualities it can receive in itself, even the self-destructing ones? In the will, *anything* toward which it can [act] constitutes its operation and some sort of perfection.}

REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD AND FOURTH OPINIONS

528 In favor of the third and fourth opinions [in nn. 450 and 451] no arguments were given that would make a reply necessary. Anyone who wants to believe [the claims] about the first simple act and about the second [act] of distinct cognition or the claim of the second opinion [i.e., of the third and the fourth opinions, in n. 451] that “the species nudges,” let him do so. For the nonbeliever, let it be shown by reason [cf. nn. 452 and 453], since it is

not an article of faith.

[In nn. 529–30 Scotus describes the opinion of some go-between—cf. *ille medius* in n. 531—who wants to harmonize the opinions of Henry of Ghent; his reply is in n. 531ff.]

529 These two opinions—namely, the third and the fourth—which appear to be mutually opposite, are in fact in mutual agreement and confirm each other, as follows: an action requires both a formal principle of acting (*ratio agendi*) and a principle of the agent (*ratio agentis*). The “agent” is the subject; the “principle of acting” is the form that brings about the action [cf. n. 380]. In the first act upon the possible intellect the phantasm is the agent, but the quiddity (*quod quid est*), as it is shining out in the phantasm, is the principle of acting insofar as this quiddity stays in the light of the agent intellect and is permeated by that light and is surrounded by that agent. And the first thing impressed in the possible intellect by this principle of acting is the onset of a habit of knowledge (*habitus scientialis*). This onset is not [the same as] the intelligible species, nor [is it] the form that moves toward the act of thinking (*intelligendi*) because the object is in itself present to the extent that it shines out in the phantasm and because the phantasm as being somewhere in the body is present to the intellect. Therefore, there is no need for another kind of species that makes the object present in that way or for something standing in for the object or representing it. Still, with respect to intellection, that first impression has the character of “by which” (*quo*) [thinking occurs] and of “that which” (*quod*) [is thought]—“by which” because through that [impression] the intellect is in close and accidental potentiality toward the act of thinking, just as a body by its weight is in potentiality toward [an instantiation of the category] “place”; “by which” also with respect to what remains in the intellect when the latter refrains from actual thinking. It [i.e., the first impression] is also “that which” because it happens first to it [i.e., the intellect] (just like, according to Avicenna, “the first thing sensed” is a species), not as the terminating object but as a thing that leads to the object, not by comparison but by continuity [i.e., directly]. Thus the first and the second opinions [= the third and the fourth, in nn. 450 and 451] agree in this way, that the former denies the species and the latter admits an inclination that precedes the act.

530 As for what is stated in the first view [of the third and the fourth ones, in nn. 450 and 451], that the intellect is passive with respect to the first act [of thinking] and active with respect to the second act, the second opinion, too, seems to posit that the soul itself elicits the act. There is agreement in the following way: as soon as a particular first impression has been made in the possible intellect, the intellect itself meets with that

particular passive event (*passioni*) because everything passive that meets with an agent tends to preserve its being (*esse*). Augustine, too, has it that way, in his *On Music* VI, where he talks about those “rhythms meeting us” (*numeris occursoribus*) and other rhythms [i.e., rhythms experienced in hearing; Augustine distinguishes five kinds].⁴⁷ And in that meeting the intellect swallows up this confused intellection and transmits it to its intimate core and so receives it [= the intellection] in a more intimate way from itself than can be done from the object. And when this impression is made intimate in that way, the intellect meets it for the second time, and in this second meeting it submerges itself in it by penetrating it. In this [process] exists the intellect’s distinct and perfect cognition.

531 Whatever may be the case with these opinions that our go-between wants to explain, there is much to be said against the foregoing [= against the interpretation put forward in nn. 529 and 530]. Take his first thesis [in n. 529], that “the quiddity, as it shines out in the phantasm, is for the latter the formal principle of acting.” Against this: how can a thing be a principle of acting for something in which it does not formally exist? Suppose that the quiddity is somehow assumed to exist in the phantasm. Since the quiddity has a qualified kind of being (*esse*) in the phantasm—namely, the being of a representation (*esse repraesentati*)—and is not in it with the being of [real] existence (*esse existentiae*), how, then, will the quiddity according to that kind of being (*esse*) be the formal principle of performing a real action? Therefore, because the phantasm by which that [kind of] being falls to it [= to the quiddity], is not the principal cause of acting, as they maintain, the quiddity as existing in it [= the phantasm] is not the principal source of acting, either, which is against them [i.e., against the proposed reconciliation of Henry’s different accounts].

532 Moreover, I ask: what does it mean that “the quiddity stays in the light of the agent intellect” [cf. n. 529]? If it means only that the agent intellect is in the soul and that the phantasm is in the imagination (*phantasia*) of the very same soul, then, when the phantasm is in the imaginative power, that “permeating and surrounding” [mentioned above, in n. 529] will permanently be there, and it will [also] be so in someone who is mentally insane or asleep, which is denied by the author whose opinion is being explained [= by Henry of Ghent]. If it means something different from the simultaneous presence of these two [the agent intellect in the soul and the phantasm in the imagination], some new action occurs, the end term of which will not be in the phantasm, but it will be in the possible intellect. Therefore, the quiddity does not act by being permeated, which would precede the action of the quiddity, but it acts only together with the agent intellect by causing some new impression in the possible intellect. This is

what the other opinion says [= the opinion of Scotus himself; cf. nn. 366, 381, 382].

533 If you say that “that other opinion posits an impressed intelligible species [cf. nn. 339, 349, 370], whereas this [opinion] does not, rather [it posits] the onset of a habit of knowing.” Rebuttal: that opinion states that that impression “is the principle by which the intellect is in accidental potentiality” [cf. n. 529: “Still, with respect to”], whereas before it was in essential potentiality. If by that impression “the intelligible object” is no more present now than before, then it [the intellect] is no more in accidental potentiality now than before. If it [the object] is now present in some way in which it was not present earlier, that in which it is now present is the intelligible species. This is clearer from the claim that “first it [the intellect] meets with it [the species] as showing the object on account of a natural continuity with it” [cf. n. 529: “as a thing that leads to the object”]. This could not be the case unless the object were shining out in it [the species] and thus had the character (*rationem*) of a species.

534 Similarly, what is said concerning “preceding” and “the onset of a habit of knowledge” [in n. 529], is not true because, speaking properly, as the Philosopher does in his *Nicomachean Ethics* II, a habit arises from an elicited act.⁴⁸ And just as the final stage of a habit is generated from the final act, so the first [stage is generated] from the first [act]. Thus any stage of a habit is posterior to some act. Therefore, what is absolutely first in the possible intellect is not something of the habit itself. This is confirmed following the opinion of the doctor whom we are explaining [Henry of Ghent] because he says that “the onset” is the total essence of the habit.

535 As to what is said further, about “meeting” [in n. 530], I reply this: the term “meeting” does not apply well, nor is it to the mind of Augustine, for a passive subject (*patiens*) that meets with an agent tends to save itself and to counteract an agent that is destroying it. This agent, however [the one we are talking about here], acts to the benefit and perfection of the passive subject (*passi*), so it [the subject] does not meet with it [the agent] for the reason “that it may save itself.” Also, this is not what Augustine meant. He wants that the soul (*anima*), when it meets with a sensation (*passioni*) produced in the air in the ear, stirs the air more vehemently, thereby producing the audition that the sound alone did not produce. This “meeting with,” therefore, amounts to “acting together.” Therefore, I reply briefly to the arguments of Augustine. As soon as an impression of the sensible species has been made in the sense organ or of the intelligible species in the intellect, the soul meets with it by a certain power (*potentiam*) in order to bring about, together with that impressed species, an act that is more perfect than the one the species could cause of itself alone.

536 As to what is added further, concerning “meeting twice” (“first there is an encounter with the sensation as it contacts [the inner ear], then with the sensation as swallowed up” [n. 530]), I ask what these metaphorical expressions mean. If they mean that by the second encounter something more perfect is caused than by the first one and that it [the second encounter] achieves a more intimate perfection (as matter is said to be perfected more intimately by a more perfect form, which actualizes it more), then that sensation enters no more deeply in the second encounter than before. But the soul acting together with that sensation causes something more perfect, which is more intimately in the soul than the sensation that was caused first.

REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS OF THE FIFTH OPINION

537 As for the authority of the Philosopher in *On the Soul* III, that “thinking is being acted upon (*pati*),” which is put forward in favor of the fifth opinion [in n. 457], I say this: the Philosopher was talking about the powers (*potentiis*) of the soul in general, inasmuch as they are that by which we are formally in the second act. About the senses, for example, inasmuch as they are that by which we formally sense and about the intellect, inasmuch as it is that by which we formally think. But we formally think by the intellect inasmuch as it receives an actual intellection, for even if it [the intellect] causes the latter actively, I am still not said to think by the intellect inasmuch as it causes, but inasmuch as it has the thought as a form—for having a quality amounts to being in a certain qualitative state (*esse quale*). And so for the intellect to have a thought or to receive it (which is the same) is precisely to be actually thinking (*esse intelligentem*). Therefore, we think by the intellect inasmuch as it receives thought. That is why the Philosopher, when he is talking thus about the intellect, felt the need to say that it is passive and that “thinking” is “a kind of being acted upon.” This means the act of thinking, inasmuch as it is that by which we formally think, is some form received in the intellect. But we do not think by it [= that form] inasmuch as it is something caused by the intellect (if it is caused by it, for if God would cause it and would impress it upon our intellect, we would no less be thinking by it) [cf. n. 479] [cf. QDA 12 nn. 27–28].

538 Of “knowing habitually” (*scire habitualiter*) I say the same as I said of “thinking actually” [in n. 537]: it is the intellect by which we know habitually, inasmuch as it receives a habit, not inasmuch as it causes the latter (if it causes it).

539 Therefore, I say that all the authoritative texts [of Aristotle] that have a ring of passivity (*passibilitatis*) in the possible intellect can be explained

with respect to the latter inasmuch as we habitually know (*scimus*) by it or inasmuch as we actually cognize (*cognoscimus*) by it. And in this way I grant that it is passive. And if it is active, it still is not [essentially] so in this respect, but it just happens to it that it is active in this respect. These authorities [in n. 457] assert what is true about the intellect not by talking about it under the aspect of something active, but by saying that it has the character (*ratio*) of something receptive. They do not say in so many words that it is “not active,” but an authoritative text cannot be taken as denying what it does not say.

540 By the same reasoning [nn. 537–39] we can reply to what is said about the essential and accidental potentiality [of the intellect, in n. 457], for the intellect is not in essential potentiality because it lacks some principle (*ratio*) of causality for its own part. It is in essential potentiality when the other partial cause, which needs to be present for an action to follow, is not present to it. When that partial cause has made contact with it, it is in accidental or proximate potentiality to acting.

541 The authoritative text saying that “the possible intellect is none of the things that are there before thinking” [n. 457] requires another explanation. Some people read this text as saying that “the possible intellect is in pure potentiality in the domain of intelligible things, as matter is in the domain of beings.” This is not the intention of the Philosopher because the potentiality for an accident has no other foundation than substance. An intellection (*intellectio*) or an intelligible species is not a substantial form but an accident. Therefore, what directly receives it is an actual substance. At least it is something that indirectly receives it (in which case that which directly receives it will be an actual accident, like a surface [which is an accident of the wall that is a substance] is related to whiteness). Therefore, the possible intellect, as being that in which the intelligible form or an intellection is received or as being that by which a species is received in the soul, will not be something purely potential but will be something in first act, although the relation of potentiality itself not is something in act. For when I talk about the receptive potentiality for whiteness I am not talking about a potentiality that means a relation to whiteness. That relation is not something in act because the whiteness to which it is related is not something actual, either, and a relation is not actual without its term. But that in which the relevant potentiality is or is said to be is something in act, like the surface as the receiver of whiteness is. Such is the case here. Although before [the act of] thinking the potentiality preceding the act (which is a relation to the act of intellection) is not something in act (just as the intellection to which it [the potentiality] is related is not in act), still that in which that potentiality resides, or is said to reside—namely, “that which receives the act of

thinking”—is something in act, and that something is the possible intellect.

542 The Philosopher does not hold that “the possible intellect is nothing in act,” as they maintain [i.e., “some people,” in n. 541]. We must explain that authority in the following way: we naturally first think of those things that are the first ones to come to us from phantasms, as is said in the second question of this distinction [nn. 73, 187]. Therefore, we cannot think of anything through proximate potentiality before thinking of something imaginable. So we cannot think of the intellect (*intelligere intellectum*) before thinking of another intelligible thing. So the intellect itself (*intellectus*) cannot be thought of by us before thinking of another intelligible thing. So it is not intelligible prior to thinking of something else. Just as the first antecedent [“We naturally cognize ... from phantasms”] is true, so is the consequence [“so the intellective act itself ... something else”]. Therefore, the statement that “prior to thinking, it [i.e., the possible intellect] is none of the things that are” (that is, of the things that are intelligible) must be understood [as holding] not because it [the possible intellect] is nothing in act before it actually thinks but because there is not something that we can think of by a proximate potentiality prior to thinking of something else because our natural act of thinking starts with phantasms [n. 187].

543 As for the next argument, about similarity being the principle (*ratio*) of both making and acting [in n. 458], I say that in the maker the form is indeed the principle of making by which the maker assimilates to itself what is being made. But in an action nothing is produced except the action itself. The action is the ultimate term and does not have another term. Therefore, it need not be the case that in an agent the principle of acting is that in which something that produces gets assimilated to something else that is produced {or [is that in which] an agent [gets assimilated] to the object of its acting, since it does not assimilate that [object] to itself}.

544 And if you say “at least the principle of acting is that in which the agent assimilates to itself the product—that is, the action itself”—I do grant that the species, which is a likeness (*similitudo*) of the object and by which the intellect becomes assimilated to the resulting cognition (*cognitioni productae*), is some principle (*ratio*) of generating [the cognition]. But it is not the total principle, or even the main one, as will become clear in the next question [n. 562]. But when two causes concur, it is sufficient that there is a formal likeness in the proximate cause and a virtual or equivocal likeness in the remote cause. And so the intellect, as the more superior [and remote] cause, is as it were assimilated virtually to the intellection and the species, as the more proximate cause, is as it were univocally and formally assimilated to it.

545 As for the next argument, about the intellect being indeterminate

with respect to various acts and objects [n. 459], I reply that there is a material indetermination on account of the absence of an act and an indetermination of the agent on account of an unlimited active power (*virtutis*), just as the sun is indeterminate with respect to generating many things. What is indeterminate in the first way does not act unless it is determined by some act because otherwise it is not sufficiently actual but only potential. What is indeterminate in the second way does not become determinate by a form different from itself. It is from itself determined toward producing any effect for which it is indeterminate from itself. This happens when something passive and receptive is present, just as the sun in the presence of something passive generates anything that can be generated on the basis of its being naturally suited to be generated. Such is the case here. The indeterminacy of the intellect is not the indetermination of a passive potentiality in its order of causality but is the indetermination of a seemingly unlimited actuality. Therefore it [the intellect] is not determined by the form that is for it the determinate principle of acting but merely by the presence of the object, which is the determinate thing with respect to which a determinate intellection can naturally occur. This could be put differently. Just as a higher cause is determined to acting (like the sun is determined to generating humans while acting humans concur, and to bovines while bovines concur, but it is not determined by some form received in itself), so, too, the intellect, which is a higher and unlimited cause, is determined to this object while a particular determinate cause concurs—for example, to *this* object while *this* species concurs. The inferior cause, however, does not determine effectively the indeterminate higher cause, not even formally as a principle of acting. But it determines in the sense that the higher, active indeterminate power (*virtus*) produces something determinate while a certain determinate lower power concurs.

546 {There is an opinion [its author is unknown] that the intellect is the principle of intellection as regards the substance of the act but that the object is the principle as regards the modification or specification of the act. Contra: for nothing there is no principle. Apart from its modification or specification it [intellection] is nothing. Therefore, etc. The major premise is understood of nothing that includes a contradiction [i.e., there is no principle for anything that includes a contradiction]. The minor premise is proved. The first thing that is naturally cognized is precisely that something is possible, but an intellection without being in the very same instant of nature (*in eodem “nunc” naturae*) of some object is a contradiction; otherwise intellection would be a merely absolute form.}

[For the reply to the arguments of the sixth opinion, in nn. 460–62, the editors refer to nn. 505–6 and 535 and the note inserted by Scotus after n. 493, in particular to “That it [the intellect] is not the total active cause.”]

REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS

547 To the first [initial argument, in n. 401] I say that the argument of the Philosopher in *On the Soul* II rightly concludes that the sense is not the total cause with respect to sensation. This I grant. Accordingly, it was argued above, against the first opinion, that the soul is not the total active cause of an intellection [n. 414], which I grant, too. But it does not conclude that it [i.e., the soul] is not a partial cause because from the latter [i.e., from being a partial cause] it does not follow that it is *always* in act; it is only so when the other partial cause concurs.

548 To the second [initial argument, in n. 403]: without treating the difficult question of whether the relevant activity belongs to the agent intellect or to the possible intellect [cf. Quod. 15 and the annotation to n. 554, below] I say that the possible intellect, as described by the Philosopher [cf. n. 537], is that by which we are formally in a state of thinking (*sumus intelligentes*), and in that way it is precisely that “by which becoming everything” obtains, for, as was said earlier [nn. 537, 539], we formally cognize by it insofar as it receives, not insofar as it acts (although it does act, but that is an accidental consequence of its being that by which we cognize).

549 To the third [n. 404]: the inference [“So if the intellect ... same sort”] is not necessary because the sun can be the cause of many specifically different things on account of the distinct powers in it, which in their quality of effective cause are sufficient to differentiate effects. Still, the inference can be granted for the present thesis, as it concludes that the soul is not the total cause of all intellections, which was granted [n. 405].

550 To the first [argument] for the opposite [n. 405]: I grant that the soul “because it is immaterial” is the recipient of any intellection whatsoever. It is also active as a partial cause with respect to any intellection of an object that is other than itself. And it is active as a total cause with respect to the intellection of itself (according to Augustine, in the last chapter of *On the Trinity* IX [cf. n. 413] but we do not have the latter kind of intellection in our present state). However, from its immateriality it does not follow that it is itself the total cause of any intellection of an object other than itself.

551 To the second argument [n. 406]: I grant the conclusion that cognitions of different species—that is, the cognitions we have through the latter’s own power (*virtute*)—are specifically different. Proof: for individual items of the same species there is no need of a total cause that is specifically

different (or something in the total cause that is specifically different) from that which is in the total cause of any other individual. {That a cause of another species is not necessarily required for individual items of the same species can be proved as follows: the form is the principle of acting and the formal end term of the action. So the perfect form of one type (*rationis*) is the principle “by which” of that type with respect to the formal end term of the same type. Therefore, with respect to such end term no other principle “by which” is needed.} But for the intellection of “white” and “black” specifically different items are needed—for example, a white thing and a black thing or things that include them. Therefore, these two differ more than the individual items of one species. Therefore, they differ specifically.

552 If you argue further that “then all habits of such things differ specifically” [n. 406, “in that case there would be”], I grant this for habits that we have through the proper power (*virtute*) of such objects. Just the previous conclusion [= the conclusion on specifically different cognitions, in n. 551] is proved by the relevant causes.

553 When you say, “How, then, would there be one science concerning most specific species?” [cf. n. 406, “there would not be one science”], I reply that a single most specific species can include virtually many other species or their properties (*passiones*) either by way of [being their] cause or according to some other essential order. And then the habit in question, which is concerned formally with the first topic that includes the other ones, is virtually about the other objects, though not formally and primarily. So the relevant habit is “one” through the unity of the first object containing virtually everything that is contained in that science. But it is not properly about all the things that are virtually contained in the first object; [habits] that would be proper to these things would be distinct, just as the latter are. {On this matter, see the first question on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* VI: “Why three”⁴⁹ [= “Is the division of the sciences into physics, mathematics, and the divine sufficient?”]}.

QUESTION 3

IS THE OBJECT, AS PRESENT IN ITSELF OR IN A SPECIES, OR THE INTELLECTIVE PART OF THE SOUL THE MAIN CAUSE OF THE PRODUCTION OF A COGNITION?

554 Concerning relative importance of the two partial causes in the production of cognition, I ask, is the object as present in itself or in a species, or the intellectual part of the soul itself the main cause in the production of cognition?¹

[*Note by Scotus*] Here it would be appropriate to discuss the question of whether the agent intellect is a principle with respect to intellections, and then we could touch the question of how it [= the agent intellect] is related to memory as discussed by Augustine [cf. below, nn. 583–87]—why it is posited [these topics are extensively discussed in Quod. 15]. However, there still are two other difficult points to be discussed here or elsewhere. The first concerns the conservation of the species after the act [of intellection], against Avicenna [cf. Rep. 1A.3.5: “Does intellectual memory preserve the species when the act of thinking is over?”; cf. also QDA 14]. This problem can well be touched in one argument in the preceding question concerning the species [cf. n. 403; Lect. 1.3 n. 309 adds to this argument: “intellectual memory pertains to the possible intellect because the latter, not the agent intellect, has the task to preserve and to retain”; cf. above, n. 400]. The second problem concerns memory in its proper sense with respect to past things. This can be a question of its own; it is addressed here [in this book of the *Ordinatio*; cf. above, nn. 383–84, 391], in the Oxford *Lectures* [Lect. 1.3, nn. 295, 301–2] and in book IV [Ord. 4.45.3; cf. Ord. 3.14.3 n. 116].

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Proof that it is the object [which is the more important cause]: what moves while not being moved itself is a more important mover than what moves something while being moved itself, too, as is clear in all essentially ordered causes. The object moves something while not moved itself, as can be gathered from the Philosopher in *On the Soul* III,² whereas the intellect

does not move unless being moved. Therefore, etc.

555 Also, an agent makes an effect similar to itself, so the more important agent is the one that does this to a greater extent. The act [of intellection] becomes more assimilated to the object than to the intellect. Therefore, etc.

556 Also, a science gets its unity on account of the unity of the object that virtually contains it [= that science]. Such a virtual containment with respect to a habit is not attributed to the intellect. “Containing virtually” belongs to an active cause; therefore, the object will be a more important cause of the habit than the intellect and, if it is the cause of the habit, then also of the act [of intellection].

557 For the opposite: the more something is actual, formal, and perfect, the more it is active; therefore, the soul, which is the more actual form when concurring with many other causes, will be more active, and so it will be the more important agent when it in its action concurs with the other causes.

558 Also, an unqualified act does not belong to an entity that has only qualified being. When it [= the act] has such qualified being through another entity that is unqualified, it belongs mainly to that unqualified entity if the latter is somehow active with respect to it. But an object of which we now [i.e., in our present state] have a natural intellection has only qualified being in our intellect on account of the unqualified being of the intellectual part [of the soul] itself because the object is there as something cognized in the cognizing person. Therefore, for an act [of intellection] for which the two [= object and intellect] concur, the object, which has such qualified being, is not the main cause, but rather the intellectual part on account of which the object has such being.

SCOTUS'S CONCLUSION: THE INTELLECTIVE PART OF THE SOUL IS THE MAIN CAUSE

559 I reply: it seems that the intellectual part [of the soul] has the more important causality with respect to intellections that now belong to us naturally. First, when one of two ordered causes is undetermined with respect to a multitude of effects, thus being sort of unlimited, while the other in accordance with its maximal power is determined to a definite effect, then the one that is more unlimited and more general seems to be more perfect and more important; see the example about the sun and specific generating factors. The intellect has a seemingly unlimited and undetermined power with respect to all intellections, whereas objects that are naturally known by us have a determinate power with respect to determinate intellections of them [= the objects], and this in accordance with their utmost power; any object has a determinate power for its being understood. Therefore, etc.

560 Second, a cause is more important than another if the other cause

cooperates with it when it acts and not the other way around. When our intellect operates for an intellection, the object just cooperates with it, in itself or in a species. It is at our own command to think because “we think when we want to” (*On the Soul II*),³ and this not primarily because of the species, which is a natural form [i.e., acting necessarily, not subject to volition], but because of the intellect, which we can use when we want to.* The action of the intellect principally follows the action of the species, whose action is always uniform.

* [Note by Scotus] How do we prove that it is at the command of the will to use the intellect rather than to use the intelligible species? Each of these two factors is something that acts naturally of itself. And why is each of them not free by participation? Answer: nothing is primarily free by participation unless it is in the same essence as the will. Contra: organic powers and the organs (the external ones, too) are free by participation [i.e., by participating in the will]; similarly, no act of the vegetative [soul] is at our command. So this is an obscure way [to argue], for it is problematic what in us is subject to the will and what is not.

561 In spite of the foregoing, an object that greatly exceeds the power (*facultatem*) of the intellective part [of the soul]—for example the beatific object as seen clearly [i.e., God]—could be posited to have the full causality with respect to [beatific] vision or [at least to have] a more important causal role than the intellective part—this on account of the excellence of such an object and on account of the deficiency of the intellective part (but more about this in the fourth book).

562 Nevertheless, for objects that we now [= in our present state] cognize in a natural way, the first part of the reply [nn. 559–60] seems to be true. It seems that the species of the intelligible things that are naturally cognized by us is in the intellect a kind of instrument of the intellect itself. It is not moved by the intellect to act (that is, as if it would receive something from the intellect); rather, it is used by the intellect for its own action because when the intellect acts, the species, as the less important agent, concurs with it toward the same result as toward a common effect.

REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS

563 To the first argument [n. 554] I say that there is a twofold act of the intellect with respect to an object that is not present in itself (this applies to the things we now understand naturally). The first act is the species, through which the object is present as an actually intelligible object; the second act is the actual intellection itself. The intellect acts to perform both acts, but it is

not moved by the partial cause concurring with it in that action, even though one act of the intellect [namely, intellection] is preceded by its [i.e., the intellect's] moving toward the other act [namely, the production of the intelligible species]. To perform the first act [of producing the species] the intellect acts together with the phantasm. There the agent intellect is a more important cause than the phantasm but both make up one total cause with respect to the intelligible species. To perform the second act the intellectual part [of the soul] (for the moment I do not care whether this is the agent intellect or the possible intellect [cf. nn. 512, 548, and Scotus's note at the beginning of the present question]) and the intelligible species act as two partial causes. Now the intellectual part acts not as moved by the species but as moving first. It sort of forces the species to cooperate with it.

564 So when you say "the object moves while not moved [n. 554]," I say that in both actions the object is something that moves secondarily, even though it is not moved itself—that is, it does not receive something in itself from a major or prior source of motion. When you say, "the intellect does not move unless moved [n. 554]," I say that it does not move in a second motion if it has not been moved by a prior motion. However, this relation involves the two motions of the intellect, not the two partial causes concurring in one motion. If you compare both partial causes within each of the two motions, I say that in both cases the intellect moves while not moved by the partial cause that concurs in the same motion.

565 As for the second [argument, n. 555], I say this: formally an effect becomes more assimilated to the proximate and lower cause than to the remote cause and the more perfect principle, as is clear from [the example of] the son with respect to his father [= proximate cause] and the sun [= remote cause]. Hence this argument favors the opposite view because it proves that the act of intellection stems from the object as from the proximate cause as it [= the act of intellection] becomes formally more assimilated to the latter. In the same way the intelligible species becomes formally more assimilated to the phantasm than to the agent intellect. Yet it stems less principally from the phantasm than from the agent intellect.

566 Objection: when an agent wants to assimilate to itself something passive, why does the principal agent not do so to a higher extent? I reply: usually the principal agent is an equivocal cause and possesses in itself the perfection of the effect more eminently than does a univocal cause. Therefore, it [i.e., an equivocal principal agent] formally does not assimilate to itself [the effect] to a higher extent because it would be an imperfection in the cause [i.e., the equivocal principal agent] to assimilate itself thus to the effect. But it does assimilate [the effect] to a higher extent in the following sense: more than any particular agent it [i.e., the principal agent] gives to

the effect a form by which it [i.e., the effect] is assimilated equivocally, and that active assimilation stems from the perfection of the cause, although formally it is not the more important assimilation.

567 Similarly, a more perfect cause assimilates the effect (to that to which it can be assimilated) to a greater extent than a lesser cause does, since it causes the effect more to the extent that it is more causable. But an effect is formally something that can be assimilated to the proximate cause. Therefore, the remote cause itself effectively assimilates the effect to the proximate cause more than the proximate cause itself does [assimilate the effect] to itself, for the fact that the son formally is similar to the father is more due to the remote cause (which effectively assimilates the son to the father) than to the proximate cause because the cause that provides to a higher extent the form by which similarity arises effectively provides to a higher extent [the act of] assimilating.

568 To the third [argument, n. 556] I say this: the unity of a science is assigned because of its object, not because of the intellect, because it is the former that differentiates between sciences, whereas the intellect is one with respect to every science. When sciences are distinguished in this manner, a science is one when it is concerned with one primary subject insofar as the primary object is such that it contains that science virtually—but this only as a partial cause, for, apart from that [object], the intellect is the other partial cause containing it [i.e., the science]. Therefore, to reduce a science to its primary object is the same as to reduce it to what is absolutely first in the other partial cause and to assign from that [point, i.e., the absolutely first in the other partial cause] the unity of the effect insofar as the effect arises from it. It is not right to apply this reduction in the other partial cause [namely, the intellect] because the latter remains the same for any habit, which, accordingly, is contained much more perfectly in that other partial cause.

QUESTION 4

IS THERE AN IMAGE OF THE TRINITY DISTINCTLY PRESENT IN OUR MIND?

569 As for this distinction, my final question is whether an image of the Trinity is distinctly present in our mind (*in mente*).

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I argue that it is not. An image represents that of which it is an image. Therefore, the mind (*mens*) would distinctly represent the Trinity. But this is false. Proof: for one thing, in that case Trinity could be inferred by natural cognition, by knowing the mind in a natural way. For another, as a representation no creature can exceed the perfection of its idea [in God], but the idea of the mind does not represent God as a trinity because it is in God insofar as he is cause, and he is cause insofar as he is one.

570 Also, nothing in our mind represents one [divine] person more than another. Therefore, the whole mind does not represent the whole Trinity. Proof of the antecedent, from [Augustine's] *On the Trinity* XV (chapter 7): the Father is "memory, intelligence, and will," etc;¹ therefore, the Father is formally intelligence and will in the same way as he is memory; and the same holds for the Son. Therefore, memory does not represent the Father more distinctly than it does the Son.

571 Third, in the Trinity two persons are produced; in an image nothing is produced, as I will prove. Therefore, it [the image] is not representative with respect to production. Proof of the assumption: in the soul there are only first acts or second acts. The first acts [i.e., the powers of intellect and the will] do not originate from each other because they are co-created with the soul. Neither do the second acts [or "actions": the acts of intellection and willing] originate [from each other]. Proof: "An action does not come from an action." It does not have another action as its subject nor as its end term, according to the Philosopher in *Physics* V.² If it did, there would be an infinite regress. Therefore, there is [in the soul] not an action that has these acts as its end term because they are formally actions already. Proof: they are second acts and not first acts, but if they were not actions, they would be

first acts.

572 Also, by them [= the second acts, or actions] a habit is generated. An action by which a form is generated is an action of the category of action. Therefore, etc.

573 For the opposite is Augustine, in *On the Trinity* XIV (chapter 8): “We must search for the image and look where our nature does not have anything more perfect [which is the mind].”³

THE MEANING OF “IMAGE” IN CORPOREAL THINGS

574 We must first get a clear understanding of the notion (*ratio*) of image in corporeal things, from which the word has been transferred to the present context [i.e., the realm of the mental]; second, we must clarify to what aspect of the Trinity the image does pertain; third, we must understand what in us makes up the image.

575 As for the first point, I say, as was said in the question on the trace [cf. nn. 289, 293], that an image is something that can represent a whole. In this it differs from a trace, which represents a part. Indeed, if the whole body were impressed in the dust just as a foot is impressed in it, there would be an image of the whole, just as the latter [i.e., the impression of the foot] is an image of the part and a trace of the whole. But a similarity (*conformity*) that expresses the whole is not sufficient [for there to be an image]. What is required is imitation because, according to Augustine, in Question 74 of *Eighty-Three Questions*, “however similar two eggs may be, the one is not an image of the other,” because the one is not naturally suited to imitate the other. Therefore, it is required that an image is naturally apt to imitate that of which it is an image and to express it.

TO WHAT ASPECTS OF THE TRINITY DOES THE IMAGE PERTAIN?

576 To the second point [listed in n. 574]—

[*Interpolation*] namely, the question of what aspect of the divine is found in our mind, one should know that in our intellect the Trinity constitutes a certain numerical whole, the parts of which are understood to be the divine persons, so the image is not to be noticed with respect to one person only or with respect to that in which they [the persons] are one but with respect to the whole Trinity and one essence.

Although in our intellect the concept of one person is partial with respect to the concept of the whole Trinity, the creature that leads us into cognition of the Trinity by way of an image will represent the Trinity with respect to the

full concept that our intellect can have of it. It will, therefore, represent the distinction of the three persons and the unity of the essence and the order of origin because the real distinction in the divine comes about by origination. It will also have an essentially imitative relationship to the Trinity it represents.

WHAT CONSTITUTES THE NATURE OF THE IMAGE IN US?

577 As for the third article [announced in n. 574], we must first consider what is manifestly present in the mind; second, what the image is not; and third, of what the image consists.

578 As for the first point, we experience that we have in us acts of intellection and acts of volition, and these acts are somehow at our command when their object is present. Therefore, we must posit that somehow there are in us active principles for these second acts, by which [principles] we are able to engage in these acts. But it is not possible that the same thing under the same formal aspect (*ratione*) is the principle of these two [different kinds of] second acts because these second acts require in their principles an opposite rationale of acting as a principle (*ratio principiandi*). So we must have some distinction between first acts, a distinction that is analogous to the one between the second acts.

[*Note by Scotus*] In distinction 13 objections concerning the powers of the soul [are discussed]. On this point see the refutation of the final opinion [cf. Ord. 1.13 n. 45 ff.].

579 Concerning the second point in this article [cf. n. 577], I say that the image is not to be found in the first acts only or in the second acts only. This is evident in two ways; first, because both the first acts are just two in number and the second acts are just two in number, there would be only an image of a duality, not of a trinity. Second, because, although there is consubstantiality in the first acts, there is still not a real distinction as between thing and thing, nor is there an order of origin. And although in the second acts there is this distinction [as between thing and thing] as well as some order of origin, there is still no consubstantiality.

580 From this the third point [cf. n. 577] follows—namely, that the image consists in first acts and second acts simultaneously. I understand this as follows: the soul has in itself some perfection according to which it is first act with respect to the generation of knowledge. It also has in itself some perfection according to which it formally receives generated knowledge, and it has in itself some perfection according to which it formally receives volition. These three perfections are called “memory,” “intelligence,” and

“will” or “soul” insofar as it has them all. Therefore, the soul insofar as having the complete first act with respect to intellection or, to be more specific, something of the soul itself and the object that is present in it under the aspect of being intelligible is called “memory” or even “perfect memory” when we include both the intellect and that by which the object is present to it [i.e., the intelligible species]. The same soul insofar as it receives generated knowledge is called “intelligence,” even “perfect intelligence,” as it comes with the generated knowledge. The will, too, is called “perfect” insofar as it comes with that perfect act of willing. So, considering these three parts of the soul as they exist under their three acts, there is, I say, consubstantiality in these three terms on account of these three realities (*realitates*) as coming from the soul. Nevertheless, there is distinction and origin as well on account of the actualities [of the second acts] as received in the soul according to these realities.

[*Interpolation*, cf. Rep 1A.3 nn. 204–9] So, what are the three items that make up the image? I reply: by admitting the single first act or the two first acts by which we can engage in the second acts of intellection and volition, we have in us a fertile principle for the operations that can be produced in the mind. Therefore, there are three things in us—namely, the fertile principle for these two acts and the two second acts themselves, which by some kind of unity are like one thing. I do not find in us three other things so perfectly representing trinity and unity. Yet, the unity is not the same in the two cases [i.e., in the divine and in our mind], for in us the three things are one by the unity of subject and accident, but in the divine they are one by the unity of essence, since in the divine there is no unity similar to that of subject and accident. So we have in us three things that represent the Trinity—namely, a fertile principle (and this is the “perfect memory” in us, which includes the essence of the soul and the intelligible species and the will, as parent and partner)—and two operations or productions corresponding to the fertile principle by a double fecundity—namely, of the intellect and the will or the principle of intellection and volition. And from this we have the order of origin.

Now let us consider Augustine’s intention in *On the Trinity* IX (chapter 5, at the end), where he most beautifully and most perfectly points out the image by saying “mind, knowledge, love.” He says “mind,” which does not precisely mean a fertile principle or the power to generate and spirare but a kind of first act that virtually contains in itself each of these two [fecundities, i.e., of generating and spirating]. And so it [the mind] represents the Father, who by himself has both [fecundities]. In my opinion, this is the most appropriate identification of the image of the

Trinity.

However, at another place, in *On the Trinity* X (chapter 10), he points to the following three: “memory, intelligence, and will.” These three items rather (and more importantly) represent a unity than a trinity because they are the same thing as the soul [i.e., identical with the soul itself]. However, they are not representative with respect to the productions or as a triad. “Memory” does not represent fertility unless with respect to thinking (*intelligendum*). Therefore, it does not represent the Father as having both fecundities in the way “mind” represents the two fecundities. Likewise, intelligence does not represent the Son as produced or under the aspect of a notional act. And intelligence as a power does not originate from memory. Likewise, the will taken as a power does not represent the Holy Spirit. However, Augustine does not take “will” as power here [in *On the Trinity* X, chapter 10] but as the act of willing, as is clear from *On the Trinity* XV (chapter 3), where he compares the two images. He says that the will is born from knowledge because it only loves what is known; nobody loves what he did not come to know first. So when Augustine says that the second description of the image is more subtle than the first, this is true with respect to one of the conditions [for being an image] because it represents more perfectly the unity of the essence, as was said earlier.

581 This approach gives rise to two problems. First, there seems to be a quaternity in the image, as the first act with respect to willing does not correspond to one of the three things in the image [namely, memory, intelligence, and will; cf. n. 580]: nor to the third part [the will, here to be taken as “volition”], obviously, because one and the same thing is not a principle of itself; nor to the second part [intelligence], as is clear, for actual knowledge is not the same as the will; nor to the first part [memory] either, because memory properly points to the productive principle of generated knowledge, not of volition. Therefore, the will is to be the fourth item.

582 The second problem is that the order of origin does not seem to be preserved here [in our mind] as it is in the divine case, for there the first person is the origin of the second and the two persons are the origin of the third. Here the first part of the image is the cause of the second [part] but neither the first nor the second [part are the cause] of the third; therefore, etc.

583 I reply to the first problem: following Augustine’s lead, the image [of the Trinity] can be pointed out in two ways. One way is found in *On the Trinity* IX (chapter 5 and following): “mind, knowledge and love (*mens, notitia et amor*).”⁴ The other way is his description in *On the Trinity* X (chapter 10 and following): “memory, intelligence, and will (*memoria, intelligentia, et*

voluntas).⁵ Talking about these two descriptions of the image, Augustine says in *On the Trinity* XV (chapter 3) that the one presented in book X is more evident.⁶

584 Talking about the first description, I say that by “mind” we can understand the first act with respect to each of the two second acts—that is, the fertility for generating and spirating. In that respect the mind has the character of being perfectly parental because it includes both kinds of fertility perfectly. The other two things—that is, knowledge and love—are two products originating from the soul in some order. And then there is no quaternity because in [the soul as] a parent having the perfect character of parenthood the two first acts concur.

[*Note by Scotus*] We experience two acts, which come about in some order, and they are at our command (*On the Soul* II; cf.n. 560); therefore, their principles are in us, either as the same thing or as united in the same thing, which [thing] will be something fertile with a twofold fertility and will be there by itself (*a se*, [by the] stopping rule [which precludes an infinite regress]). The two products are distinct and somehow the same as the first fertile [source] when the powers are exclusively taken under their acts. They reveal [the existence of] the first subject, being fertile from itself with both kinds of fertility and two products, being proper (*adaequate*) to that fertile [source], distinct and generated: therefore, an image.—Objection: the second part does not produce the third one.—Reply: here the image fails.

That is how it is in the divine case, for in the Father there is the fertility not only for generating but also for spirating, and this by himself (*a se*). For if the Father does not have of himself (*ex se*) the fertility for inspiring but has it as a residue (*derelective*) from the production of the Son (as some [Henry of Ghent] maintain), then the following impossible consequence seems to arise: that the Father would have the relevant fertility never [at all], for the Father does not through production have any reality (*realitatem*) in any way, either absolute or relative. Therefore, whatever reality he does not have in the first moment of origin (*in primo signo originis*)—that is, as far as he is, in the order of origin, understood before the Son, he will have never. Therefore, if he does not have that twofold fertility in himself in that first moment of origin, he will never have it.

585 But if “mind” is taken precisely as first act, having only fertility with respect to the generation of knowledge, then the demonstration of an image is imperfect, for in this way the mind does not have perfectly the character of being parental.

586 As for the other way of pointing out the image, I say this: if

“memory” is taken precisely as the parent with respect to the generation of knowledge, it is not perfectly parental. Something perfectly parental has not only a principle of generating but also of spirating because it cannot have the one without the other; and it must have it completely. Therefore, it must also be had in “a parent by itself.” However, if “memory” is taken for the whole soul, in its capacity of having the relevant twofold fertility in the first act, then it has the character of parenthood in a perfect way. But although memory is more evidently parental [than mind], as we must admit in view of Augustine’s words in *On the Trinity* XV (chapter 3)—that is, insofar as it [memory] expresses the relationship of something generating to what is generated better than mind does, it still seems to be the case that mind implies more perfectly a parental character if it is taken as including both kinds of fertility.

587 Briefly, in whatever way “trinity” is pointed out in the image, either this way or the other way, there is no quaternity because a twofold relationship and fertility are joined in a parent, if it is perfectly parental.

588 To the second [problem, n. 582], I say this: in us the image cannot be similar to the prototype. Indeed, knowledge generated in a created image is some accident that does not share (*communicatur*) that fertility for producing love (*amorem*) by which something is formally able to produce an act of loving (*dilectionis*). Such an accident is not naturally apt to be formally thinking or willing, so [our] memory, when generating knowledge (taking memory as being perfectly parental), cannot share with what it generates the fertility that it had before because it does not share with it the very same nature, but it produces it equivocally in another nature. However, when the Father generates the Son, he shares with him the same nature and the same fertility of spirating love, but this fertility is not understood as having an adequate end termination in the generation of the Son. Therefore, the Son can produce by the same fertility as the Father. Therefore, the reason (*ratio*) that production cannot be preserved in parts of the image, as in the persons of the Trinity, is clear: because there cannot be the same fertility in the two first parts of the image. However, it can be and is the same in the two persons with respect to the third.

589 Similarly, if generated knowledge were in some way productive of something, this would only be so by way of nature and not freely. However, there is here some order between the second part of the image and the third [that is, between the acts of intellect and will] because the third part naturally presupposes the second one, although it is not [produced] by it. This is what Augustine expresses in *On The Trinity* XV (chapter 27): “being joined together like parent and offspring by the will as the third, the will indeed proceeding from the knowledge (and he explains immediately how he

understands that ‘for no one wills something he does not know at all’) yet not being it [the knowledge],” etc.⁷ It is clear, therefore, that he posits that order of origin precisely for reasons of the natural order between the acts of willing and intellection but not because intellection is the cause with respect to willing. Regarding Augustine’s intention, therefore, it is clear that he takes here the will, as being the third part of the image, for the act of willing. This is shown by his words “the will indeed proceeding,” etc. This is not true of the will as a power. If it is true, it is so of the act of willing.

590 In addition and more specifically, since all of the previously mentioned acts are present in the mind with respect to any object, it should be noted that the most perfect and ultimate notion (*ratio*) of an image obtains when they jointly occur with respect to God as an object. Because then, as far as the previously mentioned acts are concerned, the soul will have an expressive likeness not only because of their character in itself but also because the very acts become similar to the object, for the act [of intellection] is truly a likeness of the object, as was said in the preceding question [n. 565]. Therefore, when these acts are so present in the mind as not only to have consubstantiality and likeness and distinction and origin but as having also a further similarity to God, the resemblance is more perfect on account of the object about which they are. It is less perfect, however, when the soul has itself as an object because then it [the image] obtains only to some extent—namely, insofar as God is known in the mind as in an image, even though [in that case] there is not directly a similarity to God itself as the proximate object.

591 This twofold trinity is pointed out by Augustine himself. The one that involves God [as an object of the mind] is presented in *On the Trinity* XII (chapter 4), where he says, “Only in that which pertains to the contemplation of eternal things [do we find] not just a trinity but the image of God. Though a trinity may be found in what derives from an action concerning temporal things, an image cannot be found there.”⁸ This must be understood in terms of an expressive image with respect to the highest degree of expression or likeness. See also *On the Trinity* XV (chapter 20 or 62): “Hence the eternal and immutable nature may be remembered [by memory], seen [by the intellect] and desired [by the will],” etc., [and it is] “surely an image of the highest Trinity and everything that lives must invite to remember, regard and love it.”⁹

592 The other image [based on the nature of the soul] he mentions in *On the Trinity* XIV (chapter 8 or 16): “Look,” he says, “the mind remembers itself, thinks of itself, loves itself. If we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not yet God, but already an image of God.”¹⁰ This second text appears to contradict the first one [in n. 591] unless it is understood in the aforementioned way

[cf. n. 591: “This must be understood.”]

593 And then it is clear why he does not posit an image in the mind with respect to all objects lower than the mind: because no other object is an image of God. As far as a likeness to the object is concerned, the most preferable image in the mind is the one with respect to God. The image with respect to the mind itself comes at the second place.

COROLLARY: THERE IS NO IMAGE IN THE SENSITIVE PART OF THE SOUL

594 From this it is obvious, as a corollary, why there is no image in the sensitive part [of the soul]: first, because there we do not find consubstantiality of operating powers (*operantium*) or of all those [powers] taken together with their operations, for the principle of sensing is not just something of the soul but a composite of the soul and a part of the body having a certain physical constitution that is the whole organ.

[*Note by Scotus*] Note, the proximate principle (*ratio*) of receiving sensations is not some simple entity—that is, neither the soul nor the body of a particular constitution, but the form of the whole organ (where “form” is taken in the sense of the quiddity, as the form of a subject, not in the sense of an informing form).

Similarly, the appetitive principle of the sensitive appetite is not something of the soul only. It is likewise composed. The two [powers] to which these operations belong are not consubstantial, for, although these powers of the soul reside in the same essence and perhaps are the same as the essence of the soul, they still are not the total causes of their operations (I am talking of all the relevant organs), since the parts of the body are not consubstantial with each other or with the powers of the soul.

595 Also, in the sensitive part [of the soul] there is no twofold mode of origin because the sensitive appetite desires naturally just as the senses sense naturally. Hence, beasts “do not act but are being acted,” according to John Damascene in *On the Orthodox Faith* II (check it!).¹¹

REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS

596 As for the first introductory argument [n. 569], I grant that any created essence as “this essence,” which is produced according to a certain idea [in God], does not represent God under the aspect of “three” because it is not caused or thought by God under the aspect of “three” but under the aspect of “one.” Nevertheless, a created essence, on account of its essence and the many things jointly present in it, as one aggregated whole can be

representative of the Trinity and the things that are noticed in the Trinity. Such an entity is the mind, taken in itself and together with its operations, because there we have unity and distinction and order of origin. In addition, as far as the relevant kind of combination is concerned, such an entity is not found in what is lower than the mind, as was clear with respect to the sensitive part [nn. 594–95].

597 When you argue [in n. 569] that “if there were an image [in the mind], the Trinity could be known by knowing the mind,” I reply this: the things that are jointly present in the mind are capable of convincing someone who believes in the Trinity of how it [the Trinity] can be, but they do not force the nonbeliever to conclude that it exists, for the whole assembly of many things in the mind, in which the image consists, could be and is there of one person. Therefore, it is not possible to deductively prove from it that it is an image of the Trinity. In *On the Trinity* XV (chapter 24), Augustine has this to say about it: “They who see their mind and in it that trinity but do not believe that it is an image of God, see the mirror indeed, but they do not see through the mirror because they do not know that what they see is a mirror.”¹²

598 How the argument is valid in showing that there are three persons because of the intellect and the will in the divine has been explained in the second distinction, in the question on the two productions [Ord. 1.2 nn. 301–3 and 355–56].

599 To the second [initial argument, n. 570], I say this: the argument seems to be effective, if it is assumed that the Father generated *qua* “intelligence” as is maintained by one opinion [Henry of Ghent], which was stated and refuted in distinction 2, in the question referred to before [in n. 598]. This opinion claims that the actual knowledge (*notitiam*) of the Father has somehow the character (*ratio*) of being productive with respect to the Son and the character of a formal productive principle [Ord. 1.2 nn. 278–79]. But according to the view that I held there, the Father has the divine essence present to itself under the aspect of being actually intelligible (which fits the Father inasmuch as he is “memory”), and he generates accordingly, not as actually understanding (*intelligens*), as was said there [Ord. 1.2 nn. 291–96]. Then the antecedent [n. 570: “Nothing in our mind”] is false because my memory represents the Father more than the Son, not to the extent that memory is only in the Father and understanding (*intelligentia*) only in the Son but to the extent that the Father generates the Son inasmuch as the Father has the aspect of memory, not inasmuch as he has the aspect of intelligence or will.

600 To the third [initial argument, n. 571], I say that second acts are products.

601 When you base your proof on the Philosopher's text in *Physics* V [cf. n. 571], the argument is for me. Indeed, since an action is not the end term of an action, and since what we have here [i.e., the second acts discussed in n. 571] do truly terminate an action (as Augustine says in the final chapter of *On the Trinity* IX that knowledge is truly generated,¹³ and that willing proceeds, and, in chapter 27 of *On the Trinity* XV, that willing comes forth),¹⁴ they are not actions of the category of action but absolute forms belonging to the category of quality [cf. Rep. 1A.3 nn. 169–76; Quod. 13].

602 When you prove [in n. 571] that they are properly actions because they are second acts, I say this: some forms have a fixed existence and do not permanently depend on their cause (as is the case with “becoming”)—for example, heat in wood [which burns, once set to fire]. Other forms seem to depend permanently on their cause, like light in a medium depends on the sun (about which Augustine says, in *On Genesis* VIII, “the air is not made clear but it becomes clear”).¹⁵ On account of their independence in existing, forms of the first kind do not have the character of action or of movement. On account of their permanent dependency, forms of the second kind appear to have more an existence of “becoming” than of “having been made.” {And so they have [the property] that they are being caused permanently, as long as they exist, just as in the first moment when they start to be. Therefore, these forms end their being when the cause ends causing. Still, it does not follow from this that they are actions of the category action. Rather, the opposite [follows]: that they are terms of such actions.}

603 Intellection behaves in this second way because it is permanently dependent on the presence of its cause, for otherwise it would not have being (*esse*), as is clear from Augustine, in *On the Trinity* XI (chapter 10 or 3): “But when the eye of the cognizer is turned away from there ... nothing of the form that was in it before, will remain.”* The act of thinking does not continue without that particular presence of the cause, as it is permanently influencing it. But this alone does not allow the conclusion that it [the act of the intellect] is a second act (for then light [*lumen*] in a medium can be posited to be a second act). There is this further condition for it: that these forms in virtue of their own nature pass into something as their end term.** I do not care whether the operation is intrinsic [immanent] or extrinsic [transitive], since it is not intelligible that thinking or willing occur without reference to some end term. It is appropriate for an action in the proper sense that it develops in (*transeat in*) something as in its end term. For reasons of these two conditions, which are simultaneously present in these forms, these forms are said to be “second acts, since they are truly permanent forms.”

* [Interpolation, continuation of the cited text] and that which was being

looked at in memory is no longer seen.

****** [*Note by Scotus*] On this relation [of a form to an end term], see question 3, before, sub 3. [The pertinent text is identified by the editors as nn. 478–79 above.]

604 As for the other proof [in n. 572], when it is said that such an act [namely, a second act] can generate a habit, I reply, the argument works for the opposite because an action of the category of action cannot be of the same nature (*rationis*) if it does not have the same end term, just as heating is not of the same nature unless heat is of the same nature [i.e., as an action heating must have heat as its end term]. Therefore, if a habit were generated by an act that was an action of the category of action, terminating in the habit as in its end term, that act could not be an act of the same nature if it were not *per se* capable of generating a habit [i.e., if an action generates a habit, it must be of the same nature as its end term, the habit]. It would even seem to be a contradiction in that it was an action of the same nature and not of some end term, for there cannot be an action of the category of action if it is not of some end term. However, an act of thinking or willing can be of the same nature, although it does not result in an end term [in the way an action of the category of action does]. So the relevant act [of thinking or willing] does not generate a habit as being an act of generation but rather as being a form, by which the habit is formally generated. Briefly, then, I say that an act can generate a habit in the manner of a form that is the cause or the principle (*ratio*) of causing another form, just as the light of the sun in the medium is the principle of producing heat in it. Such an act is not generative as an action, yet by an action of some sort both the act and the habit are generated as the proper end term of such an action. To denote that sort of generation, which is an action of the category of action, we say that “the power [of thinking] elicits the act of intellection.”

NOTES TO THE TRANSLATION

REMARKS ON THE TRANSLATION POLICY

The various kinds of *editorial changes* attributed to Scotus himself (cf. Balić 1968) are treated as follows: the *additiones* are inserted directly in the text itself, in curly brackets {}. The *adnotationes* and interpolations of unknown origin are not retained as footnotes at the end of a page but as notes to the relevant paragraph itself. The *cancellationes* are not included; after all, they were no longer meant to be there.

References to sources explicitly mentioned by Scotus himself, which the editors specify in the *Fontes*-section of the apparatus, are dealt with according to the following considerations: these references are in many cases outdated, given the various critical editions and translations that have been published after the first volumes of the Vatican edition—for example, in the cases of Augustine and Henry of Ghent. Moreover, they often refer to untranslated writings. As it seems to be somewhat inconsistent to translate a text from the Latin and continue referring to other Latin texts, only the essentials of such references are given here: the title of the relevant work and the specification of the relevant place in terms of the internal structure of the work (for details, see the section on Abbreviations). In the *Testimonia*-section the editors provide numerous implied references identifying Scotus's interlocutors or opponents. These references suffer from the same problems as the explicit references, and since they are often very detailed and specialized, they are not reproduced in detail. The *Testimonia*-section also has various clarifying notes and internal cross-references, which I have in general gratefully adopted. In any case, the references as included here should be sufficient to identify the relevant sources. If necessary, the pertinent details can easily be found in the critical edition by means of the paragraph numbers.

The *Index Generalis* of the Vatican edition, which is not too informative, is replaced by a detailed Outline, where the numbers refer to paragraphs. As for the structure of the text, we have followed the paragraph structure imposed by the editors (with the paragraph numbers in boldface), but most of the editors' headings have been replaced by our own (they are not part of the source text!).

As for the text itself, square brackets, [], are used for delimiting text that does not belong to the Latin original. Often it concerns an innocent addition, just making explicit the grammatical subject or object that Latin syntax permits to remain implicit. Other additions are more like an editorial intervention and to some extent disputable, as is the case with words or phrases supposedly expanding and clarifying Scotus's sometimes very elliptic or even cryptic wordings. Finally, many key terms are followed by the original Latin word, in parentheses, (). All in all the text is replete with words or phrases in brackets and parentheses, but I believe that without them the text would be even less accessible than it is already. As a writer Scotus does not seem to have been brimming with compassion for the reader. His language is terse, and he has lots of long and entangled sentences that in the translation are often split and rearranged. So, although the translation may not always preserve the subtlety of Scotus's wordings and style, it is, I hope, faithful to the subtlety of his thought.

As the central notions in *Ordinatio* 1.3 are being and knowing, the relevant Latin terms deserve special attention. Some research has been devoted to medieval philosophical language, but I am not aware of a study specifically dealing with Scotus's vocabulary. The following remarks reflect my own conclusions based on reading Scotus and, of course, Wolter's indispensable *Glossary*, included in Scotus 1975, trans. Alluntis and Wolter, and again in Scotus 2004 and 2008, trans. Wolter and Bychkov.

Esse/ens/entitas: *Ens* is usually translated as *being*. The Latin *ens* is a present participle, mostly used as a noun; in English, however, *being* can also be a gerund. *Esse* = being, to be, to exist; *entitas* = being, entity, both in the concrete and in the abstract: existence, or, what might be called "beingness." In the translation both *esse* and *ens* are usually rendered by *being*; generally, the relevant Latin word will be added in parentheses.

Esse repraesentatum and *esse cognitum*: There appear to be two possibilities for *esse representatum*, both found in various existing translations of medieval authors (not just of Scotus): (a) *represented being, the being (of) a representation*, analogous to *esse objectivum* = *objective being*—that is, *being an object (of the intellect)* and *esse diminutum* = *diminished being*; (b) *being represented* (or *having been represented*, or, glossing a bit: *having representational being*) analogous to *esse album*, or *esse hominem*. The same goes for *esse cognitum* = *being cognized or cognized being*. Unfortunately, English has not the convenient way out of an equivalent that retains the ambiguity of the Latin expressions as French has, where *esse repraesentatum* is rendered as *être représenté*. I am not sure whether the different versions entail different interpretations. I take them as having the same meaning.

Ens ratum and *ratitudo* (cf. nn. 310 ff.): Honnefelder 1989: *ens ratum* =

festes Seiendes; Scotus 2011, trans. Boulnois: *étant solide* (= *festes*). Hoffmann has an extensive discussion of *ens ratum* in his *Creatura Intellecta* (2002, 184–91). At 184 (note 46) he mentions the above translations and opts for *gültiges Seiendes* because it agrees best with the meaning as given in various lexicons of medieval Latin. In view of *gültiges* we might translate *ratum* with *valid* or with *validated*; in view of *festes* and *solide* we would have *ratum* = *solid*. Still, it appears to be make good sense to translate *ratum* with *ratified* and *ratitudo* with *ratification*; cf. *Concise OED* 2004: *ratify* = give formal consent, make officially valid; *validate* = check or prove the validity of, confirm the truth or value of. *Ratified* seems to be slightly closer to the original meaning of *ratum* than *validated*. As a bonus we preserve something of the Latin forms *ratum* (and *ratitudo*), and we can reserve *solid* for *firmitas* elsewhere, in, for instance, n. 323.

Apprehendere/cognoscere/concipere/scire: *Cognoscere* appears to be a generic term for both sense or perceptual cognition and intellectual cognition—that is, of the cognitive acts of both the sensitive and the intellectual soul; it is virtually synonymous with *apprehendere*. It is often best translated as (*come to*) *know*, *grasp*, *apprehend*, or even by that jack-of-all-trades *cognize*. *Scire* = know, as a result of analysis and synthesis and of discursive reasoning, having knowledge consisting of conclusions of (valid) syllogisms.

Intellectus/intellectio/intelligentia: *Intellectus* = intellect in the broad sense: the part of the intellectual soul concerned with cognition. Specific meanings: power or faculty of thinking/understanding: intellect; act of thinking/understanding: intellection; result of act of thinking/understanding: concept. *Intellectio* = act of producing or having a thought; also: result of understanding. *Intelligentia* = (in an Augustinian context) intellect or intellectual faculty, the part of the intellect concerned with (actual) intellection (the other parts being *memoria* and *voluntas*; *memoria* then is the part where knowledge resides habitually). *Intelligere* and *intellectio* are often translated as *understand* and (*act of*) *understanding*, but then it must be understood in a sense different from our usual sense of *knowing/understanding how and why* (cf. *OED*). In Ord. 1 d.3 *intelligere* seems to be best rendered as (*actually*) *thinking of*; *intellectio* = *act of thinking*, (*occurrent*) *thought*. *Intellectio lapidis*, for example (in n. 479), seems to be more the act of thinking of a stone than the act of “understanding a stone.” *Cogitatio* and *intellectio* appear to be synonymous (cf. Lect 1.27.1 n. 43), and *intellectio* is also used synonymously with *notitia actualis* (cf. Ord.1.3.3.2 and Rep.1.27.1.1). *Intelligere* appears to admit degrees of concentration (cf. n. 467). We can “think hard,” but it is not easy to conceive “thinking (of)” itself as varying in intensity. With these glosses in mind I often follow the line of least resistance and translate *intellectio* with *intellection* and *intelligere* most of the time as

thinking (of), but at places also by *considering*, *cognizing*, or even *understanding*. As for *intelligere confusum*, *intelligere confuse*, these expressions are often translated as *understanding (thinking of) something confused* and *understanding something confusedly* (or just *confused understanding*). This will do, provided *confused* is not taken in its modern sense (OED: *bewildered*, *perplexed*), but as a technical term, more like our *fuzzy* (OED: *indistinct* or *vague*: of uncertain or indefinite character or meaning).

Species and *phantasma*: In the categorial system of beings (ontology), *species* refers to a level below *genus*; in theories of perception and cognition (psychology), it refers respectively to the internal representation of sensory stimuli (*species sensibilis*) and the representation of intelligible or thinkable content (*species intelligibilis*); the term is usually left untranslated (although some render it simply by *idea*). The same goes for *phantasma*, which nevertheless is often translated by *sense image*, which points to its location, which is in the inner sense of the imagination (or *phantasia*). The phantasm differs from a sensible species in that it represents a complete particular or singular entity (e.g., “this rose”), whereas sensible species are restricted to the stimuli received by the individual external senses (e.g., “red” by the eye and “fragrant” by the nose). The impressions received by the external senses are processed by the internal senses, resulting in a phantasm or a sense image. Further processing leads to an intelligible species representing the abstract, universal notion of an entity (e.g. “rose”). See Cross 2014b for a detailed treatment of medieval *casu quo* Scotian psychology.

There are many other cases where an English term has to be understood specifically in a medieval sense. For example, *movere*, which has to be (or at least usually is) translated by *move*, even though this will sound strange in some cases—for instance in “moving the intellect” or even “moving the soul.” It can only be understood correctly in the context of medieval “natural philosophy.” Replacing it with some modern term, e.g. *stimulate*, which is nowadays a standard term in psychology, would give it a context that is inappropriate. Another example is *pati* and *passio*: *pati* = to suffer, but in a more general sense than nowadays (cf. OED); *to be acted upon* would be a better translation; analogously, *passio* = passion, but not in its present meaning (as listed in OED): in general it means the passive event of being acted upon; sometimes it means attribute (*passio entis*). Likewise, “patient” does not mean exactly the same as *patiens*. In such cases the translation uses often more elaborate expressions, like “something that undergoes (or experiences, something else).”

As the foregoing remarks may have made clear, it is virtually impossible to consistently render each Latin word by one single English equivalent; variation is often dictated by the kind of context and a certain level of

fluency aimed for. To avoid possible ambiguity the original Latin term will often be inserted in parentheses.

A special problem is the lack of definite and indefinite particles in Latin: it forces one to rely on intuition. For example, *habitus* (singular number) may be rendered as just “habit,” “a habit,” “the habit,” or even “habits” (in stating a general fact). The choice is dictated by one’s reading of the text. On the other hand, often the Latin words *unus* and *aliquis* appear to have the force of just an indefinite article. Similarly, *iste* and *ille* may just function as definite articles. A related problem is substantival adjectives like *bonum*, *verum*, *album*, *universale*, *ens*. Here particles would be welcome. Consider, for example, the sentences *ens est unum* and *unum est ens* (n. 134, p. 83, line 17): uncomplicated as they appear, their sense is not easily conveyed. Here and in the subsequent notes, reference is made to the page and line numbers of the Vatican edition.

NOTES TO THE TRANSLATION OF SCOTUS’S *ORDINATIO* 1.3

- n. 12, p. 6, line 12: reading *propositionis* instead of *quaestionis*.
- n. 17, p. 9, line 1: reading *de subiecto* instead of *quod* (cf. apparatus).
- n. 29, p. 19, line 6: reading *posuisset* instead of *posuissent* (cf. apparatus).
- n. 35, p. 22, line 14: *loco* usually means “instead of” (cf. n. 310); as used by the editors it refers to an alternative text found in another manuscript but not necessarily meant as a replacement; hence the neutral translation “at” or “at the place of.”
- n. 49, p. 105, lines 7–8: reading *de conceptu* instead of *de conceptu* (cf. apparatus) following Scotus 2011, trans. Boulnois, who is following Scotus 1968, trans. Fähr.
- n. 74, p. 51, line 9: reading *percipit ruborem distincte* (cf. apparatus).
- n. 123, p. 76, line 1: reading *Harclay* instead of *articulus* (which according to the editors refers to nn. 186–87, further in the text); see Balić’s comments in vol. 4 of the Vatican edition (Scotus 1956, 6*–46,* esp. 32* sqq.), conveniently summarized by Vos 2006, 79–80. Scotus 2011, trans. Boulnois, p. 447, note 184.1, also reads “Harclay.”
- n. 124, p. 76, line 14: Ed. Vat. has *Discordat*, without giving a clue as to the identity of the subject; presumably the disagreement is between Aristotle and Harclay (cf. note to n. 123).
- n. 124, p. 76, line 15: again reading *Harclay* instead of *articulus* (cf. note to n. 123).
- n. 124, p. 77, line 2: Following Scotus 2011, trans. Boulnois, who is following Scotus 1968, trans. Fähr, in correcting *pluralitas* of Ed. Vat. (which refers to Aristotle, Met. 1054a 28–29: “because of sense

- cognition, what is many is understood earlier than what is indivisible”).
- n. 135, p. 84, line 6: *Sed non est aliquod decem generum*. As the subject of this sentence is not stated explicitly, it must be implied by the previous sentence. It could be either *ens* or *aliquod istorum* (i.e., *verum* or *unum*). I take it to be the latter (cf. apparatus), whereas Scotus 2011, trans. Boulnois, opts for *ens*, which necessitates a rather convoluted explanation of the paragraph.
 - n. 280, p. 172, line 19: reading *sensibilem* instead of *intelligibilem* (cf. apparatus).
 - n. 357, p. 215, lines 16–17: It is difficult to make sense of the elliptic phrase *Sed phantasma in quo intelligitur universale*. A literal translation (“The sense image, in which the the/a universal is cognized”) is probably not correct, given Scotus’s considered opinion that the phantasm contains the singular only, and not the universal (cf. nn. 365, 392, and 531). Some variant readings (and the comment in the Wadding edition) suggest another interpretation: “at the very moment in which there is an intellection of a universal, the sense image is representing the singular.” This interpretation is consistent with the immediately preceding *simul* (line 15) and, more generally, with Scotus’s claim that actually thinking of a universal is always accompanied by a phantasm of “its” singular; cf. n. 187: *Et de facto ita est in nobis, quod quodcumque universale intelligimus, eius singulare actu phantasiamur*. See also QDA 14 and Rep. 1A.3.5: our actually thinking a universal concept of some object is accompanied by a phantasm.
 - n. 359, p. 217, line 16 and the interpolated text, taken from Rep. 1A, in Appendix A (p. 363, line 12): reading *repraesentat* instead of *repraesentatur*. Here and at several other places the text of Rep. 1A.3 as reproduced in the Vatican edition (Scotus 1954) differs from the text of the critical edition of Rep. 1A.3 (kindly made available to me by Timothy Noone) and generally also from the text of Rep. 1A.3 in Scotus 2004 and 2008, trans. Wolter and Bychkov.
 - n. 364, p. 220, line 14: inserting *non* before the second *esset* (cf. apparatus).
 - n. 365, p. 221, line 17; cf. ad n. 359.
 - n. 378, p. 230, line 17; cf. ad n. 359.
 - n. 422, p. 258, line 1: reading (with Sondag) *prohiberetur* instead of *probaretur* (cf. apparatus).
 - n. 481, p. 287, line 9: *Patet enim quod ipsa [intellectio] est causabilis a Deo immediate, ergo ab ipso solo non dependet essentialiter*. A grammatically straightforward reading gives, “It is obvious that an intellection can be caused immediately by God, so it does not essentially depend on him

alone.” However, this is a highly problematic statement. Sondag construes an interpretation for the text as is (Scotus 1993a, trans. Sondag, 184n3). Pini solves the problem by deleting *non* (Pini 2011, 58n55).

- n. 499, p. 295, line 5: following Cross in reading *prima ratione contra quintam et sextam* and correcting a “misleading and pointless textual emendation” of the Vatican editors (Cross 2014b).
- n. 580, p. 343, note *a*, referring to an interpolation from Rep. 1A.3 n. 204–209; cf. ad n. 359.

NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS

1. In square brackets inserted in the main text of the translation.
2. Inserted as endnotes.
3. The Vatican edition usually refers to Aristotle's works in terms of title, book number, chapter number (the latter for some works only), and "t. x" (where x is the number of a particular piece of text), followed by the relevant page in the Bekker edition. Here only the latter is given; this should do, since virtually every modern edition and translation includes the Bekker pagination.
4. Instead of the references as given by Scotus himself in the text (sometimes inaccurately), the references in the Vatican edition are based on PL, but they are mostly superseded by more recent critical editions.

INTRODUCTION. SCOTUS ON BEING AND COGNITION: *ORDINATIO* 1, DISTINCTION 3

1. Note: references are to paragraphs of the critical editions; for *Ordinatio* 1.3, just the paragraph number is given (e.g., n. 72). References to sources are explained in the section "Abbreviations."
2. See, e.g., Cross 2014a. For Henry, see Wilson 2011; for Godfrey, Wippel 1981; for Thomas, Pasnau 1997 and Pasnau 2002 (especially chapters 9 and 10 of the latter).
3. The following summary has profited much from the treatment in S. D. Dumont 1998a, 1998b, and the notes added by Boulnois to his translation of Ord. 1.3.1 (Scotus 2011).
4. Cf. AU, Trin. 8.3(4); see also Ord. 1.3 nn. 192, 194–95.
5. Cf. Cross 1999, 33–39: "The univocity theory of religious language."
6. E.g., nn. 114, 382, 584.
7. For helpful discussions, see Wolter 1946 and Dumont 1987.
8. See Pini 2005.
9. See Noone 2004; Hoffmann, 2013.
10. See Dumont 1987 and Brown and Dumont 1989.
11. Cf. Wolter 1946, 82–92.
12. For an overview of medieval views on divine illumination, see Noone 2010. The development of Henry's view in particular is studied in detail by Marrone 2011.
13. Cf. TA, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*, 2.9.
14. Helpful introductions to medieval cognitive theory are Tachau 1988, Pasnau 1997, and several chapters in the first volume of the *Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy* (Pasnau and Van Dyke 2010). For Scotus in particular, see Cross 2014b, which also includes much background information.
15. See Cross 2012 for a synopsis of the two frameworks.
16. See, for example, Boulnois 1999, 79–88, and Perler 2004, 205–7.
17. For further discussion of the relevant notions, see, for example, King 2004, Pini

2011, and Cross 2014b.

18. Note, in passing, the “and” in the title of QDA 12; in Quod. 15 nn. 6–7 only the intellect is claimed to have an active principle.

19. For Godfrey, see Wippel 1981 and Côté 2007.

20. Scotus has discussed this principle extensively in QMet. 9.15; see Effler 1962.

21. It is treated extensively in Quod. 15.

22. See Marrone 2011 and Goehring 2011.

23. Cf. Scotus 2006, 5:98n7 and 5:101n14.

24. Extensively worked out in *De primo principio* 1. For a summary of the general theory, see King’s contribution in Williams 2003. The application to intellection is discussed by Cross 2014b, chapter 6.

25. The issues touched in this paragraph are discussed extensively in Pizzo 1998.

26. Quod. 15: first model in n. 51–52; second model in n. 54; conclusion in n. 63.

27. For a brief account of Scotus’s trinitarian theology, see Cross 1999, chapter 5. For an extensive study of the various relevant theological traditions in the period between 1250 and 1350, see Friedman 2013; a convenient introduction is Friedman 2010.

QUESTION 1.1: CAN GOD BE KNOWN NATURALLY BY THE INTELLECT OF THE WAYFARER?

QUESTION 1.2: IS GOD THE FIRST THING NATURALLY KNOWN BY US IN OUR PRESENT STATE?

1. AR, De An. 431a14–15.

2. AR, Met. 993b9–11.

3. AR, Phys. 187b7–8.

4. AR, Met. 994b22–23.

5. Gregory the Great, *In Ezechielem* 2, hom. 2.

6. AR, Met. 1026a21–23.

7. AR, Eth. 1177a12–17.

8. AR, Met. 993b30–31.

9. AR, Top. 137b20–27.

10. AR, Eth. 1177a12–17.

11. AR, Met. 980b28–81a12.

12. AR, Post. An. 100a3–b5.

13. AR, Interp. 24b3–4.

14. AR, Met. 1008a17–15.

15. Ibid., 1012a23–24.

16. Ibid., 1028a18–19.

17. HG, Summa 24.6.

18. Ibid., 24.7.

19. Avicenna, Met. 1.6.

20. Cf. AR, Met. 984a5–9.

21. HG, Summa 32.4.

22. Ibid., 24.6.

23. Cf. ibid., 22.1, 22.4.

24. Ibid., 32.2, 42.1.

25. AR, Eth. 1177a12–17.

26. Cf. HG, Summa 44.2.

27. Ibid., 42.1.

28. AR, *On the Parts of Animals*, 644b31–33.

29. HG, Summa 24.6.

30. TA, STh. 1.88.3.
31. HG, Summa 44.2.
32. AV, Met. 2.1.
33. Cf. HG, Summa 33.1.
34. AR, Met. 1050a4–5.
35. AR, Post. An. 73b32–33.
36. Cf. AR, Met. 1048a5–7.
37. HG, Summa 1.12, 49.2.
38. AR, Phys. 184a21–22.
39. Avicenna, *Sufficientia* 1.1.
40. Cf. HG, Summa 24.7, 49.1.
41. AR, *On the Parts of Animals*, 644b31–33.
42. AR, Eth. 1177a12–17.
43. Ibid., 1178a5–6.

QUESTION 1.3: IS GOD THE NATURAL AND ADEQUATE OBJECT OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT IN ITS PRESENT STATE?

1. Cf. HG, Summa 24.8, 21.3, and 21.4.
2. AR, Met. 993b24–26.
3. TA, STh. 1.84.7, 1.85.1.
4. Cf. *ibid.*, 1.88.1.
5. Cf. *ibid.*, 1.85.2.
6. Cf. AR, De An. 404b7–5a13, 405a19–505b17, 431b29–32a1.
7. HG, Summa 24.8.
8. AR, Met. 1018a12–13, 1057b35–37.
9. AR, Post. An. 73a37–b5.
10. AR, Met. 1031a2–14.
11. Ibid., 1004b1–17.
12. AR, Post. An. 73a34–b5.
13. AR, De An. 425b21.
14. AR, Met. 1051b25–28.
15. HG, Summa 28.3, 19.1, 21.2.
16. AR, Met. 998b22–24.
17. Ibid., 1003a33–35, 1003b11–14.
18. Ibid., 1030a23–27, 1030b2–3.
19. Porphyry, *On Predicables*, 3; AR, Met. 1030a32–34.
20. AR, Phys. 185a20–21.
21. AR, Met. 995a24–b4.
22. AV, Met. 3.3.
23. AR, Met. 998b26–27.
24. AR, Top. 127a28–30.
25. AR, Met. 1054a9–11.
26. AR, Phys. 249a22–23.
27. AR, Met. 1030b4.
28. Ibid., 1017a22–27.
29. Ibid., 1030b12–13.
30. Ibid., 1029b22–30b13.
31. AR, Phys. 185a22.
32. Scotus does not reply to n. 157.

33. HG, Summa 48.1, 34.3.
34. AR, De An. 415a17–22; 418a10–17.
35. HG, Summa 48.1.
36. Ibid., 34.3.
37. Anselm, *On Truth*, ch. 11.
38. AR, Met. 1028a31–b2.
39. AR, Prior An. 67a33–36.
40. Avicenna, Met. 6.5.
41. AR, De An. 418a26–30.
42. Ibid., 418a10–17.
43. AU, Trin. 15.27(50).
44. Ibid., 8.4(7).
45. Ibid., 8.3(4).
46. Ibid., 8.3(5).
47. Ibid., 8.6(9).
48. Ibid., 8.3(5).
49. Ibid., 9.6(11).
50. Ibid., 8.4(7).

QUESTION 1.4: CAN WE KNOW A CERTAIN AND GENUINE TRUTH BY NATURAL MEANS WITHOUT ANY SPECIAL ILLUMINATION?

1. AU, Trin. 9.6(9).
2. Ibid., 9.6(10).
3. Ibid., 12.2(2).
4. Ibid., 12.14(23).
5. Ibid., 14.25(21).
6. AU, *Confessions*, 12.25(35).
7. 2 Rom 1:20.
8. HG, Summa 1.2.
9. AR, *On Heaven and Earth*, 290a29–35.
10. Plato, *Timaeus*, n. 28–29.
11. AR, Met. 981a5–7; AR, Post. An. 100a308.
12. AU, Trin. 8.4(7).
13. AU, *On the True Religion*, ch. 30 n. 56.
14. HG, Summa 1.3.
15. AU, Epist. 147, ad Paulinam, ch. 6 n. 18.
16. AR, Met. 1010a7–11.
17. AU, *Soliloquies*, 1.8(15).
18. Boethius, *On the Hebdomads* (PL 64, 1311).
19. AR, Met. 993b4–5.
20. AR, Prior An. 24b22–24.
21. AU, Trin. 15.12(21).
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 15.15(25).
26. AR, Met. 1005b29–32.
27. Ibid., 1011a3–9.
28. AU, Trin. 11.2(4).

29. AR, *On the Senses and What Is Sensed*, 437a23–26.
30. AR, Met. 1010a7–15.
31. Ibid., 1005a29–6a18.
32. Ibid., 1010b3–11.
33. Represented by Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and Thomas.
34. AR, De An. 430a14–15.
35. Ibid.
36. AU, Trin. 14.15(21).
37. Ibid., 12.14(23).
38. Ibid., 4.15(20).
39. Ibid., 9.6(9).
40. Ibid., 4.16(21).
41. Ibid., 12.14(23).
42. Ibid., 14.15(21).
43. Ibid., 4.15(20).
44. Ibid., 9.6(11).
45. Ibid., 15.27(15).

SINGLE QUESTION: IS THERE IN EVERY CREATURE A TRACE OF THE TRINITY?

1. AU, Trin. 6.10(12).
2. AR, Top. 140a10–11.
3. The editors note that the opinion of the unnamed author concerning the first issue or article is the same as that of Giles of Rome; concerning the second and third issues it is based on Henry of Ghent.
4. HG, Quod. 9.1; HG, Summa 63.1.
5. AR, Met. 1020b26–32.
6. Ibid., 1021a26–30.
7. AU, Trin. 6.10(12).
8. 1 Wis 11:21.
9. AU, Gen. 4.3(7).
10. Ibid., 4.5(12).
11. Boethius, *On the Hebdomads* (PL 64, 1311).
12. Cf. HG, Quod. 9.3.
13. Avicenna, Met. 6.1.
14. AR, Phys. 184a12–14.
15. AU, Trin. 8.3(4).
16. Boethius, *On the Hebdomads* (PL 64, 1312).
17. AV, Met. 12.19.
18. Simplicius, *On the Categories*, at the category “When.”
19. Cf. HG, Quod. 5.2; HG, Summa 21.2.
20. AU, Trin. 7.1(2).
21. AR, Met. 1011a19–20.
22. Ibid., 1011b4–5.

QUESTION 3.1: DOES THE INTELLECTIVE PART OF THE SOUL CONTAIN MEMORY AS HAVING AN INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES NATURALLY PRECEDING THE ACT OF THINKING (INTELLIGENDI)?

1. Algazel, *Philosophia [Metaph.]*, 1 tr. 3 sent. 4.
2. HG, Quod. 5.14, 5.10, 5.11.
3. AR, De An. 429a27–28.

4. AR, De An. 432a8–9.
5. AU, Trin. 15.10(19).
6. Ibid., 15.11(20).
7. GF, Quod. 9.19, 1.9.
8. AU, Trin. 11.2(2).
9. Scotus's numbering of the various arguments is confused; the critical edition has made it consistent. Here the emended numbering is adopted.
10. AR, Met. 1021a31–b3.
11. HG, Summa 34.5, 58.2.
12. AR, De An. 430a15.
13. Ibid., 430a14–17.
14. AV, De An. 3.18.
15. GF, Quod. 5.10.
16. Godfrey, Quod. 5.10: "*non secundum rationem essendi sed secundum rationem immutandi.*"
17. AR, De An. 403a3–10.
18. Ibid., 403a10–14.
19. Cf. HG, Quod. 4.7.
20. AR, De An. 431b21–23.
21. Ibid., 431b28–32a1.
22. AR, Phys. 255a33–b5.
23. AR, Post. An. 90b20–21.
24. AU, Trin. 12.4(4).
25. Ibid., 15.10(17).
26. Cf. HG, Summa 58.2, 59.2.
27. AR, *On Memory and Remembering*, 449b24–25; 451a15–17.
28. AU, Trin. 14.6(8).
29. AU, *On the Free Will*, 3.25(74).
30. AR, Met. 1032a32–b3; AV, Met. 7.23.
31. AV, Phys. 2.26; AV, De An. 1.53.
32. AR, *Memory and Remembering*, 453a23–24, 453b4–7.
33. AU, Trin. 15.10(19).
34. Ibid., 15.11(20).
35. Ibid., 15.12(22).
36. Ibid., 15.22(42).
37. Ibid., 15.27(50).
38. AR, De An. 431b21–23.
39. AR, Phys. 255a33–b5.
40. AR, De An. 417a21–b2.

QUESTION 3.2: IS THE INTELLECTIVE PART OF THE SOUL, TAKEN PROPERLY, OR A COMPONENT OF IT, THE TOTAL CAUSE GENERATING ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OR THE REASON FOR GENERATING IT?

1. AR, De An. 416b33–36, 417a6–9.
2. Ibid., 425b25–28.
3. Ibid., 430a14–15.
4. Avicenna, Met. 9.4.
5. AR, Eth. 1098a3–4.
6. Peter of John Olivi, Sent. 2.72, 2.58.
7. AU, Gen. 12.16(32).

8. AU, Trin. 10.5(7).
9. AU, City 8.6, 11.16.
10. AR, Eth. 1094a3–6; AR, Met. 1050a21–b1; AR, Phys. 202a22–24.
11. AU, Trin. 9.12(18).
12. Ibid., 11.2(3).
13. Ibid., 15.10(19).
14. Peter of John Olivi, Sent. 2.58; GF, Quod. 9.19; HG, Quod. 10.9, 11.6.
15. Peter of John Olivi, Sent. 2.72, 2.58.
16. The term “major premise” has been marked by Scotus with a sign; he refers back to it in n. 421.
17. That is, the one marked by the sign in n. 418.
18. GF, Quod. 6.7, 8.2, 9.19, and at many other places.
19. AR, Phys. 202a812; AR, *On Generation and Corruption*, 321b35–22a8.
20. AR, Phys. 198a22–27.
21. AR, Met. 1021a26–b3.
22. Ibid., 1050a34–b1.
23. AR, Eth. 1094a3–6, 1040a1–6; AR Met. 1050a21–b1.
24. AR, Eth. 1105b25–26, 1106a15–17.
25. AU, Trin. 15.12(21).
26. HG, Quod. 5.25, 2.6.
27. Ibid., 11.5.
28. AU, *On Music*, 6.5(9).
29. GR, Quod. 1.3, 3.13, 3.14, 5.9; GR, *De cognitione angelorum*, q. 1, q. 4, q. 5; TS, QOrd. 2, 3, 15, 17, 22.
30. AV, De An. 3.5.
31. AR, De An. 417a2–28, 429b31–30a2; AR, Phys. 255a30–b31.
32. Ibid., 429a24.
33. Cf. TS, QOrd. 21.
34. AU, Trin. 11.2(3).
35. AR, De An. 425b25–28.
36. AR, Phys. 202a13–21.
37. AU, Trin. 11.2(4).
38. Cf. TS, Sent. 1.3.2.
39. AR, De An. 418b26–19a1.
40. Cf. TS, QOrd. 10.
41. AR, Phys. 246a28–b27, 247a29–b21.
42. AR, De An. 417b24.
43. AR, Eth. 1178b7–32.
44. AU, Trin. 11.2(3).
45. Ibid., 11.2(3).
46. AR, Phys. 225b7–9.
47. AU, *On Music*, 6.5(11).
48. AR, Eth. 1103b21–22.
49. AR, Met. 1026a18–19.

QUESTION 3.3: IS THE OBJECT, AS PRESENT IN ITSELF OR IN A SPECIES, OR THE INTELLECTIVE PART OF THE SOUL THE MAIN CAUSE OF THE PRODUCTION OF A COGNITION?

1. Cf. nn. 512, 548.
2. AR, De An. 433b11–12.

3. AR, De An. 417b24.

QUESTION 3.4: IS THERE AN IMAGE OF THE TRINITY DISTINCTLY PRESENT IN OUR MIND?

1. AU, Trin. 15.7(12).

2. AR, Phys. 225b15–16.

3. AU, Trin. 14.8(11).

4. Ibid., 9.5–11.

5. Ibid., 10.10–12.

6. Ibid., 15.3(5).

7. Ibid., 15.27(50).

8. Ibid., 12.4(4).

9. Ibid., 15.20(39).

10. Ibid., 14.8(11).

11. John of Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith*, 2, ch. 27; AU, Trin. 15.24(44).

12. AU, Trin. 14.24(44).

13. AU, Trin. 9.12(17–18).

14. Ibid., 15.27(50).

15. AU, Gen. 8.12(26).

FURTHER READING

If you are using this text you are probably sufficiently familiar with medieval philosophy and Scotus in particular so as to be able to find your way in the relevant literature. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness I list here some titles that have a direct bearing on the subject matter of Scotus's *Ordinatio* 1.3. Further literature may be found in Hoffmann's extensive Scotus bibliography at <http://faculty.cua.edu/hoffmann/scotus-bibliography.htm>.

Source text: This translation of Ord. 1.3 is based on the third volume of the critical edition of Scotus's theological works, the so-called Vatican edition; see Scotus 1954. In the translation, often reference is made to parallel passages in the *Questions on Aristotle's De anima*, published as vol. 5 of the critical edition of the philosophical works; see Scotus 2006.

Other translations and commentaries: This is the first complete English translation of Ord. 1.3, but parts of Ord. 1.3 have been translated before and are often accompanied by useful notes and comments; see, for example, Frank and Wolter 1995 and Scotus 1987, ed., trans. Wolter. For readers competent in another modern language the following annotated translations may be useful: Scotus 2011, trans. Boulnois; Scotus 1993a, trans. Sondag; Scotus 1965, 1968a, trans. Fähr; and Manzano 2000.

Parallel texts: As Scotus read the *Sentences* three times, the subject matter of *Sentences* 1.3 happens to be available in three highly (but not completely) parallel versions. Apart from Ord. 1.3 we have *Lectura* 1.3 (Latin text with German translation: Scotus 2002, trans. Hoffmann), and Rep. 1A.3 (Latin text with English translation: Scotus 2004 and 2008, trans. Wolter and Bychkov). For an overview of the parallelism among the three versions, see the Table below (cf. Vatican edition [Scotus 1954], 19:57*).

Related texts: Several topics treated in Ord. 1.3 have also been dealt with by Scotus in other writings. The question of the univocity of being is addressed again in Ord. 1.8 (see Scotus 2002, trans. Hoffmann; Scotus 2011, trans. Boulnois; Scotus 1970, 1972, 1979, 1980, trans. Fähr); earlier treatments are found in QDA 21 (see Hoffmann 2013) and QMet. 4.1 (see Pini 2005). On the first and adequate object of the human intellect, see QDA 16 and 19–21. On intelligible species and the causes of intellection, see QDA 12, 17, and 23 (see Noone 2006). The cited questions appear to be so closely related to and so frequently reused in Ord. 1.3 that parts of the latter are

virtually a revised and enlarged version of the corresponding questions in the QDA (which are thought to be a very early work of Scotus). Anyhow, they will surely be of help in understanding the content of Ord. 1.3 and, as the case may be, illustrate the development of Scotus's thinking, which, by the way, more often consists in elaboration and refinement of inchoate ideas than in a complete change of mind. The following table shows how the questions of Ord. 1.3 relate to the QDA. In the translation of Ord. 1.3 I have included as many references to the QDA as possible. Cf. also the Introduction to the critical edition of the QDA (Scotus 2006, 123* and 128*–33*).

Lectura 1.3	Ordinatio 1.3	Reportatio 1.3
1.1 Can God be known naturally by the intellect of the wayfarer?	1.1 Can God be known naturally by the intellect of the wayfarer?	1. Is God naturally knowable by the intellect of the pilgrim?
		2. Is God's existence known <i>per se</i> ?
1.2 Is God the first thing known by us?	1.2 Is God the first thing naturally known by us in our present state?	
	1.3 Is God the first natural and adequate object for the human intellect in its present state?	
1.3 Can the intellect of the wayfarer know any certain and genuine truth by natural means, without any special illumination by the uncreated light?	1.4 Can the intellect of the wayfarer know any certain and genuine truth by natural means, without any special illumination by the uncreated light?	
2. Is there in every creature a trace of the Trinity?	2. Is there in every creature a trace of the Trinity?	3. Is there a vestige of the Trinity in every creature?
3.1 Does the intellective part of the soul contain memory as having an intelligible species of the object that precedes actual intellection of the object?	3.1 Does the intellective part of the soul contain memory as having an intelligible species naturally preceding the act of thinking?	4. Does memory have a distinct intelligible species?
		5. Does the intellective memory conserve the species when the act of understanding ceases?
3.2 Does intellective memory as such and as belonging to the intellective soul generate cognition?	3.2 Is the intellective part of the soul, taken properly, or a component of it, the total cause generating actual knowledge or the reason for generating it?	6. Is there some actually generated knowledge in our intellect?
3.3 Is the object, as present in itself or in its species, or the intellective part of the soul the main cause of the generation of knowledge?	3.3 Is the object, as present in itself or in its species, or the intellective part of the soul the main cause of the production of knowledge?	
3.4 Is there an image of the Trinity in our mind (as distinct from the sensitive part of the soul)?	3.4 Is there an image of the Trinity in our mind?	7. Is there an image of the Trinity in the mind?

The process of intellection, which is central to the third part of Ord. 1.3, is

discussed also in Ord. 1.27 (not translated, but see Cross 2009) and Rep. 1A.27 (Latin text with English translation: Scotus 2004, trans. Wolter and Bychkov), and in Quod. 13 and 15 (Latin text with Spanish translation: Scotus 1968b, trans. Alluntis; English translation: Scotus 1975, trans. Alluntis and Wolter).

Natural knowledge of God: Bonansea 1984; Scotus 2011, trans. Boulnois, 37–42; Boulnois 1999, 223–92; Mann 2002.

Univocity of being: Wolter 1946, 59–99; Langston 1979; Honnefelder 1989, 268–342; Frank and Wolter 1995, 134–83; S. D. Dumont 1987, 1998b; Brown and Dumont 1987; Boulnois 1999, 223–92; Ingham and Dreyer 2004, 38–51; Pini 2005; Demange 2007, 281–312; Hoffmann 2011, 2013.

<i>Questions on the De anima</i>	<i>Ordinatio I.3</i>
16. Do we understand what is more universal before understanding what is less universal?	1.2 Is God the first thing naturally known by us in our present state?
19. Is only the sensible quiddity the object of the intellect?	1.3 Is God the first natural and adequate object for the human intellect in its present state?
20. Is the true or being under the aspect of the true, the first object of the intellect?	nn. 110–24: the quiddity of material things
21. Is being (<i>ens</i>) the first object of our intellect?	nn. 167–84: the true nn. 129–66: being
17. Are there intelligible species in our intellect that are naturally prior to the act of thinking?	3.1 Does the intellective part of the soul contain memory as having an intelligible species naturally preceding the act of thinking?
14. Do species remain in the intellect when the act of thinking ceases? (Not in Ord. I.3, but resumed in Rep. 1A.3.5)	
12. Are the powers of the (sensitive and intellective) soul merely passive?	3.2 Is the intellective part of the soul, taken properly, or a component of it, the total cause generating actual knowledge or the reason for generating it?
23. Is the intellect, in the elicitation of an act of understanding, moving while moved by the object, or do the intellect and the object shining out in the species cooperate in the act of understanding?	3.3 Is the object, as present in itself or in its species, or the intellective part of the soul the main cause of the production of knowledge?

First and adequate object of the intellect: Heiser 1942; Honnefelder 1989, 144–67; Demange 2007, 161–72, 413–24; Goris 2013.

Knowledge, certainty, and illumination: Noone 2010; Macken 1972; Gilson 2005, 556–73; Brown 1976, 1984; Marrone 2011.

Intellective memory and intelligible species: Gilson 2005, 512–22; Tachau 1988; Boulnois 1999, 67–106; Wippel 2006; Cross 2014b (Chapter 4).

Intentionality: Perler 1994, 2004; King 2004; Pini 2008, 2011; Cross 2014b (Chapter 8).

Causes of intellection: Lacombe 1930; Boulnois 1999, 189–203; Gilson 2005, 523–42; Effler 1962, 146–59; R. E. Dumont 1965; Wippel 1981; Pasnau 1997; Manzano 2000, 19–73; Côté 2007; Marrone 2011; Goehring 2011; Cross 2014b (Chapter 6).

Trinity—trace and image: Boulnois 1999, 107–14; Friedman 2010, 75–92, 2013, 341–416.

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